In the Matter of the Marriage of: Kera Gamble & Allan Woolsey

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Marriage of:
KERA GAMBLE,
Respondent,
and
ALLAN WOOLSEY,
Appellant.
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No. 40891-4-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — The dissolution court entered an amended sexual
assault protection order against Allan Woolsey and in favor of the former couple’s two
children. Mr. Woolsey filed a notice of appeal of the interlocutory order. We dismiss his
appeal as premature.
FACTS
Mr. Woolsey and Ms. Gamble married in 2015. In 2016, Mr. Woolsey adopted
Ms. Gamble’s child from a previous relationship, A.G. Ms. Gamble petitioned for
divorce in 2023.
FILED
MARCH 5, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

No. 40891-4-III
In re Marriage of Gamble & Woolsey
2
Throughout the dissolution proceedings, both parties accused each other of
parental unfitness, including Ms. Gamble accusing Mr. Woolsey of child abuse and later
accusing him of improperly touching A.G. After multiple rounds of accusations and
protective orders against one or the other parent, the dissolution court entered an
amended sexual assault protection order against Mr. Woolsey, permitting him supervised
visits with his biological son, but precluding him from having any contact with A.G.
Mr. Woolsey promptly filed a notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
RAP 2.2 describes what decisions of the superior court a party may appeal as a
matter of right. None of the sections or subsections of that rule permit direct review of an
interlocutory protection order.
RAP 2.3(a) permits an appellate court to accept discretionary review of superior
court decisions that are not appealable as a matter of right. But acceptance of
discretionary review is conditioned on a showing that the lower court decision meets one
of four considerations. RAP 2.3(b)(1)-(4).
Here, Mr. Woolsey did not request discretionary review and the nearest
consideration that might permit review is RAP 2.3(b)(2)—“the superior court has
committed probable error and the decision . . . substantially alters the status quo or

No. 40891-4-III
In re Marriage of Gamble & Woolsey
3
substantially limits the freedom of a party to act.” Mr. Woolsey’s ability to qualify for
discretionary review under this consideration generally requires him to show legal, rather
than factual, error. This is because we defer so much to a trial court’s factual findings.
Although Mr. Woolsey raises some claims of legal error, we are convinced that
any attempt by him to obtain discretionary review under this section would be futile:
prior to the trial court’s issuance of the amended protection order, it had issued multiple
other such orders, alternating its various findings of which parent was more unfit. It is
likely that the subject order, entered more than one year ago, has since been modified.
We prefer to review a final protection order or parenting plan than issue an opinion on
claims of error that may be moot. Once the dissolution proceeding has concluded, either
party may raise issues relating to this or any other order in the proceeding by filing a
timely appeal. RAP 2.3(c).
ATTORNEY FEES
Both parties seek an award of reasonable attorney fees under chapter 7.105 RCW
or this court’s equitable authority, accusing the other of bad faith litigation. We decline
to award attorney fees. Mr. Woolsey’s appeal was ill-advised, and Ms. Gamble could
have had it promptly dismissed by filing a simple motion.

No. 40891-4-III
In re Marriage of Gamble & Woolsey
4
Dismissed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
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Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ _________________________________
Murphy, J. Hill, J.