* State of Washington, Respondent v. Anna-Christie Ireland, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 58212-1-II
Respondent,
v. PART PUBLISHED OPINION
ANNA-CHRISTIE IRELAND,
Appellant.
CHE, J. ⎯ Anna-Christine Ireland appeals her convictions and exceptional sentences for
three counts of vehicular homicide and one count of vehicular assault.
Travis Stoker and his parents, Richard and Karen Stoker, were seat-belted in Richard and
Karen’s1 vehicle parked on the shoulder of northbound Interstate 5 (I-5). They were waiting for
tow truck driver Arthur Anderson to finish strapping Travis’s disabled vehicle onto the truck bed
when Ireland collided with them. Anderson, Richard, and Karen died at the scene, and Travis
suffered serious injuries.
The evidence admitted at the bench trial included the testimony of a paramedic who
opined that Ireland’s presentation right after the collision was consistent with impairment. A
drug recognition expert (DRE) also testified.
1 We do not intend any disrespect by using the first names of the Stoker victims and only do such
for clarity because they share the same surname.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
April 29, 2025
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The trial court found Ireland guilty of multiple counts of vehicular homicide and
vehicular assault. The trial court also found that Anderson was not protected by a vehicle and
both Anderson as well as the three Stokers had no ability to detect the danger that was
approaching or avoid the collision. The trial court then concluded that both Anderson and the
three Stokers were all particularly vulnerable victims. Finding aggravating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt, the trial court imposed exceptional sentences.
Ireland argues that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Anderson
was not protected by a vehicle and, relatedly, its finding that the aggravating factor of particular
vulnerability was present for Anderson and the three Stokers. Ireland also argues that the trial
court erred by admitting certain opinion testimony.
We hold that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of fact that
Anderson was not protected by a vehicle and that he, as well as the three Stokers, were
particularly vulnerable victims. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject Ireland’s
remaining claims that the trial court erred in admitting certain opinion testimony.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
BACKGROUND
On an intermittently rainy morning in late April 2021, Travis was driving northbound on
I-5 when he lost control of his vehicle and ended up in a ditch on the right side of the roadway.
Trooper Michael Canham contacted Travis, who was uninjured but needed a tow. The roadway
where Travis and Trooper Canham were located was a fairly level, straight stretch of road with
minimal obstructions for a significant distance. The right shoulder, marked by a solid painted
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white line and a rumble strip,2 consisted of a 10-foot paved shoulder and an unimproved shoulder
leading to a ditch. Because of the weather, drivers on the roadway found visibility to be between
poor and fair.
Shortly after Trooper Canham contacted Travis, a tow truck driven by Anderson arrived
at the scene. Anderson positioned his tow truck in front of Travis’s car, pulled Travis’s car out
of the ditch, and began to load it onto his tow truck. Both Trooper Canham’s emergency lights
and Anderson’s tow truck overhead lights were activated.
Not long after, Richard and Karen arrived at the scene and parked their vehicle behind the
tow truck, which was still in the process of loading Travis’s vehicle. Trooper Canham left the
scene. While Anderson finished loading Travis’s vehicle, Travis and his parents sat in his
parents’ vehicle with their seatbelts fastened.
During this time, Ireland and another driver, Erich Uhlman, were driving north on I-5
toward the location of the three vehicles. Uhlman worked as an automotive technician for
professional, hobbyist, and amateur racing groups. He also frequently participated in various
forms of automobile racing. Both gave him experience in being in as well as watching vehicles
drive off the road or crash.
Uhlman drove in the far-right lane some distance behind Ireland who drove either in the
left or center lane. Upon approaching Anderson and the Stokers’s location, Uhlman observed
“flashing amber lights. Like an emergency vehicle, or a construction vehicle, some kind of
warning [lights]” on the shoulder of the roadway. 1 Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Mar. 28, 2023) at 140.
Uhlman had slowed and moved into the center lane when he saw Ireland’s vehicle turn out of its
2 A rumble strip provides both auditory and tactile warnings to drivers in case they are driving
into the shoulder.
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No. 58212-1-II
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lane, head straight toward the lights, and collide into Richard and Karen’s vehicle. Uhlman did
not see Ireland’s vehicle’s brake lights activate; the vehicle hydroplane; or the vehicle attempt to
slow down, change its course, or avoid the collision.
According to Ireland, as she approached Anderson and the Stokers’s location, the weather
and spray off of an adjacent vehicle caused her to have difficulty seeing, and so Ireland moved
from the center lane to the right lane. Ireland observed red lights ahead of her but believed they
were the brake lights of slow-moving traffic just ahead in the same lane, not stopped traffic.
Ireland did not remember anything after seeing the lights until she woke up in the hospital.
Ireland’s collision with the Stoker parents’ vehicle pushed their vehicle forward, pinning
Anderson between Richard and Karen’s vehicle and the back of the tow truck. An accident
reconstructionist explained that Richard and Karen’s vehicle and the tow truck were clear of the
roadway before Ireland collided with them and Ireland collided with the Stokers’s vehicle from
nearly directly behind. From examining the Stokers’s vehicle’s data, the accident
reconstructionist concluded that Ireland must have been traveling between 77 and 88 miles per
hour just before impact. The accident reconstructionist found no indication that Ireland braked,
slowed down, avoided, or attempted to avoid the collision prior to impact.
Lt. Andrew Worth, a paramedic, contacted Ireland when he arrived at the scene and
found her sitting in her vehicle complaining of left hip pain and with a contusion on her chest
area. When Worth inquired about any head pain, Ireland denied having a headache, and Worth
did not observe any head trauma nor significant injuries. Worth observed Ireland display
delayed responses, slurred speech, sleepiness, confusion, and signs of retrograde amnesia.
Worth also observed that both of Ireland’s pupils were the same size and neither had any signs of
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No. 58212-1-II
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nystagmus.3 After Worth placed a spinal collar on Ireland and administered her an electrolyte
solution, Worth transported Ireland to the hospital.
Once at the hospital, Dr. Shannon Lucas conducted a drug screen of Ireland, who tested
positive for benzodiazepines. Benzodiazepines are a type of central nervous system (CNS)
depressant that causes a person, in small doses, to be calm, potentially sleepy, or lethargic. At
higher doses, this class of drugs can make an individual unresponsive, affect a person’s reaction
times, cause slurred speech, and affect one’s judgment.4
When Dr. Lucas conducted a neurological assessment of Ireland, she found Ireland to be
confused, unable to remember what had happened, and with an altered mental state. Dr. Lucas
ordered a CT scan, which revealed that Ireland had a two millimeter in size subdural hematoma.5
To address any pain, Dr. Lucas then administered intravenously a half of a typical dose of
Dilaudid, a type of narcotic analgesic used to treat pain, to Ireland. Dr. Lucas observed no
change in Ireland’s presentation after administering the medication and, because of the low dose
given, Dr. Lucas did not expect to see any signs of drowsiness, slurred speech, or horizontal gaze
nystagmus (HGN).
After being treated by Dr. Lucas, Officer Daniel Auderer observed Ireland unable to stay
awake and with slurred speech. Officer Auderer asked Ireland if she had taken any prescription
3 Nystagmus is involuntary jerking in one’s eye.
4 Diazepam, lorazepam, and nordiazepam are types of benzodiazepines.
5 Dr. Lucas opined that it was possible that a trauma-caused intercranial bleed could cause
confusion; however, she could not opine whether Ireland’s small bleed could cause memory loss,
disorientation, personality changes, or drowsiness.
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No. 58212-1-II
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drugs, and Ireland responded that she “takes” lorazepam and Suboxone.6 1 RP (Mar. 29, 2023)
at 369.
When Trooper Christopher Huhta contacted Ireland at the hospital, Ireland repeated to
Trooper Huhta that she “takes” Suboxone and lorazepam. 1 RP (Mar. 28, 2023) at 263. Trooper
Huhta conducted two blood draws, one right after contacting Ireland and another later in the day.
Both blood samples tested positive for diazepam, lorazepam, nordiazepam, pseudoephedrine⎯a
mild CNS stimulant, Suboxone, and Suboxone’s metabolite, norbuprenorphine.7 The second
sample, taken later in the day, additionally tested positive for oxazepam, the metabolite of
nordiazepam.
Upon Ireland’s release from the hospital, Trooper Huhta and his partner interviewed
Ireland. In the interview, Ireland admitted she had taken, among other things, diazepam,
lorazepam, Suboxone, and Ambien before driving the morning of the collision. When Trooper
Huhta searched Ireland’s car, he found Suboxone strips, an empty prescription bottle for
diazepam, a prescription bottle for lorazepam, a prescription bottle for methocarbamol,8 Sudafed,
and other medications. Ireland’s diazepam prescription was filled 18 days prior to the collision
6 Suboxone (otherwise known as buprenorphine) is a type of narcotic analgesic that can impact a
person’s alertness and concentration and cause drowsiness. It is typically prescribed to assist
people in opioid addictions. Dr. Lucas testified that taking Suboxone and a benzodiazepine
together is “highly discouraged” because the additive effect of both of them can cause death as
well as “extreme sedation, difficulty with concentration, [and] difficulty with reaction time.”
RP (Mar. 29, 2023) at 319.
7 Something that is a metabolite of another means, over time, the body converts the first chemical
compound into another.
8 Methocarbamol is a medication to treat muscle spasms.
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No. 58212-1-II
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with 60 pills and none remained. The lorazepam and methocarbamol bottles, filled one and three
days prior to the collision, respectively, had 70 lorazepam pills and 32 methocarbamol pills
missing. The diazepam and lorazepam prescriptions included a warning that the drugs “[m]ay
cause drowsiness” and the methocarbamol prescription warned that using the medication could
impair one’s thinking or reactions. 2 RP (Mar. 30, 2023) at 536. All three warnings included a
caution for operating a vehicle while taking the drugs, and the lorazepam label additionally
warned that “breathing problems or drowsiness may occur” if taken with an opioid. 2 RP (Mar.
30, 2023) at 538.
Anderson, Richard, and Karen all died at the scene due to the collision. Travis sustained
substantial bodily injury from the collision, including multiple fractures and internal injuries,9
which caused him to be hospitalized for 31 days.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State charged Ireland with three counts of vehicular homicide and one count of
vehicular assault, and notified Ireland of its intent to seek an exceptional sentence based upon
two aggravating factors: (1) that Ireland knew or should have known that the victims of the
crimes were particularly vulnerable, as provided in RCW 9.94A.525(3)(b) and (2) that Travis
Stoker’s injuries substantially exceeded the level of bodily harm necessary to satisfy the
elements of the vehicular assault offense, as provided by RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y). Ireland waived
her right to a jury.
9 The parties stipulated to the following facts: that Ireland’s collision proximately caused the
injuries of Travis and the deaths of Anderson, Richard, and Karen, the foundational of the
collision reconstructionist, Ireland’s medical records, and the timing and results of the toxicology
report.
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No. 58212-1-II
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At trial, witnesses testified consistently with the above facts and introduced exhibits, later
admitted, that included footage from Trooper Canham’s dashcam, photos from the collision site,
the toxicology report from Ireland’s blood draws, and a transcript of Ireland’s interview with
Trooper Huhta and his partner.
The trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that
Ireland was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of three counts of vehicular homicide and one
count of vehicular assault, all committed while under the influence of a drug, driving in a
reckless manner, and with disregard for the safety of others. The court noted that its written
findings and conclusions were a summary of, not a substitute for, its oral ruling.
The trial court also found beyond a reasonable doubt two aggravating factors: (1) that
Travis’s injuries substantially exceeded the level of bodily harm necessary to satisfy the elements
of the vehicular assault offense, and (2) that Ireland knew or should have known that all four
victims were particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance.
In finding of fact (FF) 20, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson
was a vulnerable victim because he “did not have the protection of a vehicle surrounding him”
despite “ha[ving] every safety feature that was available to him in place when [the collision]
occurred, and unfortunately, that still was not sufficient.” 2 RP (May 8, 2023) at 810, CP at 47
(FF 20). The court additionally found that the other victims were vulnerable because “[t]hey
were inside of a vehicle, had the small layer of a safety net, as far as whatever the vehicle could
provide, as far as protection from the impact from behind, between 78 and 88 miles an hour” and
“had no ability to detect the danger that was approaching or avoid the collision.” 2 RP (May 8,
2023) at 811, CP at 47 (FF 20).
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No. 58212-1-II
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The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 240 months of total confinement as
well as other conditions. Ireland appeals.
ANALYSIS
Ireland challenges her exceptional sentence and argues that insufficient evidence
supported the trial court’s FF 20 that Anderson was not protected by a vehicle at the time of the
collision. Relatedly, Ireland argues that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding
that the victims were particularly vulnerable.10 We disagree.
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Standard of Review
To reverse an exceptional sentence, we must find either that (1) the sentencing court’s
reasons are not supported by the trial court record, (2) the reasons do not justify a sentence
outside the offense’s standard sentence range, or (3) the imposed sentence was clearly excessive
or clearly too lenient. State v. Fletcher, 20 Wn. App. 2d 476, 488, 500 P.3d 222 (2021); see also
RCW 9.94.585(4). The first prong applies here as Ireland challenges one of the trial court’s
bases for imposing an exceptional sentence.
We review whether the trial court’s reasons for an exceptional sentence are supported by
the record under a “‘clearly erroneous’” standard. Id.; see also State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 93,
110 P.3d 717 (2005). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if no substantial evidence supports
it.” Id. at 488-89 (citing State v. Morris, 87 Wn. App. 654, 659, 943 P.2d 329 (1997)).
10 Ireland argues the trial court erred based upon “particular vulnerability or incapability of
resistance” in FF 20. But because the trial court found the aggravating factor based only on the
victims’s vulnerability, we only address Ireland’s challenge to the particular vulnerability
finding. See RP (May 8, 2023) at 810-12.
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Evidence is substantial if it is “‘sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of
the asserted premise.’” State v. A.X.K., 12 Wn. App. 2d 287, 293, 457 P.3d 1222 (2020) (quoting
State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102, 105, 330 P.3d 182 (2014)). When a defendant brings an
insufficient evidence claim, “the defendant necessarily admits the truth of the State’s evidence
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it.” Homan, 181 Wn.2d at 106. On appeal,
we treat any unchallenged findings of fact as verities. Id. Additionally, we evaluate both
circumstantial and direct evidence equally. State v. Smith, 185 Wn. App. 945, 957, 344 P.3d
1244 (2015); see also State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). Furthermore,
we defer to the trier of fact when credibility determinations arise from conflicting testimony or
the persuasiveness of the evidence is challenged. Homan, 181 Wn.2d at 106.
B. Particularly Vulnerable Aggravating Factor
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, a trial court may impose
a sentence above the standard sentencing range if the court finds that the defendant “knew or
should have known that the victim[s] [were] particularly vulnerable.” RCW 9.94A.535(3)(b).
To impose an exceptional sentence based on finding that a victim was particularly vulnerable,
the trial court must find beyond a reasonable doubt “‘(1) that the defendant knew or should have
known (2) of the victim’s particular vulnerability and (3) that vulnerability must have been a
substantial factor in the commission of the crime.’” State v. Moses, 193 Wn. App. 341, 366, 372
P.3d 147 (2016) (quoting State v. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d 280, 291-92, 143 P.3d 795 (2006))
(original emphasis omitted). We may consider a trial court’s oral decision along with its entered
written findings and conclusions so long as the oral findings and conclusions are consistent with
those written. State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 88, 118 P.3d 307 (2005).
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In considering whether a victim was particularly vulnerable, “the focus is on the victim”
and the court assesses “‘if the victim [was] more vulnerable to the offense than other victims and
if the defendant knew of that vulnerability.’” State v. Ogden, 102 Wn. App 357, 366, 7 P.3d 839
(2000) (quoting State v. Bedker, 74 Wn. App. 87, 94, 871 P.2d 673 (1994)). Beyond the
characteristics personal to the victim, the circumstances of the crime can also make a victim
particularly vulnerable. E.g., State v. Baird, 83 Wn. App. 477, 922 P.2d 157 (1996) (victim
assaulted while unconscious); State v. Hicks, 61 Wn. App. 923, 812 P.2d 893 (1991) (victim
raped while asleep); State v. Kidd, 57 Wn. App. 95, 786 P.2d 847 (1990) (victims shot at while
enclosed in a bus); State v. Thomas, 57 Wn. App. 403, 788 P.2d 24 (1990), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Parker, 132 Wn.2d 182, 190, 937 P.2d 575 (1997) (pedestrian in parking lot
hit by a speeding car).
II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED ANDERSON NOT BEING PROTECTED BY A VEHICLE
Ireland argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s factual finding
that Anderson “did not have the protection of a vehicle surrounding him” when the collision
occurred. Br. of Appellant at 19. Ireland submits that, instead, Anderson “was actually cocooned
between two substantial vehicles which should have provided ample protection.” Br. of Appellant
at 19. We disagree.
It is undisputed that, at the time Ireland’s car collided with the Stoker parents’ vehicle,
Anderson was outside of any vehicle, on the shoulder of I-5, with his tow truck in front of him
and the Stokers’ vehicle directly behind him. Homan, 181 Wn.2d at 106 (“We treat
unchallenged findings of fact. . . as verities on appeal.”). Anderson was a pedestrian between
two vehicles and alongside a roadway where cars were traveling at least 70 miles per hour.
When Ireland’s vehicle collided with the Stokers’ vehicle, the force caused Anderson to be
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No. 58212-1-II
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pinned between his tow truck and the Stokers’ vehicle. Contrary to Ireland’s claim that the
vehicles should have provided added safety by “cocooning” Anderson, the two vehicles instead
“crush[ed] [] Anderson” as a direct result of Ireland colliding with the Stokers’s vehicle, causing
his death. CP at 45 (FF 8, 9). We hold that a fair-minded person could have concluded that
Anderson was not protected by either his tow truck nor the Stoker’s vehicle.
III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE VICTIMS BEING PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE
Ireland argues that neither Anderson nor the Stokers were particularly vulnerable under
our present case law. We disagree.
In considering vulnerable victims in the context of vehicle-based crimes, we have
recognized that victims of such crimes “can be particularly vulnerable where the victim was
relatively defenseless.” Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d at 291. In State v. Nordby, a defendant pleaded
guilty to committing a vehicular assault against a pedestrian pushing her bicycle alongside a
road. 106 Wn.2d 514, 515, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986). The trial court imposed an exceptional
sentence due to, in part, the particular vulnerability of the victim. Id. at 516. Our Supreme Court
affirmed this basis for an exceptional sentence, reasoning that
[u]nlike a potential victim in a second automobile, [the victim] had no opportunity
to evade . . . [n]or was she afforded the additional protection against injury that a
second automobile might provide for a driver or passenger of that automobile . . .
the victim here was, in fact, completely defenseless and vulnerable.
Id. at 518.
Similarly, in Thomas, a defendant pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide after he was
speeding through a parking lot and hit and killed a four-year-old walking through the lot. 57
Wn. App. at 404-05. The trial court subsequently imposed an exceptional sentence because of,
among other reasons, the victim’s vulnerability. Id. at 406. Division Three of this court held
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that the circumstances regarding the defendant’s crime, “excessive speed and that [] Thomas
used the parking lot as a roadway,” supported the trial court’s finding of particular vulnerability
because “[l]ike the victim in Nordby, part of th[e] victim’s inability to avoid the consequences of
[] Thomas’ negligence flowed from the fact that she was a pedestrian in an area where she had
little reason to expect a speeding vehicle.” Id. at 408.
In another pedestrian case, State v. Cardenas, our Supreme Court considered an
exceptional sentence imposed on a defendant who pleaded guilty to vehicular assault after
speeding through a residential area, losing control of his car, and eventually crashing through a
retaining wall and into a backyard where he hit the victim with his car. 129 Wn.2d 1, 4, 12, 914
P.2d 57 (1996). Division Three of this court distinguished the case from Nordby and Thomas
because “Cardenas had not ‘intended to drive in an area where he knew, or should have known,
there would be vulnerable pedestrians.’” Id. at 11 (quoting State v. Cardenas, 77 Wn. App. 112,
115, 890 P.2d 21 (1995)).
While our Supreme Court agreed that the particular-vulnerability factor required the
defendant’s knowledge that vulnerable victims were nearby, the court disagreed with Division
Three’s conclusion that Cardenas did not have this requisite knowledge. Id. at 11-12. The court
based its holding on the undisputed fact that the incident occurred in a residential area with no
evidence that Cardenas did not know that vulnerable victims were nearby and that it was
“reasonable to assume that given this [fact], Cardenas either knew or should have known that
there would be people such as the victim here, totally unprepared and vulnerable.” Id. at 12.
Moreover, in State v. Morris, a defendant pleaded guilty to multiple vehicle-related
crimes after she struck bicyclists riding alongside a road from the rear while passing them in her
car. 87 Wn. App. 654, 658-59, 943 P.2d 329 (1997). The trial court imposed an exceptional
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sentence after, in addition to another factor, finding the victims particularly vulnerable. See Id.
at 663-69.
On appeal, Morris argued that vulnerability of pedestrians is distinct from any
vulnerability of bicyclists because “a cyclist has a much greater capacity to avoid being struck.”
Id. at 667 (internal quotations omitted). Division One of this court rejected this distinction,
relying on the reasoning of Nordby and holding that “[a] car approaching from the cyclist’s rear
places the cyclist in a particularly vulnerable position not only because of the superior weight of
the car, but also because opportunities for a bicyclist to evade the car approaching from the rear
are more limited.” Id. The court additionally held that Morris knew that the victims were
particularly vulnerable because “the cyclists were exercising all reasonable care and were
complying with all applicable traffic laws” and one of the cyclists wore a reflective vest which
Morris “saw or should have seen [the cyclist] and knew that he was particularly vulnerable as a
cyclist.” Id. at 668.
As discussed above, the trial court found that Anderson was without the protection of any
vehicle when the incident occurred—a finding supported by substantial evidence. Therefore,
like the victims in Nordby, Thomas, and Cardenas, at the time of the collision, Anderson was a
pedestrian who was completely defenseless and vulnerable, especially given that he was next to a
roadway where vehicles were traveling at high speeds with only either fair or poor visibility.
Given these circumstances and the applicable case law, a fair-minded person could have found
that Anderson was a particularly vulnerable victim. We hold that substantial evidence supported
the trial court’s finding that Anderson was a particularly vulnerable victim.
Furthermore, at the time of the collision, the three Stokers were in a parked vehicle facing
away from oncoming traffic on I-5. Because the Stokers were not moving at the time of impact,
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No. 58212-1-II
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they experienced an impact of a vehicle traveling between 77 and 88 miles per hour when Ireland
collided with their stopped vehicle, which was behind a tow truck with activated overhead lights
and loading Travis’s vehicle. Richard and Karen both died at the scene, and Travis sustained
substantial bodily injury from the collision including multiple fractures and internal injuries
despite all three wearing their seatbelts.
Upon considering the facts in the light most favorable to the State, a fair-minded
individual could have concluded that, while the Stokers were afforded some protection from
injury through being seat-belted within a vehicle at the time of the collision, their position parked
alongside the interstate, behind a tow truck with activated overhead lights and loading Travis’s
vehicle, made them particularly vulnerable as compared to other vehicles on the roadway. Such
a person could also have found that Ireland knew or should have known the vehicles were
stopped on the shoulder and the Stokers were particularly vulnerable.
Like the bicyclists in Morris, the Stokers had limited opportunities to evade a collision
with a significantly faster moving object from behind. See Morris, 87 Wn. App. at 667.
Although the Stokers had their seatbelts on, they were stopped, facing away from oncoming
traffic, and behind Travis’s disabled vehicle being loaded up into the tow truck with its overhead
lights activated. Their vehicle was parked on a shoulder marked with a rumble strip, alongside a
freeway where other vehicles were moving at high speeds despite the weather and limited
visibility. In their position, the Stokers’s had little to no opportunity to avoid Ireland’s collision
from the rear. A rational person could have found that, unlike a moving vehicle on I-5, the
Stokers’s position made them “relatively defenseless” in this collision. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d at
291. Thus, a fair-minded individual could have found that the Stoker’s were particularly
vulnerable. We hold that, because of the circumstances of the collision, substantial evidence
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No. 58212-1-II
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supported the trial court’s conclusion that all three Stokers were also vulnerable victims in the
collision.
We hold that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of fact that
Anderson and the three Stokers were particularly vulnerable victims and, thus, these findings of
fact were not clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion
will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for
public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
UNPUBLISHED TEXT FOLLOWS
In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we hold that, even if the trial court erred by
allowing either or both the DRE’s testimony and the paramedic’s testimony, any error was
nevertheless harmless.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
As a paramedic since 2009, Worth frequently responded to situations where patients were
impaired and, in such circumstances, needed to “[r]ecognize signs and symptoms of
impairment.” 1 RP (Mar. 28, 2023) at 283. Worth testified at trial that, based on his
observations of Ireland when he contacted her at the scene, Ireland’s presentation “would be
consistent with impairment.”11 1 RP (Mar. 28, 2023) at 291.
11 Ireland objected to this testimony because Worth’s statements “go[ ] to the ultimate issue”;
however, the trial court allowed it. RP (Mar. 28, 2023) at 291-92.
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No. 58212-1-II
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Officer Auderer was a drug recognition expert (DRE). When he contacted Ireland at the
hospital, Officer Auderer administered an HGN test.12 He observed Ireland presenting all six
clues that the HGN test examines. At trial, Officer Auderer testified that, under the test
procedures, observation of four to six clues would be consistent with impairment.13 He also
testified that, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA)
standards, HGN is consistent with a CNS depressant and not consistent with a narcotic
analgesic.14
ANALYSIS
Ireland argues that the trial court erred in allowing the opinion testimonies of the DRE,
Officer Auderer, and the paramedic, Worth. We hold that, even if an evidentiary error occurred,
such error was harmless given the other evidence presented.
We generally review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Otton, 185 Wn.2d 673, 677, 374 P.3d 1108 (2016). A trial court abuses its
discretion when it “‘relies on unsupported facts, takes a view that no reasonable person would
take, applies the wrong legal standard, or bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.’”
12 Officer Auderer testified that the HGN test “allow[s] the person administering the test to
observe an involuntary jerking of the eye.” 1 RP (Mar. 29, 2023) at 371-72. The test involves
looking for six “clues” or observations, three for each eye. 1 RP (Mar. 29, 2023) at 373. The
three sets of clues are (1) “a lack of smooth pursuit” or how smoothly the eyes operate in a side-
to-side motion, (2) “continual, involuntary jerking of the eye” when one moves their eyes out as
far left or far right, and (3) onset of the involuntary jerking prior to the eyes being directed out
towards a 45-degree angle. 1 RP (Mar. 29, 2023) at 373-74.
13 Ireland objected and moved to strike the testimony related to impairment, not whether Ireland
passed or failed. The trial court overruled the objection with the understanding that HGN alone
does not show impairment or a specific level of impairment.
14 When Officer Auderer testified to this, Ireland made no objection.
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No. 58212-1-II
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State v. Keller, 2 Wn.3d 887, 921, 545 P.3d 790 (2024) (quoting State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784,
799, 453 P.3d 696 (2019)).
An error in admitting evidence does not warrant reversal of a conviction unless such
decision has prejudiced the defendant. State v. Davis, 176 Wn. App. 385, 396, 308 P.3d 807
(2013) (citing State v. Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d 389, 403, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997)). If a trial court
abuses its discretion, we then review the error for prejudice to determine whether it was
reasonably probable, absent the error, that the outcome of the trial would have been materially
affected. State v. Barry, 183 Wn.2d 297, 303, 352 P.3d 161 (2015). “[I]f the evidence is of
minor significance” relative to evidence as a whole, the improper admission is harmless. Davis,
176 Wn. App. at 396 (quoting Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d at 403). If the evidentiary error reaches
constitutional magnitude, such as by allowing an improper opinion on guilt, such error is
harmless if the State can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have
reached the same result absent the error.” State v. Quaale, 182 Wn.2d 191, 202, 340 P.3d 213
(2014).
Ireland points to three instances of opinion testimony the trial court erred in admitting:
(1) Officer Auderer’s affirmative response to the State’s question whether, according to “ [the
NHTSA], [HGN is] consistent with CNS Depressants”; (2) Officer Auderer’s comments that the
HGN test procedure’s passing or failing boundary lies when four of six clues are observed; and
(3) Worth’s testimony that the observations he made of Ireland—that she had delayed responses,
slurred speech, retrograde amnesia, confusion, and difficulty recalling things—would be
“consistent with impairment” according to his training experience. Br. of Appellant at 23, 26.
Contrary to Ireland’s characterization, none of these statements directly opined whether
Ireland was impaired or not or whether Ireland was guilty. Officer Auderer’s statements merely
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No. 58212-1-II
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described whether a government agency considers HGN indicative of CNS depressants and the
number of observed clues that the HGN test procedure considers a pass or a fail. Additionally,
Worth stated that, according to his training, the types of physical and behavioral presentations he
personally observed in Ireland would be consistent with impairment—a permissible expression
that a witness’s certain perceptions are consistent with a conclusion and not one indicating that
the witness personally believes that the defendant is guilty. See State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d
577, 592-93, 183 P.3d 267 (2008). Because it is not clear how any error related to these
testimonies would reach constitutional magnitude, we do not reverse unless it is reasonably
probable that, absent the testimonies, that the outcome of the trial would have been materially
different. Barry, 183 Wn.2d at 303.
Beyond Officer Auderer and Worth’s observations, significant other evidence supported
the trial court’s conclusion that Ireland’s driving was affected by drugs at the time of the
collision. Despite the section of the roadway being fairly level and straight with minimal
obstructions, Ireland drove, at a high speed, across at least one lane and over the auditory and
tactile warning of a rumble strip before crashing nearly in-line with the Stokers’s vehicle. Both
Uhlman and the accident reconstructionist testified that there was no indication that Ireland
braked, slowed down, or tried to otherwise avoid the collision.
Toxicology reports from blood taken the same day of the collision showed the Ireland
had multiple benzodiazepines in her system as well as Suboxone which an expert witness
testified, when taken with a benzodiazepine, would create the additive effects of “extreme
sedation, difficulty with concentration, [and] difficulty with reaction time.” 1 RP (Mar. 29,
2023) at 319. Law enforcement found prescription bottles, recently filled and with many pills
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No. 58212-1-II
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missing, in Ireland’s vehicle, and the bottles themselves cautioned against taking the medications
while operating a vehicle.
And, beyond observations of HGN, multiple witnesses testified that, after the collision,
Ireland appeared drowsy, had slurred speech, and had an altered mental state. Dr. Lucas also
could not opine whether Ireland’s small bleed caused such symptoms. With the evidence
presented taken as a whole, it is improbable that, even if the testimonies were improper, their
inclusion materially prejudiced the outcome of Ireland’s case.
Even if the challenged testimonies were improperly admitted, with the other significant
evidence before the trial court, we hold that it is not reasonably probable that the verdict would
have changed had the three challenged testimonies been omitted and, thus, any error would have
been harmless.
CONCLUSION
We hold that, even if the trial court erred by allowing either or both Officer Auderer and
Worth’s testimonies, any such error would have been harmless, and, thus, we affirm Ireland’s
convictions.
Che, J.
We concur:
Maxa, J.
Veljacic, A.C.J.
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