In Re the Marriage of: Jacob Cooper, Appellant v. Nancy Cooper, Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 58070-5-II
JACOB DERICK COOPER,
Appellant,
and UNPUBLISHED OPINION
NANCY CAROLINA COOPER,
Respondent.
MAXA, J. – Jacob Cooper appeals the trial court’s distribution of property in the
dissolution decree that dissolved his marriage to Nancy Cooper.
Shortly after the marriage, Nancy1 inherited $118,000 from her father. Nancy deposited
the money into a joint checking account, and then without Nancy’s knowledge or consent, Jacob
transferred most of the money to his money market account. Jacob then added Nancy to the
account. Over time, additional funds were deposited and withdrawn from the money market
account. Nancy then used the inheritance funds to help purchase the family home.
The trial court ruled on summary judgment that the $118,000 remained Nancy’s separate
property. The court subsequently divided the family home in the dissolution decree by giving
Jacob ownership but awarding Nancy $118,000 plus half the remaining value of the home.
Jacob argues that the $118,000 became community property because it was commingled with
community funds.
1 We use first names to distinguish between the parties. No disrespect is intended.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
June 25, 2024

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We hold that the trial court erred in its ruling that $118,000 constituted Nancy’s separate
property, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Nancy $118,000 plus half the
remaining value of the family home as a fair and equitable distribution of the home.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dissolution decree.
FACTS
Nancy and Jacob married in May 2016, and they petitioned to dissolve their marriage in
March 2018. They came into the marriage with separate funds, which they combined into a joint
bank account.
In February 2017, Nancy inherited $118,000 from her father. Nancy deposited the
money into the couple’s joint checking account. Without Nancy’s knowledge or consent, Jacob
moved $116,000 from the joint account to his money market account with Navy Federal Credit
Union. Nancy’s name later was added to that account. Nancy subsequently agreed to use the
inheritance funds to help buy their family home. Six months after the home purchase, Jacob
filed for dissolution of the marriage.
Jacob moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that all funds held in the money
market account constituted community property, including the money from Nancy’s inheritance.
He argued that the inheritance became community property because it was commingled with
community funds in the money market account. Jacob submitted multiple exhibits showing
transactions involving the money market account and their other bank accounts.
Nancy filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that her $118,000
inheritance remained her separate property. She claimed that the parties always considered the
inheritance as separate funds and that Jacob could not show that she intended to make the
inheritance community funds.

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The trial court denied Jacob’s motion and granted Nancy’s motion for summary
judgment.
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and
a final dissolution decree. The court awarded Jacob the marital home, but ordered him to pay
Nancy a martial lien on the home of $354,250, which constituted the $118,000 inheritance plus
50 percent of the remaining value of the marital home. The court did not specifically mention its
summary judgment ruling that the inheritance was separate property in the findings or the decree.
Jacob appeals the trial court’s dissolution decree.
ANALYSIS
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A trial court’s characterization of property as separate or community is a mixed question
of law and fact. In re Marriage of Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d 342, 348, 506 P.3d 630 (2022). The
time and method of acquisition and the donor’s intent are questions of fact that we review for
substantial evidence. Id. But the characterization of property as separate or community is a
question of law, which we review de novo. Id. at 348-49.
All property acquired during marriage presumptively is community property. Id. at 351.
However, property acquired during marriage by inheritance is separate property. RCW
26.16.010; Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d at 351. And property acquired during marriage strictly with
separate funds is separate property. Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d at 353.
“Separate property will remain separate property through changes and transitions, if the
separate property remains traceable and identifiable; however, if the property becomes so
commingled that it is impossible to distinguish or apportion it, then the entire amount becomes
community property.” In re Marriage of Chumbley, 150 Wn.2d 1, 5-6, 74 P.3d 129 (2003). In

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addition, if separate funds are used to pay off debt on community property, they cease to exist as
a separate asset and cannot be awarded as separate property in a dissolution. In re Marriage of
White, 105 Wn. App. 545, 552-53, 20 P.3d 481 (2001).
Significantly, the trial court’s characterization of property is not controlling for the trial
court’s ultimate distribution of property. In re Marriage of Groves, 10 Wn. App. 2d 249, 254,
447 P.3d 643 (2019). Instead, all the parties’ property, whether separate or community, is before
the court for distribution. Id. The trial court must make a distribution that is fair and equitable
under all the circumstances. Id.
RCW 26.09.080 states that the trial court’s “disposition of the property and the liabilities
of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering
all relevant factors.” The relevant factors include:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage or domestic partnership; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse or domestic partner at the time the
division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding
the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse or
domestic partner with whom the children reside the majority of the time.
RCW 26.09.080. The trial court has broad discretion “ ‘to make a just and equitable distribution
of property based on the factors enumerated in RCW 26.09.080.’ ” Groves, 10 Wn. App. 2d at
254 (quoting In re Marriage of Wright, 179 Wn. App. 257, 261, 319 P.3d 45 (2013)).
Another factor a trial court can consider is one spouse’s unusually significant
contributions to the assets before the court. White, 105 Wn. App. at 551.
We review a trial court’s distribution of property for abuse of discretion. Groves, 10 Wn.
App. 2d at 254. This is a “highly deferential standard.” Id. at 255. The trial court is in the best

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position to determine what is fair, just, and equitable. In re Marriage of Doneen, 197 Wn. App.
941, 949, 391 P.3d 594 (2017).
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY
Jacob argues that the trial court erred in ruling on summary judgment that Nancy’s
$118,000 inheritance remained separate property. We agree.
This court in White established that when separate funds are used to pay off debt on
community property, they cease to exist as a separate asset and cannot be awarded as separate
property in a dissolution. 105 Wn. App. at 552-53. The same rule necessarily applies when a
spouse uses separate funds to assist in the purchase of the family home along with community
funds. At that point, the inheritance “cease[s] to exist as a separate asset.” Id. at 552.
Using separate funds as a partial contribution to purchasing property is different than
when only separate funds are used to purchase property. In that second situation, the property
purchased remains separate property. Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d at 353.
We hold that the trial court erred in determining on summary judgment that the $118,000
was separate property.
C. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
The trial court’s error does not necessarily require reversal. As noted above, the
characterization of property is not controlling when the trial court distributes the parties’
property. Groves, 10 Wn. App. 2d at 254. The ultimate question is whether the court has made a
fair and equitable distribution under all the circumstances. Id.
Here, the trial court was tasked with distributing the family home. The court decided to
award Jacob the family home, but stated that Jacob was required to pay Nancy $118,000 plus
half of the remaining value of the home. The court did not even mention its previous separate

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property ruling. The court was entitled to consider that Nancy’s inheritance was a significant
contribution to the purchase of the family home. See White, 105 Wn. App. at 551. And the court
made a specific finding that “[t]he division of community personal property described in the final
order is fair (just and equitable).” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 354.
The trial court conducted a trial and considered the testimony of the parties before
making its distribution ruling. We are not in a position to second guess the trial court’s property
distribution. The trial court was in the best position to determine what was fair, just, and
equitable. Doneen, 197 Wn. App. at 949. According, we hold that the trial court did not err in
its property distribution.
D. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Nancy requests attorney fees on appeal. RCW 26.09.140 states, “The court from time to
time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a
reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding
under this chapter.” RCW 26.09.140 also gives us discretion to “order a party to pay for the cost
to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys’ fees in addition to statutory costs.”
“In exercising our discretion, we consider the issues’ arguable merit on appeal and the
parties’ financial resources, balancing the financial need of the requesting party against the other
party’s ability to pay.” In re Marriage of Kim, 179 Wn. App. 232, 256, 317 P.3d 555, (2014).
As required in RAP 18.1(c), Nancy filed a financial affidavit outlining her income and
expenses. Jacob did not file a financial affidavit, so we have no information regarding his ability
to pay. Regarding the merits of the appeal, Nancy is the ultimate prevailing party. But Jacob
prevailed on the separate property issue.
Exercising our discretion, we decline to award attorney fees to Nancy.

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CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s dissolution decree.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MAXA, J.
We concur:
VELJACIC, A.C.J.
CHE, J.