State Of Washington, Respondent V. Derek Cartmell, Appellant

20Ui OCT 13 	AH 9= Oh
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
DEREK JOHN CARTMELL,
Appellant.
No. 70520-2-1
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	October 13, 2014
Leach, J. — Derek Cartmell appeals his convictions for possession of a
stolen vehicle, attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, possession of a
controlled substance, and hit and run (property damage). 	He challenges the trial
court's admission of certain evidence, including his Department of Corrections
(DOC) 	identification 	card, 	the 	testimony 	of 	his 	DOC 	community corrections
officer, and phone calls and text messages retrieved from his cell phone. 	He
also alleges prosecutorial misconduct committed by making improper argument
and shifting the burden of proof. 	And in a statement of additional grounds, he
questions 	the 	validity 	of 	search 	warrants 	police 	officers 	obtained 	before
searching the backpack and phone left in the stolen vehicle. 	Because the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence, the prosecutor did not
commit misconduct, and Cartmell's claims in his statement of additional grounds
have no merit, we affirm.

NO. 70520-2-1 / 2
FACTS
Near Oak Harbor, on November 1, 2012, at about 9:00 a.m., Washington
State Patrol Trooper David Martin attempted to pull over a speeding pickup truck.
When the truck sped away, Martin followed in pursuit. 	The ensuing high-speed
chase ended when the truck struck a house.
By the time Martin parked his patrol car, the truck's driver had fled on foot.
Neither Martin nor the homeowner got a good look at his face.
Other law enforcement officers and the owner of the truck, Michael Hurley,
arrived 	at the scene. 	Hurley reported 	the truck stolen earlier that morning.
Hurley consented to an initial search of the truck, and officers found a backpack
and 	a 	red 	Samsung 	cell 	phone. 	After 	obtaining 	search 	warrants, 	officers
searched these 	items and found 	a 	wallet containing 	Derek CartmeN's social
security card, driver's license, DOC identification card, and Quest card.1 	Police
also searched a second cell phone found in the backpack. 	The Samsung cell
phone revealed 	phone calls and text messages, the last of which was read
approximately 10 minutes before the collision. 	Police also recovered two glass
pipes used for narcotics, two small "baggies" containing suspected narcotics, and
a license plate.
1 A Quest card is an electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card, similar to a
debit card that the Department of Social and Health Services issues to clients
receiving food assistance, 	http://www.dshs.wa.gov/onlinecso/ebt.shtml.
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NO. 70520-2-1 / 3
The 	State 	charged 	Cartmell 	with 	possession 	of 	a 	stolen 	vehicle,
attempting 	to 	elude 	a 	pursuing 	police 	vehicle, 	possession 	of 	a 	controlled
substance (methamphetamine), and hit and run (property damage). 	Before trial
started, Cartmell moved to exclude any reference to his DOC identification card
and 	the testimony 	of his 	DOC community custody officer, 	Helen 	Desmond.
Cartmell also sought to exclude 163 phone calls and text messages stored on
the cell phone. 	The trial court denied the motions. 	The court gave the jury oral
limiting 	instructions before the introduction of the DOC card 	and 	Desmond's
testimony, as well as a written limiting instruction before deliberations.
The jury convicted Cartmell as charged. 	He appeals.
ANALYSIS
DOC Evidence
Cartmell 	contends 	first 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	abused 	its 	discretion 	by
admitting his DOC card and Officer Desmond's testimony. 	Because his wallet
contained four types of identification, he asserts the DOC card was "at best"
cumulative evidence. 	He claims the DOC card "stigmatized [him] as a felony
offender." 	As a result, the danger of unfair prejudice caused by its admission
substantially outweighed its probative value and ER 403 required its exclusion.
He 	makes 	similar claims 	about 	Desmond's 	testimony, 	contending 	that 	both
"labeled the accused as a felony offender on State supervision, overwhelming
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NO. 70520-2-1 / 4
the jury's 	ability to weigh 	the evidence" and 	"encouraging] the jury to 	use
propensity reasoning." 	Cartmell describes the court's limiting 	instructions as
"wholly inadequate" to limit this evidence's prejudicial effect.
We review a trial court's decision about the admissibility of evidence under
an 	abuse 	of 	discretion 	standard. 	Unless 	the 	court 	made 	a 	manifestly
unreasonable decision or based it on untenable grounds or reasons, we affirm.2
Washington Rules of Evidence provide for the admission of all relevant
evidence 	unless 	an 	applicable 	constitutional 	requirement, 	statute, 	rule, 	or
regulation limits its admission.3 	ER 401 defines "[r]elevant evidence" as evidence
having 	a 	tendency to 	make the existence of any fact 	consequential to the
resolution of an 	action 	more or less probable than 	it would 	be without that
evidence. 	A trial court may exclude even relevant evidence "if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."4 	But "nearly all
evidence will prejudice one side or the other," and "[ejvidence is not rendered
inadmissible under ER 403 just because it may be prejudicial."5 	The trial court
sits in the best position to determine the prejudicial effect of evidence.6 	And the
chance that the harm of unfair prejudice will substantially outweigh the probative
2 State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 701, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997); State v.
Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 706-07, 903 P.2d 960 (1995).
3 ER 402.
4 ER 403.
5 Carson v. Fine, 123 Wn.2d 206, 224, 867 P.2d 610 (1994).
6 State v. Powell. 166 Wn.2d 73, 81, 206 P.3d 321 (2009).
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NO. 70520-2-1 / 5
force of evidence is "'quite slim' where the evidence is undeniably probative of a
central 	issue 	in 	the 	case."7 	Although 	a 	court 	may 	exclude 	a 	"needless
presentation of cumulative evidence," the admission of cumulative evidence is
not necessarily prejudicial error.8 	Evidentiary error is not prejudicial "'unless,
within 	reasonable 	probabilities, 	the 	outcome 	of 	the 	trial 	would 	have 	been
materially affected had the error not occurred.'"9
Here, identity was the central issue. 	At trial, Cartmell argued that certain
differences between Trooper Martin's physical description and descriptions on
his identification cards created reasonable doubt. 	Though police recovered four
forms of identification from Cartmell's wallet, only the driver's license and DOC
card contained photos and physical descriptions. 	The photos showed Cartmell
with different hair lengths, and the physical descriptions listed slightly different
weights. 	Evidence of photo identification is "undeniably probative of a central
issue" in such a case, which the trial court noted in its ruling:
This is a circumstantial evidence case. The issue is who done it, as
it were. 	This is an identity case. 	The primary issue is the identity of
the 	person 	who 	committed 	the 	crimes.... [I]t would 	not 	be
appropriate for the Court to limit the state in presenting the relevant
7 Carson. 	123 Wn.2d at 224 (quoting United 	States v. 0.161 	Acres of
Land. 837 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 1988)).
8 ER 403; State v. Dunn. 125 Wn. App. 582, 589, 105 P.3d 1022 (2005)
(citing State v. Todd. 78 Wn.2d 362, 372, 474 P.2d 542 (1970)).
9 State v. Bourgeois. 133 Wn.2d 389, 403, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997) (quoting
State v. Tharp. 96 Wn.2d 591, 599, 637 P.2d 961 (1981)).
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NO. 70520-2-1 / 6
evidence that it has on the issue of identity, and one of the relevant
items would be the DOC offender card.
The court found that the DOC card's relevance "clearly outweigh[ed] any
danger of 	unfair 	prejudice from 	any 	inference . . . that 	Mr. 	Cartmell was the
subject of DOC supervision because of criminal activity." 	The court offered to
redact the word "offender" from the card to limit its prejudicial impact, but defense
counsel declined, telling the court, "Your Honor, I'm not sure, when it says the
Department of Corrections over the top of it and clearly not an employee badge,
that there's anything that one can do to the document to limit its prejudicial
content." 	The court sought confirmation on this point, asking, "Do I understand,
then, that you're not asking for any redaction from the document?" 	Defense
counsel responded, "No, Your Honor, we're not." 	The court also suggested a
limiting instruction and emphasized, "[T]he Court would certainly not permit any
evidence of why this card 	was issued or what the crimes were that he was
previously convicted of that required that he have an offender DOC card or
something of that nature. 	There will be no evidence whatsoever of that."
Cartmell cites In re Personal Restraint of Glasmann10 to support his claim
about the unduly prejudicial effect of the DOC card. 	In that case, the prosecutor
showed the jury a booking photograph of the defendant's face, on which the
prosecutor had superimposed the word "guilty."11 	But Glasmann is inapposite.
10 175 Wn.2d 696, 286 P.3d 673 (2012).
11 Glasmann. 175 Wn.2d at 705-06.
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NO. 70520-2-1 / 7
In that case, our Supreme Court did not reverse for evidentiary error but for
flagrant and 	ill-intentioned prosecutorial misconduct "so pervasive that it could
not have been cured by an instruction."12 	Here, the State offered the DOC card
as issued, 	not altered to increase its prejudicial effect. 	Cartmell declined an
opportunity to redact potentially prejudicial content. 	Moreover, the jury received
information about CartmeN's criminal history through a different source. 	Cartmell
testified in his own defense. 	During cross-examination, he acknowledged three
convictions for crimes of dishonesty, two of which were felonies.13
The DOC card helped the State prove the central issue in the case, and
Cartmell does not show the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it. 	He
also fails to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would
have been materially affected had the court excluded it.
Cartmell also challenges the trial court's admission of DOC Officer Helen
Desmond's testimony. 	Desmond identified herself as a community corrections
officer 	who 	receives 	contact 	information 	from 	"particular 	people," 	including
Cartmell. 	Desmond testified about emergency contact information she kept as
CartmeH's community custody officer, which matched telephone numbers found
on the contacts list in the seized cell phone.
12 Glasmann. 175 Wn.2d at 707.
13 Two convictions were for possession of stolen property in the second
degree, a class C felony. 	RCW 9A.56.160.
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NO. 70520-2-1 / 8
Cartmell 	argues 	that 	Desmond's 	testimony 	was 	cumulative 	evidence
because he "had already conceded that the phone belonged to him and the
contact list inside the 	phone was 	his." 	But 	at the time 	Desmond 	testified,
Cartmell had only offered to stipulate that "the phone was his at one time," and
he later testified that someone stole it from him. 	Desmond's testimony directly
linking the phone to Cartmell was highly probative of the central issue of the
case. 	Before 	Desmond 	testified, 	the 	court 	instructed 	the jury 	that 	it could
consider Desmond's evidence "only for the purpose of identification." 	And here
again, any danger of unfair prejudice was neutralized by CartmeN's testimony
about his criminal history, which eliminated any juror speculation about why he
had a community corrections officer. 	The court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Desmond's testimony.
Text Messages and Phone Calls
The trial court admitted a 20-page document that included the dates and
times of 163 text messages and phone calls sent from and received by the cell
phone over approximately an 18-hour period, plus the content of a number of text
messages. 	First, 	Cartmell 	contends 	the 	text 	messages 	were 	inadmissible
hearsay. 	He argues further that the trial court should have excluded them as
"irrelevant, 	cumulative, and substantially more prejudicial than 	probative." 	In
addition to objecting before trial to the admission of all the text messages, at trial
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NO. 70520-2-1 / 9
Cartmell objected specifically to several messages as prejudicial. 	The trial court
noted CartmeN's standing objection but admitted the information "for the limited
purposes of identification and to show the context of the statements made by the
owner of the phone."
ER 801(c) defines "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." It is not admissible unless an exception applies.14
Because the State did not offer the text messages to prove the truth of the
statements contained in them, they were not hearsay. 	Although Cartmell asserts
that the State's aim in offering the messages was to prove the truth of the
senders' portrayals of Cartmell as "a lying, womanizing, unreliable 'player,'" the
trial court admitted the phone call and text message information only to allow the
State to "reasonably argue that this was Mr. CartmeN's phone." 	Before the State
introduced the document, the court instructed the jury that it "may consider the
evidence only for the purpose of identification." The court gave the same written
instruction 	before 	deliberations. 	And 	in 	response 	to 	a 	question 	from 	the
deliberating jury, the court reiterated, "You may use Exhibit 40 with regard to the
issue 	of 	the 	identity 	of 	the 	person 	who 	allegedly 	committed 	the 	crimes
14 ER 802.

NO. 70520-2-1/10
charged . . . and for no other purpose. 	You may not consider Exhibit 40 for the
truth of the contents of the statements in Exhibit 40."
Moreover, as the trial court also ruled, text messages that Cartmell sent
were admissible and 	not 	hearsay because they were statements of a 	party
opponent:
Any statements made by the person who owned this phone, which
the state's theory is that it was the defendant, 	Derek Cartmell,
would be admissible as substantive evidence, not hearsay.
Hearsay does not include statements by a party opponent.
So those statements are all admissible by the possessor of the
phone, as outlined in this document.'151
The messages were highly probative of the central issue: 	the identity of
the person in possession of the phone at the time of the chase and collision.
Several incoming text messages address "Derek," and the senders obviously
believed that they were communicating with the owner of the phone. 	Several
lengthy 	text 	message 	conversations 	imply 	an 	intimate 	relationship 	between
Cartmell and the other party to the conversation, supporting the State's assertion
that "[t]he implication is that [Cartmell is] the one using the phone all the way up
until ten minutes to nine in the morning." 	The last outgoing text message before
the police seized the phone was sent at 8:52 a.m.—shortly before the truck
15 ER 801(d)(2)(i) 	(An admission 	by a 	party 	opponent is a 	statement
"offered 	against 	a 	party 	and 	is . . . the 	party's 	own 	statement, 	in either an
individual or representative capacity.").
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NO. 70520-2-1/11
collided with the house. 	The trial court properly admitted the text messages as
nonhearsay evidence of identity.
Many 	of 	the 	text 	messages 	unquestionably 	portray 	Cartmell 	in 	an
unfavorable light. 	They contain strong sexual content, 	numerous profanities,
language that arguably could refer to illegal activity, 	and one offensive racial
reference. 	But evidence is not inadmissible under ER 403 just because it may be
prejudicial. 	This evidence was highly probative of identity, the contested issue in
the case. 	Because the trial court has considerable discretion in administering ER
403, 	a 	reviewing 	court 	will 	find 	reversible 	error 	"only 	in 	the 	exceptional
circumstance of a manifest abuse of discretion."16 	The court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the text messages and phone calls.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Cartmell also argues that prosecutorial misconduct violated his right to a
fair trial. 	He contends that in closing argument, the prosecutor "emphasized the
improperly admitted text messages, drawing the jury's attention to the prejudicial
content." 	He asserts that the prosecutor "repeatedly misstated the law in closing
argument, shifting the burden to the defense." 	And in a statement of additional
grounds, Cartmell alleges that the prosecutor made statements that were "not
consistent" with trial testimony and "without proper evidence."
16 Carson. 123 Wn.2d at 226.
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NO. 70520-2-1/12
When a defendant did not object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct
at trial, this court does not review the alleged error unless the misconduct was so
flagrant and ill intentioned that it caused prejudice incurable by a proper jury
instruction.17 	Cartmell agrees that he made no specific objections during closing
argument but claims he 	appropriately relied on 	his standing objection to the
court's admission of the text messages. 	Cartmell correctly notes that if the court
makes a final ruling on a 	motion, 	the parties may rely on that ruling without
raising new objections during trial.18 	But Cartmell made a standing objection to
the admission of the text messages, not the prosecutor's closing argument. 	He
made no objection, standing or otherwise, to the prosecutor's alleged improper
argument. 	Thus, the "flagrant and ill intentioned" standard applies, and Cartmell
bears the burden of establishing that the challenged conduct was improper and
prejudicial and 	could 	not have 	been 	cured 	by 	proper instruction. 	Prejudice
occurs only if '"there is a substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury's
verdict.'"19 	This court reviews misconduct claims in the context of the issues in
the case, the total argument, the evidence, and the jury instructions.20
17 State v. Emery. 174 Wn.2d 741, 760-61, 278 P.3d 653 (2012).
18 State v. Powell. 126 Wn.2d 244, 256, 893 P.2d 615 (1995).
19 State v. Monday. 171 Wn.2d 667, 675, 257 P.3d 551 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Yates. 161 Wn.2d 714, 774, 168 P.3d
359 (2007)).
20 State v. McKenzie. 157 Wn.2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 (2006).
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NO. 70520-2-1/13
CartmeN's misconduct claims fail. 	First, the prosecutor did not improperly
discuss the text messages in closing argument. 	The prosecutor highlighted the
timing and content of the text message conversations to show that Cartmell
possessed the phone between the evening of October 31 and the morning of
November 1. 	The content of the text messages was often offensive. 	But the
prosecutor properly argued from the evidence to show identity—that "no one else
can 	carry 	on 	that 	conversation. 	That's 	what's 	important 	about 	those
conversations. 	That he convinced multiple people, male or female, that that's
Derek Cartmell." 	The prosecutor did not introduce "irrelevant and inflammatory
matter. .. , which 	has 	a 	natural 	tendency to 	prejudice the jury 	against the
accused."21
Second, Cartmell calls burden-shifting a 	missing witness argument the
State appropriately applied to the facts. 	In his testimony, Cartmell asserted that
he and Angie, his children's mother, took their children trick-or-treating the night
the truck was stolen. 	He testified that after trick-or-treating, he spent most of the
night with his girl friend. And he testified that the next morning, around 9:20, he
21 State v. Miles. 73 Wn.2d 67, 69-70, 436 P.2d 198 (1968) (improper and
prejudicial to admit hearsay evidence alleging a plan by defendants to perpetrate
a robbery like the one with which they were charged); see also State v. Belgarde.
110 Wn.2d 	504, 	507-08, 	755 	P.2d 	174 (1988) 	(improper and 	prejudicial to
describe American Indian defendant as a leader of a "deadly group of madmen"
and "butchers [who] kill indiscriminately").
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NO. 70520-2-1/14
picked up his son from Angie's apartment and took him to school.22 	On cross-
examination, the prosecutor referred to Angie and several other women whom
Cartmell identified as his girl friends and asked Cartmell, "Are any of them going
to testify on your behalf today?" 	Cartmell responded, "No." 	In closing argument,
the prosecutor referred to CartmeN's alibi, noting that "he could have called Angie
to help him out. 	I was with Tina all night. 	That's great. Where is Tina?"
"A criminal defendant has no burden to present evidence, and it is error for
the 	State to 	suggest otherwise."23 	But the 	prosecutor may 	argue that 	the
evidence does not support the defense theory of the case.24 	And under the
missing witness doctrine, the State may point out the absence of a "natural
witness" when it would be reasonable to infer the witness's peculiar availability to
the defendant, the materiality of the witness's noncumulative testimony, and the
witness's absence is not otherwise explained.25 	In this case, the State could
argue, and the jury could infer, that the absent witness's testimony would 	not
22 A school employee testified as a rebuttal witness that Angie phoned the
school that day to excuse CartmeH's son because of illness and that the boy was
absent all day.
23 State v. Montgomery. 163 Wn.2d 577, 597, 183 P.3d 267 (2008) (citing
State v. Cheatam. 150 Wn.2d 626, 652, 81 P.3d 830 (2003)).
24 State v. Russell. 	125 Wn.2d 24, 87, 	882 P.2d 747 (1994); State v.
Killingsworth. 	166 Wn. App. 283, 291-92, 269 P.3d 1064, review denied. 174
Wn.2d 1007 (2012).
25 Montgomery. 163 Wn.2d at 598-99 (citing State v. Blair. 117 Wn.2d 479,
485-86, 816 P.2d 718 (1991)).
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NO. 70520-2-1/15
have been favorable to the defendant.26 	In State v. Contreras.27 the defendant
testified that he spent the entire night with 	his 	girl friend 	and that they saw
several acquaintances during the night. 	While the acquaintances testified at trial,
the girl friend did not.28 	This court held that the prosecutor was entitled both to
cross-examine the defendant and to comment in closing argument about the
defendant's failure to call his girl friend as 	an 	alibi 	witness.29 	Here, 	as 	in
Contreras. the missing witnesses had both a special relationship to the defendant
and material information about the central issue in the case. 	The prosecutor's
comment on their absence was proper argument that did not shift the burden of
proof.
Cartmell challenges another remark as a misstatement of the law. 	In
closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury,
I want you to bear a couple things in mind when you listen to
[defense counsel's] argument. 	Number one, in order to generate a
reasonable doubt[,] there has to be a reasonable explanation. 	I
was dropping off my son who didn't go to school that day is not
reasonable. 	I was with Angie doesn't help us any, especially when
he could have called Angie to help him out.
Cartmell 	contends 	that 	the 	prosecutor's 	statement 	that 	"in 	order 	to
generate a reasonable doubt[,] there has to be a reasonable explanation" implied
26 Montgomery. 163 Wn.2d at 598 (citing Blair. 117 Wn.2d at 485-86).
27 57 Wn. App. 471, 472-73, 788 P.2d 1114 (1990).
28 Contreras, 57 Wn. App. at 473.
29 Contreras. 57 Wn. App. at 475.
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NO. 70520-2-1/16
that 	"a 	defendant 	has 	a 	burden 	to 	offer 	an 	explanation" 	and 	amounted 	to
impermissible burden-shifting. 	We disagree. 	In State v. Killingsworth.30 the
defendant made a similar claim, contending that the State improperly shifted the
burden 	of 	proof 	by 	arguing 	that 	the 	only 	"reasonable 	explanation" 	for 	the
evidence was the defendant's guilt. 	This 	court rejected that contention and
affirmed, noting that the prosecutor "did not argue or imply that the defense had
failed 	to 	offer other 	reasonable 	explanations 	or comment on 	Killingsworth's
failure to testify. 	Rather, he simply argued that the evidence did not support any
other 	reasonable 	explanation."31 	Here, 	as 	in 	Killingsworth. 	the 	prosecutor
highlighted evidence that did not support a "reasonable explanation" other than
CartmeN's 	guilt: 	lack 	of 	corroboration 	of 	CartmeN's 	overnight 	alibi; 	school
personnel's rebuttal of his morning alibi that he was taking his son to school; his
belongings, identification, and unexplained fingerprint in the stolen truck; and the
numerous text messages that he apparently sent and received during the hours
directly 	before 	the 	chase 	and 	collision.32 	The 	prosecutor 	properly 	argued
inferences from the evidence, and his argument did not shift the burden of proof.
30 166 Wn. App. 283, 290 n.5, 269 P.3d 1064, review denied. 174 Wn.2d
1007(2012).
31 Killingsworth. 166 Wn. App. at 291.
32 See Killingsworth. 166 Wn. App. at 291 ("If somebody offers you those
two things for something less than $50, you know darn well it's stolen, and that's
why you pawn it real fast. 	You don't buy something to pawn it. 	Nobody gives it
to you in the middle of the night. 	There's no reasonable explanation for why—for
how he would get this without knowing that it was stolen, either buying it too
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NO. 70520-2-1/17
Search Warrants
In a statement of additional grounds, Cartmell alleges that the trial court
abused 	its 	discretion 	by 	"admitting 	evidence 	gained 	through 	faulty 	search
warr[a]nt[s]" concerning the backpack and Samsung phone. 	He argues further
that because he "was never identified being at the scene of the crime," the trial
court should not have relied on certain abandonment cases where identity was
not an issue.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibits a warrantless
search, subject to a limited set of exceptions.33 	One exception allows police to
retrieve 	and 	search 	voluntarily 	abandoned 	property 	without 	implicating 	an
individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
or article I, section 7.34
The search warrants that officers obtained before searching the backpack
and cell phone contained several errors. 	Of two search warrants for the cell
phones, both stated the wrong date of the alleged crime and one also named the
wrong victims. 	Neither warrant described the 	phones with any particularity.
Similarly, 	although 	the 	warrant 	to 	search 	the 	backpack 	described 	more
cheaply or stealing it himself or knowing it was stolen in a stolen car and pawning
it. That's trafficking.").
33 State v. MacDicken. 171 Wn. App. 169, 174, 286 P.3d 413 (2012), affd,
179 Wn.2d 936, 319 P.3d 31 (2014).
34 State v. Reynolds. 144 Wn.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200 (2001).
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NO. 70520-2-1/18
particularly a "black and gray North Face backpack," it initially listed the wrong
date and victims of the alleged offense.
In 	its 	evidentiary 	ruling, 	the 	trial 	court 	acknowledged 	these 	errors,
emphasizing that its ruling depended not on the warrants but on the fact that the
items were abandoned property. 	Cartmell attempts to distinguish his case from
the abandonment cases the trial court cited.35 	He argues the police failure to
make a positive identification of him as the owner of the backpack and cell phone
at the time of the search makes his case different. But the propriety of the search
does not depend on police identification of the owner but on whether the property
was voluntarily abandoned. 	"Discarded property is voluntarily abandoned unless
there is unlawful police conduct, and a causal nexus exists between that conduct
and 	the abandonment."36 	Here, Trooper Martin lawfully pursued a speeding
driver, who collided minutes later with a house. 	Cartmell does not dispute that
the person Martin saw flee the scene abandoned the truck and the items in it.
The trial court did not err in finding that police properly retrieved the backpack
and cell phone as abandoned property. 	Because the court did not rely on the
35 The court cited, for example, State v. Serrano. 14 Wn. App. 462, 544
P.2d 101 (1975), Reynolds, and State v. Kealev. 80 Wn. App. 162, 907 P.2d 319
(1995).
36 State v. Young. 86 Wn. App. 	194, 201, 935 P.2d 1372 (1997) (citing
State v. Whitaker. 58 Wn. App. 851, 856, 795 P.2d 182 (1990)).
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NO. 70520-2-1/19
search warrants that the police obtained, we need not address their validity on
appeal.
Cumulative Error
Cartmell argues that because of prosecutorial misconduct and the court's
admission of "irrelevant, cumulative, and unduly prejudicial evidence," this court
should 	reverse 	under the cumulative error doctrine. 	Under this doctrine, 	a
combination of errors may deny the accused a fair trial even where any one of
the errors viewed individually may not justify reversal.37 Because Cartmell fails to
show any error, we conclude that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence,
the prosecutor did not commit misconduct, and CartmeN's claims in his statement
of additional grounds have no merit, we affirm.
WE CONCUR:
U^^^ 	//.
thx.J
37 In re 	Pers. 	Restraint of Yates. 	177 Wn.2d 	1, 65-66, 296 	P.3d 872
(2013).
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