State Of Washington, Res. V. N.a.j.(dob 2/11/98), App.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
N.A.J.,
Appellant.
No. 69275-5-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: May 13,2013
Appelwick, J. — N.A.J, appeals the manifest injustice disposition imposed by the
juvenile court. 	He argues that the juvenile court erred in basing its manifest injustice
disposition on factors not included in the statute. 	The juvenile court considered factors
consistent with the purposes ofthe Juvenile Justice Act of 1977.1 We affirm.
FACTS
N.A.J., a juvenile, pleaded guilty to one count of attempted robbery in the second
degree. 	The State recommended 30 days detention, a disposition within the standard
range of 0-30 days. 	But, the juvenile probation counselor recommended a manifest
injustice disposition of 40 to 52 weeks of detention.
1 Chapter 13.40 RCW.

No. 67108-1-1/2
The 	juvenile 	court 	adopted 	the 	probation 	counselor's 	recommendation 	and
imposed a manifest injustice disposition of 40 to 52 weeks of detention. 	It made four
findings in support of the manifest injustice disposition. 	First, it found that N.A.J, posed
a high risk to reoffend and was a threat to community safety. 	Second, it found that
N.A.J, committed the offense while other criminal matters were pending. 	Third, it found
that 	a 	standard 	range 	disposition 	would 	not 	provide 	necessary 	treatment 	and
supervision for N.A.J. 	Fourth, it found that prior services, supervision, and parental
control had been insufficient to rehabilitate N.A.J.
DISCUSSION
The Juvenile Justice Act provides sentencing standards for juvenile offenders.
See 	RCW 	13.40.0357. 	However, 	where 	a 	court finds 	that disposition 	within 	the
standard range would effectuate a manifest injustice, the court may impose a sentence
outside the standard range. 	RCW 13.40.160(2). 	The act defines "manifest injustice" as
"a disposition that would either impose an excessive penalty on the juvenile or would
impose a serious, and clear danger to society in light of the purposes of this chapter."
RCW 	13.40.020(18). 	A finding 	of 	manifest 	injustice 	will 	be 	upheld 	if substantial
evidence supports the reasons given, those reasons clearly and convincingly support
the 	disposition, 	and 	the 	disposition 	is 	not 	too 	excessive 	or 	too 	lenient. 	RCW
13.40.230(2); State v. J.V.. 132 Wn. App. 533, 540, 	132 P.3d 	1116 (2006). 	N.A.J,
challenges the disposition only under the second prong of this test, arguing the reasons
given by the trial court do not properly support the manifest injustice disposition.

No. 67108-1-1/3
N.A.J, contends that RCW 13.40.150(3)2 sets forth 	an exclusive, 	rather than
illustrative, 	list 	of factors that courts can consider in 	making 	a 	manifest 	injustice
determination. 	He 	asserts 	that 	the 	juvenile 	court 	improperly 	relied 	solely 	on
nonstatutory aggravating factors. 	N.A.J, acknowledges that this court has approved the
use of nonstatutory factors to support a manifest injustice disposition. 	But, he contends
that these cases were 	based on a 	prior version 	of the 	Sentencing 	Reform Act of
1981(SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, rather than the Juvenile Justice Act.
2 RCW 13.40.150(3) provides:
Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have
committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which
the court shall:
(i) Consider whether or not any of the following aggravating factors
exist:
(i) In the commission of the offense, 	or 	in flight therefrom, 	the
respondent inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury to another;
(ii) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner;
(iii) the victim or victims were particularly vulnerable;
(iv) The respondent has a recent criminal history or has failed to
comply 	with 	conditions 	of 	a 	recent 	dispositional 	order 	or 	diversion
agreement;
(v) The current offense 	included 	a 	finding 	of sexual 	motivation
pursuant to RCW 13.40.135;
(vi) 	The 	respondent 	was 	the 	leader 	of 	a 	criminal 	enterprise
involving several persons;
(vii) There are other complaints which have resulted in diversion or
a finding or plea of guilty but which are not included as criminal history;
and
(viii) 	The 	standard 	range 	disposition 	is 	clearly 	too 	lenient
considering the seriousness of the juvenile's prior adjudications.

No. 67108-1-1/4
Contrary to N.A.J.'s contentions, the clear language of the Juvenile Justice Act,
as well as our cases applying the act, call on juvenile courts to consider the overall
purposes of the act when making a manifest injustice determination. 	RCW 13.40.150
provides 	a 	list of aggravating 	factors 	which 	the juvenile 	court should 	consider to
determine whether a manifest justice disposition is justified. 	But, we have consistently
approved the consideration of nonstatutory factors. 	See, e.g.. State v. T.E.H., 91 Wn.
App. 908, 917-18, 960 P.2d 441 (1998) (a high risk that a juvenile will reoffend is a valid
ground for a manifest injustice disposition); State v. S.H., 75 Wn. App. 1, 11-12, 877
P2d 205 (1994)3 (a high risk to reoffend and the need for treatment are valid grounds for
a manifest injustice disposition). 	And, we recently reiterated in JAA, that the juvenile
court may consider both statutory and nonstatutory factors. 	132 Wn. App. at 540-41.
N.A.J, relies on In re Postsentence Review of Leach, 161 Wn.2d 180, 163 P.3d
782 (2007), to support his argument that RCW 13.40.150(3) provides an exclusive list.
In Leach, our Supreme Court examined a list in the SRA that enumerates which crimes
are subject to a sentence of community custody. 	161 Wn.2d at 184. It held that the list
was exhaustive and that courts may not add to the list, because to do so would usurp
the 	legislature's 	authority. 	Id 	at 	186. 	But, 	N.A.J.'s 	reliance 	on 	Leach 	ignores
differences in language and purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act and the SRA.
3 State v. Sledge. 83 Wn. App. 639, 922 P.2d 832 (1996), which abrogated this
case on other grounds was subsequently vacated, 133 Wn.2d 828, 947 P.2d 1199
(1997)

No. 67108-1-1/5
By contrast, under the Juvenile Justice Act the juvenile court must consider the
aggravating and 	mitigating factors enumerated in RCW 13.40.150, all relevant and
material evidence and recommendations, and the stated purposes of the act. 	State v.
P, 37 Wn. App. 773, 778, 686 P.2d 488 (1984). 	RCW 13.40.150 is not an exclusive list
of manifest injustice factors. 	Leach does not control.
In this case, the juvenile court considered appropriate factors 	in its manifest
injustice 	determination. 	It stated 	four 	aggravating 	factors 	to 	support 	imposing 	a
manifest injustice disposition. 	Three factors that it considered—that N.A.J, posed high
risk 	of 	reoffending, 	that a 	standard 	range disposition would 	not 	provide 	adequate
treatment, 	and 	that 	prior 	services 	and 	supervision 	were 	insufficient to 	rehabilitate
N.A.J.—relate to the stated purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act. 	Those purposes
include 	preserving 	the 	community 	safety 	and 	providing 	necessary 	treatment,
supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders. 	RCW 13.40.010(2); P, 37 Wn. App. at
778.
Additionally, 	contrary 	to 	N.A.J.'s 	assertion 	that 	the 	court 	considered 	only
nonstatutory factors, 	the fourth factor considered by the juvenile court was based in
statute. 	RCW 13.40.150(3)(i)(vii) requires the court to consider whether there are "other
complaints which have resulted in diversion or a finding or plea of guilty but which are
not included as criminal history." 	On July 11, 2012, N.A.J, pleaded guilty to burglary in
the second degree and escape in the second degree, both of which occurred prior to
the attempted robbery in the second degree at issue at this disposition hearing. 	Neither

No. 67108-1-1/6
offense was included in N.A.J.'s criminal history for purposes of this disposition. 	The
court found that N.A.J, committed the current offense while other criminal matters were
pending, 	"justifying 	imposition 	of 	a 	manifest 	injustice 	disposition 	under 	RCW
13.40.150(3)."
We affirm.
£c4hSC<V? y^^
WE CONCUR: