State of Washington, Respondent v. Cyrus Nelson Plush, II, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59096-4-II
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CYRUS NELSON PLUSH, II,
Appellant.
CHE, J. — Cyrus Nelson Plush, II appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex
offender. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a boilerplate community custody condition
requiring Plush to “[r]emain within prescribed geographical boundaries.”
Plush appeals. He argues that the community custody condition requiring him to remain
within unspecified geographic boundaries is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
In 1994, Plush was convicted in Cowlitz County of five counts of attempted
communicating with a minor for immoral purposes, which required him to register as a sex
offender. Plush was released from custody in Grays Harbor County for a different crime in
March 2023 and immediately moved to Olympia. He did not register as a sex offender in any
county after his release. In April 2023, the State charged Plush with failure to register as a sex
offender. After a bench trial, a trial court convicted Plush.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
September 9, 2025

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The trial court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the standard range of 43 months
confinement followed by 36 months of community custody. The trial court also imposed
community custody conditions. The judgment and sentence included preprinted lists of
conditions with checkboxes to indicate whether the court was imposing each ground of
conditions. The trial court checked the box to impose the list of “[s]tandard” community custody
conditions. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 14. This list included a condition requiring Plush to
“[r]emain within prescribed geographical boundaries and notify the court and [community
custody officer] in advance of any change in address or employment.” CP at 14. Other
conditions also required Plush to “obey instructions, affirmative conditions, and rules of the
court,” the Department of Corrections (DOC), and his community custody officer; and to work
and reside only at DOC-approved locations. CP at 14.
Plush appeals.
ANALYSIS
Plush argues that this court should strike the community custody condition requiring him
to remain within prescribed geographic boundaries because the condition is unconstitutionally
vague. Plush does not challenge the part of the condition about notifying his community custody
officer of any change in address or employment.
Plush asserts that the community custody condition “provides no guidance regarding
what areas might be off limits and gives a community corrections officer unfettered discretion to
forbid any area.” Br. of Appellant at 3. He argues that the condition “provided no information
about what geographic boundaries he might be required to follow, and the officer is given no

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guidance regarding what type of geographic boundaries might be appropriate.” Br. of Appellant
at 5. We disagree.
The community custody condition at issue in this case was imposed under RCW
9.94A.703(3)(a), which provides: “As part of any term of community custody, the court may
order an offender to . . . [r]emain within, or outside of, a specified geographic boundary.”
“This court reviews community custody conditions for abuse of discretion and will
reverse them only if they are ‘manifestly unreasonable.’” State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 652,
364 P.3d 830 (2015) (quoting State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 792, 239 P.3d 1059
(2010)). Imposing an unconstitutional condition is manifestly unreasonable. State v. Johnson,
197 Wn.2d 740, 744, 487 P.3d 893 (2021). And we do not presume that community custody
conditions are constitutional. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 793.
“[T]he due process vagueness doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment and article I,
section 3 of the state constitution requires that citizens have fair warning of proscribed conduct.”
State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 752, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). “A statute is unconstitutionally vague
if it . . . ‘does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is proscribed, or . . . does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to
protect against arbitrary enforcement.’” Id. at 752-53 (quoting City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115
Wn.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)). If a person of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prescribed, even if there are some possible areas of disagreement, the community
custody condition is not unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 747. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly “held that community custody conditions that required further definition
from [community custody officers] were unconstitutionally vague.” Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 654.

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No published case has discussed the exact wording of the condition at issue in this case.
Plush cites several unpublished cases that have struck similar conditions. For example, Division
Three recently held that a condition requiring the defendant to “[r]emain within [a] geographic
boundary, as set forth in writing by the Community Corrections Officer” was unconstitutionally
vague because the condition “does not provide any guidance or clarification regarding the
geographic boundaries to be set such that an ordinary person would understand the conduct
proscribed or otherwise define ‘geographic boundary.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Bratcher, No.
39758-1-III, slip op. at 4-5 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2024) (unpublished)
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/ pdf/397581_unp.pdf.
In contrast, Division One recently published an opinion affirming a community custody
condition imposed by a sentencing court that directed the defendant to “[r]emain within
geographic boundaries, as set forth in writing by’” the community corrections officer. State v.
Lundstrom, No. 86537-4-I, slip op. at 3-4 (Wash. Ct. App. July 28, 2025)
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/865374.pdf (alteration in original). Division One
explained that “a person of ordinary intelligence can understand what the condition proscribes.
Its plain language requires that Lundstrom adhere to any geographic restrictions that a
[community corrections officer] . . . set[s] forth in writing.” Id. at 4 (third alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Similar to Division One’s approach, this court recently affirmed as sufficiently definite a
condition requiring a defendant to “‘[r]emain within geographic boundaries, as set forth in
writing by the Department of Corrections.’” State v. Moore, No. 59282-7-II, slip op. at 1 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 1, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/59282-7.25.pdf.

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This court reasoned that the “conduct proscribed is clear and unambiguous” because “Moore
must comply with the written restrictions provided by DOC; any reasonable person would
understand what is prohibited.” Id., slip op. at 2. This court held that the condition in that case
was not vague due to the fact that “DOC does not have unbridled discretion to set the geographic
boundaries” because “community custody conditions set by DOC . . . must be reasonably related
to the crime of conviction, the offender’s risk of reoffending, or the safety of the community.”
Id., slip op. at 2-3.
The condition at issue in this case requires that Plush “[r]emain within prescribed
geographical boundaries.” CP at 14. Numerous other conditions in the same section refer to
directions from the DOC or his community custody officer. In context, a person of ordinary
intelligence would understand that the condition requires Plush to follow geographic restrictions
set forth by the DOC and his community custody officer. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 747;
Lundstrom, No. 86537-4-I, slip op. at 3-4. And because community custody officers do not have
unbridled discretion to set geographic boundaries, the condition is not subject to arbitrary
enforcement. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752. Therefore, the challenged condition is not
unconstitutionally vague.
CONCLUSION
We affirm.

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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Che, J.
We concur:
Maxa, J.
Veljacic, A.C.J.