State of Washington, Respondent v. Dandre D. Aaron, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 60069-2-II
Respondent,
v.
D’ANDRE DESHAY AARON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
CRUSER, C.J.—D’Andre Aaron appeals his sentence for the second time, arguing that the
resentencing court abused its discretion by denying his request for an exceptional sentence under
RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e) on the basis that Aaron did not support his request with expert evidence
connecting his mental health with the offense. The State contends that Aaron’s appeal of his
standard range sentence is barred by RCW 9.94A.585(1) because the trial court recognized and
considered its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence but declined to do so.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 16, 2025

No. 60069-2-II
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We agree with the State and affirm Aaron’s sentence. The trial court explicitly recognized
its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range and determined, based
on the record before it, that such a sentence was not appropriate under the circumstances.1
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2023, D’Andre Aaron pleaded guilty to second degree robbery and second
degree malicious mischief after he punched another person, stole his cell phone, and fled the scene.
He then demanded that another person give him a ride in his car and punched the car window when
the driver refused before continuing on foot. By his own statement, Aaron had just been released
from a Department of Corrections (DOC) facility in Lewis County but had not received the mental
health treatment or support he required for his schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder
diagnosis. After release from DOC, Aaron traveled to Pierce County where he committed the
previously described offense and was arrested. Aaron asserted that he had no memory of how he
got to Pierce County or of the incident itself.
Following his convictions and judgment, Aaron appealed his sentence to this court. We
reversed Aaron’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that Aaron’s offender score
1 The State also filed a motion to dismiss Aaron’s appeal as moot because Aaron was released
from total confinement by the DOC on November 3, 2025, and therefore resentencing would not
provide Aaron with effective relief. We deny the State’s motion to dismiss. An appeal is moot
where the appellate court cannot provide effective relief. State v. T.J.S.-M., 193 Wn.2d 450, 454,
441 P.3d 1181 (2019). Aaron is serving an 18-month term of community custody. If this court
were to grant Aaron’s requested relief, the trial court could modify his term of community custody
at resentencing. See State v. Vasquez, 4 Wn.3d 208, 216, 560 P.3d 853 (2024) (plurality opinion)
(holding that resentencing court had “broad discretion to depart from an earlier sentence” and
consider new sentencing issues where appellate court imposed no limitation). Therefore, this
appeal is not moot.

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was miscalculated and that Aaron had received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
told him that he did not qualify for a mental health sentencing alternative (MHSA), which was
incorrect. State v. Aaron, No. 58517-1-II, slip op. at 6, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2024)
(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2058517-1-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf.
II. RESENTENCING
At the resentencing hearing, rather than requesting an MHSA, Aaron requested an
exceptional sentence below the standard range based on his assertion that he was suffering from a
mental health event at the time of his offense which significantly impaired his capacity to
“appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct, or to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of
the law.” RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e). When asked about whether Aaron was seeking a MHSA, Aaron
explained that he was requesting an exceptional sentence rather than a MHSA because “if the
Court ordered the mental health sentencing alternative, DOC would not have the ability to put him
into the reentry program,” but, if sentenced, Aaron “has been approved to go into the [Reentry
Community Services] program where they are willing to assign him a social worker . . . to provide
him with treatment for up to five years.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 28.
The State argued that a standard range sentence, rather than an exceptional sentence, was
appropriate because Aaron had not met his burden of showing substantial and compelling reasons
for an exceptional sentence because there was no evidence in the record that Aaron was unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform to the requirements of the law as a result
of his mental illness. The State contended that, to the contrary, the circumstances of the incident—
that once Aaron had secured the victim’s cellphone, he fled the scene, found another person and

No. 60069-2-II
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demanded to be driven out of the area and when that person refused, fled on foot—indicate that
Aaron understood that his conduct was wrong. The State also expressed its view that Aaron’s
mental illness concerns would best be addressed through community custody because “[l]etting
him out earlier isn’t going to get him into help sooner. In fact, it will just lessen the probability of
him being ready to get into a situation where he’s going to be supported in the community.” Id. at
23. And the State emphasized that these offenses were committed only five days after Aaron was
released from a sentence on another set of violent offenses.
The court clarified that the reentry program to which defense counsel referred would still
be available if the court denied Aaron’s request and imposed a sentence within the standard range.
Then, the trial court specifically asked Aaron’s counsel for “the best evidence in the record that
you provided to the Court that, on that day, [Aaron] was suffering from an episodic event.” Id. at
35. Defense counsel stated that Aaron’s plea supported his contention that he was suffering from
a mental health episode at the time of his offense. The trial court expressed skepticism that the plea
of guilty, which was written sometime after the offense, can prove that Aaron was in the middle
of a mental health event on the day of the offense. Defense counsel explained that Aaron was not
evaluated contemporaneously with the event. The court then clarified that Aaron had not provided
an expert opinion that, after reviewing the records and facts, Aaron was suffering from a mental
health event. The court then, again, presented counsel with the opportunity to share what, from
counsel’s perspective, was the best evidence that a specific mental illness in effect at the time of
the incident caused Aaron’s conduct. Counsel responded,
I think the best evidence was just the nature of the allegations that were -- the
description of the actual event that took place, the firsthand impressions by the
officers involved in that, the statements to the court by my client that he didn’t
know he was even in Tacoma at the time, the statement that he made to the one

No. 60069-2-II
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victim when he broke the window asking and demanding and pleading that he be
taken away from Tacoma.
Id. at 37.
Following argument, the trial court stated, “[T]he Court is operating under the assumption
that it has discretion to order a mental health sentencing alternative. Also, it has the authority under
RCW 9.94A.535, for exceptional downward.” Id. at 43. The court continued,
But in reviewing the materials that have been provided to the Court, the Court does
not see a basis for a substantial compelling reason to justify an exceptional
downward.
And even if the Court found that [compelling reasons justified an
exceptional downward sentence], then it would still be discretionary, but the Court
is exercising its discretion in not ordering that.
Id. The trial court imposed the low end of the standard range. Aaron appeals the trial court’s denial
of his request for an exceptional sentence.
DISCUSSION
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A trial court “may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if
it finds, considering the purpose of [the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981], that there are substantial
and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” RCW 9.94A.535. One of the factors
that a court may use to justify an exceptional sentence below the standard range is “[t]he
defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her
conduct to the requirements of the law, was significantly impaired” in some way other than by the
voluntary use of drugs or alcohol. RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e).
“While no defendant is entitled to an exceptional sentence below the standard range, every
defendant is entitled to ask the trial court to consider such a sentence and to have the alternative
actually considered.” State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005) (emphasis

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omitted). Additionally, “[w]hen a trial court is called on to make a discretionary sentencing
decision, the court must meaningfully consider the request in accordance with the applicable law.”
State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 56, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017). The sentencing court’s failure to
consider an exceptional sentence authorized by statute is reversible error. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at
342. We may remand for resentencing if both of the following circumstances are met: (1) the trial
court did not think that providing a mitigated sentence was within its discretion, and (2) it is
possible, according to the record, that the trial court would have imposed a mitigated sentence. In
re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322, 333-34, 166 P.3d 677 (2007).
B. ANALYSIS
Aaron contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for an
exceptional sentence because it failed to acknowledge its discretion to impose an exceptional
sentence under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e) where there was no expert evidence in the record. The
record belies this claim. The trial court explicitly recognized its authority to impose an exceptional
sentence and, considering the evidence in the record before it, declined to do so. The trial court
stated that it “has the authority under RCW 9.94A.535, for exceptional downward.” VRP at 43.
The court continued,
But in reviewing the materials that have been provided to the Court, the Court does
not see a basis for a substantial compelling reason to justify an exceptional
downward.
And even if the Court found that [compelling reasons justified an
exceptional downward sentence], then it would still be discretionary, but the Court
is exercising its discretion in not ordering that.
Id. While the trial court indicated that the opinion of a medical expert would be helpful, it never
expressed its view that it was prevented from imposing an exceptional sentence in the absence of
such evidence.

No. 60069-2-II
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Aaron asserts that the trial court must have concluded that expert testimony was required
to impose an exceptional sentence because the trial court imposed a mental health evaluation as a
community custody condition and therefore necessarily found that “reasonable grounds exist to
believe that the offender is a mentally ill person as defined in RCW 71.24.025, and that this
condition is likely to have influenced the offense.” RCW 9.94B.080. But this standard is not
identical to RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e)’s requirements for permitting the trial court to impose an
exceptional sentence. It is possible that the record could support that the offense was “influenced”
by a defendant’s mental condition but fell short of establishing that this condition “significantly
impaired” the defendant’s ability to control his conduct or appreciate that his conduct was wrong.
Even if these standards were legally identical, RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e) leaves it to the trial court’s
discretion to determine whether these circumstances constitute a substantial and compelling reason
for departing from the standard range in light of all of the circumstances. Therefore, the record
does not support the conclusion that the trial court declined to impose an exceptional sentence
because it believed that it lacked the authority to do so in the absence of expert evidence.
Aaron also argues that the trial court did not meaningfully consider its discretion to impose
an exceptional sentence below the standard range because its decision not to impose an exceptional
sentence appears to be largely based on the fact that Aaron did not provide expert evidence to
establish a relationship between his mental health and the offense. But the record does not support
the conclusion that the trial court’s denial of Aaron’s request for an exceptional sentence was based
mainly on Aaron’s failure to support his request with expert evidence. Both attorneys relied on the
circumstances of Aaron’s offense to support their position on an exceptional sentence. Defense
counsel argued that an exceptional sentence was justified because

No. 60069-2-II
8
the nature of the allegations that were -- the description of the actual event that took
place, the firsthand impressions by the officers involved in that, the statements to
the court by my client that he didn’t know he was even in Tacoma at the time, the
statement that he made to the one victim when he broke the window asking and
demanding and pleading that he be taken away from Tacoma.
VRP at 37. The State argued that the nature of the offense—forcibly taking a phone from a stranger
and then attempting to flee the scene by asking another stranger for a ride and then fleeing on foot
when they did not comply—indicate that Aaron understood the wrongfulness of his conduct at the
time of the offense. And the State emphasized the fact that the offense occurred only five days
after Aaron had been released from a sentence for another set of violent offenses. The trial court
could have reasonably determined that there were not substantial and compelling reasons to impose
an exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e), even without considering the lack of expert
evidence. Therefore, the record does not support the conclusion that the trial court did not
meaningfully consider Aaron’s request for an exceptional sentence.
Because the trial court recognized its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence under
RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e), meaningfully considered the arguments and record before it, and ultimately
exercised its discretion not to impose an exceptional sentence, RCW 9.94A.585(1) bars review of
Aaron’s standard range sentence.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that RCW 9.94A.585(1) bars review of Aaron’s claim that the trial court
abused its discretion by imposing a sentence within the standard range because the trial court
recognized its authority to impose an exceptional sentence, meaningfully considered Aaron’s
request, and exercised its discretion not to do so.

No. 60069-2-II
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
CRUSER, C.J.
We concur:
PRICE, J.
VELJACIC, J.