pratt v. young

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Rutland Unit Docket No. 31-1-15 Rdev

ROBERT D. PRATT, SR.,

Plaintiff
¥ BILED
16
SHERWIN YOUNG, APR 14 20
Defendant VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
RUTLAND

DECISION
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

This matter came before the Court on the 16 of February, 2016 for hearing
on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff was present with
his attorney, Karl C. Anderson, and the Defendant was represented by his attorney,
John E. Brady. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Background

This case arises out of an incident involving a dog bite that the Plaintiff
alleges occurred in October 2012. At the time of the incident, the Plaintiff was a
tenant in a rental property owned by the Defendant. Timothy Cummings was a
tenant in a different apartment owned by the Defendant at the same address. Mr.
Cummings kept a dog named Zeus in his apartment. On the day of the incident, Mr.
Cummings invited the Plaintiff into his apartment and the Plaintiff entered. While
the Plaintiff was in Mr. Cummings’s apartment, the Plaintiff reached out his hand
to pet Zeus, and Zeus allegedly bit the Plaintiffs hand, injuring the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff now sues the Defendant, claiming that the Defendant was negligent in
allowing Mr. Cummings to harbor a dangerous and vicious dog in his apartment,
and that the Plaintiffs injuries were caused by this negligence.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56; In re Holbrook, 2016 VT 18, { 28.

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Analysis

On summary judgment, the parties do not dispute the material facts that
form the basis of the Plaintiffs claim. The issue in dispute is the extent of the
Defendant’s legal duty. The existence of a legal duty of care is an essential element
of a claim for negligence, and “an action for negligence fails in the absence of a duty
of care.” Langlois v. Town of Proctor, 2014 VT 130, J 7 (quoting Buxton v.
Springfield Lodge No. 679, Loyal Order of Moose, 2014 VT 52, { 7). “Whether a duty
was present, as well as the scope of any duty, is primarily a question of law.” Id.

The Defendant argues that Vermont law imposes no duty of care on a
residential landlord to protect an invited guest of a tenant from attack by the
tenant’s dog. The Defendant correctly notes that the corpus of Vermont dog bite
cases explores only the liability of the dog owner. See, e.g., Martin v. Christman,
2014 VT 55; Carr v. Case, 135 Vt. 524 (1977); Hillier v. Noble, 142 Vt. 552 (1983);
Davis v. Bedell, 123 Vt. 441 (1963); Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251 (1880). Indeed,
there are no Vermont cases where liability has been imposed upon a landlord for an
attack by a tenant’s dog.

The Defendant also points to the case law on the general duty of a landlord to
the guests of a tenant. In particular, the Defendant cites Beaulac v. Robie and
Slayton, 92 Vt. 27, 32-38 (1917), a case that involved an unsafe trapdoor on leased
retail premises. A retail customer fell through the unsafe trapdoor and was injured.
In ruling that the customer had no cause of action against the landlord, the
Supreme Court of Vermont stated that “persons who claim damages on the ground
that they are invited into a dangerous place in which they receive injuries must
seek their remedy against the person who invited them, and there is nothing in the
relation of the landlord and tenant which changes this rule.” Jd. The Defendant
correctly argues that the application of the holding of Beawlac, id., to this case
compels the conclusion that the Defendant was under no duty of care with respect
to the Plaintiff and the dog in Mr. Cummings’s apartment.

The Plaintiff argues in opposition that Beaulac, id., should not govern, and
that the more recent case of Favreau v. Miller, 156 Vt. 222, 228 (1991), should
control. In Favreau, id., the plaintiff tenant was injured falling from a dangerous
attic staircase in her apartment, and sued her landlord. The Court held that a
landlord can be held liable for exposing a tenant to an unreasonable risk of harm in
the leased premises. Jd.

Contrary to the Plaintiffs characterization, Favreau did not overturn the
principles that led to the Beaulac decision. Favreau stands for the proposition that a

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landlord leasing an apartment to a tenant has a duty to that tenant with respect to
dangerous conditions in that apartment. Favreau is silent on the question of a
landlord’s duty to third-party invitees, a question that remains controlled by
Beaulac. To be clear, the Plaintiff here stands in the place of a third-party invitee to
Mr. Cummings’s apartment, where the injury occurred; the fact that the Plaintiff
was a tenant of another unit owned by the Defendant at the same address does not
alter the analysis.

The Court therefore concludes that, under established Vermont law
regarding the extent of liability for dog bites and the extent of landlord liability for
the injuries to third-party invitees of tenants, the Defendant had no duty of care
with respect to the Plaintiff and the risk of a bite from Mr. Cummings’s dog.

The Plaintiff in opposition further points to Matthews v. Amberwood
Associates Ltd. Partnership, Inc., 719 A.2d 119, 124-26 (Md. 1998), a Maryland case
where a residential landlord was held liable for injuries suffered by an invited guest
on a tenant’s premises. However, in Matthews, id., the Maryland court’s analysis
hinged on the fact that the landlord retained control over the leased premises
through a no-pets clause in the lease. The Maryland court heavily emphasized the
importance of the landlord’s retention of control over the presence of animals on the
leased premises.

In the present case, though, the Plaintiff has presented no evidence
suggesting that the Defendant retained any control over the presence of animals on
the leased premises via any written lease term. Counsel for the Defendant indicated
at hearing that there was in fact no written lease at all, and counsel for the Plaintiff
did not dispute this assertion. Though the Defendant is the summary judgment
movant and bears the evidentiary burden in the first instance, the Plaintiff remains
responsible for supporting assertions of fact that are crucial to his legal theory. “If
the nonmoving party fails to establish an essential element of its case on which it
has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.” Washington v. Pierce, 2005 VT 125, { 17 (quoting State v. G. S.
Blodgett Co., 163 Vt. 175, 180 (1995)), Thus, even if the Court were to adopt the
Maryland rule, there would remain no evidence to give rise to a triable issue
regarding the extent of the Defendant’s control over the presence of animals on the
premises.

Both parties cite numerous other cases from other jurisdictions considering
issues closely related to the one presented by this case. Different states have taken
a wide range of different approaches to this question. However, the rule urged by
the Plaintiff, imposing liability upon landlords for their tenants’ dogs’ bites, would
be a significant departure from clearly established Vermont law. Such an expansion
of liability is not supported by compelling public policy reasons.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Defendant had no duty of care with
respect to the Plaintiff and the risk of a bite from Mr. Cummings’s dog. Plaintiff is
therefore unable to prove the duty element of his negligence claim.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted. Defendant’s counsel shall submit a proposed form of
judgment for Defendant.

Dated at Rutland this 12th day of April, 2016.

Woy Wb Leche

Mary Miles Teachout
Superior Court Judge