Weber v. Ameriscape

Termont Superior Court
Filed 04/13/26
Washington Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Washington Unit Case No. 25-CV-02099
65 State Street
Montpelier VT 05602
802-828-2091
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Parker Weber v. Ameriscape Inc, et al

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion for Summary J udgment (Motion: 4)
Filer: Carl E Lindstrom
Filed Date: February 04, 2026

The motion is GRANTED.

Defendant SBC Cedar has filed the present motion for summary judgment. SBC
contends that, based on the undisputed material facts, it did not owe a duty, either directly or

under vicarious liability to Plaintiffs in this case, and it was not part of a joint venture with the

other Defendants. Plaintiff Parker Weber has filed an opposition to this motion contending that

he has not completed discovery and that SBC is liable either as part of a joint venture or under

Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which holds that individuals can be liable to
third parties when undertaking certain duties.!

Background Facts
As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine what facts may be considered as part
of the record for the present motion. In its initial filing for summary judgment, SBC included a
separate and concise, 54-paragraph statement of undisputed material facts. Each paragraph was

supported by citations to affidavits or specific admissible evidence. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(1). Plaintiff
Webber did not, as required under Rule 56(c)(2), file a response to SBC's statement or provide

any specific citations to affidavits or any other admissible evidence that would indicate a factual
basis to dispute any of the listed facts. Based on the lack of dispute, SBC's Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts are deemed admitted for the purposes of this motion. V.R.C.P.
56(e)(2); Caldwell v. Champlain College, Inc., 2025 VT 17 1 9.

'
Prior to the issuance of this decision, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. While the Court has not resolved this
motion, nothing in the proposed amended complaint alters the Court's analysis in the present motion.
Plaintiff did file a “Counter Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. While this filing
does not directly address SBC’s Statement, it does offer 10 statements that contradict several of
SBC’s assertions. This filing does not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(c)(2), and it is
defective in at least two fundamental ways.
First, the filing relies entirely on Plaintiff’s Complaint and does not contain any citation
to any part of the record beyond the allegations in the complaint. Plaintiff does not cite any other
exhibits, evidence, discovery, affidavits or declarations. As the Vermont Supreme Court has
long held, when a moving party challenges the factual basis of a claim by affidavit or other
documentary evidence, then the non-moving party “may not rest upon his mere allegations, but
must come forward with an opposing affidavit or other evidence that raises a dispute as to the
fact or facts in issue.” Alpstetten Ass’n v. Kelly, 137 Vt. 508, 514 (1979); see also Webb v.
Leclair, 2007 VT 65, ¶ 14 (reaffirming this standard). Based solely on this insufficiency,
Plaintiff’s counter statement is insufficient to create a dispute of fact as a matter of law.
Second, much of Plaintiff’s counter statement includes legal conclusions and other bald
assertions that are out of place in a statement of material facts. By way of example, Plaintiff
contends at paragraph 10 that SBC “had the right to control Mr. Singh in performing this
service.” This is both a legal conclusion as well as an unsupported assertion that begs the
question. The fact that Plaintiff cites to his original complaint only makes the exercise of
discerning any basis for this assertion tautological.
The result is that Plaintiff’s counter statements are not only unsupported but they lack
even the semblance of factual assertions. Based on each of these reasons, the Court will not
consider Plaintiff’s counter statement for the purpose of this motion.
Undisputed Facts
Based on this standard, the Court finds the following facts derived from Defendant’s
SBC’s statement of undisputed material facts.2
At approximately 6:46 AM on April 11, 2024, Satnam Singh was driving a 2019
Freightliner Cascadia tractor trailer southbound on Route 100 near Duxbury, Vermont. At the
same time, Rosetta Weber was driving northbound on the same road. As Mr. Singh and Ms.
Weber approached each other, Mr. Singh’s truck crossed the center line and collided with Ms.

2 The Court has not included SBC’s facts concerning Blackbird’s SMS profile or Mr. Singh’s driving record as these

facts are not material to the Court’s present analysis. Their exclusion is strictly for purpose of relevance.
Weber’s vehicle. Ms. Weber was killed in the resulting accident. Plaintiff is Ms. Weber’s
widower and brought the present action, filed in May 2025, in his own name and as executor of
her Ms. Weber’s estate.
At the time of the incident, Ms. Singh worked and was driving for Blackbird, a Canadian
interstate motor carrier company based out of Calgary.3 Mr. Singh was hauling a load of mulch
on behalf of Ameriscape, a mulch and groundcover wholesaler, who had hired Blackbird. Mr.
Singh was driving to Bisbee Hardware in Waitsfield, Vermont to deliver the load of mulch.
SBC is a Canadian company located in Saint-Prosper, Quebec, that sells cedar shingles
and mulch. SBC does not own or lease any tractor trailers or shipping vehicles. SBC does not
have a relationship with Blackbird or Bisbee Hardware. SBC frequently sells mulch to
Ameriscape, but it does not share any profits or losses with Ameriscape. It does not control or
take part in Ameriscape’s sales, and it does not have a relationship with Ameriscape’s customers.
Apart from mulch sales, in which Ameriscape purchases wholesale mulch from SBC at fixed or
negotiated rates, there is no on-going business relationship between SBC and Ameriscape.
In early 2024, SBC sold a load of mulch to Americscape. Ameriscape then sold the
mulch to Bisbee Hardware. Ameriscape then hired Blackbird, through a trucking contractor, to
haul the purchased mulch from SBC’s Quebec location to Bisbee’s store in Waitsfield, Vermont.
Blackbird then selected Mr. Singh to pick up the mulch shipment. SBC had no role in the sale of
the mulch to Bisbee’s, the selection of Blackbird as trucking contractor, or the assignment of the
driving and hauling to Mr. Singh.
On April 10, 2024, Mr. Singh arrived at SBC’s place of business. SBC employees loaded
Mr. Singh’s truck with mulch and weighed the truck. For customs purposes, SBC was listed as
the exporter/shipper. Through a typo, Brassworks of Rhode Island, was listed as the carrier,
instead of Blackbird. Mr. Singh left SBC’s property shortly after the loading and paperwork
were completed. SBC did not direct or control Mr. Singh’s route or driving choices, and there is
no indication that SBC played any role in Mr. Singh’s driving once he left the SBC premises.
Legal Analysis

A. Standard of Review

3 Neither Mr. Signh, nor Blackbird has, as of the date of this motion, been named as a defendant in the present action

or complaint.
Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. “The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to as a matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(a). See Gross v.
Turner, 2018 VT 80, ¶ 8, 208 Vt. 112; Gilman v. Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2003 VT 55, ¶ 7, 175
Vt. 554. The moving party must support its assertion with numbered paragraphs with references
to materials in the record. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(1). The nonmoving party must show that the material
facts are in dispute. Boyd v. State, 2022 VT 12, 275 A.3d 155. The nonmoving party does this
through introducing their own admissible evidence. Gross, 2018 VT at ¶ 8. Additionally, the
court gives the nonmoving party the benefit of reasonable doubts and inferences. Brousseau v.
Brousseau, 2007 VT 77, 182 Vt. 533. If the court determines there are no genuine issues of
material fact, the court will grant summary judgment. V.R.C.P. 56.

B. Negligence and Vicarious Liability

The facts of this case demonstrate that SBC’s only relationship to the accident involving
Mr. Singh and Ms. Weber is that Mr. Singh was driving from SBC’s place of business to his
delivery destination carrying a load of mulch purchased by Ameriscape from SBC. While there
is some evidence of a relationship between Singh, Blackbird, and Ameriscape, there is no
evidence that would create a relationship between SBC and either Blackbird or Singh. There is
no evidence that SBC had a role in selecting, hiring, or overseeing Blackbird or Mr. Singh. SBC
did not control Mr. Singh’s route, and SBC did not enter into a contractual relationship with
Blackbird or Mr. Singh. Effectively, Mr. Singh was a contractor retained by Ameriscape to pick
up and carry the mulch, which Americscape had purchased from SBC and sold to Bisbee, to
Bisbee’s store.
As a result, the Court finds that Blackbird and Singh were independent contractors who
performed a service of carrying mulch. As an independent contractor outside of SBC’s control,
SBC is not responsible either directly or through vicarious liability for Mr. Singh’s later
negligence. Richards v. Consolidated Lighting Co., 90 Vt. 552, 557 (1916). As the Court in that
case noted, permitting the servant, or agent, of another to enter the defendant’s property to do
work does not give rise to negligence if the owner lacks any authority over the agent. Id. at 556–
57. In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that SBC had authority over Singh or Blackbird.
As such, there is no basis to support a claim that SBC owed any duty to third-parties who might
encounter Singh when he left the SBC property. Without a basis to assign a duty of care from
SBC to the Webers or other drivers in Mr. Singh’s path, Plaintiff cannot establish the essential
elements of negligence on which his claims rely. Montague v. Hundred Acre Homestead, LLC,
2019 VT 16, ¶ 14.
Plaintiff argues that SBC’s label as a shipper gives rise to liability under Section 324A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This provision of the Restatement, which the Vermont
Supreme Court has adopted, creates an exception to the general principle cited above that parties
are generally not liable for the actions of independent contractors to third parties. Derosia v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Vt. 178, 182–83 (1990). This provision, however, only applies when
(1) the party’s failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm; or (2) the party
undertakes a duty that belonged to the contractor to the third-party; or (3) the other party or the
third-party relied on the party to perform a particular undertaking. Id. In this case, there are no
facts to support any of the three possible routes for liability under Section 324A. First and
foremost, there is no allegation that any of SBC’s actions contributed to the accident. Mr. Singh
crossed the centerline, and there is no evidence suggesting that any thing SBC did contributed to
this unfortunate moment. SBC did not undertake any duties or actions that were directed at the
Webers. SBC loaded mulch onto a truck at the direction of a buyer. It did not select the driver,
vet the driver, or even have reason to question the driver. SBC did not direct the driver or take
on any duty after Mr. Singh left their premises. For these reasons, the Court finds no basis to
extend liability under Section 324A. There has been no threshold showing. Kennery v. State,
2011 VT 121, ¶ 14.
Plaintiff also seeks to tie SBC’s nominal designation as shipper to various duties under
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, but in each of the cases cited, the analysis is
similar to the foregoing Section 324A analysis. Namely, did SBC do something that increased
the harm or fail to warn about a hazard that resulted from the shippers action. See, e.g., Contship
Containerslines, Ltd. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 442 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a
shipper has a duty to adequately warn a carrier of foreseeable dangers posed by hazardous
cargo). Here, there is no allegation that the mulch SBC loaded was inherently dangerous either
in its composition or loading. There is no allegation that SBC’s failed to warn about a particular
danger that it created or resulting from their loading. Again, there is simply no evidence in the
record that would suggest that anything SBC did or did not do increased or affected the resulting
accident with Ms. Webber, such that was some duty or resulting causative chain that would
support a finding of negligence or liability. Plaintiff’s efforts to tie SBC to the present action is
missing several critical links in the chain of both duty and causation. As such, SBC is entitled to
summary judgment on these issues.
C. Joint Venture Liability
In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that SBC should be held liable as part of a joint
venture. “A joint venture is a special relationship of two or more parties to engage in and carry
out a single business venture for joint profit.” Winey v. William E. Dailey, Inc., 161 Vt. 129, 139
(1993). To qualify as a joint venture,” there must be an agreement to share in profits and losses,
joint control or right to control, a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter and a community
of interest in the performance of the common purpose.” Id. In effect, a joint venture arises when
separate entities or individuals so closely align their activities as to become a de facto
partnership. Id.
Plaintiff’s argument on this point lacks any credible evidence to give rise to the legal
conclusion that SBC acted in concert with any of the other defendants. The evidence indicates
that SBC sold mulch to Ameriscape, and at Ameriscape’s direction loaded it onto Mr. Singh’s
truck. Such activity is simply a commercial transaction. Plaintiff uses the designation of
“shipper” to spin out a theoretical network of business connections between SBC and the other
defendants. While such might be appropriate for a complaint, it is insufficient to support a claim
in a motion for summary judgment. SBC has come forward with credible and unrebutted
evidence that their role in the transaction was to sell a single load of mulch. They were paid for
this load, but they were not part of a joint venture as they did not share profits or control the
overall transaction. As such, the claim for joint venture cannot be sustained on the record before
the Court. For these reasons, SBC is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
D. Disputed Facts and Discovery
Plaintiff’s final argument against summary judgment contends that he has not had enough
time to perform adequate discovery. A party seeking to forestall a motion for summary
judgment on the basis of needing additional time for discovery is required under Rule 56(d) to
show by affidavit or declaration the specified reasons “it cannot present facts essential to justify
the opposition.” V.R.C.P. 56(d). As one trial court interpreting Rule 56(d)’s obligation to
establish a basis for continuing consideration for lack of discovery has held:
The rules allow a court to defer considering a motion for summary judgment to
allow time for additional discovery “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.”
V.R.C.P. 56(d)(1). An affidavit submitted in accordance with this rule should
describe (1) the facts Landowners seek and how they can be obtained, (2) how
Landowners reasonably expect the additional facts will create a genuine issue of
material fact, (3) efforts Landowners have made to obtain the additional
information; and (4) why those efforts were unsuccessful. See Aetna Cas. and
Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., Inc., 404 F.3d 566, 606 (2d Cir. 2005); Sage
Realty Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 34 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1994).

University of Vermont v. Porter, Dckt. No. 22-CV-3135, at 3–4 (Feb. 21, 2023) (Toor, J.).
In this case, Plaintiff has not submitted any such declaration or indicated what
information remains outstanding or necessary to further determine SBC’s role in the transaction
or what facts would be necessary to disprove or create a factual dispute against SBC’s evidence
showing its limited role in the commercial transaction. In effect, Plaintiff has turned back to his
original complaint as source for these allegations. Neither Plaintiff, nor Plaintiff’s counsel, have
suggested that there are specific facts that discovery is likely to uncover. For these reasons, the
Court finds no basis to extend additional time in the hope that something might arise from an
unspecified discovery process that would support a theory from Plaintiff’s speculations.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, SBC’s motion for summary judgment is Granted, and all claims
against SBC are Dismissed pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56. The Court clerk shall set this matter for a
status conference in regard to Plaintiff’s motion for an amended complaint, the remaining
discovery issues, and whether the parties are prepared to revisit Fine Home Details, Inc.’s motion
to dismiss in light of the Court’s September 9, 2025 decision.

Electronically signed on 4/10/2026 3:14 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

__________________________________
Daniel P. Richardson
Superior Court Judge