Zampella v. Romp

7ermont Superior Court
Filed 03/1 26
Ad dison nit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Addison Unit Case No. 25-CV-04554
7 Mahady Court

Middlebury VT 05753
802-388-7741
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Aniello Zampella v. Henry Romp

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion: 1)
Filer: Hans G. Huessy
Filed Date: December 10, 2025

Plaintiff Aniello Zampella filed this case on October 20, 2025, and styled his complaint
as an action for eviction. On December 10, 2025, he moved for summary judgment, which is
currently before the court. Plaintiff asserts that (1) Defendant Henry Romp resides in Plaintiff's
property, (2) there is no lease agreement related to Defendant's occupancy of the property, (3)
Plaintiff had agreed to let Defendant reside at the property with the understanding that Defendant
would work for Plaintiff, (4) Defendant had now stopped working for Plaintiff, (5) Defendant did
not exercise an option to purchase the property, which option has now expired, and (6) Plaintiff
terminated Defendant's tenancy by providing him a valid notice dated August 14, 2025.

Defendant is self-represented, and has not, at first, properly responded to Plaintiff's
motion. After urging by the court, Defendant filed a written opposition, which though still does
not strictly comply with the requirement of Rule 56 of Vermont's Rules Civil Procedure that a
nonmoving party responding to a statement of undisputed material facts "file a paragraph-by-
paragraph response, with specific citations to particular parts of materials in the record that the
responding party asserts demonstrate a dispute." See V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2) (emphasis added).

Defendant has, however, requested that the court defer its decision on Plaintiff's motion
and allow further discovery under Rule 56(d). See V.R.P.C. 56(d) ("If a nonmovant shows by
affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition, the court may ... defer considering the motion or deny it; ... allow time to obtain
affidavits or declarations, or to take discovery; or ... issue any other appropriate order."). The
request is accompanied by Defendant's own affidavit and advances several grounds in support of
deferral. Defendant had also attempted to file counterclaims at the early stage of the case, which,
the court has rejected as improperly filed. See Entry Regarding Motion (filed Jan. 12, 2026)
("Plaintiff also seeks to bifurcate his complaint from defendant's counterclaims. That motion is
premature and therefore denied. Defendant's motion to extend the time to file an answer and
counterclaim was denied. There is, at this time, no counterclaim to bifurcate."). Defendant has
not attempted to refile the counterclaim.

Conclusions

The court will deny Plaintiff's motion at this time. Several considerations militate in
favor of this decision. First, the motion was filed after a relatively short time after the complaint.

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The factual record in the case is not particularly well-developed. And, Defendant is self-
represented and has not had adequate opportunity to engage in discovery. Allowing discovery
may help elucidate whether this case is, in fact, a simple eviction action.

Under Rule 56, a motion for summary judgment may be filed “at any time until 30 days
after the close of all discovery.” V.R.C.P. 56(b). It is not required in all cases that discovery be
completed before such a motion is filed. Moyers v. Poon, 2017 WL 2963438, at *3 (Vt. June
2017) (unpub. mem.) (citation omitted). However, there should be “an adequate time for
discovery.” Doe v. Doe, 172 Vt. 533, 534 (2001) (mem.) (quotation omitted). Indeed, the
nonmovant must be afforded “an adequate opportunity to engage in discovery before being
required to respond to the motion.” Al Baraka Bancorp (Chicago), Inc. v. Hilweh, 163 Vt. 148,
156 (1994); see also Bushey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 164 Vt. 399, 405 (1995) (rejecting plaintiff’s
claim that summary judgment was premature where discovery, although not complete, had
produced “a substantial amount of information,” including depositions of defendant’s personnel
and its experts and responses to written interrogatories); Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 255
(1989) (plaintiff had adequate time for discovery where she had sixteen months between the
filing of the complaint and the summary judgment hearing and more than eight months from the
signing of a discovery schedule to complete depositions).

Here, Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment less than two months after filing his
complaint. There is no discovery schedule in place. In several of his assertions of fact, Plaintiff
relies solely on the assertions in his own affidavits, see SUMF (filed Dec. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 1–4,
which Defendant has not had the opportunity to explore through deposition, see In re
Shenandoah LLC, 2011 VT 68, ¶ 17, 190 Vt. 149 (“It is well-established that ultimate or
conclusory facts and conclusions of law cannot be utilized on a summary-judgment motion”).
The court concludes that the factual record in this case is simply not developed enough, and there
has not been adequate time for discovery. As such, it would not be efficient for the court to
address the issues raised at this time.

Separately, the court notes that summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(a). To show that a fact is disputed, the nonmoving
party must file a response, “with specific citations to particular parts of materials in the record
that the responding party asserts demonstrate a dispute.” V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2). Although Defendant
has largely failed to comply with this requirement, “in some situations, the trial court may
exercise its discretion and refuse to grant summary judgment even though the legal standard
appears to have been satisfied.” Margison v. Spriggs, 146 Vt. 116, 119 (1985). This could be the
case where the court is “clearly apprised of important and relevant facts which could have
defeated the motion for summary judgment though offered in a manner arguably not in
compliance with the rule.” Bingham v. Tenney, 154 Vt. 96, 101 (1990). The court also may
afford some leeway to a pro se litigant. Zorn v. Smith, 2011 VT 10, ¶ 22, 189 Vt. 219.

The court is satisfied by the grounds for deferral advanced in Defendant’s motion and
accompanying affidavit. Defendant shall have additional time to complete discovery. The court
will, however, limit the scope of the discovery to those issues raised in Defendant’s motion and

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affidavit, and instructs Defendant that it shall be completed with all deliberate speed. See
V.R.C.P. 56(d); 10B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2740 (4th ed.).

Lastly, but perhaps most crucially, the court will caution Defendant that in filing with the
court, a party is certifying, to the best of its knowledge, that its legal contentions are warranted
by existing law. See V.R.C.P. 11(b)(2). Inventing a legal authority and presenting it to the court
for a particular proposition is unacceptable. See Defendant’s Motion for Continuance (filed Feb.
13, 2026) (citing nonexistent Estate of Calderwood, 2020 VT 3, ¶ 13)) and compare with In re
H.T., 2020 VT 3, ¶ 13 (case that Defendant actually cites, recounting background of CHINS case
at paragraph 13). Whatever might have led to Defendant citing Calderwood, he should keep in
mind that similar violations of Rule 11 rule in the future may lead to sanctions. See V.R.C.P.
11(c).

Order

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED at this time, without prejudice to
renewal after Plaintiff has had a fair and reasonable opportunity to conduct appropriate
discovery.

Signed electronically March 13, 2026 pursuant to V.R.E.F 9(d).

_________________________________________
David Barra
Superior Court Judge

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