Vecchiarino v. Ridgway

7ermont Superior Court
Filed. 02/10/26
Windhain nit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Windham Unit Case No. 23-CV-01112
Court Street
Newfane VT 05345
802-365-7979
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Giovanni Vecchiarino v. Margit Ridgway, et al

Ruling on Defendant Margit Ridgway's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Motion # 22)
In this personal injury action, Plaintiff Giovanni Vecchiarino alleges that he was
injured when Defendant Seton King hit a golf ball in an indoor golf simulator room, and
the golf ball ricocheted and struck Plaintiff. The incident took place at a property
allegedly owned by Defendant Margit Ridgway, who had purportedly leased the
premises to Defendant Snow Mansions, LLC ("Snow"). Ridgway moves for summary
judgment based on the theory that she had no duty toward Vecchiarino because Snow
had taken complete control of the premises.

Procedural Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence in the record, referred to in the
statements required by V.R.C.P. 56(c), shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
V.R.C.P. 56(a); Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 163 Vt. 83, 86 (1994). The Court derives the
undisputed facts from the parties' statements of fact submitted under V.R.C.P. 56(c) and
any supporting documents and affidavits. Boulton v. CLD Consulting Engineers, Inc.,
2003 VT 72, 1 29, 175 Vt. 413, 427. "Where the moving party does not bear the burden
of persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden of production by showing the court that
there is an absence of evidence in the record to support the nonmoving party's case."
Caldwell v. Champlain Coll. Inc., 2025 VT 17, {7 (quotation omitted). "The nonmoving
party may survive the motion if it responds with specific facts raising a triable issue,"
and courts "give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
inferences." Id. (quotations omitted). Summary judgment is "mandated," however,
"where, after an adequate time for discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case and on which the
party has the burden of proof at trial." Jd. (quotation omitted).

Facts

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. At the time of the
events that precipitated this complaint, Ridgway owned the property in question, in
which the golf simulator room was located. Prior to that time, Ridgway had entered into

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a contract to sell the property to Steel Work Realty Ventures. Exh. B at 1. The parties
substituted PS Dover Properties LLC as the purchaser, and due to ongoing permitting
issues, the parties agreed that Ridgway would rent the property to the purchaser or its
assignees while she attempted to resolve the permitting issues, “allowing the purchaser
to perform needed maintenance and improvement to the property while relieving the
seller of the burden and expense of managing the property until a closing” could occur.
Id. In accordance with that understanding, Ridgway entered into a lease agreement
with Snow (as assignee) for the premises at 2 Margit Ridgway Road in Dover, Vermont.
Id.

Under the terms of the lease, Snow was to pay Ridgway $75,000 for the term of
the lease, beginning on May 11, 2021 and ending on May 11, 2024. Id. at 2. The lease
agreement specified that Snow would use the premises “as long and short term
residential rental property and for camps or other gatherings” and was “entitled to all
income therefrom without accounting to” Ridgway. Id. Snow agreed to “be responsible
for all maintenance of and repairs to the Premises.” Id. at 3. Snow was also responsible
for utilities and taxes, and could make alterations, remodel, or renovate the premises at
its cost and without further approval. Id. Snow was also required to purchase and
maintain liability insurance for injury claims related to the premises. Id. at 3–4.

Ridgway had no involvement with the rentals of the premises once Snow began
conducting rentals. Exh. C at 66. The fraternity rented the premises on or around
December 20, 2021. Complaint, ¶ 6. It is undisputed that Vecchiarino sustained his
injury in the golf simulator room on the premises on or about December 20, 2021.

Plaintiff asserts that Ridgway placed a sign on the door of the golf simulator room
indicating that it was broken, gave “the renters” a tour of the premises, and told them
that they should not use the room. Exh. 2, responses to ¶¶ 5 and 32.1

Discussion

Ridgway contends that although she remained the titled owner of the premises
until the sale was finalized, she had no control of the premises and was not involved in
Snow’s rental business, including the rental to Plaintiff’s fraternity on the weekend of

1 Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant Margit Ridgway’s Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts that did not include “specific citations to particular parts of materials in the record that the
responding party asserts demonstrate a dispute” to Exhibits 1 and 4. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2). Plaintiff
also did not file a separate statement of disputed facts with specific citations to these materials,
which he included with his opposition filings and to which he refers in his Opposition Motion to
Defendant Ridgway’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Request for Hearing (“Opposition”).
See V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2) (“To the extent that the responding party asserts that there are additional
material facts that should be considered, the party may file a separate and concise statement of
additional material facts in numbered paragraphs, with specific citations to particular parts of
admissible materials in the record.”) The Court construes Plaintiff’s reference to Exhibits 1 and
2 in his Opposition as an attempt to dispute Ridgway’s assertion that she was not in possession
or control of the premises and that she did not have anything to do with the rental to the
fraternity.

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the incident that resulted in Plaintiff’s injury. Essentially, Ridgway’s argument is that
the evidence shows that she had turned over control of the premises and its rental
business to Snow, and conversely, that there is no evidence that shows that she had a
duty toward Plaintiff as Snow’s invitee.

“Common law negligence has four elements: a legal duty owed by defendant to
plaintiff, a breach of that duty, actual injury to the plaintiff, and a causal link between
the breach and the injury.” Demag v. Better Power Equip., Inc., 2014 VT 78, ¶ 6, 197 Vt.
176 (quoting Zukatis v. Perry, 165 Vt. 298, 301 (1996). “The existence of a duty ‘is
primarily a question of law.’” Id. (quoting Endres v. Endres, 2008 VT 124, ¶ 11, 185 Vt.
63). “Absent a duty of care, an action for negligence fails.” Deveneau v. Wielt, 2016 VT
21, ¶ 8, 201 Vt. 396.

Plaintiff notes that “[t]he landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to an invitee,
such that the invitee ‘is not unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger.’” Demag
v. Better Power Equip., Inc., 2014 VT 78, ¶ 11 (quoting Ball v. Melsur Corp., 161 Vt. 35,
43 (1993)) (overruled by Demag as to the distinction between invitees and licensees).
That broad statement in Demag occurs within a discussion of the previous distinctions
between a landowner’s duty toward licensees and invitees under the common law.
Importantly, the injured party in Ball was making a delivery of wood flour for the
defendant’s use at the premises owned by the defendant. Neither Demag nor Ball
squarely support the proposition that Plaintiff was Ridgway’s invitee for purposes of
establishing a duty, or that Ridgway, as owner of the property, automatically had a duty
of care to Plaintiff while he was on the premises.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Bardwell Motor Inn, Inc. v. Accavallo, in which the
“plaintiff here had a nondelegable duty to keep its premises reasonably safe,” is similarly
unavailing. 135 Vt. 571, 573 (1977). In Bardwell, the hotel operator had a nondelegable
duty toward its guests to keep the premises reasonably safe, when a guest fell through a
door from which a contractor had removed a glass panel and failed to advise about the
dangerous condition of the door. Id. Bardwell refers to another case, Digregorio v.
Champlain Valley Fruit Co., which Plaintiff also relies upon here. 127 Vt. 562 (1969).
In Digregorio, an injured customer had a right of action against a grocery store owner
even though the cause of the injury was a thermometer that another party, a fruit
wholesaler, had left in a piece of fruit. Id. Both of these cases are actually about
indemnification rights between joint tortfeasors in which one tortfeasor was the person
in control of the premises and the other person was responsible for the tort. In both
cases, the injured party in the underlying action was a business invitee of the person
controlling the premises, a crucial distinction from the current case, in which Plaintiff
and the fraternity members were invitees of Snow, the rental company. In Bardwell and
Digregorio, the hotel operator and grocery store operator controlled the premises in
which another party performed a task negligently. Those circumstances do not align
with the facts in this case.

Plaintiff proffers that Ridgway admits to having put a sign on the door of the golf
simulator room and that she showed “renters” the room and told them not to use it.
This evidence is equivocal at best, because it does not refer to a date on which she

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purportedly placed the sign on the room or whether she is referring to representatives of
Snow, or the fraternity, as the “renters.” Even if the Court makes all reasonable
inferences from this evidence in favor of Plaintiff, the evidence does not render it a
dispute of fact that Ridgway, rather than Snow controlled the property under the terms
of the lease, and it does not show that Ridgway had assumed a business relationship as
premises owner toward the fraternity or Plaintiff. The inferential leap is too great.

Plaintiff argues that he “has alleged that Defendant Ridgway was the owner of the
property at the time of the incident.” Opposition at 3. Plaintiff points to 12 V.S.A. §
1036, which provides that “[w]here recovery is allowed against more than one
defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of the defendant's causal negligence to
the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is
allowed.” That statute establishes proportional liability when there is recovery against
multiple defendants, but it does not establish that Ridgway, as undisputed owner of the
property, had control of the premises and a duty to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff urges the Court to apply sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement of
Torts (2d). Section 343 provides the following:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only
if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize
the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it,
and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.

Restatement (2d) of Torts § 343. Section 343A provides:

(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the
possessor should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate
harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the
invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the
facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance
indicating that the harm should be anticipated.

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Application of the rules stated in these sections of the Restatement, however,
would not elevate Ridgway to a possessor of the premises because Plaintiff has not
disputed Snow’s possession and control of the premises or produced evidence from
which the Court could reasonably infer that Ridgway controlled the premises.

The Vermont Supreme Court has noted that “[w]hile we have followed § 343 in
Vermont, see LeClair v. LeClair, 2017 VT 34, ¶ 11, 204 Vt. 422, 169 A.3d 743, this
section, along with § 343A, addresses only ‘possessor[s] of land.’” Fleurrey v. Dep’t of
Aging & Indep. Living, 2023 VT 11, ¶ 12, 217 Vt. 527. It noted further that

[a] land possessor is:
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with
intent to control it or
(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with
intent to control it, if no other person has
subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or
(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation
of the land, if no other person is in possession under
Clauses (a) and (b).

Id. (quoting Restatement (2d) of Torts § 328E); see also Possessor, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Someone who has possession of real or personal property;
esp., a person who is in occupancy of land with the intent to control it or has been but no
longer is in that position, but no one else has gained occupancy or has a right to gain
it.”). In the face of Ridgway’s evidence that Snow controlled the property, Plaintiff’s
evidence does not support reasonable inferences that it is a genuine dispute of material
fact that Ridgway continued to maintain control of the property such that a duty arose to
Plaintiff.2

In Fleurrey, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a
negligence claim against a landlord where the tenant’s invitee was injured due to a
dangerous condition on the property, and the plaintiff had not alleged a legal
relationship to the landlord that would establish the existence of a duty. Id., ¶ 14. Here,
Plaintiff’s bald allegation in the complaint that the fraternity rented the property from
Ridgway and Snow would perhaps survive a motion to dismiss. In the context of this
motion for summary judgment, however, Ridgway has backed with evidence the
assertion that Snow controlled the property. Plaintiff has not responded by producing
evidence that would show that Ridgway, as owner of the premises, had a legal
relationship to Plaintiff such that a duty arose.

2 It does not escape the Court’s attention that if Plaintiff were correct in his contention that

Ridgway’s purported note on the door of simulator, and her warning to not use the room, give
rise to a legal relationship to Plaintiff that establishes a duty to Plaintiff, she would then have
warned Plaintiff about the simulator, and Plaintiff has produced nothing to show that there are
disputed facts to support the theory that her duty would have extended beyond such a warning.

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It has long been the law in Vermont that “[l]iability for an injury due to defective
premises ordinarily depends upon power to prevent the injury by making repairs and
therefor rests primarily upon him who has control and possession of the premises.” Id.,
¶ 7 (quoting Beaulac v. Robie, 92 Vt. 27, 32 (1917)). “A tenant having entire control of
the premises is, so far as third persons are concerned, deemed the owner.” Id. (quoting
Beaulac, 92 Vt. at 32.). Ridgway has demonstrated with reference to admissible
evidence that it is undisputed that Snow, as tenant, had control and possession of the
premises. The burden thus shifted to Plaintiff, who also has the burden of proving each
element of negligence at trial. Plaintiff has not shown that the disputed facts could
support the element of duty in his claim against Ridgway. Ridgway is therefore entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

Order

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Ridgway’s motion for summary
judgment is granted.

Electronically signed: 2/9/2026 1:09:23 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

_________________________________________
John R. Treadwell
Superior Court Judge

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