Tyler Bridge Road Permit Amendment Application - Decision on Motion

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
Environmental Division Docket No. 25-ENV-00066
32 Cherry St, 2nd Floor, Suite 303,
Burlington, VT 05401
802-951-1740
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Tyler Bridge Road Permit Amendment Application
ENTRY ORDER
Title: Motion for Party Status
Filed: December 8, 2025
Filed By: Pietro J. Lynn, attorney for Appellant
Applicant’s Opposition to Appellant’s Motion for Party Status, filed December 19, 2025, by
John M. Mazzuchi, attorney for Applicant
Appellant’s Reply in Support of Motion for Party Status, filed January 2, 2026, by Pietro J.
Lynn
The motion is GRANTED IN PART.
This is an appeal by Theodore Palmer (Appellant or Mr. Palmer) of a decision of the Act 250
District #9 Environmental Commission’s (District Commission) denial of his request for party status
and a public hearing on an Act 250 amendment application (#9A0196-2). The revised application
seeks approval for the construction of a ±2,000 square-foot, single-story duplex building (with two
bedrooms per unit) on an undeveloped ±116-acre tract of land located off Turkey Lane in Monkton,
Vermont, ±0.7 miles north of the intersection with Tyler Bridge Road (the Property). 1 By Entry Order
issued November 24, 2025, this Court denied Doyle-Burr Farm, LLC’s (Applicant) motion to dismiss
and gave Applicant 14 days to file a motion asserting his claim of party status. Applicant’s motion for
party status was timely filed. Appellant has moved for party status pursuant to 10 V.S.A. §
8504(d)(1)(B) and 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c)(1)(E).
The Legislature has authorized any “person aggrieved” by an act or decision of a District
Commission to appeal to this Court within 30 days of the act or decision. 10 V.S.A. § 8504(a). A
“person aggrieved” is statutorily defined as “a person who alleges an injury to a particularized interest
protected by the provisions of law listed in section 8503 of this title, attributable to an act or decision

1 The original amendment application proposed a ±2,500 square-foot, 4-bedroom single-family residence on the

Property.

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by a district coordinator, District Commission, the Secretary, or the Environmental Division that can
be redressed by the Environmental Division or the Supreme Court.” 10 V.S.A. § 8502(7) (emphasis
added); see In re Snowstone LLC Stormwater Discharge Authorization, 2021 VT 36, ¶¶17–19
(citations omitted) (interpreting the quantum of evidence required to establish statutory standing
under § 8504 in light of the definition of “person aggrieved”). A “particularized interest” for the
purposes of § 8504(a)—similar to “particularized interest”-based standing in Act 250 cases under 10
V.S.A. § 6085(c)(1)(E)—is “an interest that sets the interests of the would-be party apart from the
general interests of others.” Snowstone, 2021 VT 36, ¶ 16. As the language of § 8502(7) suggests,
“statutory standing under § 8504(a) may be predicated on allegations, and the showing required to
establish statutory standing under § 8504(a) is minimal.” Id. at ¶ 15. Allegations describing a
“reasonable possibility of injury” exceed § 8504(a)’s evidentiary threshold. Id.
Typically in the Act 250 context, the involved District Commission must first grant the
aggrieved person party status under specified Act 250 criteria. 2 10 V.S.A. § 8504(d)(1). Any
subsequent appeal by a person aggrieved is then limited to those criteria under which the District
Commission granted party status. Id. However, “notwithstanding these limitations [of § 8504(d)(1)],
an aggrieved person may appeal an act or decision of the District Commission if . . . [this Court]
determines that: . . . (B) the decision being appealed from is the grant or denial of party status.” Id. at
§ 8504(d)(1)(B).
Here, is undisputed that: (1) the District Commission reviewed the Act 250 amendment
application at issue as a minor application under Act 250 Rule 51; (2) Appellant functionally sought
both party status and a hearing before the District Commission; and (3) the District Commission ruled
upon and denied both of Appellant’s requests. 3 Thus, the Court concludes that the decision being
appealed from is the denial of party status that may be properly appealed to the Environmental
Division under § 8504(d)(1)(B), notwithstanding the limitations of § 8504(d)(1), assuming Appellant
otherwise qualifies as an aggrieved person.
In this case, Appellant has alleged possible injuries from Applicant’s project that are personal
to him (and not interests of the public generally). Further, these possible injuries are both

2 This status must thereafter be exercised through participation before the District Commission and retained at

the end of the District Commission’s proceedings. Id.
3 Specifically, the District Commission reviewed Mr. Palmer’s request for party status and a public hearing and

concluded that he had not established a “particularized interest” under any of the requested Act 250 criteria. Accordingly,
the District Commission denied his request for party status and his request for a public hearing and issued the permit
amendment as a minor application.

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“nonfrivolous” and “not entirely speculative.” Snowstone, 2021 VT 36, ¶ 17. For instance, he alleges
that:
(1) the proposed development application indicates that there will
be water run-off into a tributary of Otter Creek and yet there is no
corresponding indication in the application that the wastewater system
will be designed to prevent any pollution, which will directly and
negatively impact [him] . . . as an adjoining landowner whose land
receives drainage from the project tract;
(2) the application’s proposed driveway would intersect Turkey
Lane with potentially unsafe sightlines, which will directly and
negatively impact him personally because he uses this portion of the
road on a daily basis to access his home;
(3) the proposed development would disrupt a robust and scenic
wildlife habitat, and the proposed duplex would adversely affect the
scenic beauty of the area as viewed from his property; and
(4) the application proposes that the duplex be constructed on
agricultural land whose location would make it difficult or impossible
for Mr. Palmer to continue agricultural operations on the remainder of
his property due to the project’s impact on forestry and soil.

Appellant’s Motion for Party Status at 3 (emphasis added). These allegations correspond to Act 250
Criteria 1, 5, 8 and 9(B), respectively, and are adequate to establish a particularized interest—and
aggrieved person status—under § 8504(a).
Under 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c)(1)(E), “any adjoining property owner or other person who has a
particularized interest protected by . . . chapter [151 of Title 10] that may be affected by an act or
decision of a District Commission” shall be entitled to party status in proceedings before the District
Commission. 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c)(1)(E). In Snowstone, the Vermont Supreme Court noted that “the
standard for establishing standing to appeal under § 8504(a) may not be the same as that for
establishing standing to challenge an Act 250 permit as a person with a particularized interest.” 2021
VT 36, ¶ 17, n. 5. While correctly stating that § 6085 “includes a detailed set of requirements for a
person seeking party status on the basis of a ‘particularized interest,” the Supreme Court further
observed that this Court “has interpreted § 6085(c)(1)(E) to require that a person seeking aggrieved-
party status in an Act 250 proceeding before a district commission need only demonstrate a
‘reasonable possibility’ that their particularized interest may be affected.” Id. (citing In re Bennington
Wal-Mart Demolition/Const. Permit, No. 158-10-11 Vtec, slip. op. at 9-10 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div.
Apr. 24, 2014) (Walsh, J.)). Ultimately, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that it “need not
decide whether ‘reasonable possibility’ is the proper standard under Act 250.” Id.

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The Court continues to apply the Bennington Wal-Mart standard. As noted above, under §
6085(c)(1)(E), “[a]ny adjoining property owner or other person who has a particularized interest
protected by [Act 250] that may be affected by an act or decision by a district commission” is entitled
to party status. 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c)(1)(E) (emphasis added). Thus, a person seeking party status under
this section must allege, by way of a petition consistent with 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c)(2)(A)-(D), a “specified
interest protected by Act 250 that is particular to them, not a general policy concern shared by the
general public.” Bennington Wal-Mart, No. 158-10-11 Vtec, slip. op. at 9 (Apr. 24, 2012) (Walsh, J.).
However, to show that their particularized interest “may be affected by an act or decision of a district
commission,” a person seeking party status under Act 250 is not required to prove that a decision
regarding the proposed project will affect their particularized interests, only that it “may.” In using
“may,” the statute is permissive and indicates possibility not exactitude. See Black’s Law Dictionary
(12th ed. 2024) (defining “may” in relevant part as: “1) To be permitted; 2) To be a possibility . . . .”).
Therefore, the Court concludes that the standard for obtaining party status under 10 V.S.A. §
6085(c)(1)(E) is a showing of a reasonable possibility that a decision on the proposed project may
affect a person’s particularized interest. 4 Id. at 10, n.5. We continue to reject the application of any
“heightened evidentiary standard, more akin to a merits review” when considering a party's standing
under § 6085(c)(1)(E). Id..
In this case, the District Commission found that Appellant is an adjoining landowner within
the meaning of 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c)(1)(E), but it concluded—with limited findings or analysis—that
“‘particularized interest’ has not been established under any of the requested Act 250 Criteria.”
Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, Ex. 1 at 2. Thus, it denied Appellant’s party status request under all
requested criteria, as well as his request for a hearing. For the reasons discussed above, the Court
concludes that Appellant has adequately articulated particularized interests (i.e., interests protected by
Act 250 that are personal to him) under Criteria 1, 5, 8 and 9(B).
Having concluded that Appellant failed to establish any particularized interests, the District
Commission did not determine whether he had shown a reasonable possibility that the proposed
project may affect such interests. While this Court could potentially resolve this issue under its de
novo hearing standard described in 10 V.S.A. § 8504(h), we believe that the better practice is to remand

4 An appellant must also provide an offer of proof that shows how the particularized interests they allege may

be affected by the issuance of the Act 250 permit. In other words, they must refer to evidence that demonstrates a non-
speculative causal connection between the proposed project and the particularized interests they claim are protected by
the criteria in question. Bennington Wal-Mart Demolition/Const. Permit, No. 158-10-11 Vtec, slip. op. at 9 (quoting In
re Pion Sand & Gravel Pit, No. 245-12-09 Vtec, slip op. at 7 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Jul. 2, 2010) (Durkin, J.).

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this matter to the District Commission. Through this remand, the District Commission may consider
in the first instance whether Appellant has shown a reasonable possibility that the proposed project
may affect his particularized interests (as those interests were found by the Court above), including
consideration of any supplemental petition for party status or further offer of proof Appellant may
provide. If the District Commission ultimately concludes that Appellant has shown a reasonable
possibility that his particularized interests may be affected by the proposed project (and, presumably,
that “substantive issues have been raised” under Act 250 Rule 51(D)), then it should grant his party
status request, notice the application for a hearing and conduct such a hearing on the merits of
Appellant’s claims. See 10 V.S.A. § 6084(e)(2) (setting forth the process to hold a hearing on a matter
initially noticed as a minor); see also Act 250 Rules, Rule 51(D) (setting forth the factors for
consideration and process to hold a hearing in the context of a minor permit application).
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s motion for party status is GRANTED
IN PART (as to his particularized interests) and REMANDED to the District Commission for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Electronically signed on January 8, 2026, pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).

Joseph S. McLean
Superior Court Judge
Environmental Division

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