Liable v. Bower

7ermont Superior Court
Filed 01/02/26
Chittenden Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Chittenden Unit Case No. 25-CV-2724
175 Main Street
Burlington VT 05401
802-863-3467
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Linae Laible,
Plaintiff

v DECISION ON MOTION
Robert Bower, Exelon Corp., Hannaford
Bros. Co., LLC and The Essex Experience
Plaza and/or Eurowest Retail Partners, LP,
Defendants

RULING ON MOTION TO SEVER

This personal injury case involves two unrelated motor vehicle accidents Plaintiff Linae
Laible alleges occurred in July 2022 ("Accident One") and January 2023 ("Accident Two"). The
defendants named in Accident One have no relationship to the defendants named in Accident
Two. The only common element between the two accidents is the identity of Plaintiff Laible.
Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants from Accident Two,
The Essex Experience Plaza and Eurowest Retail Partners, LP, have moved to sever this action
into two distinct cases, and Defendant Hannaford Bros. Co., LLC, also from Accident Two, was
granted permission to join the motion to sever. The named defendants from Accident One have
taken no position on this motion. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that the injuries she
suffered from the two accidents involve overlapping medical records, damages evidence, and
expert proof, and that these overlaps in proof weigh against severance. Plaintiff Laible is
represented by Michael J. Gannon, Esq. Defendants The Essex Experience Plaza and Eurowest
Retail Partners, LP are represented by Richard Windish, Esq., and Hannaford Bros. Co., LLC is
represented by Walter Judge, Esq. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion to sever
is GRANTED.!

Factual Background

In her Complaint, Ms. Laible alleges that Accident One occurred as follows: On July 20,
2022, Robert Bower was operating a vehicle belonging to Exelon Corporation or Exelon
Powerlabs LLC when he "caused a motor vehicle accident which caused harm and injuries to
Plaintiff." As a result of the accident, Laible has incurred financial loss, pain and suffering, loss
of enjoyment of life, fear, anxiety, and emotional distress. Laible then alleges Accident Two as a
completely separate incident. On January 1, 2023, Laible was driving away from Hannaford

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In light of the Court's decision, Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's sur-reply is DENIED.
after purchasing groceries when her vehicle “hit a deep hole located in the lane of travel of the
roadway” that was not visible because it was dark out and the hole was filled with water. Laible
asserts that Defendants responsible for Accident Two owe a duty to business invitees, like her,
including the requirement of repairing and mitigating dangerous conditions. The damages Laible
claims resulting from Accident Two are the same as those resulting from Accident One:
financial loss, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, fear, anxiety, and emotional distress. 2

Discussion

Rule 21 addresses the misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties:

Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.

Vermont’s Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled on the federal rules; as a result, Vermont courts
“look to federal case law for guidance on the applicable standard” when interpreting or applying
our rules of civil procedure. Belter v. City of Burlington, 2025 VT 35, ¶ 11 (citation omitted);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (essentially same as Vermont rule for these purposes). Federal courts that
have addressed severance under Rule 21 consider the following factors to determine if severance
is appropriate:

(1) whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; (2)
whether the claims present some common questions of law or fact; (3) whether
settlement of the claims or judicial economy would be facilitated; (4) whether
prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted; and (5) whether different
witnesses and documentary proof are required for the separate claims.

Dumont, 2016 WL 11383918, at *2 (quoting Oram v. SoulCycle LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 498, 502-
03 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)); accord Anticancer, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., No. 11CV107 JLS (RBB), 2012 WL
1019796, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (quotation omitted); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
Research Reports Sec. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 152, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted). Only
one factor need be present to justify severance. Dumont, 2016 WL 11383918, at *2. “The
decision of whether to sever a claim is left to the discretion of the trial court.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The party moving for severance carries the burden to demonstrate that severance is
necessary “to avoid prejudice or confusion and to promote the ends of justice.” Id. at *3
(quotation omitted). A court “must balance the factors of benefit and prejudice to arrive at both a
fair and equitable conclusion.” Id. at *2 (quotation omitted).

Applying the factors set out above, the Court initially considers whether Accident One
and Accident Two arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. The Vermont Supreme Court

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“When ruling on a motion to sever, courts must assume the truth of the allegations in the
complaint.” Dumont v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 2:14-cv-209, 2016 WL 11383918, at *3 (D. Vt.
Jan. 26, 2016) (quotation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-CV-209, 2016
WL 3129163 (D. Vt. June 2, 2016).

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has cited with approval cases holding that “[w]here multiple wrongs combine to produce a
common injury, . . . the claims arise out of the ‘same transaction’ or ‘occurrence’ or a ‘series of
transactions or occurrences’ and have a question of fact ‘common to all defendants.’” Breslauer
v. Fayston Sch. Dist., 163 Vt. 416, 427-28, 659 A.2d 1129, 1136 (1995) (quotation omitted). In
a more recent case addressing the doctrine of claim preclusion, the Supreme Court explained that
two claims may be classified as being part of the same transaction where “the facts are related in
time, space, origin, or motivation [and] they form a convenient trial unit.” Sutton v. Purzycki,
2022 VT 56, ¶ 23, 217 Vt. 326 (quoting Faulkner v. Caledonia Cnty. Fair Ass’n, 2004 VT 123,
¶ 13, 178 Vt. 51); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2) (1982) (“What factual
grouping constitutes a ‘transaction’, and what groupings constitute a ‘series,’ are to be
determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related
in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage.”).

Considering factors two and five, there is no dispute that the facts involved in the
occurrence of Accident One have nothing in common with the facts of Accident Two, and that
the witnesses to the accidents (other than Ms. Laible), if any, will not overlap. The accidents
took place nearly six months apart and involve unrelated defendants. Indeed, Laible describes
alleges the accidents as two separate and unrelated events. Laible argues that the two accidents
“implicate overlapping injuries, medical records, treating providers, experts, and fact
development.” Opp. at 1. However, this does not weigh against severance by establishing that
the facts concerning liability are “related in time, space, origin, or motivation” or “form a
convenient trial unit.” Sutton, 2022 VT 56, ¶ 23. Indeed, the Court notes that the Complaint
fails to indicate the extent of Laible’s injuries or suggest that any injuries she suffered from
Accident Two exacerbated, or are related in any way to, any injuries she suffered from Accident
One. Rather, Liable contends for the first time in her sur-reply, with no supporting affidavit, that
Accident Two “aggravated or compounded injuries sustained in [Accident One], requiring
intertwined medical proof, overlapping treatment records, and common expert testimony.” Sur-
reply at 2. But even assuming that Accident Two compounded injuries sustained in Accident
One, Laible will be able to introduce evidence of a pre-existing condition or injury when
addressing her damages from Accident Two. The fact that she may have to introduce the same
medical records or expert testimony in two different cases does not render the two accidents “a
series of transactions or occurrences” for purposes of determining whether the actions should be
severed.

Further, as in Stimson, where the trial court exercised its discretion to deny plaintiff’s
motion to amend her complaint to add a second defendant because the claims against the two
defendants were completely different (contract as opposed to tort), Ms. Laible’s causes of action
against the instant defendants are different. See Stimson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.
2:23-CV-581, 2024 WL 3565233, at *2 (D. Vt. July 29, 2024) (stating that the facts of the case
“diverge . . . when the Court considers the causes of action being brought against” the two
defendants). Laible’s theory of liability against the Accident One Defendants appears to sound
in ordinary negligence, whereas her theory of liability against the Accident Two Defendants
seems to be based on premises liability and the duty owed to a business invitee. Therefore, proof
of one cause of action does not affect, and should not influence, proof of the other. See id.
(concluding that joinder “would not result in litigation involving the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions common to all defendants” (quotation omitted)).

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Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Breslauer, 163 Vt. at 427, 659 A.2d at 1136,
where plaintiff named several defendants that had allegedly engaged in different types of
misconduct, but all of which culminated in a decision by two defendants not to hire plaintiff.
The Breslauer Court explained that the trial court had discretion to allow all defendants to be
joined together in one action because plaintiff suffered just one injury (the failure to be hired)
and no specific injuries were attributed to individual defendants. Id. Here, by contrast, Laible
suffered two discrete accidents that have no facts in common other than her. The fact that she
may have had a pre-existing condition or injury when Accident Two occurred does not tie the
two accidents together factually or sufficiently to justify trying two separate and unrelated
accidents together.

Turning to factor four, Defendants from Accident Two argue that they could be
prejudiced by having their case tried together with Accident One, “depending upon the liability
issues and the nature of damages being claimed by Plaintiff in connection with Accident One.”
Mot. at 4. The Court agrees that the Accident Two Defendants should not be placed in the
position of being held responsible for injuries Laible may have suffered from Accident One,
which could occur if both accidents were tried as part of one action. Any inconvenience to
Laible from being deposed more than once or from having to present similar, or the same,
evidence when trying the second case does not overcome the potential prejudice to Defendants.

The parties do not address factor three, which asks whether settlement of the claims or
judicial economy would be facilitated; therefore, the Court affords the factor no weight.
However, the other four factors favor severance. Accordingly, the Court hereby concludes that
Defendants from Accident Two were misjoined and should be severed from the case against
Defendants from Accident One.

Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Sever (Mot. #2) is GRANTED. The
Motion to Strike Sur-reply (Mot. #5) is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s claims against the Accident Two Defendants (The Essex Experience Plaza,
Eurowest Retail Partners, LP, and Hannaford Bros. Co., LLC) shall be severed and continued in
a new, separate action. The Clerk shall create a new case number for the second action, and shall
include in the record copies of the Complaint and all documents filed by the Accident Two
parties, as well as the Court’s orders and any notices pertaining to such parties. A copy of this
decision shall be filed in both dockets.

Electronically signed on January 1, 2026 at 12:38 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).

________________________________
Megan J. Shafritz
Superior Court Judge

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