Doe v. Norwich Univ

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Washington Unit Case No. 25-CV-04798
65 State Street
Montpelier VT 05602
802-828-2091
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Jane Doe v. Norwich University et al

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion; Motion; Motion to Seal/Redact; to Proceed by Pseudonym; for Protective
Order (Motion: 1; 2; 3)
Filer: Mario Bernard Hankerson; Mario Bernard Hankerson; Mario Bernard Hankerson
Filed Date: October 30, 2025; October 30, 2025; October 30, 2025

The motions are DENIED.

Decision on Ms. Doe’s 3 Motions to Seal, Proceed by Pseudonym,
and for Protective Order
In this case, Plaintiff Jane Doe, a former employee/professor at Norwich University, has
asserted in her amended complaint, 26 claims against Norwich University, Mr. Robert Berkey
(former Norwich employee), and Good Measure Inc. (operator of the Good Measure Pub and
Brewery) arising out of core allegations of sexual harassment and assault. Plaintiff’s real name
is not Jane Doe. She elected to proceed in this case under that pseudonym and, with her original
complaint, filed 3 identical motions seeking permission to do so. She also seeks:

3. Entry of a permanent redaction/sealing order for:
A. Plaintiff’s home address and location data;
B. Plaintiff’s children’s identifying information: names, ages, schools, and
activities;
C. Plaintiff’s private medical/counseling details;
D. Plaintiff’s former campus/classroom offices, schedules, extensions, and
job
identifiers not germane to adjudication;
E. Exhibits containing any of the foregoing.
4. Entry of a Protective order under V.R.C.P. 26(c) prohibiting disclosure or use
of
sealed/confidential materials beyond this litigation.
In short, she proposes to litigate this case as a completely unidentified plaintiff against named
defendants, who in addition will be subject to substantial limits on their free speech rights. She
asserts in her motions and a supporting affidavit that doing so will avoid “[h]assessment,
doxxing, embarrassment, and professional repercussions” as well as “[i]rreparable emotional
harm and exposure of sensitive facts to her minor children and their peers via internet/social
media search.” She asserts without analysis that there is no legitimate public interest in her
identity.

Ms. Doe’s request to seal is properly considered under the Rules for Public Access to
Court Records. The court assumes without deciding that the request to proceed under a
pseudonym is as well. The overarching principle is that the “public has access to all judicial-
branch case records, in accordance with the provisions of this rule, except as provided in Rule
6(b).” Vt. R. Pub. Acc. Ct. Rec. 6(a); see also Vt. R. Pub. Acc. Ct. Rec. 3(a) (“Except as
provided in these rules or in statute, the public may inspect or copy all judicial-branch case and
administrative records.”). Rule 6(b) itemizes particular exemptions from access.

Rule 9 provides the procedure for limiting access to case records through a process of
sealing. Potential bases for limiting access under Rule 9 are not limited to the exemptions at
Rule 6(b). Rather, a party can support a requested redaction with reference to “any statute,
administrative or court rule, court order or precedential decision providing for confidentiality
with respect to the identified privacy interest(s).” Vt. R. Pub. Acc. Ct. Rec. 9(a)(3)(C); see In re
Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 160 (2001) (noting common-law authority granted to courts to
seal records). To determine whether to seal, the court employs the rigorous standards described
in In re Sealed Documents and related case law. See Reporter’s Notes (original and 2022
amendment), Vt. R. Pub. Acc. Ct. Rec. 9.

To warrant a seal, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence, that good cause
and exceptional circumstances exist for the restriction of public access.” Vt. R. Pub. Acc. Ct.
Rec. 9(a)(5). And any seal must be implemented in the “least restrictive” manner possible. Vt.
R. Pub. Acc. Ct. Rec. 9(a)(5)(a). Those terms are further reinforced and defined by the strong
constitutional right of access to court records set out in cases such as State v. Densmore, 160 Vt.
131, 133-35 (1993); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986)
(sealing must be “essential to preserve higher values and . . . narrowly tailored to serve that
interest” (citation omitted)).

The court notes that Ms. Doe’s goal—to sue in secret—is primarily served by her request
to proceed under a pseudonym. The contemplated sealing order mostly appears to be intended to
suppress collateral information that would nevertheless reveal her identity. Accordingly, the
court addresses the request to litigate anonymously first.

Civil Rule 10(a) requires, in no uncertain terms: “In the complaint, the title of the action
shall include the names of all the parties.” V.R.C.P. 10(a). There is no exception in the civil
rules. There is a good reason for that. As one court has explained:

“[O]ne of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice [is] that its
proceedings should be public.” Rule 10(a) requires parties to a lawsuit to identify
themselves in their respective pleadings. Courts have explained that Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 10(a) illustrates “the principle that judicial proceedings, civil
as well as criminal, are to be conducted in public.” “Identifying the parties to the
proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The people have a right to
know who is using their courts.” And, defendants have a right to confront their
accusers. A plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym “runs afoul of the public’s common
law right of access to judicial proceedings.”

Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011) (construing the analogous federal rule)
(citations omitted); see also Doe v. Hill, 141 F.4th 291, 293 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“Requiring parties
to litigate under their real names serves important values. Accurate party names allow citizens to
evaluate the nature of the claims raised and the interests at stake, to assess ‘the real-world
aftermath of a suit,’ and to determine for themselves whether ‘justice was done.’ Knowing the
identity of parties also makes it easier for citizens to investigate abuses of the judicial process
like judicial conflicts of interest and ex parte contacts, and it promotes the appearance of
fairness.” (citation omitted)); Cajune v. Independent School District 194, 105 F.4th 1070, 1076
(8th Cir. 2024) (“The use of fictitious names runs afoul of the public’s First Amendment interest
in public proceedings and their common law right of access thereto. Proceedings are only truly
public when the public knows the identities of the litigants.”); Doe v. Trustees of Indiana
University, 101 F.4th 485, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Why should a plaintiff be able to shield
himself from public knowledge of his acts when throwing a harsh light on identified defendants?
If there should be a difference, it ought to run the other way—as plaintiffs enjoy an absolute
privilege against claims of defamation for what they say in their complaints and briefs.”). The
interests favoring disclosure of the true identities of the parties to a lawsuit are weighty indeed.

Nevertheless, in rare circumstances, a party may appropriately be permitted to proceed
under a pseudonym. See Doe v. Trustees of Indiana University, 101 F.4th at 492 (noting that it is
per se error for a trial court to permit a party to proceed under a pseudonym without engaging “in
the careful and demanding balancing of interests required in making this determination” (citation
omitted)); Megless, 654 F.3d at 408 (“That a plaintiff may suffer embarrassment or economic
harm is not enough. Instead, a plaintiff must show ‘both (1) a fear of severe harm, and (2) that
the fear of severe harm is reasonable.’” (citation omitted)); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,
537 F.3d 185, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2008) (“This requirement [naming all the parties], though
seemingly pedestrian, serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial
proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly.”). Various courts, often with reference to
each other, have developed nonexclusive sets of factors that may be consulted when determining
if the balance of interests (the plaintiff’s privacy v. prejudice to the defendant and public interest)
weighs in favor of anonymous litigation. The prevailing list in the Second Circuit is as follows:

(1) whether the litigation involves matters that are “highly sensitive and [of a]
personal nature”;

(2) “whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to
the . . . party [seeking to proceed anonymously] or even more critically, to
innocent non-parties”;

(3) whether identification presents other harms and the likely severity of those
harms, including whether “the injury litigated against would be incurred as a
result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity”;

(4) whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of
disclosure, particularly in light of his age;

(5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government or that of private
parties;

(6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to press his
claims anonymously, whether the nature of that prejudice (if any) differs at any
particular stage of the litigation, and whether any prejudice can be mitigated by
the district court;

(7) whether the plaintiff’s identity has thus far been kept confidential;
(8) whether the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the
plaintiff to disclose his identity;

(9) “whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or
otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants’
identities”; and

(10) whether there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting the
confidentiality of the plaintiff.

Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 189–90 (citations omitted). Though lists vary, they are
nonexclusive and, functionally, the courts generally are conducting the same inquiry regardless
of what list of factors controls. Compare, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 189–90 (2d Cir.),
with Hill, 141 F.4th at 293 (D.C. Cir.); Cajune, 105 F.4th at 1077 (8th Cir.); Megless, 654 F.3d at
409 (3d Cir.).

There is no binding case law in Vermont setting forth the correct analysis when a plaintiff
seeks to litigate anonymously. However, federal case law is generally consistent across circuits,
and the court seriously doubts that the analysis should be any different in Vermont. The court
thus relies on the authorities cited above upon considering Ms. Doe’s request.

Consideration of applicable factors reveals nothing extraordinary about this case that
might warrant the rare order permitting a plaintiff to litigate anonymously. First, the court
understands that, to Ms. Doe, the subject matter of this lawsuit may seem highly sensitive and
personal. However, civil suits with allegations about sexual harassment, discrimination, and
assault are litigated in the courts commonly without suppressing party names. See Doe v.
Trustees of Indiana University, 101 F.4th at 492 (“Federal courts adjudicate thousands of sex-
discrimination suits annually without concealing the plaintiffs’ names.”). To the extent that she
hopes to keep the litigation secret so that she can control how her children may hear about it, that
loss of control is nothing unusual. It is an ordinary incident of the transparent nature of civil
litigation.

Second, while Ms. Doe proposes that revealing her identity might subject her to ridicule,
retaliation, or opprobrium, the concern is highly speculative and there is no basis for concluding
that any such retaliation would rise to the level of physical or emotional harm. See Doe v.
Stegall, 653 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The threat of hostile public reaction to a lawsuit, standing
alone, will only with great rarity warrant public anonymity.”).

Third, Ms. Doe is not a child or for some other identified reason particularly vulnerable.

Fourth, proceeding by pseudonym likely would not achieve the goal of anonymity in any
event. The allegations of the complaint are clear that many people in the Norwich community
are well aware of the underlying circumstances, and a reporter for a student newspaper sought to
interview her about them. There also has been prior, related litigation.

Fifth, there would be probable prejudice in allowing Ms. Doe to make serious allegations
publicly against Defendants and others who are named while remaining anonymous herself.

Sixth, whatever legal issues this case may present, the court anticipates that the facts,
sprawling in the complaint, are likely to be deeply disputed. Factual disputes of this sort
heighten the public interest in the identities of the parties. This case plainly does not present the
sort of pure legal question that might render the identity of a party less relevant.

On balance, there is no compelling reason to permit anonymous litigation here. Doing so
would likely prejudice Defendants, and the public interest in the identity of the parties is
significant. The request to proceed under a pseudonym is Denied.

With the request to litigate anonymously denied, most of the requests to seal or redact
(and the related request for a Rule 26(c) order, lose any purpose. The exception is the request to
keep secret “Plaintiff’s private medical/counseling details,” which the court presumes Ms. Doe
would seek regardless whether she is permitted to litigate anonymously.

This request is Denied at this time. The court notes first that it is a completely
generalized request. Ms. Doe cites nothing extraordinary about any particular
medical/counseling records that might warrant secrecy. Moreover, this is precisely the sort of
privacy that a plaintiff voluntarily surrenders when she chooses to file a case like this. See
Mattison v. Poulen, 134 Vt. 158, 161 (1976) (“We agree that, by bringing an action for damages
arising from the injuries the plaintiff claims to have suffered, the [patient] privilege is waived.”);
Paquette v. State, No. 196-3-17 Wncv, 2018 WL 11358604 (Vt. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2018) (“By
filing this lawsuit, Mr. Paquette has placed his current and prior back injuries and related
treatment squarely at issue, and he has waived related privacy rights and privileges.”); Adams–
Thompson v. Potter, No. 755-11-15 Wncv, 2018 WL 11358771, *2 (Vt. Super. Ct. Mar. 29,
2018) (“Ms. Adams–Thompson certainly has privacy interests in her medical, employment, and
educational records. However, by filing this lawsuit, which places those matters squarely at
issue, she generally has waived related privacy rights and privileges.”).

ORDER

Ms. Doe’s 3 Motions to Seal, Proceed by Pseudonym, and for Protective Order are
Denied. Within 30 days, Ms. Doe shall refile any sealed filings or filings containing redactions
consistent with this Order.

Electronically signed on 12/12/2025 6:18 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

__________________________________
Daniel Richardson
Superior Court Judge