Stephens v. Gilmour

Termont Superior Court
Filed 10/23/25
Washington Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Washington Unit Case No. 24-CV-04273
65 State Street
Montpelier VT 05602
802-828-2091
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Juliet Stephens v. Shannon Gilmour

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion; Motion; Motion; Motion in Limine; Motion in Limine; Motion in Limine;
Motion to Seal; Motion to Enforce Motion For: to allow Jury to submit questions to witnesses;
Motion For: for permission for support person for minor witness; Motion For: for accommodation
of child witness; to Exclude Irrelevant and Prejudicial Evidence; to Exclude Evidence re Mental
Health History; to Admit Evidence of Plaintiff's Retaliatory Conduct; to File Medical Records Under
Seal; Emergency Motion to Enforce Court Order and Redact Minor's Name from Opposing
Counsel's Exhibits (Motion: 22; 23; 24; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29)
Filer: Shannon Gilmour; Shannon Gilmour; Shannon Gilmour; Claudine C. Safar;
Claudine C. Safar; Shannon Gilmour; Shannon Gilmour; Shannon Gilmour
Filed Date: October 06, 2025; October 06, 2025; October 07, 2025; October 10, 2025; October
10, 2025; October 10, 2025; October 17, 2025; October 22, 2025

The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Parties have filed eight pre-trial/motions in limine in anticipation of the scheduled jury trial
in this matter. The Court will address each motion separately and in turn in this Order, but the
Court will begin with a brief review of the procedural history of the present action as there have
been over 20 motions made during the course of this litigation that have altered what claims remain
before the Court.

Procedural History

The present matter arises from a residential tenancy created between Plaintiff (Landlord) and
Defendant (Tenant) regarding the rental of two rooms at Plaintiff's property at 15 Phelps Street in
Montpelier, Vermont. In October 2024, Plaintiff sought to terminate Defendant's tenancy pursuant
to 9 V.S.A. § 4476(h), which covers the provisions for terminating a tenancy created when landlord
and tenant occupy the same dwelling space. When Defendant did not vacate, Plaintiff brought the
present case for ejectment on October 24, 2025, pursuant to 9 V.S.A. § 4468. Plaintiff seeks the
remedy of ejectment under 12 V.S.A. § 4761.

Plaintiff initially brought this ejectment action against both Defendant and Defendant's
minor daughter, M.G., who resides with her mother at 15 Phelps Street. On November 11, 2024,

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Defendant filed an answer and counterclaims on behalf of herself and her daughter. The
counterclaims for both Defendant and M.G. included the following:
1) Breach of the implied warranty of habitability for lack of smoke detectors and carbon
monoxide detectors.
2) Breach of the warranty of habitability regarding mold and smells from the upstairs
bathroom.
3) Retaliatory Eviction under 9 V.S.A. § 4465 based on the following alleged facts:
a. Plaintiff’s failure on 9/9/24 to give Defendant a 60-day notice of rent increase;
b. Defendant’s request for smoke and carbon monoxide detectors on 9/10/24;
c. Plaintiff’s threatening statements on 9/10/24;
d. Defendant’s contacting Vermont Tenants, Inc. on 9/14/24;
e. Defendant’s complaint to a government regulatory entity on 9/14/24; and
f. Plaintiff’s changing of the terms of the verbal agreement between the parties to
extend the written lease.
These claims, in respect to Defendant, have survived the various motions to dismiss, and remain
active counterclaims against Plaintiff’s ejectment claim.
In addition to the surviving counterclaims, Defendant brought the following counterclaims that
have been dismissed by the Court in previous rulings:
4) Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) based on:
a. Plaintiff’s initial failure to install smoke and carbon monoxide detectors and failure
to install them when asked; and
b. Plaintiff’s attorney’s initial statements, actions, and filings against Defendant, and
Plaintiff and her attorney’s decision to include Defendant’s minor child, M.G. in the
complaint as a separate party.
5) Defamation based on Plaintiff’s inclusion of M.G. as a separate party in the complaint for
ejectment.
6) Abuse of process based on Plaintiff’s inclusion of M.G. as a separate party in the complaint
for ejectment.
On January 8, 2025, the Court issued an Order on the parties’ pending motions. In that
Order, the Court ruled as follows. First, it gave Defendant 30 days to obtain counsel for M.G.
pursuant to Estate of Snelgrove v. LeBlanc, 2023 VT 58, ¶¶ 6–7, 218 Vt. 636. Second, it denied
Defendant’s motion to join Attorneys Safar and Stafford to the present matter pursuant to V.R.C.P.
19. Third, it ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why M.G. should not be dismissed as a party.
Fourth, it dismissed Defendant’s counterclaims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation. The Court found that the facts plead for both IIED claims did not rise as a matter of
law to the type of outrageous and extreme actions on which such a claim must be premised. The
Court dismissed the defamation claim as it belonged to M.G. and not to Defendant. Both dismissals
were pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Fifth, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the

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pleadings. Sixth, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Rule 12(f) motion to strike the portions of
Defendant’s answer and motion to join that discussed Plaintiff’s mental health history in four places.
The Court sealed the filings and required Defendant to refile versions of both filings with the
identified passages removed or redacted. No other sanctions were awarded.
On April 17, 2025, the Court issued a second Order that addressed the subsequent motions
and developments in the case. The Court made the following rulings. First, it recognized that
Plaintiff had sought to dismiss her claims against M.G. in February of 2025 and granted the
dismissal of these claims under V.R.C.P. 41(a)(3). Second, the Court granted permission for
Attorney Anderson to enter a notice of appearance on behalf of M.G., even though the appearance
occurred outside of the Court’s January 30-day deadline. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss M.G.’s counterclaims pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), but the Court dismissed M.G.’s
counterclaims and M.G. as a party because of the delay that these claims posed to the central claims
of the case. The Court invoked V.R.C.P. 1 and its discretionary authority to control its docket,
preserve judicial resources, and ensure efficient disposition of cases. In re Snowstone, LLC Act 250
Jurisdictional Opinion, 2021 VT 72A, ¶ 24, 216 Vt. 216. The Court will further note that this ruling
followed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against M.G., which removed any compulsory
counterclaim issues under V.R.C.P. 13. Letourneau v. Hickey, 174 Vt. 481, 481–82 (2002) (mem.).
Finally, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to set this matter for trial at the Court’s next available
date.
On July 11, 2025, the Court issued a third Order. This decision dismissed Defendant’s
abuse of process counterclaim for similar reasons to its prior decision to dismiss Defendant’s
defamation claims—namely that the claims belonged to M.G., and they were hers alone to assert.
On August 8, 2025, the Court issued a fourth Order addressing three motions by Defendant
to take judicial notice and admit (1) Vermont statutes and (2) two voice recordings. The Court
denied the first request as Vermont statutes are not evidence but explained that both parties may
argue in reliance on them. The Court denied the second motion in two respects. First, it did not
rule that the recordings were admissible, but it denied Plaintiff’s request to rule them per se
inadmissible. Instead, the Court ruled that the admissibility of such recordings would depend on
whether a sufficient foundation could be established, including relevance and reliability, and whether
at such time of admission the prejudice outweighed the evidentiary value of the exhibits. State v.
Williams, 2010 VT 77, ¶ 11, 188 Vt. 405.
In addition to these motions, Defendant filed several motions for interlocutory appeal.
These motions were denied by this Court on August 25, 2025, and by the Vermont Supreme Court
on October 13, 2025.
Current Motions in Limine
The parties have filed eight pre-trial motions seeking various accommodations, rulings, and
processes for the upcoming jury trial presently set for October 27 and 28, 2025.

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1. Motion to Allow Jury to Submit Questions (Motion #22)
Defendant has requested that the Court permit jurors to submit questions to each witness.
Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
Under Vermont caselaw, it is in the discretion of the trial court to allow jurors to pose
questions to the witnesses. State v. Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, ¶ 34, 176 Vt. 203. The procedure for such
questioning is laid out in Doleszny as follows:
(1) the jurors must submit the proposed questions to the judge and be made part of
the record; (2) the judge must disclose the proposed questions to the parties and give
them the opportunity to object or request the question be narrowed or rephrased;
and (3) the judge must rule on each proposed question on the record, allowing,
rejecting or modifying the question. The procedures should be explained to the
parties and jurors at the commencement of the trial.

Doleszny, 2004 VT 9, at ¶ 34. The Court will grant this request and will incorporate the procedure of
Doleszny into its preliminary jury instructions. The Court will also work with staff to develop a
protocol for how such questions will go on the record in a manner that will look to minimize the
time and delay associated with this process. In allowing this process, the Court does not adopt or
endorse Defendant’s reasoning for the request. Instead, the Court invokes its discretion to allow
such questions because it finds that this request can be managed with the limited number of
witnesses in the parties’ witness lists, the fact-specific nature of the claims, and the apparent lack of
any prejudice from adopting such a process. The request for including juror questions is Granted.
2. Allowing Support Person for M.G. (Motion #23)
Defendant requests permission for a support person, Tracy Stober, to be present in the
Courtroom for Defendant’s daughter M.G. Specifically, Defendant asks that Ms. Stober be
permitted to provide childcare and supervision for M.G. during the trial, to sit in a place where she
can have eye contact with M.G. during M.G.’s testimony, and to accompany M.G. to and from the
Courtroom. Plaintiff does not directly oppose these steps but more generally opposes M.G.’s
testimony. The Court will address those broader issues as they are presented in Plaintiff’s motion in
limine. For the purposes of the present motion, there is no restriction from the Court on Ms.
Stober’s ability to sit with or accompany M.G. throughout the trial with the following clarifications.
First, M.G., as a witness, will likely be sequestered until her testimony. That means she will
have to sit outside the Courtroom until she is called to testify. During that time, Ms. Stober is free
to sit with and accompany M.G. and does not need permission from the Court to do so.
Second, if and when M.G. is called to testify, she will, like all witnesses, be directed to sit in
the witness stand. This seat faces the jury and the public portion of the Courtroom. Ms. Stober is
welcome to sit in the public portion of the Courtroom but may not sit with M.G. or enter the area
where the parties and their attorneys sit. It will be up to Ms. Stober to select a seat in the public

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portion of the Courtroom as there is generally no reserved or assigned seating, but nearly every part
of the public section shares an unobstructed view of the witness stand.
Third, when M.G. has completed her testimony, she, like all other non-party witnesses, may
remain in the Courtroom but will be obligated to sit in the public portion of the Courtroom where
Ms. Stober is free to sit with her. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 80–85 (2d Cir. 2005) (individuals
enjoy a first amendment right to access state courthouses).
The Court will remind the parties that anyone’s presence or location in the Courtroom will
depend upon their decorum and respect for the process. If any individual’s presence becomes
disruptive, the Court has the inherent authority to control the Courtroom to ensure that the judicial
process is not disrupted. Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.1997) (describing a judge’s role
to ensure that trials are not disrupted and to maintain “proper order and decorum”).
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to allow a support person for M.G. largely asks for
permission where none is needed. As such the motion as understood by the Court is Moot.
3. Accommodations of a Minor Witness (Motion #24)
Defendant seeks five accommodations from the Court related to M.G.’s anticipated
testimony. Plaintiff continues her general objections.
Defendant requests that if and when M.G. testifies that she be allowed the following: (1)
Permit Tracy Stober to be present in the Courtroom as a support person for M.G. when she
testifies; (2) Give M.G. breaks as needed; (3) Allow Defendant to introduce M.G.’s written
statement; (4) Permit the use of the written statement in lieu of testimony; and (5) Require an age-
appropriate cross-examination.
Defendant’s first two requests fit within the existing framework of a jury trial. The first
concerning Ms. Stober’s presence in the Courtroom was addressed above. She may be present when
M.G. testifies, but she must sit in the public portion of the Courtroom. The second concerns
requests for reasonable breaks. The Court generally allows reasonable breaks in testimony where
needed, but such reasonableness cannot be determined in advance and will have to be addressed
during trial.
As to the use of M.G.’s written statement, the Court begins its analysis by looking to the
document in question. While Defendant’s motion does not identify the specific written statement,
the Court has reviewed the exhibits, and the sole document that appears to fit the description is
what Defendant has labeled Exhibit BF. This exhibit is a 17-page affidavit, although the format
does not strictly follow what an affidavit would contain: it has both traditional affidavit provisions
along either a section of questions and answers that have been “Edited for Court Presentation” as
well as a “personal statement” section that purports to be “Verbatim, Unedited.” The document is
first and foremost a hearsay document in that it is an “statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

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asserted.” V.R.E. 801(c). Under Rule 802, hearsay is not admissible except as the rules of evidence
or procedure may permit.
Therefore, the Court begins with the understanding that the document sought to be
admitted is not admissible under the rules of evidence.
Defendant seeks to use the affidavit in two ways through her motion. In the first instance,
she seeks to introduce the statement as an exhibit and in the second instance use it in lieu of M.G.’s
testimony if M.G. is unable to testify. Both propositions are inconsistent with the rules as to trial
testimony and the use of out-of-court statements as exhibits.
A witness can only testify from his or her personal knowledge of the relevant matter. V.R.E.
402, 602. This knowledge is usually established through testimony. V.R.E. 602. Each party is
responsible for securing the attendance of their witnesses to testify at trial. In re Odessa Corp., 2006
VT 35, ¶ 17, 179 Vt. 640. Under Rule 43, “the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open
court, unless otherwise provided.” V.R.C.P. 43(a). Together, these rules place an emphasis on live
testimony, particularly in trials, by witnesses. Nichols v. Brattleboro Retreat, 2009 VT 4, ¶ 6, 185 Vt. 313
(“The preference for live, in-court testimony is well settled in our jurisprudence.”); see also Simpson v.
Rood, 2003 VT 39, ¶ 8, 175 Vt. 546 (mem.) (finding error where trial court allowed telephonic
testimony from witness without agreement by the parties).
Against this general rule, there are limited exceptions. One of these exceptions comes under
Rule 32, which allows either party to use a deposition “for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness or for any other purpose permitted by the
Vermont Rules of Evidence.” V.R.C.P. 32(a)(1); see also Nichols, 2009 VT 4, at ¶ 6. Another is
found under Vermont Rule of Evidence 613(b), which allows the admission of prior inconsistent
statements by a witness. As well, Rule 801(d) establishes that a prior statement may be used to
demonstrate a witness’s inconsistency or consistency or when it constitutes an admission by a Party-
opponent.
M.G.’s affidavit does not fit any of these exceptions at this time.1 Given this lack of
admissibility, the Court will not permit the affidavit to be admitted or to have M.G. use it in lieu of
testimony. These requests are Denied.
As to Defendant’s request that M.G. be subject to age-appropriate cross-examination,
Defendant does not specify what such a cross-examination would entail. The Court generally grants
parties the leeway to conduct direct and cross-examinations as they choose. In this respect, the

1 While Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows prior consistent statements, they can only be offered “to rebut an

express or implied charge against the witness of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.”
V.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that only statements that predate the alleged
motive to lie, truly rebut the charge of improper influence or motive required by the Rule. Tome v. United
States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995). Given that M.G.’s affidavit was signed on October 17, 2025, the
document cannot meet the standard of Tome and limitation of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), regardless of the
foundation.

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Court will not rule on how either party should conduct their examinations in advance of trial but will
defer any ruling on the scope and nature of the cross-examination until trial begins and the scope of
M.G.’s direct examination is established. State v. Williams, 2010 VT 77, ¶ 11, 188 Vt. 405.
For these reasons, Defendant’s motion for accommodations is Denied as to the admission
and use of M.G.’s affidavit. It is Moot regarding allowing Ms. Stober as a support person and taking
breaks as necessary since these practices are already allowed. The issue of M.G.’s cross-examination
is Deferred until trial.
4. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Motion # 25)
Plaintiff seeks in her motion in limine to prevent Defendant from having M.G. testify, from
having Attorney Safar testify, and from introducing testimony regarding the dismissed abuse of
process claims. Defendant objects to this motion on the grounds that a prior ruling by the Court
constituted a waiver of any objection to M.G. testifying and that Attorney Safar’s testimony is critical
to her retaliation claim.
“A motion in limine is a useful device for limiting the issues and evidence prior to trial where
that is possible.” State v. Dubois, 150 Vt. 600, 602 (1988). A motion in limine is necessarily limited
and must be used, if at all, as more of a scalpel than a shotgun. Id. In other words, a motion in
limine is best used to address a specific and discrete issue and not for broader and sweeping rulings
that may depend on the state of evidence at the time of trial and when admission is sought. Id.
“Evidence should be excluded on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible
on all potential grounds.” United States v. Paredes, 176 F.Supp.2d 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
In this case, the relief sought falls into two categories. First, Defendant’s opposition makes
plain that she seeks to adduce evidence and testimony from M.G. and Attorney Safar regarding
Plaintiff’s decision to include Defendant’s daughter as a party to the case.
Defendant’s argument demonstrates that she has sought to reframe the issue that Plaintiff
initially included M.G. as a party as part of her retaliation counterclaim. Notwithstanding, these
facts are not relevant to the retaliation claim for two important reasons.
First, Defendant did not include service on her daughter as part of her November 11, 2024,
counterclaim for retaliation. As noted above, Defendant listed six bases for her retaliation claim.
None of them includes the post-termination decision to serve M.G. Defendant has not put Plaintiff
on notice that she intended to include this issue as a part of her retaliation claim, and it would be
prejudicial to include it now. In re Waitsfield-Fayston Telephone Co., Inc., 2007 VT 55, ¶ 12, 182 Vt. 79
(“Failure to plead a claim means that the claim is not in the case.”).
Second, the nature of a retaliation claim is focused on whether the landlord has either
changed the terms of a rental agreement or threatened or brought an action against a tenant who has
taken action consistent with one of the three protected categories. 9 V.S.A. § 4465(a); see also Houle
v. Quenneville, 173 Vt. 80, 87–88 (2001). As the Vermont Supreme Court has noted, “Vermont's
retaliatory eviction statute contemplates that the tenant’s protected activity will precede the
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landlord’s retaliatory action.” Houle, 173 Vt. at 90. Therefore, the service of and inclusion of M.G.
as a party is irrelevant to the retaliation claim.
In the alternative, Defendant also seeks to put this evidence forward in support of her
Breach of Habitability claim to show that Defendant’s failure was willful and intentional. This
contention is not logically connected. The breach of warranty claim is premised on the allegations
that Plaintiff did not have smoke detectors and carbon monoxide detectors installed at the start of
Defendant’s tenancy and that Plaintiff did not install them in a timely manner. Whether Plaintiff
included M.G. as a party does not make the question of whether she willfully failed to install the
detectors more or less true.
Finally, Defendant also contends that this testimony will establish her claim for punitive
damages and for attorney liability. Neither of these claims are before the Court, and therefore they
cannot provide a basis for admissibility. In re Waitsfield-Fayston Telephone Co, Inc., 2007 VT 55, at ¶ 12.
Furthermore, Attorney Safar is not a party, and any claims that Defendant may have against
Attorney Safar are also not before the Court in this trial.
For these reasons, the Court Grants Plaintiff’s motion in limine regarding any testimony
about the inclusion of M.G. as a party to this lawsuit and the process of serving her the complaint.
Such testimony is not relevant to any surviving claims that are presently before the Court and within
the scope of the present trial. Given that this area of testimony is the only testimony sought from
Attorney Safar, the motion in limine regarding calling Attorney Safar as a witness is Granted.
Defendant may not call Attorney Safar as a witness.
As to the second category, M.G.’s general ability to testify, Defendant notes that M.G. lived
in the house at 15 Phelps Street at all relevant times and was a witness to the incidents and facts that
make up Defendant’s remaining counterclaims, regarding retaliation and habitability. This proffer
suggests that M.G. has personal knowledge of the facts underlying these claims. For this reason, the
Court Denies Plaintiff’s request to outright bar M.G.’s testimony. At the same time, the Court will
note again that M.G. is not a party to this case, and any damages that she claims to have suffered or
any opinions that she may have about the process are not relevant to the present claims. Her
testimony will be circumscribed by V.R.E. 402 and 602, which require a witness to testify about their
personal knowledge of what they witnessed to the extent that such personal observations are
relevant to the claims before the Court.
In summary, the Court Grants Plaintiff’s motion in limine in Part. Neither party may offer
testimony regarding M.G.’s inclusion as a party in this case or the service of process that she
received as it is not relevant to the remaining claims. It is also Granted as to the testimony of
Attorney Safar, who shall not be called as a witness. It is Denied in Part to the issue of M.G.’s
testimony as she may testify about her personal observations and knowledge.

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5. Exclusion of Mental Health History (Motion #26)
Plaintiff has also filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any testimony regarding her
mental health history. Plaintiff’s basis for this motion is twofold. First, she contends that her
mental health is not relevant to the claims. Second, she contends that whatever minimal relevance is
strongly outweighed by the prejudicial effect. She notes that the Court previously granted her
motion to strike Defendant’s references to her mental health in her answer as more prejudicial than
probative.
Defendant does not dispute this motion and contends that she has complied with the
Court’s prior order.
Based on this, the Court Grants Plaintiff’s motion. Defendant may use the properly
redacted and re-filed exhibits and may not reference or make allegations regarding Plaintiff’s mental
health history at trial.
6. Evidence of Retaliatory Conduct (Motion #27)
Defendant’s next motion concerns various areas of testimony and evidence for which she
seeks a preliminary ruling of admissibility. These include: (A) a list of alleged protected activity from
September 14th to October 24th, 2024; (B) facts regarding the complaint and service brought against
M.G.; (C) emails with Attorney Safar; and (D) the Court’s destruction Defendant’s exhibits.
Plaintiff opposes categories (B) and (C). Plaintiff notes that service of the complaint on
M.G. and including her in the original complaint is not relevant to the claims before the Court.
Plaintiff notes that the evidence sought in category (C) should be excluded as either an offer of
settlement under V.R.E. 408 or irrelevant to the present claims.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff on both counts. The evidence of M.G.’s inclusion as a party
was addressed above. The Court finds that the preliminary conversations between Defendant and
Attorney Safar fall under the confidentiality provisions of Rule 408, which generally makes any
communication made in settlement negotiations inadmissible in relation to liability and damages. As
to the remaining communications, the Court does not find them to be relevant as they concern the
parties’ ongoing, tense cohabitation and do not make any of Defendant’s counterclaims more or less
true. For this reason, the Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to admit Categories (B) and (C) as they
are inadmissible under Rules of Evidence 402 and 408.
As to category (A), the Court will not address the admissibility of these facts at this time.
The facts in category (A) appear to have some relevance to the claims and counterclaims, but as the
Court has noted in this decision, issues of admissibility are best addressed at trial. State v. Williams,
2010 VT 77, ¶ 11, 188 Vt. 405.
Similarly, the Court will not address the admissibility of the documents listed in Category (D)
as Defendant will have to lay a foundation and establish the relevance of each exhibit unless the
parties can stipulate to admissibility.
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This last issue appears to have arisen, in part, because Defendant filed original paper copies
with the Court as part of her earlier filings, and the Court, consistent with Vermont Rule of
Electronic Filing 12, destroyed the paper copies once they were scanned and entered into the
electronic filing system. V.R.E.F. 12(a) and (b), rptr n. (explaining that the electronic file is the
official record, that parties should not file originals that they wish to preserve, and that “The paper
document may be scanned and destroyed and, thus, become unavailable to the filer in the future.”).
The Court will note that Rule of Evidence 1003 allows that a duplicate of an original document is
admissible to the same extent as the original, subject to the same objections that the original might
have as to authenticity or the extent that admission of a duplicate would be unfair. V.R.E. 1003.
For these reasons, Defendant’s motion is limine is Denied at this time for the reasons
stated.
7. Motion to File Medical Records under Seal (Motion #28)
Defendant has filed a motion to file medical records for M.G. under seal. This motion was
filed after the Court-imposed deadline for pre-trial filings. To date, the Court does not have a
response to this motion from Plaintiff.
Given the sensitive and personal nature of the medical records, the Court will Grant
Defendant’s motion in part. The Court will allow these records to be filed under seal. In doing so,
the Court makes no ruling on the admissibility of these records as M.G. is not a party to the present
case. Her health is not an issue in any of the claims, and any claim for impacts to M.G.’s health are
M.G.’s claims to assert, and it is not for Defendant to raise.
Therefore, the Court will address these records with parties as part of the pre-trial
conference in this matter on October 27, 2025.
8. Motion to Enforce (Motion #29)
Defendant filed a motion seeking sanctions and injunctive action against Plaintiff for filing
five exhibits with M.G.’s name. These documents were not new documents but prior exhibits.
Defendant claims extensive and ongoing harm from the filing of these documents. Before the
Court became aware of this Motion, Plaintiff had filed redacted versions of the offending
documents. The Court finds this to be a reasonable resolution as it corrects the prior filings and
eliminates any ongoing issues.
The Court will note that the decision on which Defendant relies does not impose sanctions
or any retroactive obligations on the parties. It simply grants the motion to proceed with any
reference to M.G. being limited to her initials. In reviewing this Order, the Court finds that there is
room for confusion. Therefore, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that there was a Court
order requiring the extensive redaction that Defendant seeks. Second, the Court also does not find
that there is evidence of bad faith or malice in the filing. Both parties have filed multiple
documents, and the documents at issue were previously filed in this case and have not been sealed.

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Third, the mistake appears to be mutual as Defendant has filed at least two exhibits (BB and AI,
page 11) that fail to redact M.G.’s name.
For these reasons, the Court Denies Defendant’s motion for sanctions as it has largely
become moot with the corrective filings. The Court will seal the original unredacted filings.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court has ruled on the pending motions as follows:
1) The motion to allow jurors to submit questions is Granted (Motion #22).
2) The motion to allow a support person for M.G. is Moot as the relief sought does not require
Court approval (Motion #23).
3) The motion for accommodation for M.G. is Granted in Part as to requests 1 and 2 and
Denied as to requests (3) and (4). Request (5) is Deferred until trial. (Motion #24).
4) Plaintiff’s first motion in limine is Granted in part in regard to Attorney Safar’s testimony
and any testimony regarding the inclusion of M.G. as a party and service of the complaint on
her. It is Denied in part in regard to any request to outright bar M.G.’s testimony. (Motion
#25).
5) Plaintiff’s second motion in limine regarding her mental health history is Granted. (Motion
# 26).
6) Defendant’s motion to allow evidence of retaliatory conduct is Denied in regard to
Categories (B) and (C) as both are inadmissible under V.R.E. 402 and 602. The Court
declines to make any pre-trial ruling as to the admissibility of the facts under Category (A) or
the documents in Category (D) without testimony and foundation, but it notes that
duplicates are addressed under V.R.E. 1003. (Motion #27).
7) Defendant’s motion to file M.G.’s medical records under seal is Granted in part as the
Court will keep the records under seal, but the Court has concerns about the admissibility
and relevance of these records in light of the remaining claims. As such, the parties shall
address these exhibits with the Court at the pre-trial conference on October 27th. (Motion
#28)
8) Defendant’s Motion to Enforce is Denied as Moot in light of the redacted exhibits. The
Court will put the originals under seal, and Defendant may file redacted versions of Exhibits
BB and AI at which time the Court will put the originals under seal.

Electronically signed on 10/23/2025 12:21 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

__________________________________
Daniel Richardson
Superior Court Judge

Entry Regarding Motion Page 11 of 11
24-CV-04273 Juliet Stephens v. Shannon Gilmour