Redmond Road JO 4-451 - Decision on Motion

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
Environmental Division Docket No. 25-ENV-00048
32 Cherry St, 2nd Floor, Suite 303,
Burlington, VT 05401
802-951-1740
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Redmond Road JO 4-451

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Request to Defer Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion: 3)
Filer: Justin B. Barnard, Esq.
Filed Date: October 20, 2025
Opposition to Request to Defer Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Mark G. Hall,
Esq., on October 23, 2025.
Reply in Support of Request to Defer, filed by Anne B. Rosenblum, Esq., on November 5,
2025.
The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This is an appeal by Casella Waste Management, Inc. (Casella) of a May 29, 2025 jurisdictional
opinion of the District Coordinator of the District 4 Environmental Commission (the JO) concluding
that Chittenden Solid Waste District (CSWD) did not need an Act 250 permit for the construction of
a materials recycling facility (the MRF) at property located on Redmond Road, Willison, Vermont (the
Property).
This Court held its initial status conference in this matter on September 8, 2025. At this
conference, the parties, through counsel, expressed differences of opinion on how to marshal this
matter towards resolution. Namely, CSWD wished to resolve this matter through an immediate
motion for summary judgment and Casella believed that discovery was necessary before reaching the
merits of the matter, either on motion or otherwise. The Court directed CSWD to file its motion for
summary judgment in October and noted that after review of the motion Casella has the opportunity
to request the Court to defer ruling on the motion to allow for discovery. CSWD filed its motion and
Casella now requests that the Court defer ruling upon the motion until Casella can conduct discovery,
as outlined, in Casella’s request. CSWD opposes the motion.

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Pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d), when a nonmoving party shows by affidavit or declaration that it
cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the Court may defer considering the motion
and allow time to take discovery. See V.R..C.P. 56(d)(1)-(2).
The Vermont Supreme Court has recognized that, typically, the Court decides motions for
summary judgment after adequate time for discovery. See Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 254—
55 (1989); see also Doe v. Doe, 172 Vt. 533, 534 (2001) (mem.) (noting that a one-month period
between filing a complaint and a motion for summary judgment did not provide sufficient time for
discovery). The Court notes that this Court’s procedures and appellate review status provides a
somewhat different procedural and/or factual posture than those presented in a traditional civil case.1
Here, CSWD submitted a request for the JO to the District Coordination and provided documentation
in support of its assertion that the MRF does not require an Act 250 permit. Casella is in possession
of those documents and the basis of CSWD’s claim of no Act 250 jurisdiction.
The Court further notes the unique circumstances of an Act 250 jurisdictional opinion and an
appeal thereof. A jurisdictional opinion, while it may create a final decision, is in some respects “a
statutory authorization for a district coordinator, and this Court on appeal, to render an advisory
opinion as to whether a proposed development requires a state land use permit.” In re WhistlePig,
LLC Act 250 JO, No. 21-2-13 Vtec, slip op. at 11 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Apr. 11, 2014) (Durkin,
J.) (citation omitted). In this context, a jurisdictional opinion “is only as good as the facts presented
to the District Coordinator.” In re Laberge Shooting Range JO, No. 96-8-16 Vtec, slip op. at 18 (Vt.
Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Aug. 15, 2017) (Walsh, J.) (citations omitted).
While the Court understands CSWD’s concerns with allowing discovery beyond what it
provided to the District Coordinator, that concern must be balanced with the present appellate posture
of the case and the above-referenced precedent from the Vermont Supreme Court. Thus, the Court
GRANTS IN PART Casella’s motion to defer ruling upon CSWD’s motion for summary judgment
to allow it to perform discovery. The Court will, however, limit that discovery as set forth herein.
Therefore, the Court DENIES IN PART Casella’s motion to the extent it seeks unfettered discovery
from CSWD.

1 The Court also notes that, while this appeal was initially filed in June 2025, the initial status conference was not

held until early September 2025, one month before the pending motion was filed. No discovery schedule had been put in
place following the appeal. While this does not prevent any party from moving forward with reasonable discovery, in this
matter, Casella’s motion for party status was not granted until the same day as the initial status conference. Thus, while
not necessary to delay discovery, it is reasonable that Casella did not begin to undertake discovery until after its motion
for party status was granted.

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The Court has authority to limit discovery. See V.R.E.C.P. 2(c).The issue before the Court is
whether CSWD’s MRF is exempt from Act 250 permitting because it is a municipal project not
exceeding 10 acres, and therefore, does not constitute development” as defined by Act 250. Also at
the center of this matter is whether a permit amendment to other CSWD permits is required because
the MRF will bear a relationship to those subject parcels.2 Limited, targeted discovery on these issues
is warranted. Discovery beyond these issues is not allowed.
The Court sets a February 1, 2025 deadline for Casella to file its response to the pending
motion. Discovery within the limited confines of this Entry Order shall take place to allow for the
February 1 response deadline.3 Responses may be filed as provided by V.R.C.P. Given this liberal
extension, the Court will not grant further extensions of this deadline without a clear showing of good
cause. The Court requests all parties work together to ensure this deadline is met.
Electronically signed November 18, 2025 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(D).

Thomas G. Walsh, Judge
Superior Court, Environmental Division

2 It is for this reason that CSWD’s previously withdrawn application for an Act 250 permit for another materials

recycling facility is irrelevant to the present question of Act 250 jurisdiction for this MRF.
3 The Court would have been inclined to impose a 45-day deadline to complete this discovery but recognizes that

the multiple holiday period falls within those 45 days that may make scheduling depositions difficult. Should the parties
be able to complete discovery before the holidays, the Court would appreciate expeditious filings.

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