Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC Major Subdivision Appeal - Decision on Motion

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
Environmental Division Docket No. 22-ENV-00018
32 Cherry St, 2nd Floor, Suite 303,
Burlington, VT 05401
802-951-1740
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC Major Subdivision Appeal

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion to Reconsider (Motion: 18)
Filer: Fletcher D. Proctor, Esq.
Filed Date: August 15, 2025
Applicant Response to Motion, filed August 29, 2025, by Samuel H. Angell, Esq.
Neighbors’ Reply in Support of Motion, filed on September 2, 2025, by Fletcher D. Proctor,
Esq.
The motion is DENIED.
This is an appeal of a major subdivision permit issued by the Town of Westminster (Town)
Development Review Board (DRB) to Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC (Applicant) for a subdivision on land
that it owns in Westminster, Vermont. Neighbors Daniel Deitz, Steven Goulas, Sr., Veronica Goulas,
Martha Monscrip, Nancy Pike, Michael Sylvester, and Teresa Sylvester (collectively, Neighbors)
appealed that decision to this Court.
On December 8, 2023, this Court issued a Merits Decision that resolved this appeal in favor
of Applicant. In re Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC Major Subdivision Appeal, No. 22-ENV-00018 (Vt.
Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Dec. 8, 2023) (Walsh, J.). In that decision, the Court concluded that Applicant
had demonstrated sufficient access to the proposed subdivision over Old Codding Road as required
by 24 V.S.A. § 4412(3) and the Westminster Zoning Bylaws (the Bylaws) by making a “threshold
showing” that it had a right to use the road. Id. at 6. The Court explained that the “threshold showing”
analysis was in recognition of the fact that this Court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate private
property rights, and such jurisdiction resides in the Civil Division, but could undertake this narrow
analysis to demonstrate requisite access under the applicable zoning regulations and laws. See id.
Neighbors appealed that decision to the Vermont Supreme Court.

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In an October 24, 2024 Decision, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that this Court has
jurisdiction to determine whether Applicant has a “permanent easement or right-of-way” that provides
access to a public road as set forth in § 4412. In re Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC Major Subdivision
Appeal, 2024 VT 66, ¶ 10. The Vermont Supreme Court, therefore, reversed and remanded the matter
“for a determination of whether applicant has established the existence of an easement or right-of-
way over Old Codding Road.[]” Id. at ¶ 14. Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment on this issue.
Applicant moved for summary judgment on the issue of access, and Neighbors cross-moved
for summary judgment in response. On August 5, 2025, this Court granted in part Applicant’s motion
for summary judgment, concluding that Applicant owns the first 1,800 feet of Old Codding Road.
See In re Ranney Dairy Farm, LLC Major Subdivision Appeal, No. 22-ENV-00018 (Vt. Super. Ct.
Envtl. Div. Aug. 5, 2025) (Walsh, J.).
Presently, before the Court is Neighbors’ motion to reconsider the August 5, 2025 Decision.
Applicant opposes the motion.
Motion to Reconsider
While Neighbors’ motion does not cite the civil rule under which they file their motion, the
Court interprets it as being made pursuant to V.R.C.P. 59(e). The Court has identified four basic
grounds for granting Rule 59(e) motion: (1) to “correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the
judgment is based”; (2) to allow a moving party to “present newly discovered or previously unavailable
evidence”; (3) to “prevent manifest injustice”; and (4) to respond to an “intervening change in
controlling law.” In re Lathrop Ltd. P’ship I, Nos. 122-7-04 Vtec, 210-9-08 Vtec, 136-8-10 Vtec, slip
op. at 10—11 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Apr. 12, 2011) (Durkin, J.) (quoting 11 Wright, Miller, &
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1). Motions to reconsider should not be used
to “relitigate old matters” or to “raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to entry of the judgment.” Appeal of Van Nostrand, Nos. 209-11-04 Vtec, 101-5-05 Vtec, slip op. at
4 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. Dec. 11, 2006) (Durkin, J.) (quoting Wright, Miller, & Kane, § 2810.1) (internal
footnotes omitted). Therefore, disagreement between the parties or with the Court’s decision is not
grounds for granting such a motion. In re Boutin PRD Amendment, No. 93-4-06 Vtec, slip op. at 2
(Vt. Envtl. Ct. May 18, 2007) (Wright, J.).
Neighbors motion argues that reconsideration is warranted to correct manifest errors because
the Court’s August 5, 2025 Decision was based upon inadmissible evidence and/or the evidence
presented was insufficient.

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First, Neighbors challenge Exhibit AA which is a trace of the original Town Map that is
recorded in the Town land records, and Exhibit Y, a recorded map noted as being the map referred
to “in and by the original deed from Josiah Willard, Esquire to Crean Brush and also referred to in
and by sundry other deeds executed by the said Josiah Willard.” Ex. Y. Neighbors argue that the
documents do not meet the requirements of V.R.E. 803(14). Rule 803(14) makes a record affecting
an interest in property an exception to the hearsay rule when it is a
Record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in
property, as proof of the content of the original recorded document
and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to
have been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an
applicable statute authorized the recording of documents of that kind
in that office.
V.R.E. 803(14).
It is undisputed that these documents are recorded with the Town, with respect to Exhibit
AA, and with the State Archives, with respect to Exhibit Y. Both documents are certified by those
respective entities. Neighbors do not dispute that they the kind of documents, generally, that are to
be recorded therein. The Court fails to see how such documents would not be admissible under the
Rule 804(14).1 Instead, Neighbors’ argument appears not related to the admissibility of the documents
under the Rules of Evidence but related to those documents’ legal import and/or weight. Prior to
the Court’s August 5 Decision, Neighbors failed to respond to Applicant’s supplemental statement of
material facts offering these exhibits in support of its motion. Neighbors failed to object to these
exhibits when they had the opportunity. Raising arguments in the motion for reconsideration that
could have been raised earlier does not present grounds to reconsider a decision. Van Nostrand, Nos.
209-11-04 Vtec, 101-5-05 Vtec, slip op. at 4 (Dec. 11, 2006) (Durkin, J.). Thus, Neighbors arguments
with respect to these exhibits do not present grounds to reconsider, but instead relitigate a matter that
could have, and should have, been litigated earlier.
Neighbors also argue that reconsideration is necessary because some of the maps provided by
Applicant in support of the motion and relied upon by the Court lack dimensions, keys, or other
internal distances rendering the maps ambiguous. Neighbors offer that some maps are distorted
causing reliability concerns. Neighbors previously raised both arguments. See Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and Opposition at 3 (filed May 7, 2025) (addressing dimensional concerns); see
also Response to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at ¶ 16 (filed May 7, 2025) (addressing

1 The Court does not address any other evidentiary issue that, independently or in connection with another rule,

may also present grounds for the admissibility of these documents.

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alleged deviations and irregularities). The Court considered these arguments in rendering its August
5 Decision. The Court declines to reconsider the August 5, 2025 Decision on these grounds as the
motion seeks to relitigate the issues.
Finally, to the extent that Neighbors seek reconsideration because they argue that there are
material facts in dispute that preclude summary judgment, this argument seeks to relitigate the initial
motion and does not present new grounds for reconsideration.
For these reasons, Neighbors’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
A. Remaining Issues
Concurrent with its issuance of the August 5, 2025 Decision, the Court set this matter for a
status conference to discuss whether there were any remaining issues before the Court. This is because
the Court was “unclear if this conclusion resolves the present dispute because it is unclear to the Court
how this distance of 1,800 feet relates to the proposed lots and the access.” Id. at 12. The Court held
that status conference on August 18, 2025. Neighbors and Applicant attended through counsel.
At this status conference, and in opposing the above motion to reconsider, Applicant concedes
that the 1,800 feet of ownership established by the August 5, 2025 Decision is short of where the
proposed lots and access is located along Old Codding Road. Despite this, Applicant argues that it
has sufficiently established that it has legal access to the proposed subdivision beyond the 1,800 feet
established by the August 5, 2025 Decision. Applicant offers two theories. First, Applicant argues
that beyond 1,800 feet it has the same right to use Old Codding Road as other parties, including
Appellants because original deeds to the properties in that area describe the boundary line as being
the road. Thus, it asserts it has the same right to use the road as Appellants. Alternatively, Applicant
offers that if it does not have this right then no one can use the road. Second, Applicant argues that
it owns the roadway in this area by virtue of a right of way agreement issued by Applicant’s predecessor
in interest for the use of the road.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(a), applicable here through V.R.E.C.P. 5(a)(2). At this time,
neither party has established that they are entitle to judgment as a matter of law regarding Applicant’s
access rights over Old Codding Road beyond 1800 feet. This Court during the original days of trial
ruled that the Environmental Division is without jurisdiction to consider this issue. The Supreme
Court concluded that the Environmental Division has jurisdiction, therefore, a day of trial on this
limited issue is now required.

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The Court directs that on or before Friday, September 29, 2025, the parties file their dates
of unavailability for a 1-day remote trial in November, 2025.
Electronically signed September 15, 2025 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(D).

Thomas G. Walsh, Judge
Superior Court, Environmental Division

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