Westwardhos v. Anatoly Glass

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Orange Unit Case No. 24-CV-00722
5 Court Street
Chelsea VT 05038
802-685-4610
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Westwardhos LLC v. Anatoly Glass LLC et al

FINAL JUDGMENT

The Court having:

granted Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment under V.R.C.P. 55(c)(6) following Defendant’s willful failure to
appear at the February 10, 2025 duly scheduled jury draw in this matter as memorialized in
the Court’s February 10, 2025 Entry Order. Subsequent to the February 10th Order, Plaintiff
has submitted two affidavits in conformance with V.R.C.P. 55(c)(1), which the Court has
reviewed and adopted below for the final judgment.

Judgment is entered for Plaintiff(s): as follows: Plaintiff was awarded
possession on April 2, 2024, by Order of this Court, which became effective on or about April
24, 2024 when Defendant vacated the premises at 228A Industrial Drive, Bradford, Vermont.
Plaintiff, based on the affidavit of Scott Sargent, the sole member and manager of
Westwardhos, LLC, is further awarded damages based on unpaid rent and damages and
repairs to the rental unit in the amount of $13,075.

Plaintiff has also filed for attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 36(D) of the parties’
lease, which provides that the prevailing party in an action premised on the breach of a
lease is entitled to seek reasonable attorney’s fees. The Court finds that this provision still
applies despite the expiration of the original lease term based on Section 35 of the parties’
lease. This provision expressly allows a tenant to holdover and create a month-to-month
tenancy after the expiration of the original lease term but subject to all terms and conditions
of the original lease. Plaintiff is also entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to 12 V.S.A. §
4854, which allows an award of reasonable attorney’s fees in ejectment actions when the
parties allow for such in the written terms of their lease.

In assessing the reasonableness of the fees sought, the Court looks to the number of
hours that are claimed by the attorney as multiplied by the attorney’s hourly rate.
L’Esperance v. Benware, 2003 VT 43, ¶ 22. In this case, Attorney Fink’s affidavit and billing
statements indicate that he is claiming 49.42 hours of time at an hourly rate of $250 for a
total amount of fees of $12,355. The Court finds the $250 per hour rate to be reasonable
and consistent with what other attorneys of equivalent experience will charge for legal work
in central Vermont for general civil litigation, including ejectment actions. The Court has
had multiple opportunities to review these rates in other landlord tenant cases in Orange
and Caledonia Counties.

As to the number of hours spent by Attorney Fink, the Court finds that 49.42 hours to
be mostly reasonable in the context of the case. The ejectment action itself did not present
any particular, novel legal issue. It was a straightforward application of the terms of the
parties’ lease agreement and the Vermont ejectment statutes. What made the present case
somewhat unusual was Defendant’s approach to the litigation. As detailed in the Court’s
February 9, 2025 Order denying Defendant’s motion for an interlocutory appeal, Defendant’s
litigation strategy involved challenging nearly every order issued by the Court by filing
motions to reconsider, motions to stay, motions for interlocutory appeals, or other
extraordinary relief. These motions were time-consuming for Plaintiff’s counsel to review
and draft responses. They represent additional resources that Plaintiff’s counsel needed to
expend and were driven by the Defendant and not Plaintiff’s counsel. Additionally,
Plaintiff’s success in this case warrants a justification for these fees as they represent a
reasonable expenditure of resources to move this case forward to remove Defendant from
the rental unit, and to bring its claims to a successful conclusion.
The one issue within Plaintiff's counsel's billing that the Court finds unreasonable
under this standard involves the billing for status conferences on 5/21/24; 1/9/25; and

1/27/25.1 In each case, counsel billed for four hours of time, but the Court's review shows

that the actual conferences were substantially shorter. The Court understands based on
the surrounding billing that these figures likely include preparation, travel time, and post-

hearing conversations with the client. Notwithstanding, the Court does not find these four-
hour figures to be reasonable, and the Court will reduce the allowable hours from each of
these status conferences to one hour, thereby reducing the overall billable hour lodestar
amount to 40.42 hours. In doing so, the Court does not find that counsel did not spend this

time working on the case or the claim to the four-hour blocks to be untrue. In fact, the

Court suspects based on its review of counsel's billing records and the record of this case
that the four-hour billing amount is, in fact, a conservative estimate. Nevertheless, the
Court is compelled to apply the concept of a lodestar to the billings to either raise or reduce
amounts based on various factors. 1 Esperance, 2003 VT 43, at § 22. In this case, the
twelve hours billed for the three status conferences is unreasonable and has been reduced
accordingly to three hours.

Based on this analysis, the Court awards Plaintiff $10,105 in attorney's fees.

THEREFORE, it is ORDERED and ADJUDICATED that Plaintiff Westwardhos, LLC
shall have judgment against Defendant Anatoly Kishinevski for possession of the rental unit
at 228A Industrial Drive, Bradford, Vermont and a judgment for damages and attorney's fee
in the amount of $23,180. Plaintiff is also awarded his filing fee of $295 and $474.85 in
service costs under V.R.C.P. 54 for a TOTAL JUDGMENT $23,949.85.

Electronically signed on 2/26/2025 1:59 AM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

Vermont Superior Court
Filed 02/26/25
Daniel Richardson Orange Unit
Superior Court Judge

1
The Court does not include the rent escrow hearings held on March 25 and 26, 2024 as the record
indicates that these were longer hearings in which both parties offered evidence and testimony over the
two-day period.