Drinan v. Green Mountain Stock Farm

7ermont Superior Court
Filed 05/21/25
Orange UUnit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Orange Unit Case No. 24-CV-02231
5 Court Street
Chelsea VT 05038
802-685-4610
-vermontjudiciary.org
Heather Drinan v. Green Mountain Stock Farm, Inc.
ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion to Reconsider (Motion: 7)
Filer: Rodney E. Mcphee; Heather E Drinan
Filed Date: April 28, 2025
The motion is DENIED.

Defendant's first argument for reconsideration is that the case of Moore v. Center controls to
Plainuffs first claim of warranty against encumbrances. 124 Vt. 277, 281 (1964). The Court does

not find Moore to be controlling. The holding of Moore concerns an easement granted by a

defendant's predecessor in title, the Tuppers, for parking, which was not indicated in the Tuppers'

later deed to defendant. Id. at 279. After taking possession, defendant encountered plaintiff's use of

the easement, and he was then notified of the easement by the plainuff. Id. Defendant then made

improvements to his property that excluded plaintiffs from the easement. Id. at 280. The Court
held that this exclusion was not permissible because the easement had been validly conveyed and

continued despite not being a part of the Tuppers' deed to defendant. Id. at 281.

Nothing in Moore concerns whether the Tuppers' warranty was accurate or whether the
Tuppers had any liability as a result of excluding the information. Id. at 281 82. The Tuppers were
not party to the litigation, and their relationship was not at issue. If anything, the holding of Moore
indicates that such an excluded easement is a real and valid encumbrance, and it leaves open the

question of whether excluding such an encumbrance constitutes a violation of the warranty. All of
which makes a motion to dismiss on Moore inappropriate as nothing in this case forecloses Plaintiff
Drinan's current claims against Defendant Green Mountain Stock Farm, Inc. which in terms of
Moore stands in the same position as the Tuppers did. As such, Defendant's first argument does not

persuade the Court that there are grounds to dismiss Count I at this time.!

1
Defendant also raises an argument that Plaintiff Drinan did not act to cure the encumbrance, and it
should be enforced against her. In re West, 165 Vt. 445, 450 (1996). This argument, however, goes
beyond the pleadings into the factual record and is not appropriate for a motion to dismiss under
Vermont's notice pleading standards. Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. v. Ace American Ins. Co., 2022
J
VT 45, 40 (citing to V.R.C.P. 8 and Vermont's liberal notice pleading standards).
Entry Regarding Motion Page 1 of 2
24-CV-02231 Heather Drinan v. Green Mountain Stock Farm, Inc.
As to Defendant’s argument regarding Count II, the same analysis applies. The argument
raised by Plaintiff Drinan is not whether she is deemed to have constructive notice for purposes of
enforcement of the easement, but whether Defendant as seller took actions that misrepresented the
nature of the parcel. Defendant’s argument that because the easement is binding on Plaintiff and
because Plaintiff had the opportunity to conduct a title search absolves Defendant from any liability
for making misrepresentations is neither black letter law nor patently obvious at this stage of the
case. Silva v. Stevens, 156 Vt. 94, 105 (1991); Crompton v. Beedle, 83 Vt. 287, 300–02 (1910). For these
reasons, Defendant’s arguments concerning Count II of the complaint do not provide sufficient
grounds for dismissal.

Finally, Defendant’s arguments concerning “reasonable interpretation” and the consumer
fraud act are similar to its arguments concerning misrepresentation. The Court does not find any of
the caselaw cited by Defendant to support the proposition that because a plaintiff could have
uncovered a Defendant’s misrepresentations and incorrect statements that the defendant is absolved
of liability as a matter of law. As Carter and Ianelli note, consumer fraud does not require an intent to
mislead, it only requires evidence of misleading statements (representations or omissions) that were
reasonably construed and influenced Plaintiff’s actions regarding the transaction. Ianelli v. US Bank,
2010 VT 34, ¶ 34; Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 168 Vt. 48, 56 (1998). Plaintiff’s pleadings establish these
elements, and Defendants arguments concern the facts that go beyond the pleadings into the nature
of Plaintiff’s title search, what was or was not known, and what specific representations or
disclaimers were exchanged. For these reasons, Count III of Plaintiff’s complaint is not susceptible
to a motion to dismiss.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is Denied.

Electronically signed on 5/20/2025 1:59 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

__________________________________
Daniel Richardson
Superior Court Judge

Entry Regarding Motion Page 2 of 2
24-CV-02231 Heather Drinan v. Green Mountain Stock Farm, Inc.