Pownal Ctr Community Church v. Pownal

Vermont Superior Court
Filed 07/02/25
Bennington Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Bennington Unit Case No. 25-CV-01511
207 South St
Bennington VT 05201
802-447-2700
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, raa Vermont Municipality

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion to Dismiss (Motion: 1)
Filer: Robert M. Fisher
Filed Date: May 07, 2025

This case involves a dispute over title of the Property at 495 Center Street in Pownall,
Vermont, known as the Pownal Center Community Church. Plaintiff Pownal Center Community
Church (Church) filed a Complaint on April 4, 2025, against Defendant Town of Pownal
(Town). Church seeks an order of quiet title on theories of having legal title, acquiring title
through adverse possession, and acquiring a prescriptive easement to continue using the
Property. Town filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 2025, pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
Church responded with Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on June 5, 2025,
a

asserting, among other things, that Town's Motion to Dismiss should be treated as a motion for
summary judgment. On June 13, 2025, Town filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.

The ruling on the motion, for the reasons herein, is:

1. Town's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Standard

Town's Motion to Dismiss comes pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Vermont Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides that a motion to dismiss should be granted where it is "beyond
doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Kaplan
v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2009 VT 78, J
7, 186 Vt. 605. In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts
assume the truth of factual allegations asserted in the complaint, as well as any reasonable
inferences that may follow, and focus their inquiry "on the absence of any facts, reasonable
factual inferences, and legal bases for recovery alleged in the complaint, attachments thereto, or
to matters the court may judicially notice." Sprague v. Nally, 2005 VT 85, § 2, 178 Vt. 222
J
(quoting Gilman v. Maine Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2003 VT 55, 20, 175 Vt. 554 (mem.) (internal
quotations omitted)). The "purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the law of the claim, not the
facts which support it." Powers v. Office of Child Support, 173 Vt. 390, 395 (2002) (citing
Levinsky v. Diamond, 140 Vt. 595, 600 (1982)). Motions under Rule 12(b)(6) are not favored
and rarely granted. Endres v. Endres, 2006 VT 108, 1 4, 180 Vt. 640.
Entry Regarding Motion Page 1 of 5
25-CV-01511 Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, a Vermont Municipality
Facts
The following facts from Church’s Complaint are accepted as true. On January 28, 1760,
Province of New Hampshire Governor Benning Wentworth chartered the Town of Pownal on
behalf of King George II of Great Britain, wherein a Glebe was set aside for the Church of
England. Around 1790, a congregation in Pownal raised funds and built a church at the
Property. Around 1849, the Town of Pownal voted to raise funds to repair the church structure.
There is no report examining title to the Property. Subsequently, around 1905, Ward E. Niles
conveyed to several parties and the Trustees for Church a portion of the Property known as the
“carriage shed” premises. Around 1991, Town stopped using the basement story of the church
building on the Property for town and Freeman’s meetings. Church has maintained and insured
the Property since 1951 and 1980, respectively. Since its inception, the Property has operated as
a religious site of worship. Town has not taken any affirmative action to retain ownership of
some, or all, of its perpetual lease lands that it may have.

Discussion
1. Town’s Motion to Dismiss is not a motion for summary judgment.
2.
Church baldly insists that this Court must treat Town’s Motion to Dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment. The Court disagrees. V.R.C.P. 12(b) provides that:

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

However:

The general rule is that “[w]hen the complaint relies upon a
document ... such a document merges into the pleadings and the
court may properly consider it under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.” Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001) (quotation omitted); accord
Levy v. Southbrook Int'l Invs., Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 13 n. 3 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that it was “appropriate for the district court to refer
to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the
documents were referred to in the complaint”); Collins v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir.2000) (court
may consider materials “referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and
... central to her claim” in ruling on motion to dismiss) (quotation
omitted); New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am., 18 F.3d 1161, 1164 (4th Cir.1994) (court did not
err in considering document referred to in complaint in granting
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25-CV-01511 Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, a Vermont Municipality
motion to dismiss). Similarly, it is well settled that, in ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts may properly consider
matters subject to judicial notice, such as statutes and regulations,
and matters of public record. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179
(2007) (in ruling on a motion to dismiss, “courts must consider the
complaint in its entirety, as well as ... documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice”)

Kaplan v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2009 VT 78, ¶ 10 n. 4, 186 Vt. 605. Indeed, the court may
consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which the
court may take judicial notice. Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 999 F.3d 842, 854
(2d Cir. 2021).

Here, the parties are not presenting any matters to the Court outside the pleadings that
warrant treating Town’s Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Town has not
presented any documents to the Court to consider outside of the pleadings. Moreover, any
documents mentioned in Church’s Complaint are incorporated because they are documents to
show potential transfers of title of the Property that are attached to the Complaint. Accordingly,
Town properly labelled its Motion to Dismiss, and this Court will not treat it as a motion for
summary judgment.

3. Church’s Complaint does not present facts that demonstrate that it is entitled to
legal title of the entire Property based on transfer of title.
Interests in land are legal or equitable, and a legal interest has its origins in the principles,
standards, and rules developed by the courts of law. Restatement (First) of Property § 6. At this
stage, Church is simply required to allege facts to legal or equitable title to the Property.
Church’s Complaint does say that it is entitled to legal title of the entire Property. Yet its
Complaint does not allege the facts that would demonstrate this.

A glebe is “land possessed as part of the endowment or revenue of a church or
ecclesiastical benefice.” Black’s Law Dictionary, glebe (12th ed. 2024). 24 V.S.A. § 2401
states:

The selectboard shall have the care of lands in the town granted
under the authority of the British Government as glebes for the use
of the Church of England and now by law granted to such town for
the use of schools, and lands granted to the use of the ministry or
the social worship of God, and lands granted to the first settled
minister, and not appropriated according to law.

Leases of glebe lands are durable leases and create a landlord-tenant relationship. Galkin
v. Town of Chester, 168 Vt. 82, 87–90 (1998). Moreover, a “[c]onveyance of land or of an estate
or interest in land may be made by deed executed by a person duly authorized to convey it, or by

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25-CV-01511 Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, a Vermont Municipality
the person’s attorney, and acknowledged and recorded as provided in this chapter.” 27 V.S.A. §
301.
Here, Church has only alleged that it has a glebe, which does not give legal title, or
possible legal title over the carriage shed premises of the Property. The deed in 1905 only
concerns the “carriage shed” of the Property. Even if Church is not asserting that it has a glebe,
as it claims, it still does not present an alternative claim to legal title of the property aside from
the conveyance of the “carriage shed.” Church has only stated a plausible claim for the “carriage
shed” portion of the Property. Thus, Church’s claim for legal title is dismissed for all the
Property except for the “carriage shed” portion of the Property.

4. Church has failed to state a claim of adverse possession or easement by prescription.
Church also asserts a claim of title to the Property based on theories of adverse
possession and easement by prescription.

“[A]n adverse possession claim is ... for recognition of title and enforcement of the rights
that accompany title,” and the burden of proving adverse possession is on the party asserting it.
Roy v. Woodstock Cmty. Tr., Inc., 2013 VT 100A, ¶¶ 35, 37, 195 Vt. 427. Such a claim can only
be brought after the statute of limitations for recovery of land under 12 V.S.A. § 501 has run. Id.
¶ 35. Establishing a prescriptive easement requires “essentially the same” elements as adverse
possession. Schonbek v. Chase, 2010 VT 91, ¶ 8, 189 Vt. 79 (quotation omitted). However,
adverse possession, unlike a prescriptive easement, requires “ ‘exclusive possession’ ” for the
statutory period. Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 2.17 cmt. a).

Public lands generally are statutorily exempted from adverse possession, even if such
possession is open and notorious. Benson v. Hodgdon, 2010 VT 11, ¶ 14, 187 Vt. 607 (citing 12
V.S.A. § 462). Both adverse possession and prescriptive easements contain the element of actual
continuous possession for the statutory period. However, 12 V.S.A. § 462 limits the
applicability of the statutory period to lands dedicated to public, pious, or charitable use. Roy v.
Woodstock Cmty. Trust, 2013 VT 100A, ¶ 60. Additionally, title to a glebe cannot be acquired
by adverse possession. See Brown v. Derway, 109 Vt. 37, 43 (1937) (ruling that disputed glebe
land could not be acquired by adverse possession).

Here, Church’s claims of adverse possession and prescriptive easement are against public
lands. Moreover, the statutory period is time barred. Church does not offer any response in its
Memorandum to counter Town’s Motion to dismiss these counts. Consequently, Church has
failed to state claim of adverse possession or prescriptive easement.

Conclusion

Church has failed to state a claim to title over the Property, except for the “carriage shed”
portion of the Property. Thus, Count I of the Complaint is dismissed except for the portion of the
Property known as the “carriage shed.” Counts II and III are dismissed in their entirety.

It appears that if Church amends its Complaint to include more factual allegations in its
Complaint, it could assist the Court in understanding the “inherent vagueness and complexities
of title to land in Vermont” that may entitle Church to relief or quiet title. Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to
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25-CV-01511 Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, a Vermont Municipality
Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (filed Jun. 5, 2025). As such, this Court grants Church leave to amend its
Complaint within 30 days after entry of this Order. Otherwise, the Complaint is dismissed
except for the claim for legal title to the “carriage shed” portion of the Property.

The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Signed electronically July 2, 2025 pursuant to V.R.E.F 9(d).

_________________________________________
David Barra
Superior Court Judge

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25-CV-01511 Pownal Center Community Church v. Town of Pownal, a Vermont Municipality