Uvm Med Ctr v. Tanko

Termont Superior Court
Filed 03/07/25
Chittenden Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Chittenden Unit Case No. 24-CV-02106
175 Main Street
Burlington VT 05401
802-863-3467
.vermontjudiciary.org

The University of Vermont Medical Center, Inc., et al v. Dawn Tanko

DECISION ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AND WRIT OF POSSESSION

This matter came before the Court on February 20. 2025 for a hearing on Plaintiff's
Motion for J udgment and Writ of Possession. UVMMC and Union Place Apartments
(collectively "Plaintiff') appeared by Webex, represented by Attorney Angela N. Zaikowski,
Esq. Defendant Dawn Tanko appeared in person, represented by Attorney Lily Yan, Esq. The
Court heard testimony from both parties and argument from counsel, during which defense
counsel asserted that Ms. Tanko is entitled to a reasonable accommodation of additional time to
pay her rent or vacate the premises, based on her disability. The Court allowed the parties the
opportunity to submit post-hearing memoranda on this issue, which they have done.! The Court
then took the matter under advisement for determination. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.

Discussion

Based on the credible evidence presented, the Court finds the following facts to be
established by a preponderance of the evidence.

Defendant Dawn Tanko has been employed by Plaintiff UVMMC for 24 years. She lives
in a rental unit owned by Plaintiff. In the past year or so, Ms. Tanko was in an accident and
unfortunately suffered a brain injury, which has kept her out of work for a considerable period of
time. As a result, she has been unable to pay her rent. In May 2024, Plaintiff filed this eviction
action. In October 2024, the parties reached a stipulated resolution, which was approved and
adopted by the Court, wherein Plaintiff agreed to a reasonable accommodation to provide Tanko
with more time to make payments to cure the rent deficiency. See Stipulated Order, dated Oct.
11, 2024, 13. The Order provides that if Tanko did not make the monthly payments required,
Plaintiff would be entitled to file © Motion for Judgment and Writ of Possession, which the Court
a

would set for hearing.

On March 5, 2025, Ms. Tanko, acting pro se, made an email submission to the Court. It does
not appear that Tanko sent a copy of her email to Plaintiff. To the extent Tanko's submission
contains additional facts, the Court has not considered them, but rather views the filing as further
argument in support of her opposition to Plaintiff's motion.

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24-CV-02106 The University of Vermont Medical Center, Inc, et al v. Dawn Tanko
Ms. Tanko was able to make her monthly payments for October through December using
short-term disability funds. However, these funds ran out and Tanko was unable to make her
payments. She experienced setbacks in her healing process and has not been able to return to
work. She also has not completed the necessary paperwork to enroll in long-term disability
coverage. Tanko currently owes $11,753 in back rent. In addition, the CVOEO benefits that
were expected did not come through. Tanko is on new medication and would like to return to
work at UVMMC; however, there are no set plans or timeline in place.

Tanko argues that she is a person with a disability and therefore Plaintiff is required to
grant her a “reasonable accommodation” by giving her additional time to cure her rent deficiency
and pay her arrears, and/or additional time to vacate her unit. Plaintiff does not appear to
challenge Tanko’s disability. It points out that it has already provided a reasonable
accommodation in the October 2024 stipulation, although it argues it was not legally required to
do so, and that Tanko’s further requests are not reasonable.

The Court is certainly sympathetic to Ms. Tanko’s situation. It is regrettable that the
parties have not been able to reach a further resolution of this matter, particularly in light of
Tanko’s status as a long-time UVMMC employee. However, the Court must conclude that
Tanko has failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that the accommodation she is requesting is
reasonable. See, e.g., Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175,
1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that plaintiff must prove the requested accommodation is
reasonable as part of her prima facie case) (cited in Gates v. Mack Molding Co., 2022 VT 24,
216 Vt. 379). As the Second Circuit has explained, “[e]conomic discrimination,” that is, the
failure to accommodate a disabled person’s inability to pay the required rent, “is not cognizable
as a failure to make reasonable accommodations.” Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden
Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Congress could not have intended the FHAA to
require reasonable accommodations for those with handicaps every time a neutral policy imposes
an adverse impact on individuals who are poor.”). Further, “the payment of rent as consideration
for the right to possess and use a property is the very basis and nature of the transaction between
a lessor and lessee.” Dempsey v. Hous. Operations Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-615 (SRU), 2016
WL 730702, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2016). While the Fair Housing Act “requires housing
providers to make reasonable accommodations for renters’ disabilities, . . . it does not undermine
the nature of their transaction or so fundamentally alter their relationship that it removes eviction
as a remedy for nonpayment of rent.” Id.

Nor does the Court find that Ms. Tanko’s financial circumstances were entirely beyond
her control, or that other good cause exists to relieve her of the obligations imposed by the
Court’s October 2024 Order. Tanko understood her obligation to continue making her rental
payments, and could have timely pursued long-term disability coverage or other options to obtain
the necessary funds. During the hearing, she could not present a specific timeline for returning
to work fulltime and getting caught up on her rental arrears. Again, the Court appreciates Ms.
Tanko’s desire to return to work for UVMMC and understands that she has been the victim of
some very unfortunate circumstances. But Vermont law allows Plaintiff to proceed with this
eviction action, and the Court finds Plaintiff has demonstrated that it is entitled to judgment.

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24-CV-02106 The University of Vermont Medical Center, Inc. et al v. Dawn Tanko
Order

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment and Writ of Possession is
GRANTED. Plaintiff shall submit a proposed judgment order.

Electronically signed on March 7, 2025 at 2:57 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).

________________________________
Megan J. Shafritz
Superior Court Judge

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24-CV-02106 The University of Vermont Medical Center, Inc. et al v. Dawn Tanko