Woods v. Brown

7ermont Superior Court
Filed 01/09/25
Rutland nit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT Ky CIVIL DIVISION
Rutland Unit Case No. 24-CV-04338
83 Center St
Rutland VT 05701
802-775-4394
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Glen Woods et al v. Kerry Brown et al

DECISION ON THE MERITS

This is a no-cause ejectment action brought by Plaintiffs Glen Woods and Wanda Woods against
Defendants Kerry Brown and Cameron Powell. Defendants brought a counterclaim alleging consumer
fraud, defamation, and illegal eviction. The court held a final hearing in this action on January 7, 2025.
Plaintiffs were represented by Attorney Jeffrey Guevin. Defendants represented themselves.

Findings of Fact
Based upon the credible evidence presented, the court makes the following findings of facts based
upon a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiffs own real property located at 1992 Main Street, Castleton,
Vermont. Glen Woods is a pastor at a local church in Hubbardton, Vermont and works at Rutland
Regional Medical Center as a psychiatric technician. Wanda Woods works as a LNA for Bayada Health.
Mrs. Woods is third cousins with Ms. Brown.

In April of 2024, Ms. Brown started attending Mr. Woods' church in an effort to reconnect with
family. Ms. Brown had grown up in the area, but had left for some period of time, before returning. Ms.
Brown is in a relationship with Mr. Powell. Ms. Brown approached Mrs. Woods about renting rooms at
1992 Main Street in July, 2024. The property is rented to a Mr. and Mrs. Hughes by the Plaintiffs. After
Mrs. Woods confirmed the Hughes' were ok with Ms. Brown and Mr. Powell renting rooms at 1992 Main
Street, the parties agreed to the following oral contract. The Defendants would pay Plaintiffs $100 per
week to reside at the property and would pay the Hughes' $50 per week to offset their utility usage.

When the agreement was made the parties discussed that the oral lease was anticipated being for a
short amount of time as the Defendants were looking at other residences. The parties did discuss the
possibility of the lease going into the winter months as some portion of the discussion revolved around the
Defendants assisting the Hughes' financially during the winter months. The Plaintiff, at the time the lease
as agreed to, did intend to sell the property. The Defendants made several offers to buy 1992 Main Street
from the Plaintiffs, however the offers were not accepted.

On September 7, 2024, the Plaintiffs authored a Notice of Termination requiring the Defendants
to vacate the property by October 1, 2024. Plf. Ex. 1. The Notice was sent via certified mail and was
received by the Defendants on September 10, 2024. No reason was given in the Notice for the
termination. Defendants paid their weekly rent as required.

Ms. Brown testified she felt the Plaintiffs disapproved of her relationship with Mr. Powell because
they were not married. This belief stems from a conversation she had with Mr. Woods about getting
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baptized at his church. During this conversation, Mr. Woods asked her if she was going to get married to
Mr. Powell. Ms. Brown testified this started a pattern where Mr. Woods would push marriage on the
Defendants. Mr. Woods testified there was only one conversation where marriage was discussed, which
was during the discussion of baptism. Mr. Woods testified it was church policy that he could not baptize
couples who were living together who were not married. It is unclear from the testimony whether this
reasoning was explained to Ms. Brown during that conversation. Mr. Woods denied any additional
conversation regarding marriage with Ms. Brown.
Ms. Brown during cross-examination was asked whether the Plaintiffs ever said anything untrue.
Ms. Brown’s response was “not the point.” When pressed, Ms. Brown did not point to any specific
statements made by either Glen Woods or Wanda Woods that was untrue regarding the property, the
lease, or the Defendants.
The Defendants maintained possession of 1992 Main Street, Castleton, Vermont after October 1,
2024.
The Summons and Complaint in this case was served by Castleton Police Patrolman Edward
Hayes.
Conclusions of Law
Plaintiff’s Claim
Plaintiff’s cause of action is governed by the requirements and terms of Vermont’s Residential
Rental Agreements Act, 9 V.S.A. § 4451 et seq. When there is no written lease agreement, a “landlord may
terminate a tenancy for no cause as follows: … [i]f rent is payable on a weekly basis, by providing actual
notice to the tenant of the date on which the tenancy will terminate, which shall be at least 21 days after
the date of the actual notice.” 9 V.S.A. § 4667(c)(2). Actual notice is defined as “receipt of written notice
hand-delivered or mailed to the last known address. A rebuttable presumption that the notice was received
three days after mailing is created if the sending party proves that the notice was sent by first-class or
certified U.S. mail.” 9 V.S.A. § 4451(1). The date of termination shall be at least 30 days after the date of
actual notice if the property is a covered property under the federal CARES Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 9058(a)(2)
and (c).
In this case, the Defendants received actual notice of termination on September 10, 2024 when the
received the certified letter at the Fair Haven, Vermont Post Office. Plf. Ex. 2. The Notice required
Defendants to vacate the property by October 1, 2024. That is exactly 21 days after Defendants received
actual notice of termination, making the Notice in compliance with 9 V.S.A. § 4667(c)(2). Defendants
allege Plaintiffs failed to comply with the CARES Act because they didn’t complete a mortgage search.
Neither the CARES Act nor V.R.C.P. 9.2 require a landlord to complete a mortgage or title search. As
Defendants do not allege the property is a covered property under the CARES Act, Plaintiff’s 21 day
notice requirement was sufficient under state and federal law. Defendants remain in possession of the
property after October 1, 2024. When a tenant holds over possession of property after their tenancy has
been terminated, a landlord may seek a writ of possession from the court. 12 V.S.A. § 4851. Plaintiffs
have met their burden on this claim and is entitled to judgment for possession of 1992 Main Street,
Castleton, Vermont.
As Plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the property, they are also entitled to judgment for rents
due, damages, and costs. 12 V.S.A. § 4854. There was no evidence presented of any rents due or other

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damages. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the statutory cost of the filing fee in this matter of $295. 32
V.S.A. § 1431(a).
At trial, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s case was not properly brought because the Summons
and Complaint was served by a Castleton Police Officer instead of a sheriff or deputy sheriff. Vermont
Rule of Civil Procedure 4 states, “[s]ervice of all process shall be made by a sheriff or deputy sheriff, by a
constable or other person authorized by law…” V.R.C.P. 4(c). Patrolman Hayes is not a sheriff or deputy
sheriff, but a municipal police officer. Municipal police officers “shall have the same powers as sheriffs in
criminal matters and the enforcement of the law and the same powers, immunities, and matters of defense
in serving criminal and civil process.” 24 V.S.A. § 1935. Municipal police officers are authorized by law to
service civil process. There was no insufficiency of process or service of process in this case because the
Summons and Complaint was served by Patrolman Hayes.
Defendants’ Claims
Defendants raised three separate causes of action against the Plaintiffs: 1) Consumer Fraud; 2)
Defamation; and 3) Illegal Eviction.1 Each will be addressed separately.
1. Consumer Fraud
The Defendants’ first claim alleges violations of the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). The
purpose of the CFA is “to protect the public against unfair or deceptive acts or practices and to encourage
fair and honest competition.” Sawyer v. Robson, 2006 VT 136, ¶ 12 (citations and quotations omitted).
Landlords are subject to the requirements of the CFA. Id. at ¶ 13. Under the CFA:
Any consumer who ... sustains damages or injury as a result of any false or fraudulent
representations or practices prohibited by section 2453 of this title ... may sue for
appropriate equitable relief and may sue and recover from the seller, solicitor or other
violator the amount of his damages ....

9 V.S.A. § 2461(b). A critical element of this claim is the Plaintiffs engaged in “false or fraudulent
representations or practices.” Defendants were not able to identify any false or fraudulent statements or
acts by the Plaintiffs during testimony. As such, they cannot meet their burden on this claim.
2. Defamation
The Defendants’ second claim alleges defamation of character. In order to prevail on this claim,
Defendants must prove the following elements:
(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) some negligence, or greater
fault, in publishing the statement; (3) publication to at least one third person; (4) lack of
privilege in the publication; (5) special damages, unless actionable per se; and (6) some
actual harm so as to warrant compensatory damages.
Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 291 (1990) (citations omitted). As noted above,
Defendants failed to identify any false statements made by plaintiffs during their testimony. As such, they
cannot prove the first element of defamation and cannot meet their burden on this claim.

1 Although Defendants alleged during testimony the Plaintiffs engaged in harassment and discrimination, the causes of action

alleged in the Defendant’s counterclaim is limited to the three noted.
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Plaintiffs have requested reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 5771, which states that
“[i]f judgment is rendered for a defendant in a defamation action and the court finds that the action as
frivolous and without merit, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the defendant.”
A frivolous claim is defined as one “that has no legal basis or merit, esp. one brought for an unreasonable
purpose such as harassment.” CLAIM, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also State v. Blum, 132
N.H. 396, 401 (1989) (defining frivolous as “of little weight or importance; having no basis in law or fact”
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)). The standard for
finding a claim frivolous is a high one. In re Bailey, 2009 VT 122, ¶ 68 (Johnson, J., dissenting). In this case
the court finds credible Defendants’ believe that the Plaintiffs made false statements that they believed
harmed them. The admissible evidence at trial did not support this belief, however the court cannot find
that the claim was brought frivolously or brought for the purpose of harassment. As such, Plaintiffs are
not entitled to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in responding to this claim.
3. Illegal Eviction
The Defendants’ final claim alleges illegal eviction. Under the Residential Rental Agreement Acts,
“[n]o landlord may willfully cause, directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of any utility
service being supplied to the tenant, except for temporary interruptions for emergency repairs.” 9 V.S.A. §
4463(a). Nor may a landlord “directly or indirectly deny a tenant access to and possession of the tenant’s
rented or leased premises, except through proper judicial process.” 9 V.S.A. § 2263(b). Defendants
alleged that there was an illegal eviction in November, 2024. The testimony at trial by Ms. Brown was
incredibly sparse regarding this alleged event. Ms. Brown testified she was locked out of the property
without a key, however there was no explanation of when this occurred, what led up to it, who locked her
and Mr. Powell out of the property, or how long they were locked out for. Ms. Brown’s brief statement
she was locked out without a key is insufficient for the court to find that Plaintiffs willfully denied
Defendants access to the property. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented that Plaintiffs willfully
caused a termination or interruption of the utilities at the property. Defendants have not met their burden
on this claim.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for possession of 1992 Main Street, Castleton, Vermont. A clerk
shall prepare a writ of possession. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs of $295. Plaintiffs are entitled to
judgment on Defendants’ counterclaims.

Electronically signed on January 9, 2025 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

__________________________
Alexander N. Burke
Superior Court Judge

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