Woods v. Doc

Termont Superior Court
Filed 09/03/24
Caledonia Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Caledonia Unit Case No. 24-CV-01144
1126 Main Street Suite 1
St. Johnsbury VT 05819
802-748-6600
www.vermontjudiciary.org

George Woods, Jr. v. Vermont Department of Corrections

FINDINGS AND ORDER

This is an appeal that arises from a case staffing determination by the Vermont Department of
Corrections. The basis for Appellant Woods' appeal is that while many of the facts underlying the

interrupt are true, there are several that are incorrect, including his participation in substance abuse
treatment programs, and that when all of the facts are viewed in the larger context of his efforts to stay

sober and seek mental health treatment, it mitigates to a shorter interrupt.

The present appeal is governed by 28 V.S.A. § 724 and V.R.C.P. 74.

For the reasons outlined below, Appellant Woods' appeal is Denied.

Background Facts

The facts of this matter are largely uncontested. The Department released Woods on community

supervised furlough on or around August 21, 2023. This release came after a prior 180-day interrupt

arising from an incident in October of 2022, which were the subject of a prior furlough appeal, which can
be found at Docket No. 22-CV-3890.

Appellant's release was initially conditioned on his securing housing, which he did with the Barre
Community Justice Center. As part of his furlough, Appellant agreed to several terms and conditions,
which were updated on January 4, 2024 and included the following:

A) To follow all Barre CJC's housing program rules.

B) To abide by a curfew defined as 8:00pm to 6:00am.

C) Condition 12, which stated: "I will not enter or inhabit a residence my supervising officer has
denied based on risk to the public and/or my victim(s)."

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Under this last condition, Appellant’s probation officer directed Appellant not to go to or stay at his ex-
wife Rebecca Wood’s house. While Appellant and his ex-wife have an on-going relationship, she was the
victim of the assault on which Appellant’s current sentence is based, and the two have a history that has
involved relief from abuse petitions and issues with violence.

Appellant struggled with his initial transition from the correctional facility to furlough. In early
October 2023, Appellant self-reported a relapse into drug use to his probation and parole as well as his
housing coordinator. Based on the testimony that Appellant provided at the hearing through Paul Brodie,
a licensed drug and alcohol counselor, Appellant began seeking treatment for his addiction in late
October/early November and continued with Brodie until his re-incarceration in January. Shortly after,
this relapse, Appellant also began attending recovery coaching sessions with John Reese, a recovery coach
with Turning Point. Both Reese and Brodie testified that Appellant was actively participating in these
recovery programs, but both witnesses clarified that they were not mental health practitioners, and the
programs were not mental health treatment programs but were focused on substance abuse treatment.

Appellant freely admits that he did not regularly seek mental health treatment before January 2024
when his mental health began to deteriorate. Appellant testified that he saw a mental health counselor up
and until October, but that he switched to Brodie because he wanted a male approach to his treatment.
Appellant claims that he did not realize that Brodie was only a substance abuse counselor and not a mental
health counselor. The Court does not find this testimony credible. Both Brodie and Reese were upfront
about their scope of practice, and the Court finds that Appellant, who is intelligent, would quickly
recognize that he was receiving only substance abuse treatment and not the larger mental health counseling
and support that he appears to need.

Appellant’s mental health began to deteriorate during the following January. On January 17, 2024,
Appellant reported to his probation officers and housing coordinator that he was not taking his prescribed
medication. By January 19, 2024, Appellant’s mental health appears to have deteriorated as he was
becoming uneasy with his housing and the “energy” it was projecting. He reported feeling unsafe and
uncomfortable in the building. His complaints included certain physical manifestations associated with
this growing anxiety. At that time, Appellant’s probation officer re-stated that he was not permitted to
visit or stay at his ex-wife’s house.

Shortly after this meeting, Appellant left the Barre CJC housing facility. He contacted his ex-wife
who picked him up and allowed him to return to her home where he stayed for the weekend. As a result,
Appellant violated his curfew on January 20th and 21st and Condition 12 as well as the rules of his CJC
housing.
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On Monday, January 22, 2024, Appellant communicated to his probation officers that he had
violated his curfew and Condition 12 by spending the weekend with his ex-wife. The probation office also
received a letter from the Barre CJC informing the office that it had terminated Appellant’s housing
agreement. Appellant’s probation officers directed Woods to come to the probation office, which he did
voluntarily. After some conversation, the office placed Appellant into custody, and he was returned to the
facility.

At all times, Appellant has been open with the fact that he violated the conditions of his furlough
and spent the weekend of January 20th with his ex-wife. Appellant states that due to his mental health he
felt compelled to go to his ex-wife’s house where he felt safe. Appellant blames the probation office for
failing to connect him with a mental health provider, and he feels that his decision was justified in the
context of his condition. Appellant’s location were confirmed by his GPS tracking unit, which Appellant
kept charged and on his person the entire weekend.

On March 6, 2024, the Department conducted a case staffing determination and found that
Appellant George Woods was ineligible for furlough for the remainder of his current sentence under
Department Policy Directive 430.11 based on a variety of factors, including: (1) Appellant’s high risk score
on the ORAS (Ohio Risk Assessment System); (2) the fact that this was Appellant’s second significant
violation; (3) Appellant had demonstrated a pattern of risk-related behaviors; (4) previous interventions
have failed to mitigate the risks; (5) the Department can no longer adequately control Appellant’s risk to
reoffend; and (6) that he poses a danger to others. (Administrative Record at 4.)

Standard of Review

The present appeal is a de novo review of the Department’s case staffing record. 28 V.S.A. §
724(c)(1). By statute, the Court’s review is limited to “determine whether the decision to interrupt or
revoke an offender’s community supervision furlough status was an abuse of discretion by the
Department . . . .” Id. at (c)(2). An abuse of discretion in the decision to revoke or interrupt furlough
is presumed for any period greater than 90 days for a technical violation unless:

(A) The offender’s risk to reoffend can no longer be adequately controlled in the
community, and no other method to control noncompliance is suitable.

(B) The violation or pattern of violations indicate the offender poses a danger to others.

(C) The offender’s violation is absconding from community supervision furlough. As
used in this subdivision, “absconding” means: based on the criteria set forth in
subdivision (d)(2) of this section.

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28 V.S.A. § 724(d)(2).

In this case, the Department has not sought to dismiss the complaint as a non-technical
violation constituting a new crime as defined in Section 724(d)(1). Nor is there evidence to suggest an
absconding charge under Section 724(d)(2)(C) as that term is defined under 28 V.S.A. § 722 (1).
Instead, the sole question on appeal is whether the record supports the factual basis for the furlough
revocation under the provisions of Section 724(d)(2)(A) and (B).

Legal Analysis

There is no factual question as to whether Appellant violated the terms and conditions of
furlough. As noted above, the evidence shows Appellant violated three conditions of this furlough:
(A) abiding by Barre CJC house rules; (B) following his curfew; and (C) staying away from his ex-
wife’s house and property.

There is also sufficient evidence that the probation sought to impose several intermediate
methods to control compliance leading up to these violations. These included: (1) a meeting at the
beginning of January 2024 to review and revise Appellant’s furlough terms; (2) the use of a GPS
device; (3) repeated warnings to Appellant not to stay with his ex-wife; (4) initial connections in
August with a mental health specialist; (5) prior efforts to engage Appellant in domestic violence
counseling; (6) increased supervision and more frequent meetings with probation staff; and (7) efforts
with Appellant to help him develop a plan to address panic attacks and crisis moments where he could
establish alternative transportation and meeting places where he could be compliant.

The record also shows a number of mixed actions on the part of the Appellant. On one hand,
Appellant ended his mental health treatment in the fall of 2023 as he ramped up his substance abuse
treatment. He was unable to find regular employment. He stopped taking medication that he had been
prescribed. He waited until he was at a crisis point before contacting Copley Hospital or making any
serious effort to obtain mental health support. On the other hand, there is evidence that Appellant kept
his GPS charged and intact. Appellant also reached out to a number of mental health providers over
the January 21st weekend and sought emergency housing. The record shows that Appellant tried to
stay in contact with his probation office and voluntarily complied with direction to come to the office.

If Appellant’s furlough revocation was based solely on his mental health issues, the Court
would be inclined to side with him in this matter. Appellant has long-terms struggles with mental
health and substance abuse, and he acted in a reasonable manner in the fall of 2023 when he prioritized
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his substance abuse dependency after a relapse over his mental health that appeared to be stable. In
this case, however, any stability with his mental health in the fall of 2023 proved short-lived.
Nevertheless, the evidence shows Appellant struggling and engaged with his issues and making active
efforts to address his substance abuse issues.

The central issue in this case, however, is Appellant’s continued contact and reliance on his ex-
wife. While there is evidence that Ms. Woods continues to care for Appellant and is willing to provide
support, the record also shows that when Appellant’s substance abuse or mental health issues are
unchecked that she is the likely victim of his anger and outbursts.1 This may simply be a matter of
proximity, but it may also bespeak a deeper issue.

From the beginning of Appellant’s most recent furlough, the Department made a determination
that his contact with Ms. Woods needed to be monitored and limited. That this was the best way to
keep Ms. Woods safe from an outburst or triggering event, which given Appellant’s history was
possible and highly likely. His probation and parole team has repeatedly set clear limitation on
Appellant’s contact with Ms. Woods, and the evidence is that Appellant has resisted these conditions
and has pushed for contact with Ms. Woods.

The Department has discretion to set the terms and conditions of furlough release. 28 V.S.A. §
723(a)(3) (inmate must agree “to comply with such conditions of supervision the Department, in its
sole discretion, deems appropriate for that person’s furlough.”) (emphasis added); see also Geraw v.
Vermont Dep’t of Corrections, Dckt. No. 21-CV-2443, 2022 WL 1242686, at *2 (Feb. 7, 2022)
(Mello, J.).

On appeal, the Court is not in a position to second guess the imposition of such conditions as
they reflect an individualized process that the Department, within the delegated authority, has applied
to determine the best way to keep an individual on furlough in compliance and members of the public
safe. It may be that there are other, less restrictive terms that could be applied, and it is possible that
reasonable minds could disagree about these terms. It is also possible, as it appears in this case, that
the individual intended to be protected disagrees with the terms and would also be more comfortable
with less restrictive terms. None of this, however, is subject to review, and ultimately, it rests with the
Department to set the terms and conditions. This is because the Department’s charge is larger than any
one person’s individual input, and they are the sole purview of the Department to determine and
1 Appellant’s underlying convictions involve domestic abuse against Ms. Woods, and the Administrative Record indicates

that this violence, while not continuous, has continued to crop up between Appellant and Ms. Woods.

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impose. For the purposes of the present review, these objections or alternatives do not give valid
grounds to challenge the findings that an individual violated the terms and conditions of their furlough
or the consequences imposed for such.

In this case, the evidence shows that Appellant violated three furlough conditions. These
violations came after probation and parole took several intermediate steps to correct and re-direct
Appellant’s behavior. As a result of these violation, Appellant lost his housing and was left in a
situation where he was likely to be more dependent on Ms. Woods, and that the likelihood of further
violations had only increased.

In reviewing Appellant’s testimony, the Court finds that one of the central problems is that
Appellant has a deep connection and reliance upon Ms. Woods. It is apparent that if one of
Appellant’s furlough conditions is that he keep some distance between himself and Ms. Woods, it is
very likely that this condition will be violated.

In light of these facts and conclusions, the Court concludes that the Department did not abuse
its discretion from determining that Appellant had a risk to reoffend that could no longer be adequately
controlled in the community and no other method to control non-compliance was suitable (Section
724(d)(1)), and that Appellant had demonstrated a pattern of violations that indicate he poses a danger
to others (Section 724(d)(2)).

Appellant is scored as a high-risk offender, and this is his second substantial offense within a
year. Under the provisions of Department Policy 430.11, the appropriate furlough interrupt is two
years. Given that Appellant has less than that time left in his sentence, the Department determined that
the appropriate sanction was a determination that he should remain ineligible for furlough for the
remainder of his sentence. The Court finds no abuse of discretion in this determination as it is in
compliance with the Department’s Policy and the provisions of 28 V.S.A. § 724.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Appellant Wood’s appeal is Denied. The furlough interruption is
Affirmed.

Electronically signed on 9/2/2024 1:51 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

__________________________________
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24-CV-01144 George Woods, Jr. v. Vermont Department of Corrections
Daniel Richardson
Superior Court Judge

Electronically signed pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

John S. Hall
Assistant Superior Court Judge

Electronically signed pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

____________________
Merle L. Haskins
Assistant Superior Court Judge

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