State v. . Brittany L. Knight

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 24-AP-212
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

AUGUST TERM, 2025

State of Vermont v. Brittany L. Knight* } APPEALED FROM:
} Superior Court, Lamoille Unit,
} Criminal Division
} CASE NO. 192-4-20 Lecr
Trial Judge: Daniel P. Richardson

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Defendant pled guilty to domestic assault and appeals from the trial court’s restitution
order. We affirm.

The record indicates the following. Defendant was charged with domestic assault for
allegedly punching her mother in the face several times with a closed fist on April 5, 2020. The
affidavit of probable cause alleged that defendant’s mother called 911 after being punched by
defendant. Defendant’s mother’s eye was bruised and bleeding and she thought her nose was
broken. Defendant claimed that her mother attacked her. Defendant noticed her mother was
bleeding, which defendant thought was “probably from her broken glasses.”*

Defendant pled guilty to domestic assault on July 15, 2024, pursuant to a plea agreement.
As a factual basis for the plea, defendant acknowledged that on the date in question, her mother
reported to police that defendant “hit her three times in the face with a closed fist” and that her
mother “wasn’t sure if her nose was broken.” Defendant agreed that she “hit [her] mom” and
“that would have caused her some pain.” As part of the plea agreement, the court conditionally
dismissed a second charge. The parties agreed to a contested restitution hearing for the
domestic-assault conviction. The court informed the parties on the record that, absent any
stipulation to restitution, the restitution hearing would be held on July 30, 2024, at 1:30 p.m.

Defendant did not appear at the scheduled restitution hearing. The court noted that
defendant’s counsel was present, that counsel tried unsuccessfully to reach defendant, and that

*
The affidavit of probable cause is part of the procedural history of this case and
included here for that reason. Defendant’s request to strike this information from the State’s
brief is denied.
defendant’s absence was apparently work-related. Defendant did not request a continuance and
her attorney raised no objection to continuing with the hearing. A victim’s advocate from the
Lamoille County State’s Attorney’s Office testified that she assisted the victim in obtaining
restitution for injuries incurred in the domestic-assault case. She submitted evidence of the
victim’s itemized medical expenses from a dentist visit and for new eyeglasses in early April
2020. The advocate testified that she personally received the itemized bills and paid them on the
victim’s behalf very early in these proceedings, money that was reimbursed by the Victim’s
Compensation Program. Following defendant’s guilty plea, the Victim’s Compensation Program
sought reimbursement for funds expended on the victim’s behalf.

At the close of the hearing, the court issued a restitution order in the claimed amount of
$574. The court acknowledged that the State relied in part on circumstantial evidence. Because
defendant’s mother was punched in the face and injured, the court inferred that the resulting bills
paid by the Victim’s Compensation Board for the victim’s eyeglasses and dentures were related
to those injuries. The court noted that the Board’s approval of a compensation request from a
victim was regulated by statute. See 13 V.S.A. § 5355(a) (providing that, “[a]fter review of the
evidence relevant to the application for compensation, the Board shall approve the application if
a preponderance of the evidence shows that as a direct result of the crime an injury occurred that
resulted in a pecuniary loss to the victim or the dependent”); id. § 5356(a) (“If the application
[for compensation] is approved, the Board shall authorize cash payments, not to exceed
$10,000.00, to or on behalf of the applicant, equal to the unreimbursed pecuniary loss directly
resulting from the injury or death of the victim”). The court found that the Board paid expenses
to service providers in the victim’s name for costs associated with the victim’s eyeglasses and
dentures. Defendant pled guilty to domestic assault and there was evidence in her criminal case
that she struck the victim, likely in the face. The court found it reasonable to infer that
defendant’s actions were damaging to someone who had dentures and wore glasses. It
concluded that the State satisfied its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and
therefore approved the restitution request. This appeal followed.

Defendant first argues that the court committed plain error by proceeding with the
scheduled restitution hearing in her absence. Defendant maintains that she had a constitutional
right to be present at the hearing and she did not waive that right by failing to attend the hearing.
Defendant acknowledges that this Court has never addressed whether a restitution hearing is a
“stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome,” State v. Grace, 2016 VT 113,
¶ 12, 204 Vt. 68 (quotation omitted), such that she has the right to be present. She nonetheless
contends that the error was obvious and that it “[struck] at the very heart of [her] constitutional
rights.”

An appellant raising a plain-error claim faces “a very high bar” as “we find plain error
only in rare and extraordinary circumstances.” State v. Ray, 2019 VT 51, ¶ 6, 210 Vt. 496
(quotations omitted). As we have explained, “[p]lain error requires a showing that (1) there was
error, (2) the error is obvious, (3) the error affects the substantial rights of and results in
prejudice to the defendant, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted). Defendant fails to show plain error
here.

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Pursuant to Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(1), a “defendant shall be present
at the arraignment, at any subsequent time at which a plea is offered, at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.” An exception to this rule exists “whenever
a defendant, initially present, . . . voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced,
whether or not he has been informed by the court of his obligation to remain during the trial.”
V.R.Cr.P. 43(b)(1).

As defendant acknowledges, this Court has never addressed whether a restitution hearing
is a “critical stage” of a defendant’s criminal proceeding such that a defendant has a right to be
present. Assuming arguendo that it is, the court did not commit plain error in proceeding with
the hearing after implicitly finding that defendant voluntarily chose not to attend. See V.R.Cr.P.
43(b)(1); State v. Stanley, 2015 VT 117, ¶ 23, 200 Vt. 341 (holding that trial court did not err in
proceeding with sentencing hearing despite defendant’s absence, explaining that “[b]y
voluntarily absenting himself . . . , defendant waived his right to be present”). Defendant was
personally notified of the date of the restitution hearing on the record. Her counsel attended the
restitution hearing and indicated he was unable to reach defendant. The court found defendant’s
absence was apparently work-related.

Unlike Grace, on which defendant relies, defendant fails to show how she was prejudiced
by the alleged error in going forward with the restitution hearing in her absence. 2016 VT 113,
¶ 15. Defendant acknowledged at the change-of-plea hearing that on the date in question, her
mother reported to police that defendant “hit her three times in the face with a closed fist” and
that her mother “wasn’t sure if her nose was broken.” Defendant agreed that she “hit [her] mom”
and “that would have caused her some pain.” The State introduced evidence to show the amount
paid by the Victim’s Compensation Board on the victim’s behalf for medical expenses incurred
shortly after the date of the domestic assault. Defendant does not identify any specific evidence
she would have presented or any specific challenges she would have raised to the State’s
evidence had she attended the hearing. “Prejudice must exist to demonstrate that error
undermined fairness and contributed to a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Pelican, 160 Vt. 536,
539 (1993). Defendant fails to make the necessary showing here.

Defendant next argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s restitution
award. She maintains that the State failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
her actions caused the victim’s loss.

Vermont’s criminal-restitution statute requires that restitution “be considered in every
case in which a victim of a crime . . . has suffered a material loss.” 13 V.S.A. § 7043(a)(1). As
relevant here, a “victim” is “a person who sustains physical, emotional, or financial injury . . . as
a direct result of the commission . . . of a crime.” 13 V.S.A. § 5301(4); id. § 7043(a)
(incorporating definition of “victim” from 13 V.S.A. § 5301(4)). “ ‘[M]aterial loss’ means
uninsured property loss, uninsured out-of-pocket monetary loss, uninsured lost wages, and
uninsured medical expenses.” Id. § 7043(a)(2). The Victims Compensation Board is entitled to
seek reimbursement for payments it makes on victims’ behalf. Id. § 7043(i)(2) (“[T]o the extent
that the Victims Compensation Board has made payment to or on behalf of the victim in
accordance with chapter 167 of [Title 13], restitution, if imposed, shall be paid to the Restitution
Unit, which shall make payment to the Victims Compensation Fund.”). “The trial court has
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discretion in determining the amount of restitution owed, so long as there is a direct link between
the victim’s loss and the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Gorton, 2014 VT 1, ¶ 12, 195 Vt. 460.

Defendant argues that this case is like State v. Baker, 2017 VT 91, 205 Vt.569. We
disagree. In that case, we rejected the argument that a “but-for” standard of causation applied in
restitution cases, i.e., that “reasonable actions taken in response to the natural and probable
consequences of a crime are recoverable via restitution.” Id. ¶ 9. We reiterated that there must
be a “direct link” between the crime and the restitution, which “means that there must be
proximate cause between the criminal act and the losses claimed.” Id. ¶ 10. We recognized that
while “the foreseeability analysis is similar to the causation test in the civil context, . . . criminal
restitution requires a narrower reading of causation.” Id. ¶ 14. “[B]ecause restitution is triggered
by a conviction, the harm for which a defendant pays restitution must be a directly foreseeable
result of the criminal act that leads to a conviction.” Id.; see also id. ¶ 16 (recognizing that
“[r]estitution is also not meant to cover losses that are consequential to or incidental to the
crime”).

In Baker, the victim was visiting Vermont and her car was totaled as a result of the
defendant’s grossly negligent operation. The victim’s husband missed work to drive to Vermont
and assist his family in addressing the situation. We concluded that the husband’s lost wages
were not a “direct result” of the defendant’s negligent operation because the husband missed
work based on his “desire to assist his wife and children,” and not as a direct result of the loss of
the vehicle. Id. ¶ 21. “There was no evidence that he was directly prevented from continuing to
work as a result of the accident.” Id. We thus held that his “lost wages [were] . . . not
compensable under Vermont’s restitution statute.” Id.

We are faced with a different situation here. Defendant admitting hitting her mother and
causing her pain; she agreed that law enforcement was called on the date in question and that her
mother reported that defendant punched her in the face three times with a closed fist and her
mother thought her nose might be broken. Very shortly thereafter, the victim incurred medical
expenses and worked with a victim’s advocate to obtain payment for her eyeglasses and
dentures. The Victim’s Compensation Board approved the payment, an approval that required,
by statute, a showing that as “a direct result of the crime an injury occurred that resulted in a
pecuniary loss to the victim.” 13 V.S.A. § 5355(a). The Board then sought restitution for the
money paid on the victim’s behalf and the State submitted bills to establish the amount of
restitution.

The trial court could rely on circumstantial evidence in reaching its conclusion and draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence. See, e.g., State v. O’Neill, 2019 VT 19, ¶ 35, 209 Vt.
599 (recognizing that State can “rely exclusively on circumstantial evidence in proving its
case”); State v. Murphy, 2023 VT 8, ¶ 17, 217 Vt. 578 (recognizing that factfinder “may draw
rational inferences” in reaching its ultimate determination). It did not rely on the bills alone, as
defendant suggests, or base its decision on mere speculation. The standard of proof here was a
preponderance of the evidence, which “is satisfied when the equilibrium of proof is destroyed,
and the beam inclines toward him who has the burden, however slightly.” In re M.L., 2010 VT
5, ¶ 25, 187 Vt. 291 (reiterating that “[a] bare preponderance is sufficient, though the scales drop
but a feather’s weight”) (quotations omitted)). Taking the evidence as a whole, the court acted
within its discretion in concluding that, while this was a close case, it was “more probably true
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than false,” id. ¶ 26 (quotation omitted), that a “direct link” existed “between the victim’s loss
and the defendant’s conduct,” State v. Gorton, 2014 VT 1, ¶ 12.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

Karen R. Carroll, Associate Justice

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