State v. Aaron Labor

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 23-AP-288
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a
cross-appellant.

ENTRY ORDER

SEPTEMBER TERM, 2023

State of Vermont v. Aaron Labor* } APPEALED FROM:
} Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
} Criminal Division
} CASE NO. 23-CR-08961
Trial Judge: A. Gregory Rainville

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Defendant Aaron Labor appeals from orders by the Superior Court, Chittenden Criminal
Division, entered on September 14, 2023, imposing conditions of release and holding defendant
in custody unless and until he could enter residential treatment for drug rehabilitation. Because
there is no legal basis for defendant to be in custody, he is ordered to be released forthwith. In
addition, the order imposing conditions of release was made without the necessary finding
regarding whether defendant poses a risk of flight from prosecution or presents a risk to public
safety. The matter is therefore remanded for the criminal division to hold a hearing as soon as
possible.

In September 2023, defendant was charged with false pretenses under 13 V.S.A. § 2002
and for violating conditions of release on a prior charge requiring him to maintain a curfew under
13 V.S.A. § 7559(e). Defendant pleaded not guilty to these charges.

On September 14, 2023, defendant was arraigned. At the arraignment, the court initially
imposed $2500 bail but changed course and imposed the following conditions of release:
(1) defendant “must come to court when . . . told to,” (2) defendant “must give [his] attorney and
the court clerk [his] address and phone number,” (3) defendant “must engage in rehabilitative
treatment within 30 days,” (4) defendant must be subject to a twenty-four-hour curfew at a court-
approved address, and (5) defendant “must NOT buy, have or use regulated drugs without a
prescription.”
Because defendant was not presently receiving rehabilitative drug treatment, the court
orally ordered him to be held until he could receive such treatment. However, neither the
Conditions of Release nor the Mittimus reflect the court’s order to immediately place him into
custody and to hold him until a treatment bed is secured. Despite the absence of a written order
so stating, neither party contests that this is what the trial court verbally ordered or that this is
why defendant continues to be held.

In justifying its decision, the court implied that defendant was a flight risk because he had
eleven charges pending against him and a parallel history of failing to comply with conditions of
release, reasoning that “the more time that a person is exposed to creates a greater flight risk.”
The court also noted his unemployment, found that he suffers from a “substantial drug problem,”
and claimed that the “court [ha]s had some success holding people until they go to rehab” rather
than “putting them back on the street.” The court concluded that defendant was “not held
without bail. He’s held until he goes to rehab. That’s a very different thing.” Therefore, the
court orally ordered defendant into the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC).

On appeal, defendant argues the court’s decision to hold defendant in jail because he has
not yet found a treatment bed for drug rehabilitation—and cannot do anything to leave until he
does—is framed as a violation of a condition of release but effectively amounts to defendant
being held without bail. Defendant argues, as such, that the court acted without constitutional or
statutory authority to hold defendant without bail until he was admitted to treatment. Defendant
further claims that the trial court’s finding that defendant posed a flight risk is unsupported by
the record.

A defendant charged with a criminal offense is entitled to release on conditions pursuant
to 13 V.S.A. § 7554, unless an exception applies under § 7553 or § 7553a. Under 13 V.S.A.
§ 7554(a)(1), the court may impose “the least restrictive combination” of several enumerated
conditions upon a determination that release on personal recognizance “will not reasonably
mitigate the risk of flight of from prosecution.” Under § 7554(a)(2), the court may also impose
“the least restrictive combination” of several additional conditions to “reasonably ensure
protection of the public.” In deciding the conditions of release to impose under § 7554(a)(1) and
(2), the court “shall take into account,” based on “available information,” several considerations,
including the nature of the offense, the weight of the evidence, and the defendant’s family ties,
record of convictions, and record of appearance for court. Id. § 7554(b)(1)-(2). This Court will
affirm the order imposing conditions if it is “supported by the proceedings below.” 13 V.S.A.
§ 7556(b); see State v. Rougeau, 2019 VT 18, ¶ 14, 209 Vt. 535. This Court reviews a decision
regarding imposition of conditions of release for an abuse of discretion. Rougeau, 2019 VT 18,
¶ 14.

Defendant’s first argument concerns the trial court’s oral ruling remanding defendant into
the custody of the DOC. To order a defendant into DOC custody, it is incumbent on the trial
court to “make out and deliver . . . a mittimus in due form, stating therein the grounds of issuing
it.” Abells v. Chipman, 1 Tyl. 377, 380 (Vt. 1802) (per curiam). As this Court has noted, one of
the “essential parts of a mittimus” is “that it be in writing.” State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 163
(1901). “If this [is] omitted,” a correctional facility “cannot . . . be justified in holding [a]

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prisoner.” Abells, 1 Tyl. at 380. Although the court issued a mittimus in this case, the court’s
written order failed to provide why defendant was to be held or how he could be released.

Moreover, the court lacked a legal basis to detain defendant. Defendant was not charged
with a crime where a hold without bail order was an option under 13 V.S.A. § 7553 or § 7553a.
Even accepting that there was a basis to hold defendant for failure to meet the conditions of
release imposed,1 there was no connection between the conditions imposed and the order
remanding defendant into custody. There was no monetary bail imposed. The Conditions of
Release order states that defendant “must engage in rehabilitative treatment within 30 days,” not
that he must immediately engage in residential treatment or be remanded into custody until he
can engage in rehabilitative treatment. Thus, the record demonstrates no legal justification for
defendant to be presently held in custody, and he is ordered released.

Defendant also challenges the imposition of a twenty-four-hour curfew. As explained
above, conditions of release may be imposed where a defendant presents a risk of flight from
prosecution or for protection of the public. 13 V.S.A. § 7554(a)(1), (2). A “person charged with
a criminal offense” poses a risk of flight if they engage in “any action or behavior . . . undertaken
. . . to avoid court proceedings.” 13 V.S.A. § 7576(9); see State v. Racicot, No. 23-AP-039,
2023 WL 1818914, *2 (Vt. Feb. 8, 2023) (unpub. mem.).

Here, in determining the issue of flight risk, the trial court implied—without expressly
finding—that defendant was a flight risk because “he [i]s continually violating court orders,”
“[i]s not following court orders,” and “is looking at . . . eleven charges . . . [m]ost of which have
accrued in the last twelve months and at least three [of which are] felonies,” including one
charge for violating conditions of release on a prior charge under 13 V.S.A. § 7559(e). At the
same time, the court acknowledged defendant has not failed to appear. By reviewing the flight
risk issue summarily without ever expressly finding that defendant is a flight risk, the court
abused its discretion by failing to exercise it. See Hausermann v. Hausermann, 2013 VT 50, ¶ 5,
194 Vt. 123 (explaining that court abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise its discretion
altogether); see also State v. J.S., 2018 VT 49, ¶ 22, 207 Vt. 379 (“A court has abused its
discretion if it has failed to exercise its sound discretion.” (internal quotations omitted)).2

1
There is no need to reach the constitutional or statutory question of whether the court
had authority to impose a condition for immediate treatment and then hold defendant for failure
to meet that condition. However, we note that a condition requiring alcohol or drug treatment
must “take into consideration the defendant’s ability to comply” and “the availability of
treatment resources.” 13 V.S.A. § 7554(a)(1)(C).
2
Even if the court had properly found that defendant was a flight risk, its cursory
analysis relied on inconsistent and impermissible grounds. In its finding, the court emphasized
defendant’s character, specifically his habitual drug abuse, noting that defendant “has fentanyl
sale charges pending, so it’s clear to the [c]ourt that he has a substantial drug problem.” But as
this Court has held, in reversing a trial court’s flight risk assessment, “that [a] defendant presents
a risk to . . . relapse and use substances . . . is not a risk of flight from prosecution.” Racicot,
2023 WL 1818914, *2. Moreover, as the court recognized, defendant “ha[d] show[n] up to most
of [his] hearings,” again repeating defendant’s consistency in “show[ing] up to court.” A finding
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Therefore, the conditions imposed lacked the requisite findings regarding whether they were
necessary to mitigate the risk of flight or to protect the public.

The order detaining defendant is reversed, and the case is remanded for further findings
as to whether he is a flight risk or danger to the public and, if so, the least-restrictive conditions
to be imposed. Defendant is to be immediately released under the written conditions imposed by
the criminal division until a hearing can be held. Mandate to issue forthwith.

FOR THE COURT:

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

that defendant has consistently appeared in court leaves the conclusion that he is a flight risk,
such that he has attempted to “avoid court proceedings,” inconsistent and unsupported, and thus
an abuse of the court’s discretion. See 13 V.S.A. § 7576(9); Racicot, 2023 WL 1818914, *2.

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