Pauley v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance

VIRGINIA:
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Friday the 12th day of May,
2000.
Frank Raymond Pauley, 	Appellant,
against 	Record No. 992366
Circuit Court No. CL98-300
State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, 	Appellee.
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit
Court of Hanover County on the 14th day of July, 1999
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of
counsel, the Court is of opinion that there is no error in the
judgment of the circuit court.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether our holding
in Cotchan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 250 Va. 232, 462
S.E.2d 78 (1995) applies on the facts of this case. 	In Cotchan,
we held that an exclusion in an automobile liability insurance
policy which provided that the policy’s medical expense coverage
did not apply to “bodily injuries sustained by the named insured
or any relative while occupying any motor vehicle owned by or
furnished or available for regular use of such named insured or
relative and which is not an insured motor vehicle” was not
violative of the provisions of Code § 38.2-2201 requiring that
such coverage be extended to relatives of a named insured and

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permitting the “stacking” of medical expense coverage for up to
four vehicles so insured. 	Id. at 234-36, 462 S.E.2d at 79-81.
In Cotchan, the claimant was the named insured in a separate
policy of insurance issued by a different insurance company and
he had declined medical payments coverage under that policy. 	We
held that as defined in the policy under which he sought
coverage, his vehicle was not “an insured vehicle” and, thus,
the exclusion applied and barred his recovery under that policy.
Appellant asserts that the present case can be
distinguished from Cotchan on the grounds that the separate
policy of insurance on his vehicle was issued by the same
company as the policy on his wife’s vehicle under which he seeks
to stack medical expense coverage and that both policies
contained provisions for medical payments coverage. 	Thus, he
contends, appellee had a known risk that the coverage of the two
policies could be stacked and had accepted premiums for that
risk. 	We disagree.
The clear import of our holding in Cotchan is that Code
§ 38.2-2201 “does not prohibit reasonable exclusions of medical
expense coverage that are clear and unambiguous.” Id. at 234-35,
462 S.E.2d at 80. 	The exclusion here is identical to the one at
issue in Cotchan. 	Under the definitions of the policy relevant

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to this exclusion, an “insured vehicle” is one insured under the
same policy as the vehicle for which medical expense coverage is
being sought, and not merely one insured under a policy issued
by the same company. 	As such, the exclusion is clear and
unambiguous, and, under the same rationale applied in Cotchan,
it is not violative of Code § 38.2-2201.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The appellee shall recover thirty dollars damages from the
appellant.
This order shall be certified to the said circuit court and
because we are advised that the issue is one of significance in
proceedings in other circuit courts, this order shall be
published in the Virginia Reports.
A Copy,
Teste:
David B. Beach,
Clerk