Commonwealth of Virginia v Mark Edward Reynolds

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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINA

Present: Judges Wllis, Bray and Annunziata
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

COMVONWEALTH OF VI RGN A
MEMORANDUM OPI N ON’ BY
Vv. Record No. 2626- 98- 1 JUDGE JERE M H WILLIS, JR
MAY 28, 1999
MARK EDWARD REYNOLDS

FROM THE CI RCU'T COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUIH
Jerone Janes, Judge Designate
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
Farle C. Mbbley (Mircus, Santoro, Kozak &
Melvin, on brief), for appellee.

The Commbnvealth appeals a pretrial order suppressing
evidence obtained during an investigative stop of a car driven
by Mark Edward Reynolds. It contends the trial court erred in
concluding that the stop violated the Fourth Anendnent’s
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. VWé
disagree and affirmthe trial court’s j udgnent.

Upon appeal froman order granting a notion to suppress,

the Comnonvealth mist showthe trial court’s decision was

erroneous. See Freeman v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 660,

460 S.E. 2d 261, 262 (1995). W wll not disturb the trial

*Pursuant to Code § 17. 1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116. 010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.

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court’s ruling unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it. 	See id.
As Reynolds, heading north, approached the intersection, he
engaged his left-turn signal, proceeded to the northern edge of
the break in the median, brought his vehicle to a stop
approximately one foot from the curb of the northern median, and
placed the front end of his vehicle across the yellow line of
the left-turn lane of southbound traffic. 	Although the
intersection was marked with two “no U-turn” signs, nothing
prohibited a left turn onto the entrance ramp to Interstate 264,
which was accessible from the position of Reynolds’ vehicle at
the time of the stop. 	Thus, Officer Laskey lacked sufficient
basis upon which to conclude that Reynolds was about to make an
illegal U-turn into the southbound lanes of Frederick Boulevard
rather than a legal left turn onto the entrance ramp. 	We cannot
conclude, therefore, that the trial court’s finding that
Reynolds could have turned legally onto the entrance ramp was
clearly erroneous, and we decline to disturb that finding on
appeal.
Laskey’s erroneous belief that Reynolds illegally crossed
the yellow line of the oncoming turn lane constituted an
insufficient basis for the stop of Reynolds’ vehicle. 	A police
officer may stop a motor vehicle for investigatory purposes if
the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion based on
articulable facts that either the vehicle or an occupant is

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subject to seizure for violation of law. 	See Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 347, 353, 470 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1996).
Contrary to Laskey’s belief, it was not unlawful for Reynolds to
cross the yellow line of the oncoming turn lane for the purpose
of turning left onto the entrance ramp. 	See Code § 46.2-804(6).
An officer’s mistaken belief as to the law will not support a
finding of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 	See Ford v.
City of Newport News, 23 Va. App. 137, 145, 474 S.E.2d 848,
851-52 (1996).
The evidence supports the trial court’s holding that the
police lacked a factual basis for a reasonable suspicion that
Reynolds was engaged in, or was about to engage in, illegal
activity. 	Thus, the traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.

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Annunziata, J., dissenting.
I dissent because, contrary to the majority, I find that
the defendant could not have turned onto the entrance ramp to
Interstate 264 from his position without completing an illegal
U-turn on Frederick Boulevard.
A U-turn is defined as a turn “by a vehicle traveling along
one side of a way by crossing the lane of oncoming traffic and
turning into and proceeding along a lane on the other side of
the way in a direction exactly opposite to the direction of
movement at the start of the turn.” 	Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 2526 (1981). 	Officer Laskey testified
that, because the defendant had driven “too far” north, the
defendant could not have reached the entrance ramp without
“looping around,” entering the lanes of southbound traffic on
Frederick, and returning to the ramp. 	The pictures introduced
as exhibits support the conclusion that the defendant would have
had to turn his vehicle into southbound traffic on Frederick,
albeit briefly, before reaching the beginning of the entrance
ramp to Interstate 264.
Based on this evidence, I believe the trial court’s
determination that the defendant could have legally turned left
onto the entrance ramp was clearly erroneous. 	Because the
evidence supports Officer Laskey’s reasonably articulated
suspicion that the defendant was about to make an illegal
U-turn, I would hold that the stop was justified and reverse the

denial of the defendant’s suppression notion. See Layne v.

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 23, 25, 421 S.E 2d 215, 216 (1992).