Elise N.B.McK. Horn v Clyde J. Horn

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder
Argued at Salem, Virginia
ELSIE NAOMI BOYD (McKINNEY) HORN OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 2654-97-3 	CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
DECEMBER 22, 1998
CLYDE J. HORN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY
Donald R. Mullins, Judge
Susan E.F. Henderson (Henderson & Fuda, on
brief), for appellant.
Robert M. Galumbeck (Dudley, Galumbeck &
Simmons, on brief), for appellee.
Elsie Naomi Boyd (McKinney) Horn (wife) appeals the trial
court's divorce and equitable distribution decree. 	Because this
order is interlocutory in nature and thus not appealable, we
dismiss the appeal.1
I.
In its decree entered October 9, 1997, the trial court
granted the parties a divorce. 	On the issue of the equitable
distribution of the parties' business property, the court found
as follows:
Dana Coal Company, Inc., although the
stock in same was solely owned by [wife] at
1On appeal, wife argues that the court erred: 	(1) in
classifying a corporation solely owned by wife as marital
property; (2) in finding that wife committed waste with regard to
the parties' marital property; and (3) in setting the valuation
date for the marital estate as of the time of separation.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, we do not reach
the merits of these claims.

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the time of the marriage of the parties, and
remains solely owned by [wife] at this time,
has been transmuted into marital property by
the investment of marital funds, marital
property and the personal efforts of the
parties in the said company during the
marriage. 	The Court finds that there remains
no identifiable portion of the asset which
may continue to be classified as separate
property, as a result of the investment of
marital funds, marital property and the
personal efforts of the parties in the
operation of the business since the marriage
of the parties.
Accordingly, the trial court classified Dana Coal and the
remaining businesses as marital property subject to equitable
distribution and set the valuation date of the marital estate as
the time of the parties' separation.
Although the trial court granted the divorce and determined
the classification of property owned by the parties, it retained
jurisdiction to value and distribute the various property.2 The
2We initially note that the trial court did not retain
jurisdiction pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(K), which grants a trial
court continuing jurisdiction in various enumerated situations,
none of which apply here. 	Code § 20-107.3(K) provides:
The court shall have the continuing authority and
jurisdiction to make any additional orders necessary to
effectuate and enforce any order entered pursuant to
this section, including the authority to:
1. 	Order a date certain for transfer or
division of any jointly owned property under
subsection C or payment of any monetary award
under subsection D;
2. 	Punish as contempt of court any
willful failure of a party to comply with the
provisions of any order made by the court
under this section;
3. 	Appoint a special commissioner to

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court found that:
[a]dditional evidence must be taken with
regard to the value of the marital estate;
and, further, this Court finds that matters
currently pending before the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Virginia, Abingdon Division, may affect the
valuation of, individual ownership and
distribution of such property, specifically
as same relates to McHorn Construction
Company, Inc. and Dana Coal Company, Inc.;
and, that as a result of same, and upon
motion of [husband], further matters
concerning the equitable distribution of the
marital estate, including valuation thereof
and the manner in which the distribution of
the estate shall be made, must be continued
upon the docket of this Court because such
action is clearly necessary and the Court
will, therefore, retain jurisdiction
concerning same.
Accordingly, the court ordered that the equitable distribution,
value and manner of distribution "shall be determined at a later
date for the reasons previously set forth, herein." 	The matter
was continued on the docket of the trial court. 	No final
valuation of the property or monetary award was entered.
transfer any property under subsection C
where a party refuses to comply with the
order of the court to transfer such property;
and
4. 	Modify any order entered in a case
filed on or after July 1, 1982, intended to
affect or divide any pension, profit-sharing
or deferred compensation plan or retirement
benefits pursuant to the United States
Internal Revenue Code or other applicable
federal laws, only for the purpose of
establishing or maintaining the order as a
qualified domestic relations order or to
revise or conform its terms so as to
effectuate the expressed intent of the order.

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II.
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over final decrees of
a circuit court in domestic relations matters arising under
Titles 16.1 or 20, and any interlocutory decree or order
involving the granting, dissolving, or denying of an injunction
or "adjudicating the principles of a cause." 	Code
§ 17.1-405(3)(f) and (4), recodifying § 17-116.05(3)(f) and (4).
A final decree is one "which disposes of the whole subject,
gives all the relief that is contemplated, and leaves nothing to
be done by the court." 	Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 390,
451 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1994) (quotations omitted).
In the instant case, the decree is far from final. 	Only the
first step in the equitable distribution scheme has been
completed. 	The parties' property has been classified but has not
been valued or divided and no monetary award has been made. 	The
trial court specifically retained jurisdiction to consider
further valuation and distribution of the marital property. 	The
court acknowledged that the valuation of Dana Coal and McHorn
Construction, two of the included assets, was dependent upon the
outcome of a bankruptcy proceeding.
Unless the trial court's decree constituted an interlocutory
decree that "adjudicates the principles of the cause," we do not
have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the equitable
distribution of property.
An interlocutory decree adjudicates the
principles of a cause where "`the rules or
methods by which the rights of the parties

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are to be finally worked out have been so far
determined that it is only necessary to apply
those rules or methods to the facts of the
case in order to ascertain the relative
rights of the parties, with regard to the
subject matter of the suit.'"
Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 227, 231, 481 S.E.2d 482, 485
(1997) (quoting Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 851, 407
S.E.2d 339, 341 (1991) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 142 Va. 244, 252-53,
128 S.E. 524, 527 (1925))).
An interlocutory decree that adjudicates the principles of a
cause is one which must "determine the rights of the parties" and
"would of necessity affect the final order in the case."
Erikson, 19 Va. App. at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 713. 	An interlocutory
order that adjudicates the principles "must respond to the chief
object of the suit," id., which, in an equitable distribution
proceeding is to classify the property, value the marital estate,
and distribute the estate accordingly. 	"[T]he mere possibility
that an interlocutory decree may affect the final decision in the
trial does not necessitate an immediate appeal." 	Id. (quotations
omitted).
The trial court's decree, while classifying the marital
property, did not value the property and did not actually
determine the manner in which the distribution of marital assets
would be accomplished. 	Although the court's ruling may affect
the ultimate decision as to the distribution of Dana Coal and
McHorn Construction, the valuation of this property also
significantly affects the parties' property rights. 	See Webb v.

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Webb, 13 Va. App. 681, 682-83, 414 S.E.2d 612, 613 (1992)
(dismissing an appeal because the parties' rights may still be
determined through equitable distribution proceedings). 	We hold
the decree is interlocutory and does not adjudicate the
principles of the cause. 	Accordingly, we are without
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
Dismissed.