Mary Wright Juares, s/k/a Mary Juarez v CW

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Benton, Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MARY WRIGHT JUARES, S/K/A
MARY JUAREZ OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 3106-96-2 	JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
DECEMBER 9, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Robert W. Duling, Judge
Matthew T. Paulk, Assistant Public Defender
(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on
brief), for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Mary Wright Juares contends that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to support her conviction for unreasonably or
unnecessarily obstructing the free passage of others to and from
private property open to the public and failing to cease such
obstruction after having been requested to do so, in violation of
Code § 18.2-404. 	We disagree and affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
On appeal, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences
fairly deducible therefrom. 	The judgment of
a trial court sitting without a jury is
entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict
and will not be set aside unless it appears
from the evidence that the judgment is
plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418

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(1987) (citations omitted).
On July 6, 1996, City of Richmond Police Officer Shepard was
working off-duty as a security guard at the Richmond Medical
Center (Center). 	Shepard testified that, on several occasions
between 8:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., he saw Juares standing in the
middle of the driveway that serves as the entrance to the Center.
She had "positioned herself in the center of the entranceway to
the [Center]," and attempted to pass out brochures and to speak
to people who were approaching the Center.
Juares stood in "the break in the sidewalk for the
driveway," which was the only entrance to the Center. 	The
sidewalk crossed over and merged with the driveway, which sloped
down to the Center's parking lot. 	To enter the parking lot,
vehicles were required to cross over the sloped sidewalk area.
Because the entrance to the Center was adjacent to the driveway,
people walked alongside the driveway to enter the Center.
On four different occasions, Shepard told Juares that she
could not stand in the driveway. 	He advised her that she could
stand on the sidewalk, that she could walk back and forth across
the driveway, but that she could not stop and stand in the
driveway. 	Each time, Juares had stood in the driveway for
approximately two to three minutes. 	Shepard testified that
"[h]er whole attitude the whole day was arrogant and very
hostile."
Several people were required to walk onto the grassy area

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next to the sidewalk to avoid Juares, who was standing in the
driveway. 	Some of the people that she blocked were "just walking
down the sidewalk," while others were going into the Center.
Shepard estimated that twenty people entered and left the
driveway that day. 	He was unsure how many vehicles entered.
Once or twice, Shepard saw Juares go up to a car entering the
Center's parking lot, "and actually put her hand on the car to
hand the brochure or whatever it [was] that she was handing out
to people coming into the [Center]." 	Shepard testified that had
a car driven away with Juares' hand still on it, "[i]t's a
possibility she could have been injured."
The last time Shepard approached Juares, he told her he was
going to issue her a summons. 	In a bench trial, Juares was
convicted of obstructing the free passage of others, in violation
of Code § 18.2-404.
In pertinent part, Code § 18.2-404 provides that:
Any person or persons who in any public place
or on any private property open to the public
unreasonably or unnecessarily obstructs the
free passage of other persons to and from or
within such place or property and who shall
fail or refuse to cease such obstruction or
move on when requested to do so . . . shall
be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added).
Contending that the evidence fails to support her conviction
under Code § 18.2-404, Juares argues first, that her temporary
presence in the driveway was necessary to permit her to share her
views with the Center's patrons; and second, that any

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inconvenience to motorists and pedestrians resulting from her
conduct did not "unreasonably" obstruct the free passage of other
persons. 	We find neither argument persuasive.
"Generally, the words and phrases used in a statute should
be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a
different intention is fairly manifest." 	Woolfolk v.
Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994).
The ordinary and plain meaning of "unreasonable" is "not
governed by or acting according to reason" or "evincing
indifference to reality or appropriate conduct." 	Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 2507 (1986). 	See also Sydnor Pump &
Well Co. v. Taylor, 201 Va. 311, 317-18, 110 S.E.2d 525, 530
(1959) (defining "reasonable" as "just, fair, and suitable under
the circumstances").
"Necessarily" means "in such a way that it cannot be
otherwise." 	Webster's, supra, at 1510. 	See also Scottsdale Ins.
Co. v. Glick, 240 Va. 283, 288, 397 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1990).
Conversely, "unnecessarily" means "not by necessity." 	Webster's,
supra, at 2504.
The adverbs "unreasonably" and "unnecessarily" modify the
verb "obstruct," and are an element required for conviction under
Code § 18.2-404. 	The accused must be proven to have obstructed
the free passage of other persons either unreasonably or
unnecessarily. 	Determining whether an obstruction is
unreasonable or unnecessary requires an examination of the facts

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and circumstances of each case.
Juares positioned herself so that people were required to
walk around her, and vehicles were required to stop. 	She
repeatedly refused Shepard's requests to cease blocking the
driveway. 	She jeopardized her own safety and obstructed the free
movement of other persons. 	As suggested by Shepard, she could
just as well have proposed her views and tendered her brochures
from the sidewalk without obstructing the driveway and the
passage of other persons. 	She failed and refused to cease such
obstruction when requested to do so by Shepard. 	Thus, the
evidence supports the trial court's finding that Juares' actions
were unnecessary and unreasonable obstructions. 	Accordingly, the
evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of Code
§ 18.2-404.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.