Robert Lyle Yingling v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Baker, Bray and Overton
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
ROBERT LYLE YINGLING
v. 	Record No. 1149-94-1 	OPINION BY
JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 	DECEMBER 5, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
Norman Olitsky, Judge
Dianne G. Ringer, Assistant Public Defender
(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for
appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Robert Lyle Yingling (defendant) was convicted in a bench
trial of an escape by "Furlough Violation," conduct proscribed by
Code § 53.1-37(D). 	On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the conviction. 	We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting
to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. 	Martin
v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987).
The judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury, is entitled
to the same weight as a jury verdict and will be disturbed only if
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 	Id.
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. 	Defendant, then an
inmate at the Southampton Work Release Center (Southampton),1 was
1An institution of the Virginia Department of Corrections.

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approved for a thirty day "furlough" pursuant to Code § 53.1-37(C),
which authorizes the Director of the Department of Corrections
(Director) to "permit a prisoner a furlough when the prisoner has
been approved for release on parole by the Parole Board and thirty
days or less remain to be served by the prisoner prior to his date
of release on parole." 	Such furloughs "extend the limits of
confinement of any prisoner . . . to permit . . . visiting . . .
home or family," subject to "rules and regulations" prescribed by
the State Board of Corrections. 	Code § 53.1-37(A). 	A willful
failure by a "prisoner . . . to remain within the limits of
confinement set by the Director" shall constitute an "escape . . .
as though he left the state correctional facility itself." 	Code
§ 53.1-37(D).
As a condition to his furlough, defendant executed an
"Extended Furlough Agreement," which required, inter alia, that he
report to the "Chief Probation and Parole Officer, Probation and
Parole District #3[,] . . . Portsmouth, Va." within "one working
day" after his release. 	The agreement further directed that
defendant thereafter "report to the supervising Probation and
Parole Officer as he/she may require . . .[,] follow any other
instructions the officer may give," "obey all . . . laws and
ordinances," and "not use, possess or distribute illegal drugs."2
Supervision of defendant's furlough and enforcement of all related
conditions were assigned to Portsmouth parole officer Albert
2Defendant agreed to provide "urine or blood samples if
required."

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McCloskey, with the understanding that violations would be reported
to officials at Southampton for appropriate action.
Shortly after defendant's furlough commenced, he submitted a
required urine specimen to McCloskey which tested "positive for
marijuana use." 	McCloskey immediately requested instructions from
Southampton and ordered defendant to report to the Portsmouth
parole office the following morning. 	Defendant appeared as
instructed, acknowledged using the drug while on furlough, and
McCloskey directed that he "sit in the lobby, . . . remain in the
lobby until further notice," warning that "if he left the building
. . . he could be charged with escape." 	McCloskey allowed
defendant to "smoke a cigarette" "on the steps in front of the
building," provided "he let the receptionist know before he did
that," but denied his request to "get something to eat."
At approximately 1:05 p.m., McCloskey learned that defendant
"was no longer in sight" of the parole office. 	McCloskey searched
for defendant both inside and outside the office without success,
and defendant "never came back" or made further contact with the
parole office. 	He was arrested four days later in the City of
Portsmouth on a warrant charging the subject offense.
Because the Commonwealth did not establish that defendant
"left the City of Portsmouth while on furlough," defendant contends
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he willfully
exceeded the prescribed "limits of confinement" in violation of
Code § 53.1-37(D).
"When statutory construction is required, we construe a

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statute to promote the end for which it was enacted, if such an
interpretation can reasonably be made from the language used."
Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533
(1994). 	"The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is
always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction."
Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424
(1992). 	"Although penal laws are to be construed strictly [against
the Commonwealth], they 'ought not to be construed so strictly as
to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.'" 	Willis v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 430, 441, 393 S.E.2d 405, 411 (1990)
(citation omitted). 	Moreover, "a statute should never be construed
so that it leads to absurd results." 	Branch, 14 Va. App. at 839,
419 S.E.2d at 424.
Assuming, without deciding, that the statutory language
"limits of confinement" contemplates only geographical or
territorial considerations, the "Extended Furlough Agreement"
required that defendant "report to the supervising . . . Parole
Officer as he/she . . . may require and follow any other
instructions the officer may give." 	(Emphasis added.) 	Thus, the
Director clearly authorized the supervising parole officer,
McCloskey in this instance, to assume institutional control of
defendant. 	When McCloskey thereafter ordered defendant to remain
in the lobby of the parole office, warning that noncompliance could
result in a charge of "escape," he specifically established new and
more restrictive "limits of confinement" governing defendant's
furlough. 	Defendant's subsequent departure from the premises

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therefore constituted an escape in violation of Code § 53.1-37(D).
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.