Francisca Louis, s/k/a, etc v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Annunziata, Frank and Senior Judge Bray
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
FRANCISCA LOUIS, S/K/A
FRANCISCA J. LOUIS
OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 1078-02-1 	JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
APRIL 1, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Verbena M. Askew, Judge
Alfred O. Masters, Jr., for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
In a bench trial, the trial court convicted Francisca J.
Louis (defendant) for feloniously "defraud[ing an] Innkeeper" in
violation of Code § 18.2-188.1 On appeal, defendant contends the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. 	We agree
and reverse the trial court.
FACTS
"On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" 	Archer v. Commonwealth,
26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted).
1 The subject indictment alleged defendant "unlawfully . . .
procure[d] . . . accommodation having a value of $200 or more
from Mulberry Inn without paying therefore [sic] and with the
intent to defraud," language paralleling Code § 18.2-188(4).

The facts are substantially uncontroverted. 	Appellant and
her five children, military dependents, returned from Germany to
the United States in early September, 1999. 	Because a local
military "post" was unable to accommodate the family, defendant
secured lodging at the "TDY Inn" while she sought more suitable
housing. 	By September 14, defendant had "signed a lease" for a
home located in Newport News, but, before she relocated, flood
waters from Hurricane Floyd inundated both the residence and the
TDY Inn, necessitating evacuation from the motel.
By prior arrangement with the Red Cross, the nearby
Mulberry Inn agreed to accept persons displaced by the storm
waters, and defendant was directed there by the manager of the
TDY Inn. 	Defendant had not confirmed entitlement to Red Cross
relief, but, nevertheless, proceeded with her children to the
Mulberry Inn on September 16, 1999. 	Requesting a room,
defendant represented to the clerk that she had been displaced
by the flood and was "with the Red Cross," although unable to
provide a related "voucher" or "notice." 	Defendant completed
the registration card required by the Mulberry Inn, indicated
both "cash" and "credit card" as the "method of payment," listed
the address of the recently rented home as her residence and was
assigned a room.
During the ensuing twelve days of her stay, defendant, on
"several" occasions, assured Mulberry Inn employees that she was
"in the process" of obtaining forms necessary to secure Red
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Cross payment of the lodging costs directly to the Inn. 	When
her account of $1,022.28 remained unpaid at the time of
"checkout" on September 28, 1999, defendant acknowledged
ultimate responsibility for the debt, but again assured the
management that either the Red Cross or the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) would satisfy the charges.
Uncertain defendant was qualified for Red Cross or FEMA
benefits, a Mulberry Inn employee, Katherine Swetnam, then
prepared and presented defendant with a promissory note payable
to the Mulberry Inn in the principal sum of $1,022.28, due in
twelve monthly installments. 	Defendant agreed to the proposal
and executed the note, once again providing the home address
reported on her registration card. 	In exchange, the Mulberry
Inn designated the room and related charges as an "account
transfer" on its records, noting a zero balance. 	Defendant then
proceeded immediately to the rental home, her residence during
the following eighteen months.
The record is clear that defendant thereafter defaulted on
the promissory note and the Mulberry Inn received no payments
from either FEMA or the Red Cross. 	In explanation, defendant
testified that, because benefits would be paid "directly to" the
Mulberry Inn, she assumed the obligation had been satisfied
until initiation of the instant prosecution proved otherwise.
ANALYSIS
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In pertinent part, Code § 18.2-188 prohibits "any person,
without paying therefor, and with the intent to cheat or defraud
the owner or keeper to: 	. . . 4. 	Without having an express
agreement for credit, procure food, entertainment or
accommodation from any hotel, motel, campground, boardinghouse,
restaurant, eating house or amusement park." 	The Commonwealth
maintains that defendant's failure to either satisfy the
promissory note or secure payment to the Mulberry Inn by FEMA or
the Red Cross proves the requisite intent to defraud in violation
of Code § 18.2-188. 	However, the Commonwealth's argument ignores
both the clear language of the statute and the proscribed conduct
embraced by the indictment.
Code § 18.2-188(4), the subsection tracked in the
indictment, expressly criminalizes procurement of "food,
entertainment, or accommodation," without payment, only in the
absence of an "express agreement for credit." 	"When the language
of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain
meaning of that language and may not assign a construction that
amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it
actually has stated." 	Williams v. Commonwealth, __ Va.
__, __, 576 S.E.2d 468, __ (2003) (citations omitted). 	Thus, a
"hotel, motel, campground, boardinghouse, restaurant, eating
house or amusement park" providing the enumerated goods and
services pursuant to an agreed credit arrangement, does not enjoy
the protection afforded by Code § 18.2-188(4) upon a breach of
such agreement.
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Here, the record clearly reflects that the Mulberry Inn
accepted defendant's promissory note in satisfaction of the
charges arising from those accommodations procured by her,
inarguably an express agreement for credit. 	Indeed, the Mulberry
Inn specifically transferred the underlying account to the note,
resulting in a zero balance remaining due. 	Under such
circumstances, defendant's subsequent default did not constitute
criminal conduct within the intendment of Code § 18.2-188(4).
Accordingly, we reverse the conviction.
Reversed and dismissed.
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