Combustion Engineering, etc. v Ernest Lafon, et al

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.
AND
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY
v. 	Record No. 2327-95-3 	OPINION BY
JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
ERNEST R. LAFON, JR. 	APRIL 9, 1996
AND
CENTER FOR REHABILITATIVE MEDICINE
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Richard A. Hobson, on brief), for appellants.
(J. D. Morefield; Ginger Jonas Largen; Morefield,
Kendrick, Hess & Largen, on brief), for appellee
Ernest R. Lafon, Jr.
(Clifford L. Harrison; Stone, Harrison, Turk &
Showalter, on brief), for appellee Center for
Rehabilitative Medicine.
Combustion Engineering, Inc. and its insurer (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in (1) exercising its jurisdiction
over an application filed by the Center for Rehabilitative
Medicine ("the Center"), and (2) finding that the three-year
statute of limitations contained in Code § 8.01-246 did not bar
the commission from considering the Center's application. 	Upon
reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. 	Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the commission's decision. 	Rule 5A:27.

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Background
On October 23, 1987, Ernest R. Lafon, Jr. sustained a
compensable injury to his thumb while operating a grinder for
employer. 	On March 29, 1990, pursuant to a memorandum of
agreement, the commission entered an award in Lafon's favor,
providing for compensation at the rate of $344 per week during
incapacity and payment of medical benefits. 	On August 31, 1993,
the commission approved a settlement entered into by the parties.
Pursuant to the approved settlement, Lafon received a lump sum
payment and payment of causally related medical treatment
provided from the date of his accident through the date of entry
of the order approving the settlement. 	Lafon also received
medical benefits for one year following entry of the settlement
order.
On November 18, 1994, the Center filed an application
requesting that the commission order employer to pay $11,085.14
in medical expenses incurred by Lafon from August 22, 1991
through September 6, 1991 for causally related inpatient medical
treatment rendered at the Center. 	On April 18, 1995, Lafon's
counsel filed an affidavit signed by Lafon, requesting that the
commission make him a party to the proceedings.
I. 	Jurisdiction
"All questions arising under [the Workers' Compensation Act
("the Act")] . . . shall be determined by the Commission . . . ."
Code § 65.2-700. 	"This grant of subject matter jurisdiction

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includes the authority of the commission to enforce its orders
and to resolve coverage and payment disputes." 	Bogle Development
Co. v. Buie, 250 Va. 431, 434, 463 S.E.2d 467, 468 (1995). 	Code
§ 65.2-714(A) provides the commission exclusive jurisdiction over
all disputes concerning payment of the fees or charges of
physicians and hospitals. 	Moreover, an employer has a statutory
duty to provide an employee with free medical care related to a
compensable injury. 	Code § 65.2-603(A).
The commission found that it had subject matter jurisdiction
because the Center's application concerned employer's duty to pay
medical expenses related to Lafon's compensable injury. 	Employer
argues that the commission's decision is contrary to the Supreme
Court's decision in Bogle. 	We disagree.
In Bogle, the Supreme Court ruled that the commission did
not have jurisdiction to consider the reimbursement claim of a
private health insurance carrier after the employer had
reimbursed the employee for his out-of-pocket payment for his
medical expenses. 	Bogle, 250 Va. at 434, 463 S.E.2d at 468-69.
The Court ruled that the commission lacked jurisdiction to
consider a claim by the employee's insurer against the employer
for reimbursement of the insurer's expenses because "no right of
the [employee] was 'at stake.'" 	Id. 	Once the employer
reimbursed the employee, the litigants were left to common law
remedies in resolving the issue whether the employer had to
reimburse the employee's private health insurance carrier. 	Id.

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In this case, unlike Bogle, the employee's rights were at
stake. 	If Lafon's reasonable and necessary medical bills were
not paid by the employer, he would be personally liable for them.
Lafon had the right, pursuant to the Act, the commission's
award, and the settlement order, to have his causally related
medical expenses paid by employer. 	Lafon joined the Center's
application as a party and sought to require employer to abide by
its duty to pay his causally related medical expenses. 	Moreover,
employer does not challenge the commission's ruling that the
medical expenses incurred by Lafon at the Center were necessary,
reasonable, and causally related to his compensable injury by
accident.
The commission did not have before it a request for
reimbursement by a private health insurance company. 	Rather, the
commission had before it a dispute among a medical care provider,
an employee, and an employer concerning whether the employer was
responsible for payment of Lafon's medical expenses. 	Such a
dispute falls squarely within the commission's sole jurisdiction
provided for under the Act. 	Code § 65.2-714. 	Accordingly, the
commission did not err in exercising jurisdiction over the
Center's application.
II. 	Code § 8.01-246
Employer also argues that the three-year statute of
limitations contained in Code § 8.01-246, which applies to common
law actions founded upon express or implied unwritten contracts,

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barred the commission from considering the Center's application
for payment of medical expenses. 	The commission found that Code
§ 8.01-246 did not apply because the Center and Lafon sought
payment of medical expenses incurred for treatment rendered
pursuant to the commission's March 19, 1990 award.
We agree with the commission that the application was
grounded in the commission's award. 	The dispute did not involve
a common law action founded upon an express or implied unwritten
contract. 	The dispute concerned an employer's duty to pay
causally related medical benefits awarded to Lafon by the
commission. 	Under these circumstances, the commission correctly
ruled that the three-year statute of limitations contained in
Code § 8.01-246 did not apply to bar the Center's application.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.