Vonda Kay Wilson v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Willis, Lemons and Frank
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
VONDA KAY WILSON
OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 2683-98-1 	JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
DECEMBER 28, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY
Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge
S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Counsel (Elwood
Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender; Public
Defender Commission, on briefs), for
appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
On appeal from the revocation of her suspension of
sentence, Vonda Kay Wilson contends that the trial court erred
in sentencing her to prison, rather than ordering her admission
to a community-based detention center. 	She argues that her
sentence violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq. (ADA). 	We disagree and affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
On September 2, 1993, Wilson was convicted of unlawful
wounding and was sentenced to five years imprisonment, suspended
on conditions including probation. 	On March 10, 1998, the trial
court determined that Wilson had violated the conditions of her

probation for the third time. 	At that time, three years and
four months remained to be served under her original sentence.
The trial court ordered:
That the defendant shall be screened and
evaluated for the Detention Center Program.
The court further ordered that the defendant
shall enroll into and successfully complete
the said program with an emphasis on Drug
Abuse Treatment. 	If the defendant is not
accepted into said program, or if she does
not enroll into and successfully complete
said program, she shall be brought back
before the Court and ordered to serve the
imposed sentence of three (3) years and four
(4) months.
See Code §§ 19.2-316.2, 53.1-67.8.
After a psychiatric examination of Wilson, the Department
of Corrections reported that she was ineligible for the
Detention Center Program, an alternative "boot camp" facility,
due to her schizophrenic condition. 	Based upon this report, the
trial court sentenced Wilson to serve the remainder of her
sentence according to the March 10, 1998 order.
Defense counsel argued that denying Wilson admission to the
Detention Center Program due to her mental condition violated
the ADA. 	The trial court stated, "if she's not eligible for
detention center I'm not going to ram it down their throats."
Defense counsel replied, "Nobody's asked you to." 	Defense
counsel did not move for an order requiring the Detention Center
to admit Wilson. 	Thus, we do not address whether such an order
would have been proper or within the trial court's authority.
- 2 -

The trial court then examined other options for Wilson,
including a community-based "diversion center." 	See Code
§§ 19.2-316.3 and 53.1-67.7. 	The Commonwealth argued that the
March 10, 1998 order sentenced Wilson to incarceration, with
suspension only upon condition that she successfully complete
the Detention Center Program and drug treatment. 	Defense
counsel did not argue that the diversion center was an
acceptable alternative. 	Defense counsel stated, "The [trial]
court can emasculate me through giving her the diversion center
or it can frame the issue very precisely for [Penn. Dept. of
Corrections v.] Yeskey[, 524 U.S. 206 (1998)], or dare I say
Wilson, for the future."
Wilson contends that the trial court erred in committing
her to prison rather than ordering her admission to the
Detention Center. 	She argues that by doing so, the trial court
violated the ADA. 	We disagree.
The purpose of the ADA is to ensure that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."
42 U.S.C. § 12132. 	Citing Yeskey, Wilson argues that the ADA
prohibits the Detention Center from rejecting her on the basis
of her mental condition. 	Yeskey proclaims no such holding.
- 3 -

Yeskey was sentenced to a boot camp facility, which refused
his admission due to his history of hypertension. 	The Supreme
Court held that a state prison is a "public entity" as an
"instrumentality of a State . . . or local government." 	42
U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). 	Thus, action by prison officials may
violate the requirements of the ADA. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
That is the full extent of the Yeskey holding. 	The holding
addressed that issue alone because the trial court in Yeskey had
not addressed the merits of Yeskey's claim, but had dismissed
his original suit for failure to state a claim.
Wilson fails to recognize that Yeskey was a civil suit,
filed in accordance with the provisions of the ADA.
The remedies, procedures, and rights set
forth in section 794a of Title 29 shall be
the remedies, procedures, and rights this
subchapter provides to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of section 12132 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 12133. 	That section provides specific civil and
administrative remedies. 	Nowhere in the ADA does it appear that
Congress intended the Act to provide rights that could be
asserted in a criminal proceeding or at a probation revocation
hearing. 	Assuming, without deciding, that the Detention Center
violated the ADA in rejecting Wilson, a probation revocation
hearing in a criminal court is not the proper forum in which to
attack that violation. 	The Detention Center is not a party to
this case.
- 4 -

The March 10, 1998 sentencing order directed that Wilson be
incarcerated to serve her remaining sentence if she were
ineligible for the Detention Center.
A trial court has broad discretion to revoke
a suspended sentence and probation based on
Code § 19.2-306, which allows a court to do
so "for any cause deemed by it sufficient."
. . . The court's findings of fact and
judgment will not be reversed unless there
is a clear abuse of discretion.
Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86, 402 S.E.2d 684, 687
(1991) (citation omitted). 	Having found that Wilson had
violated her probation, the trial court had discretionary
authority to order her to serve her original sentence.
The issue before us is whether revocation of Wilson's
probation and the imposition of her remaining sentence was an
abuse of discretion. 	Considering her previous probation
violations and her unsuitability for alternative programs, we
find no such abuse. 	Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
- 5 -