Tracy M. Bolden v Commonwealth of Virginia

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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present : Judges Coleman, Willis and Bumgardner Argued at Richmond, Virginia
TRACY M. BOLDEN
OPINION BY
V. Record No. 2036-97-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. NOVEMBER 24, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY George F. Tidey, Judge
John W. Parsons (Law Office of Wood & Wood, P.C., on brief) , for appellant.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief) , for appellee.
On appeal from her conviction of obtaining an automobile by false pretenses in violation of Code § 18.2-178, Tracy M. Bolden contends that the evidence failed to prove that by virtue of her fraud, both title to and possession of the automobile passed to her from the Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (Toyota) . ' We agree and reverse her conviction.
I. On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury . will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. .
Bolden was convicted also of forgery and uttering. However, she has appealed only her conviction for larceny by false pretenses.

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Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418
(1987) (citation omitted).
On February 29, 1996, Bolden received a loan from Toyota to
finance her purchase of a 1996 Toyota RAV-4 motor vehicle. 	The
vehicle's certificate of title listed Bolden as the owner and
Toyota as the lienholder.
On July 5, 1996, Bolden went to a branch office of the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) in Henrico County and applied
for a duplicate certificate of title to the vehicle. 	See Code
§ 46.2-607. 	She presented a letter purportedly from Toyota
stating that she had satisfied the lien on the vehicle. 	Based
upon her application and the letter, DMV issued Bolden a
duplicate certificate of title, showing no lien, and revised its
records to reflect that Toyota's lien had been satisfied.
In fact, Bolden had made no payment on the loan. 	John
Gregory Kirby, a Toyota customer service supervisor, testified
that Toyota had not mailed the lien release statement to Bolden
and that the letter presented by Bolden to DMV was not from
Toyota. 	He testified that in the normal course of business,
Toyota would issue a lien release letter only if the loan was
paid in full and the title to the vehicle had been misplaced.
Because Bolden had not paid her loan in full, Toyota retained the
certificate of title. 	Bolden admitted to Special Agent Taylor
Jones of the Virginia State Police that she had falsified the
letter in order to obtain a lien-free duplicate certificate of

title so that she could sell the vehicle.

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II.
The indictment charged that Bolden
on or about July 5, 1996 . . . did obtain, by
false pretenses, from Toyota Motor Credit
Corporation, a 1996 Toyota, RAV-4,
VIN#JT3HP10V9T0081119, with a value in excess
of $200.00, in violation of Virginia Code
§ 18.2-178 . . . .
The indictment does not charge and the Commonwealth does not
argue that Bolden originally obtained the car from the dealership
by false pretenses, only that she obtained it from the lienholder
by false pretenses. 	Bolden contends that the Commonwealth failed
to prove that she obtained the 1996 Toyota RAV-4 motor vehicle
from Toyota by false pretenses. 	She argues that prior to her
alleged fraud, Toyota did not own or possess the vehicle.
Rather, she contends, she owned and possessed it, subject to the
lien. 	We agree.
A.
In a prosecution for larceny by false pretenses,
the Commonwealth must prove: 	(a) that the
accused intended to defraud; (b) that a fraud
actually occurred; (c) that the accused used
false pretenses to perpetrate the fraud; and
(d) that the false pretenses induced the
owner to part with his property.
Wynne v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 459, 460, 445 S.E.2d 160, 161
(1994) (en banc) (citations omitted). 	"The gravamen of the
offense . . . is the obtainment of ownership of property, by
false representations or pretenses." 	Quidley v. Commonwealth,
221 Va. 963, 966, 275 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1981) (citations omitted).

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"An essential element of larceny by false pretenses is that both
title to and possession of property must pass from the victim to
the defendant (or his nominee)." 	Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 219
Va. 399, 402, 247 S.E.2d 683, 685 (1978).
B.
Bolden fraudulently acquired a duplicate certificate of
title indicating no lien on the vehicle. 	She used the
fraudulently obtained certificate of title to sell the vehicle
for value to a bona fide purchaser, to the detriment of the
lienholder. 	See Toyota Motor Credit Corp. v. C.L. Hyman Auto
Wholesale, Inc., __ Va. __, __, __ S.E.2d __, __ (1998). 	At the
time Bolden acquired the new certificate of title, Toyota neither
owned nor possessed the vehicle. 	It merely held a lien that was
recorded on the title. 	Thus, Bolden did not obtain ownership or
possession of the vehicle from Toyota by virtue of the fraud
perpetrated on DMV.
The dispositive issue is whether title to and possession of
the vehicle passed from Toyota to Bolden when she fraudulently
obtained a duplicate certificate of title from DMV. 	"The owner
of an automobile is the party who has legal title to it." 	Hall,
Inc. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 248 Va. 307, 309, 448
S.E.2d 633, 635 (1994). 	See Code § 46.2-100 (defining "owner" as
"a person who holds legal title to a vehicle"); First Virginia
Bank v. Sutherland, 217 Va. 588, 593, 231 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1977)
(decided under predecessor to Code § 46.2-100). 	The certificate

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of title showed Bolden as owner, designating that she held legal
title to the vehicle. 	A certificate of title serves not only as
a substitute recording system but also as evidence of ownership.
See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 227 F.
Supp. 958, 963 (W.D. Va. 1964). 	Thus, when Bolden fraudulently
obtained the duplicate title, she was already the owner of the
vehicle and already possessed it.
Title passed to Bolden upon the delivery of the vehicle to
her and issuance of the original certificate of title. 	See Code
§ 46.2-628; Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Storm, 200 Va. 526, 529, 106
S.E.2d 588, 590 (1959). 	Cf. Davies v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App.
350, 353, 423 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1992) (title passes upon seller's
delivery of goods in retail sales transaction). 	Bolden's
fraudulent procurement or receipt of the duplicate certificate
effected no further delivery of the vehicle or transfer of title
to her. 	Code § 46.2-628, entitled "How certificate of title
transferred," provides, in relevant part:
The owner of a motor vehicle . . . registered
under this chapter, when transferring or
assigning his title or interest thereto,
shall fully and correctly endorse the
assignment and warranty of title on the
certificate of title of the motor vehicle
. . . to its purchaser, with a statement of
all security interests on it, and shall
deliver the certificate to the purchaser or
transferee at the time of delivering the
motor vehicle . . . .
Id. 	Bolden was the legal owner of the vehicle both prior to and
subsequent to her fraudulent conduct.

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Toyota's physical possession of the certificate of title did
not give it ownership of the vehicle. 	The "owner" of a vehicle
is required by statute to obtain a certificate of title or
ownership, Code § 46.2-600, and to deliver it to the person
holding a security interest. 	Code § 46.2-641. 	Upon satisfaction
of all security interests by the owner, "the certificate of title
shall be delivered . . . to the owner." 	Id. 	Although Toyota
kept physical possession of the certificate of title, it never
held title to the vehicle. 	See Toyota, __ Va. at __, __ S.E.2d
at __.
Toyota never had possession or ownership of the vehicle.
Toyota never asserted a right to repossess it. 	See Code
§ 8.9-503 (codifying secured party's right to take possession
after default). 	Bolden maintained actual and uninterrupted
possession of the vehicle before, during and after her receipt of
the duplicate certificate.
Under Code § 18.2-178, a thief may not steal by false
pretenses from his own lawful possession. 	But see Code
§ 18.2-115 (criminalizing fraudulent disposal of property subject
to lien). 	Because Bolden's fraud resulted in neither title nor
possession of the vehicle passing from Toyota to her, we reverse
her conviction for larceny by false pretenses and dismiss the
charge.
Reversed and dismissed.