Bluemel v. State

1 Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002 & Supp. 2007).
2007 UT 90
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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No. 20060586
Tammy Bluemel,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
F I L E D
State of Utah,
Defendant and Petitioner. November 6, 2007
---
Fourth District, Provo Dep’t
The Honorable James R. Taylor
No. 040401880
Attorneys: Gregory G. Skordas, Rebecca C. Hyde, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Brett J. Delporto,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant
---
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 This case concerns Tammy Bluemel’s petition for post-
conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed as
untimely. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the
trial court’s violation of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure alone qualifies Bluemel’s petition for the “interests
of justice” exception to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act’s1
(“PCRA”) statute of limitations. We granted certiorari on two
issues: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in its evaluation
of the interests of justice exception to the PCRA’s one-year
statute of limitations, and (2) whether the court of appeals
applied the correct standard for reviewing a trial court’s

No. 20060586 2
violation of rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure raised in
the context of a petition for post-conviction relief. We address
both issues and ultimately reverse the court of appeals. The
court of appeals incorrectly evaluated the interests of justice
exception and did not apply the correct standard in reviewing a
rule 11 violation raised in the context of a post-conviction
proceeding.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Between October 1998 and April 1999, Bluemel had sexual
intercourse with her fourteen-year-old foster son on multiple
occasions and, on one occasion, provided him with alcohol. On
October 18, 2001, Bluemel was charged with seven counts of rape,
each a first degree felony, and one count of supplying alcohol to
a minor, a class A misdemeanor.
¶3 Bluemel negotiated a plea agreement, which was reduced
to writing as a plea statement, in which she pleaded guilty to
three counts of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a
minor. The plea statement included an explanation that, by
pleading guilty, Bluemel waived various constitutional rights,
including her right to a jury trial, her right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, her right to compel witnesses, her right
to testify and the privilege against self-incrimination, her
presumption of innocence until proven guilty and the State’s
burden of proving each element of the crimes with which she was
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and her right to appeal. The
plea statement also included a statement that Bluemel entered
into the guilty pleas of her own free will and choice and that
she had read and understood the statement. Further, the plea
statement declared that Bluemel “was not under the influence of
any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair [her]
judgment when [she] decided to plead guilty” and that she was
“not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or
intoxicants which impair [her] judgment.” And finally, the plea
statement indicated that Bluemel was “free of any mental disease,
defect, or impairment that would prevent [her] from understanding
what [she was] doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entering [her] plea.”
¶4 At her arraignment, Bluemel pleaded guilty to three
counts of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor.
During the plea colloquy, the trial court explained to Bluemel
that, “[b]efore I can accept your pleas, you have certain
Constitutional Rights that you need to waive. They are talked
about in that statement in advance of the plea.” The court then
asked Bluemel if she had any questions about the plea statement,
to which Bluemel replied, “I don’t, your Honor.” The court asked

3 No. 20060586
Bluemel if she understood each of her rights and stated as
follows:
You have a right to a speedy trial, a right
to a trial by jury, a right to confront and
cross examine the witnesses against you. You
have a right not to incriminate yourself; you
don’t have to take the witness stand and
testify. In fact, you don’t have to prove or
disprove anything. The burden of proof is
upon the State to prove each and every
element of the crimes that are alleged.
Bluemel said that she understood those rights and waived them.
Following this exchange, the trial court asked Bluemel to sign
the plea statement, which she did. Bluemel then verbally entered
her guilty pleas into the record. The trial court accepted her
pleas and found that “Ms. Bluemel ha[d] knowingly and voluntarily
entered her pleas.”
¶5 On March 27, 2002, the trial court sentenced Bluemel to
three indeterminate terms of five years to life for rape and one
indeterminate term not to exceed one year for supplying alcohol
to a minor, each to run concurrently. Bluemel did not file a
motion to withdraw her pleas and did not file an appeal. But
Bluemel alleges that immediately after sentencing and repeatedly
thereafter, she told her attorney that she wanted to appeal and
that he said that he would handle it. Bluemel further alleges
that when she tried to communicate with her attorney regarding
the status of her appeal, he would not accept her calls or
respond to her written requests. After one year, Bluemel began
to look for a new attorney. In October 2003, Bluemel retained
her current counsel.
¶6 On May 3, 2004, over two years after sentencing,
Bluemel filed a petition for post-conviction relief under the
PCRA. In her petition, Bluemel claimed that the conviction
obtained by the guilty pleas was “unlawfully induced or not made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charges and
the consequences of the plea[s].” This claim was based on her
allegation that, at the time she entered her guilty pleas, she
was taking a number of medications, including Neurontin, Effexor,
Xanax, trazodone, Soma, ibuprofen, Macrodantin, and Axid, the
combination of which prevented her from entering voluntary and
knowing pleas. Bluemel also claimed that she was denied the
effective assistance of counsel and that she should be granted
post-conviction relief on that basis. Specifically, Bluemel
alleged that her counsel was ineffective in failing to request a
competency hearing for her despite knowing that her use of the

2 Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, ¶ 1, 134 P.3d 181.
3 Id. ¶ 15.
4 Id. ¶ 18.
5 Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3), (4)(A)).
6 Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
7 Id. ¶ 9 n.2.
No. 20060586 4
above-mentioned prescription medications rendered her unable to
enter knowing and voluntary pleas, in failing to file a motion to
withdraw her guilty pleas, and in failing to file any other post-
conviction motions. The State moved to dismiss Bluemel’s
petition as untimely, arguing that it did not meet the interests
of justice exception to the PCRA’s one-year statute of
limitations.
¶7 The post-conviction court granted the State’s motion to
dismiss. The court found that the petition was time barred by
the plain language of the PCRA’s statute of limitations and that
this was “not a case where the interests of justice require a
waiver of the statutory filing limit.” Bluemel appealed.
¶8 The court of appeals reversed and remanded.2 The court
of appeals found “that the plea statement was not properly
incorporated into the record” because “the trial court asked
Bluemel only if she had ‘any questions about the statement’” but
“never asked Bluemel if she actually read, understood, and
acknowledged her plea statement.”3 The court of appeals also
determined “that the trial court did not sufficiently conduct a
rule 11 colloquy with Bluemel”4 because it “failed to inform
Bluemel of her ‘right to the presumption of innocence,’ that the
State carried the burden of proving her guilty ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt,’ that her ‘plea is an admission of all those
elements,’ and that she had the ‘right to compel the attendance
of defense witnesses.’”5 The court of appeals concluded that,
because of these errors, Bluemel’s petition for post-conviction
relief fell within the interests of justice exception to the
PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations and that the trial court
therefore erred in dismissing the petition.6 Because it found
the trial court’s failure to comply with rule 11 dispositive, the
court of appeals did not address Bluemel’s claims that her pleas
were unknowing and involuntary due to the medications she was
taking and that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance.7 We
granted the State’s petition for certiorari and have jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a).

8 Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, ¶ 4, 978
P.2d 460 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
9 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(1) (2002).
5 No. 20060586
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. We review the
court of appeals’ decision for correctness and give its
conclusions of law no deference.”8
ANALYSIS
¶10 We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of
appeals erred in its evaluation of the interests of justice
exception to the PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations. We also
granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals
applied the correct standard for reviewing a trial court’s
violation of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
raised in the context of a petition for post-conviction relief.
We first explain the requirements of a petition for post-
conviction relief under the PCRA and the interests of justice
exception to the PCRA’s statute of limitations and conclude that
the court of appeals erred in its evaluation of this exception.
We then address the rule 11 issue and conclude that the court of
appeals applied the incorrect standard for reviewing a rule 11
violation in the context of a petition for post-conviction
relief. And we find that the court of appeals incorrectly relied
on the rule 11 violation as a basis for applying the interests of
justice exception to the PCRA.
I. A COURT SHOULD WEIGH THE MERITORIOUSNESS OF A CLAIM FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF AND THE REASON FOR THE UNTIMELY FILING IN
CONSIDERING THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE EXCEPTION TO THE PCRA’S
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
¶11 The PCRA “establishes a substantive legal remedy for
any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies.”9 A
petitioner may request relief only upon certain grounds, which
are:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the
sentence was imposed in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution;

10 Id. § 78-35a-104(1).
11 Id. § 78-35a-107(1).
12 Id. § 78-35a-107(3).
13 Id. § 78-35a-107(2)(a).
14 Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 400.
No. 20060586 6
(b) the conviction was obtained under a
statute that is in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or
the conduct for which the petitioner was
prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an
unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in
an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence
exists that requires the court to vacate the
conviction or sentence.10
A petitioner must also meet the statutory time limit of the PCRA
and file a petition “within one year after the cause of action
has accrued.”11 A failure to file within this statutory period
is excused only “[i]f the court finds that the interests of
justice require.”12
¶12 In Bluemel’s case, the PCRA’s statute of limitations
began to run on “the last day for filing an appeal from the entry
of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken,”13
which was April 26, 2002. She therefore had until April 26,
2003, to file her petition for post-conviction relief. But she
filed her petition on May 3, 2004, more than one year late.
Thus, Bluemel’s petition is viable only if the interests of
justice require.
¶13 We have explained that “an analysis of what constitutes
an exception in the ‘interests of justice’ should involve
examination of both the meritoriousness of the petitioner’s claim
and the reason for the untimely filing.”14 But it is not “a hard
and fast rule that a petitioner must be able to demonstrate both

15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. ¶ 17.
19 Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, ¶¶ 16-17, 134 P.3d
181.
7 No. 20060586
that his claim is meritorious and that he was justified in
raising it late.”15 Instead, a “court will give appropriate
weight to each of those factors according to the circumstances of
a particular case.”16 Thus, “a claim of actual innocence
supported by the discovery of DNA evidence may require virtually
no justification for a late filing; on the other hand, an
entirely frivolous claim would not meet the ‘interests of
justice’ exception even with the best possible excuse for late
filing.”17 But when a case falls between these extremes, a court
should consider both the claim itself and the reason for the late
filing.18 Such is the case here.
¶14 The post-conviction court dismissed Bluemel’s petition
because it was untimely and found that the interests of justice
exception did not apply. The court of appeals reversed.
Specifically, the court of appeals found that, during the plea
colloquy, the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11
and that this noncompliance necessarily infringed on Bluemel’s
constitutional rights, warranting application of the interests of
justice exception.19 The State argues that the court of appeals
erred when it concluded that a rule 11 violation necessarily
infringes on a defendant’s constitutional rights. The State
further contends that proof of a rule 11 violation alone is not
enough to trigger the interests of justice exception. In
response, Bluemel argues that the court of appeals properly
concluded that a failure to strictly comply with rule 11 triggers
the interests of justice exception. Bluemel argues that a
failure to strictly comply with rule 11 renders a guilty plea
unknowing and involuntary, and therefore unconstitutional.
¶15 We conclude that the court of appeals erred in its
evaluation of the interests of justice exception to the PCRA’s
statute of limitations. The court of appeals did not explicitly
consider both the meritoriousness of Bluemel’s claims and the
reason for her untimely filing; rather, it rested its decision
exclusively on its conclusion that any rule 11 violation results
in an unconstitutional plea. In so doing, it erred. To
correctly evaluate the applicability of the interests of justice

20 Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, ¶ 16, 134 P.3d 181.
21 Id. ¶ 17 (citation omitted).
22 See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992); Salazar v.
Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993).
23 Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991.
No. 20060586 8
exception to Bluemel’s petition for post-conviction relief, the
court of appeals should have considered the merits of Bluemel’s
two claims: first, that her use of prescription medications
caused her pleas to be unknowing and involuntary and, second,
that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
request a competency hearing and file motions challenging her
guilty pleas. The court of appeals should then have considered
her explanation for the untimeliness of her petition.
II. A RULE 11 VIOLATION IS NOT NECESSARILY A CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION THAT RENDERS A CLAIM MERITORIOUS IN THE CONTEXT OF A
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
¶16 In evaluating Bluemel’s claim that her guilty pleas
were unknowing and involuntary, the court of appeals found that
the trial court failed to inform Bluemel of all of the rule 11(e)
“factors and rights” during the plea colloquy.20 The court held
that “because noncompliance with rule 11 infringes on the
constitutional rights of the accused . . . noncompliance with
rule 11 readily falls within the interests of justice exception
under the PCRA.”21 In so holding, the court of appeals erred.
As we further explain below, in the context of a collateral
attack on a conviction, a rule 11 violation is not, in and of
itself, a constitutional violation and therefore does not,
standing alone, make a petitioner’s claim meritorious and warrant
application of the interests of justice exception.
¶17 Because a guilty plea involves the waiver of several
constitutional rights, a guilty plea is not valid under the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution unless it is
knowing and voluntary.22 Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure is designed to protect an individual’s rights when
entering a guilty plea “by ensuring that the defendant receives
full notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant’s
conduct amounts to a crime, the consequences of the plea, etc.”23
Rule 11 identifies specific rights that a trial court must
explain to a defendant who wishes to plead guilty. It provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:

24 Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).
25 Id. 11(e)(8).
26 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993).
27 Id. at 991-92 (holding “that a rule 11 violation does not
warrant habeas corpus relief absent the deprivation of a
constitutional right”).
9 No. 20060586
(e) The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea
until the court has found:
. . . ;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right
to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance
of defense witnesses, and that by entering
the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements.24
The trial court’s findings “may be based on questioning of the
defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting
these factors after the court has established that the defendant
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement.”25
¶18 In Salazar v. Utah State Prison,26 we held that a rule
11 violation does not necessarily constitute a constitutional
violation under either the Utah Constitution or the United States
Constitution.27 We noted specifically, “If this were a direct
appeal from denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, . . .
failure to strictly comply with [rule 11] would be grounds for

28 Id. at 991 n.6 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 992.
30 Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 20, 123 P.3d 400.
No. 20060586 10
reversal,” but that “on collateral attack of a conviction, the
petitioner must show a constitutional violation to obtain
relief.”28 Further, we stated that “[t]o obtain a writ of habeas
corpus, a petitioner must show more than a violation of the
prophylactic provisions of Rule 11; he or she must show that the
guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary.”29
¶19 In a case for post-conviction relief, the petitioner
bears the burden of “pointing to sufficient factual evidence or
legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness.”30
Bluemel asserts, however, that she had no affirmative obligation
of proof at the post-conviction hearing. We disagree. In order
to show that her claim has merit, Bluemel was obligated at the
post-conviction hearing to establish not just that the trial
court violated rule 11, but that she did not, in fact, enter her
pleas in a knowing and voluntary way. This Bluemel failed to do.
Bluemel did not raise the issue of a rule 11 violation, nor did
she point to any evidence tending to suggest that the trial
court’s violation of rule 11 rendered her pleas unknowing and
involuntary. She failed even to submit an affidavit to the
effect that she did not understand her rights, and specifically
those the trial court failed to mention during the plea colloquy.
We therefore hold that the court of appeals did not apply the
correct standard for reviewing a violation of rule 11 because the
court based its opinion only on the fact that the trial court
violated rule 11 and did not consider whether such violation
rendered Bluemel’s pleas unknowing and involuntary.
¶20 We remand to the court of appeals for consideration of
Bluemel’s claims that, first, her pleas were not knowing and
voluntary because she was using a variety of prescription
medications at the time she pleaded guilty and, second, that her
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request a
competency hearing and in failing to file post-conviction motions
challenging her guilty pleas. On remand, the court of appeals
should consider both the meritoriousness of the claims and the
reason for the untimely filing in order to determine whether the
interests of justice exception to the PCRA applies.
CONCLUSION

11 No. 20060586
¶21 We hold that the court of appeals erred in its analysis
of the interests of justice exception to the PCRA’s statute of
limitations because it did not consider both the meritoriousness
of Bluemel’s claims and the reason for her untimely filing. We
also hold that the court of appeals did not apply the correct
standards for reviewing a rule 11 violation raised for the first
time in a petition for post-conviction relief. In the context of
a petition for post-conviction relief, a rule 11 violation does
not necessarily constitute a constitutional violation that,
alone, triggers application of the interests of justice
exception. Instead, for a petitioner’s claim to have merit, she
must show that her plea was, in fact, unknowing and involuntary
because of a rule 11 violation. Moreover, proof that the trial
court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 alone is not
sufficient to prove that a guilty plea was unknowing and
involuntary, and thus unconstitutional. Reversed and remanded.
---
¶22 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant’s
opinion.