City of West Jordan v. Goodman

1 Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002).
2 Id. §§ 78-5-101 to -140.
3 Utah Const. art. V, § 1.
2006 UT 27
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
West Jordan City, No. 20040944
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
Christopher Goodman,
Defendant and Appellant. April 28, 2006
---
Third District, West Valley
The Honorable Stephen L. Roth
No. 045100001
Attorneys: Roger F. Cutler, Ryan B. Carter, West Jordan,
for plaintiff
Michael N. Martinez, Salt Lake City, and Sarah Lynn
Mathews, West Valley City, for defendant
Kent R. Hart, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
---
PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 After the West Jordan Justice Court convicted
Christopher Goodman of two misdemeanor charges, Goodman exercised
his statutory right to a trial de novo in the district court.1
There, Goodman raised a constitutional challenge to the statutory
scheme authorizing municipal justice courts,2 arguing that it
violates the separation of powers principles of the Utah
Constitution.3 Goodman also argued that municipal court judges
are biased and have an impermissible conflict of interest because

4 Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (1998).
5 Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-22 (2003).
6 Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002).
No. 20040944 2
they are employed and controlled by the municipalities that
benefit from the fines they levy. The district court rejected
both challenges and convicted Goodman on both charges. Goodman
now appeals. While Goodman’s arguments are not without
superficial appeal, his briefing on the constitutional claim is
inadequate, and our review of the record reveals that he failed
to offer any probative evidence in support of his conflict of
interest claim. We accordingly affirm the convictions entered by
the district court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 On December 12, 2002, West Jordan police officer Holly
Curtis was “running license plates” on “all cars” in the Jordan
Landing Wal-Mart parking lot. This process involves inputting a
vehicle’s license plate number into a computer database that
returns pertinent information about the vehicle (e.g., insurance
status, warrants of arrest issued for the registered driver,
etc.). Goodman’s vehicle was parked in this lot. Curtis ran its
license plate number and discovered that it was uninsured. When
Goodman left the parking lot and entered a public street, Curtis
issued him a citation for operating a vehicle without insurance
in violation of Utah Code section 41-12a-302,4 a class B
misdemeanor.
¶3 The citation required that Goodman appear before the
West Jordan Justice Court, but he failed to do so. Accordingly,
the justice court issued a bench warrant for Goodman’s arrest and
added a class B misdemeanor charge pursuant to Utah Code section
77-7-225 for failure to appear. At a bench trial, Justice Court
Judge Ronald Kunz found Goodman guilty on both charges and
sentenced him to sixty days in jail, suspended upon payment of a
fine totaling $1,170 plus interest.
¶4 Goodman appealed his justice court conviction to the
Third District Court, where he was entitled to a trial de novo
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-5-120.6 At trial, Goodman
verbally moved to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that
the municipal justice court scheme violated the constitutional
requirement of separation of powers and that the justice court
judge had a pervasive conflict of interest stemming from the
alleged power of the city over the justice court.

7 1999 UT 6, ¶ 8, 976 P.2d 581.
3 No. 20040944
¶5 The district court deferred ruling, requested written
briefing on both issues, and scheduled them for further argument.
Following argument, the district court denied Goodman’s motion to
dismiss and found him guilty on both charges. The district court
subsequently articulated the basis for its ruling in a carefully
reasoned memorandum decision and order. Applying the three-part
test we articulated in In re Young7 for evaluating constitutional
challenges arising from the separation of powers doctrine, the
district court rejected Goodman’s constitutional claim.
¶6 The district court also rejected Goodman’s claim that
the justice court system constituted a de facto violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. It held that Goodman had failed
to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that justice court
judges have an inherent conflict of interest in every case or
that they are biased because of the structural relationships
between justice courts and the municipalities that create them.
¶7 Goodman appealed. After the briefing was complete,
West Jordan moved to dismiss the appeal due to a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and moved to strike Goodman’s briefs or, in
the alternative, to strike those portions of the briefs referring
to factual matters that were not admitted as evidence in the
district court. West Jordan’s motion to strike was supported by
an affidavit from Paul Barron, a member of the Information
Technology Department for the Administrative Office of State
Courts, in which Barron testified that the statistical
information referenced in Goodman’s briefs was inaccurate as a
result of a software program glitch.
¶8 Goodman opposed both motions and moved to disqualify
the Chief Justice from sitting on this appeal. Goodman argued
that, as the presiding officer of the Utah Judicial Council, the
Chief Justice has supervisory authority over the Administrative
Office of State Courts and all of its employees, including
Barron. Goodman reasoned that West Jordan’s submission of the
Barron Affidavit requires the disqualification of the Chief
Justice because of an actual, as well as a perceived, conflict of
interest. We deferred resolution of West Jordan’s motions and
indicated our intent to resolve them concurrently with Goodman’s
appeal.

8 Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ¶ 5, 86 P.3d 73.
9 State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 6, 980 P.2d 191.
10 Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
11 See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982) (“A
judgment may properly be rendered against a party only if the
court has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy
involved in the action.”).
12 Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 16, 94 P.3d 211 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 500 (1994).
No. 20040944 4
ANALYSIS
¶9 A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a
question of law, which we review for correctness.8 When
considering such a challenge, we presume that the statute is
valid and “resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.”9 When reviewing factual questions, we uphold
the trial court’s findings unless they are “clearly erroneous.”10
¶10 Before turning to the merits of this appeal, we first
determine whether we have subject matter jurisdiction to hear it.
We then address Goodman’s motion to disqualify the Chief Justice.
Concluding that neither of these questions poses an obstacle to
our deciding the case, we turn to Goodman’s substantive claims
and reject them because they are inadequately briefed and lack
factual support.
I. THIS COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO HEAR AN
APPEAL CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUSTICE COURTS
¶11 Our authority to determine the substantive issues
presented in this appeal is contingent on whether we have subject
matter jurisdiction.11 We therefore begin by addressing West
Jordan’s argument that neither the district court nor this court
has subject matter jurisdiction over Goodman’s constitutional
challenge to the justice court scheme.
¶12 In examining this issue, we start with the basic
premise that “[a] court has subject matter jurisdiction if the
case is one of the type of cases the court has been empowered to
entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court
derives its authority.”12 The Utah Constitution gives district

13 Utah Const. art. VIII, § 5; see also State v. Taylor, 664
P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1983).
14 Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1) (2002).
15 Id.
16 Id.; State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 275 n.2 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).
17 State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ¶ 7 n.3, 97 P.3d 732,
cert. granted, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah Dec. 22, 2004).
18 Taylor, 664 P.2d at 441.
5 No. 20040944
courts “appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute,”13 and the
legislature has enacted a statute giving the district courts
jurisdiction over appeals from justice court convictions.14
Under this statute, a criminal defendant who has been convicted
by a justice court is entitled to a trial de novo in the district
court.15 As a part of this de novo review, a defendant is
permitted to raise in the district court any relevant defense to
the charges, including challenges to the constitutionality of the
statutes or ordinances under which he was convicted.16
¶13 Had Goodman lodged a direct challenge to the
constitutionality of the statutes under which he was convicted,
the jurisdiction of the district court, and hence this court,
would be beyond dispute. But Goodman does not challenge the
constitutionality of the particular statutes under which he was
convicted. Rather, he challenges the validity of the convicting
justice court. West Jordan argues that the constitutional
validity of the justice court conviction was relevant to neither
the de novo trial in the district court nor the operative
question of whether the prosecution established the elements
necessary to convict Goodman in the district court. West Jordan
further argues that Goodman’s attempt to challenge the justice
court scheme in the context of the appeal of his convictions
deprived West Jordan of due process. We find neither argument
persuasive.
¶14 We recognize the importance of claims involving the
constitutionality of statutes or ordinances and the necessity of
a forum for raising them.17 We accordingly construe any
restriction on jurisdiction narrowly.18 When “[t]here is no
provision of the Constitution excepting [particular types of
cases], nor . . . any law of the state prohibiting jurisdiction

19 Jardine v. Harris, 227 P. 1029, 1030 (Utah 1924).
20 Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7) (2002).
21 See id.
22 See, e.g., State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah
1988); State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 729 (Utah 1984); State v.
Gabert, 564 A.2d 1356, 1359 (Vt. 1989); State v. Robbins, 980
P.2d 725, 730 (Wash. 1999); Joyner v. State, 2002 WY 174, ¶ 14,
58 P.3d 331.
23 See Utah Const. art. I, § 12.
No. 20040944 6
of the district court over the subject-matter,” we presume that
the district court has jurisdiction.19
¶15 West Jordan has failed to identify either a
constitutional provision or a statute limiting the district
court’s jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the
validity of a justice court conviction. Indeed, applicable
statutes implicitly contemplate such jurisdiction. Utah Code
section 78-5-120(7), which governs the jurisdiction of Utah
appellate courts over appeals from a district court’s review of a
justice court conviction, specifically provides that Utah
appellate courts may entertain appeals from district court review
of justice court proceedings if “the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.”20 This provision
suggests that district courts have statutory authority to hear
appeals from justice courts that challenge the constitutionality
of statutes. And it does not limit such constitutional
challenges to those statutes or ordinances defining the express
elements of the crime or violation under which a defendant was
charged.21
¶16 There are both express and implied elements of any
conviction.22 An implied element of Goodman’s convictions is the
underlying validity of the convicting court. If the convicting
court is constitutionally infirm, then the conviction is
necessarily invalid.23 This conclusion is particularly
compelling in this case because one of the charges on which
Goodman was convicted in the district court was his failure to
appear before the West Jordan Justice Court. One of the
indisputable elements of a failure to appear charge is the
implied, if not express, notion that the court that required the
defendant’s appearance was constitutionally legitimate.

24 See, e.g., Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, 106 P.3d 707
(involving defendants who challenged the constitutionality of
Utah’s two-tiered justice court system on appeal after being
convicted of several crimes in the justice court); Shelmidine v.
Jones, 550 P.2d 207, 209-11 (Utah 1976) (involving defendants
who, having been convicted by a justice court of drunk driving,
challenged the constitutionality of having nonlawyers as justice
court judges); Dillard v. Dist. Court, 251 P. 1070 (Utah 1926)
(reviewing the constitutionality of a law limiting the
jurisdiction of justice courts).
25 See Bernat, 2005 UT 1, ¶¶ 10-42; Shelmidine, 550 P.2d at
209-11.
26 See Utah Const. art. I, § 12 (indicating that an accused
shall have “the right to appeal in all cases”); Utah Const. art.
VIII, § 5 (“Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause.”).
7 No. 20040944
¶17 Although we have not explicitly addressed the scope of
appellate court jurisdiction over cases originating in the
justice courts, we have consistently heard cases challenging
various constitutional aspects of the justice court system.24 By
repeatedly hearing these cases, we have implicitly acknowledged
our subject matter jurisdiction over them and have recognized
that the questions they raise about the constitutionality of a
convicting court are inherently related to a defendant’s
conviction.25
¶18 Goodman has a constitutional right to appeal his
convictions. If that right is to have any meaning, it must
include the right to challenge the validity of the convicting
court.26 As a result, we conclude that we have subject matter
jurisdiction over Goodman’s challenges to the constitutionality
of the justice court scheme.
¶19 West Jordan also argues that it was denied due process
because it did not have notice that Goodman would be challenging
the constitutionality of the justice court scheme in the context
of his trial de novo in the district court. We are not
persuaded. Because the constitutionality of a convicting court
is an implicit element of any conviction (and particularly of
Goodman’s conviction for failure to appear), Goodman was entitled
to challenge the constitutional validity of the justice court in
his de novo trial before the district court. West Jordan should
have reasonably anticipated such a defense. Moreover, West

27 See Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Utah 1994);
Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
28 See Low v. City of Monticello, 2004 UT 90, ¶ 15, 103 P.3d
130 (indicating that due process is a flexible standard that
tries to ensure fairness).
29 Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 (2005).
30 Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 (2005).
31 Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E (indicating that
judges should disqualify themselves “in a proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or where the
(continued...)
No. 20040944 8
Jordan’s claim that it was deprived of due process rings hollow
in the face of the fact that the district court allowed the
parties the opportunity to fully brief and orally argue the
issues relating to the validity of the justice court scheme once
Goodman raised it orally.27 Under these circumstances, and in
light of the heavy emphasis that we place on protecting a
defendant’s right to raise constitutional claims, we hold that
West Jordan has been accorded due process and that we have
subject matter jurisdiction.28
II. GOODMAN’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
THE CHIEF JUSTICE IS WITHOUT MERIT
¶20 We next turn to Goodman’s motion to disqualify the
Chief Justice. The factual predicate for Goodman’s motion is the
Chief Justice’s role as the presiding officer of the Judicial
Council, pursuant to which she has general supervisory power over
all court administrative staff. Paul Barron, a computer
specialist who is part of the Judicial Council’s administrative
staff, filed an affidavit in support of West Jordan’s motion to
strike Goodman’s briefs. Goodman argues that Barron’s affidavit
calls into question the impartiality of the court because of the
“appearance of impropriety of the employee in involving himself
in a case before his employer.” We disagree.
¶21 As a general rule, a judge has a duty to preserve “the
integrity and independence of the judiciary”29 and should
disqualify herself “in a proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”30 The word
“reasonable” connotes the idea that judges are not subject to
disqualification in every situation where their impartiality is
questioned, particularly when the potential for bias is remote.31

31 (...continued)
judge has “more than a de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding.” (emphasis added)).
32 Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Terminology (2005).
33 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3549 (2d ed. 1984 &
Supp. 2005).
34 Id.
35 767 P.2d 538, 549 (Utah 1988).
36 Id. (citation omitted); see also V-1 Oil Co. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1193 (Utah 1997) (holding that it
did not violate due process for a staff attorney to serve as an
administrative adjudicator for the same agency whose disputes he
was to adjudicate because the staff attorney was “structurally
segregated from the branch of the division conducting
investigations and prosecutions”); In re Va. Elec. & Power Co.,
539 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that a trial judge’s
interest in a possible rebate on utility payments was a de
minimis interest).
9 No. 20040944
Indeed, the Judicial Canons specifically recognize that a judge
may have a “de minimis” interest, or in other words, “an
insignificant interest that could not raise reasonable question
as to a judge’s impartiality.”32
¶22 Scholars discussing this principle have described it as
the “reasonable person” test.33 This test “look[s] to see
whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would
believe that the judge’s impartiality could be questioned.”34 We
have adopted a similar approach. For example, in Madsen v.
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n,35 we held that even
though a judge was a potential member of an alleged class in a
class action suit, he was not disqualified from hearing the case
because the potential for bias was “too remote and
insubstantial.”36
¶23 In this case, any possibility for bias is too
speculative and remote to require disqualification. The Chief
Justice’s broad and general supervisory power over all
administrative court staff statewide is insufficient to
disqualify her from hearing a case in which one of hundreds of
court employees has submitted an affidavit. No reasonable person
would expect the Chief Justice to be biased under these

37 See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges § 91 (1994) (“The majority view
is that the rule of disqualification of judges must yield to the
demands of necessity.”).
38 See City of Kanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1068-69 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998) (reviewing the constitutionality of rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure); City of Monticello v.
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 519 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that this court is both the ultimate
source of content for the meaning of constitutional language and
the promulgating agency for rule 26(13)(a)); see also Utah Const.
art. VIII, § 4 (“The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by
rule manage the appellate process.”).
39 See In re Anderson, 2003 UT 35, ¶ 14, 81 P.3d 758
(refusing to apply a bright-line rule of disqualification in
reviewing findings of the Judicial Conduct Commission).
No. 20040944 10
circumstances, especially given the lack of any evidence that the
Chief Justice has ever exercised any direct administrative
oversight over the employee submitting the affidavit.
¶24 As a matter of necessity,37 this court has an
obligation not only to promulgate court rules, but also to review
their constitutional validity and to supervise lower courts.38
Requiring the disqualification of the Chief Justice, and possibly
other justices, whenever an administrative court employee is
remotely involved in a case would result in our abdicating our
responsibility to supervise lower courts and determine the
validity of court rules.39 We therefore deny Goodman’s motion to
disqualify the Chief Justice.
III. GOODMAN HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION FAVORING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE JUSTICE COURT SCHEME
¶25 We now consider Goodman’s substantive claims. First,
Goodman asserts that the statutory structure of justice courts
violates the separation of powers principles of the Utah
Constitution. Second, he asserts that justice court judges have
an inherent conflict of interest preventing them from exercising
independent judgment because they are employed and controlled by
the municipalities that benefit from the fines they levy.
¶26 We have articulated a three-part test for analyzing
whether a law violates separation of powers principles. It asks:

40 Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ¶ 23,
94 P.3d 283 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Young, 1999
UT 6, ¶ 8, 976 P.2d 581).
41 State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ¶ 31, 973 P.2d 404 (quoting
(continued...)
11 No. 20040944
First, are the [actors] in question “charged
with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to” one of the three branches of
government? Second, is the function that the
statute has given the [actors] one
“appertaining to” another branch of
government? The third and final step in the
analysis asks: if the answer to both of the
above questions is “yes,” does the
constitution “expressly” direct or permit
exercise of the otherwise forbidden function?
If not, article V, section 1 is
transgressed.40
¶27 The district court examined the statutory scheme
pursuant to which the West Jordan Justice Court was created and
concluded that Goodman failed to meet the requirements of the
first prong because the West Jordan City manager is not charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to the judicial
branch of government. Having determined that Goodman had failed
to meet the first prong, the district court found it unnecessary
to address the other two prongs and held that the West Jordan
justice court scheme did not violate constitutional separation of
powers principles.
¶28 The district court similarly rejected Goodman’s claim
that the West Jordan municipal court judge had a conflict of
interest in every case, finding that the claim lacked evidentiary
support. The scant evidence that Goodman offered in support of
his claim consisted of a West Jordan City organizational chart,
city budget estimates, and justice court conviction rate
statistics. After examining each piece of evidence, the district
court concluded that none of it supports anything other than
“mere speculation” regarding Goodman’s claim that West Jordan’s
justice court is so dominated by the city that Judge Kunz cannot
act independently and impartially on the cases before him.
¶29 We affirm the district court’s ruling on Goodman’s
separation of powers claim because Goodman has failed to brief it
adequately. This court “is not ‘a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.’”41

41 (...continued)
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)).
42 State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ¶ 7, 1 P.3d 1108.
43 State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, ¶ 11, 108 P.3d 710.
44 Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ¶ 31 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45 Jones, 2004 UT 53, ¶ 23 (citing In re Young, 1999 UT 6,
¶ 8, 976 P.2d 581).
46 Broadbent v. Gibson, 140 P.2d 939, 943 (Utah 1943).
No. 20040944 12
An adequately briefed argument must provide “meaningful legal
analysis.”42 A brief must go beyond providing conclusory
statements and “fully identify, analyze, and cite its legal
arguments.”43 This analysis “requires not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis
based on that authority.”44
¶30 Goodman’s briefing fails to meet these requirements.
As previously indicated, we have articulated a three-part test
for evaluating claims that a statute violates separation of
powers principles of the Utah Constitution.45 The district court
prepared a thoughtful and detailed opinion addressing Goodman’s
claims, the centerpiece of which was an analysis of Goodman’s
constitutional claim under the controlling three-part test. But
Goodman’s brief on appeal acknowledges neither the controlling
test nor the district court’s discussion of that test. Nor does
Goodman make any attempt to explain why the test does not apply
here. In short, Goodman fails to explain why or how he believes
the district court erred. These deficiencies in Goodman’s
briefing, coupled with the presumption that statutes passed by
the legislature are constitutional,46 require that we affirm the
ruling of the district court on Goodman’s separation of powers
claim.
¶31 We also affirm the district court’s ruling rejecting
Goodman’s claim that Judge Kunz has a conflict of interest in
every case because Goodman failed to establish the factual
predicate for this claim. Goodman offered only three pieces of
evidence to the district court. As the district court found,
however, none of this evidence established an actual conflict of
interest. Goodman attempted to remedy this deficiency on appeal
by attaching to his appellate brief additional “evidence,”
including memoranda relating to the Salt Lake City Justice Court,

47 Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 21, 104 P.3d
1208 (emphasis added) (quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat’l Life
Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)).
48 Id.
49 Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, 202 P.2d 892, 896 (Utah
1949) (“While we are appreciative of the efforts of amicus curiae
in presenting this problem, we are reluctant to decide so
important a problem, . . . without having the benefit of
(continued...)
13 No. 20040944
unauthenticated statistics regarding justice court conviction
rates, and an unauthenticated document reflecting municipal court
organization. But we may not properly consider evidence that was
not presented to the district court.
¶32 Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires that “[a]ll statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below . . . be supported by citations to the record.”
Rule 24(a)(9) further indicates that “[t]he argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court.” The combined effect of
these rules is to require that parties on appeal make well-
reasoned legal arguments supported by specific facts of record.
¶33 Goodman disagrees, arguing that rule 24 does not
preclude reliance on extra-record facts, but only requires
citation to those facts that happen to be supported by the
record. This is incorrect. “As a general matter, ‘this court
need not, and will not[,] consider any facts not properly cited
to, or supported by, the record.’”47
¶34 Arguably, citations to the record need not be perfect
so long as the court is “nevertheless able to adequately navigate
the record with the citations provided.”48 But Goodman’s failure
to cite to the record presumably stems, in large part, from the
fact that much of the evidence on which he relies is not present
in the record at all or is too speculative to merit serious
consideration.
¶35 As a side note, we acknowledge that the amicus curiae
brief, filed by the Utah Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
in support of Goodman’s claims, makes a valiant effort to salvage
Goodman’s appeal. But an amicus brief filed on appeal cannot
remedy Goodman’s fundamental problem--that he failed to offer in
the district court the evidence necessary to support his claim.49

49 (...continued)
proceedings, arguments, and parties who may be adversely
affected, to aid us in this determination.”)
50 See generally Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation,
Disqualification of Judge, Justice of the Peace, or Similar
Judicial Officer for Pecuniary Interest in Fines, Forfeitures, or
Fees Payable by Litigants, 72 A.L.R.3d 375 (Update 2002).
51 See Carrier, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 21.
No. 20040944 14
¶36 In affirming Goodman’s convictions, we are not
foreclosing future challenges to the validity of the justice
court scheme, and in fact, we encourage the legislature to give
serious consideration to some of the arguments raised in the
amicus brief. It is theoretically possible that a justice court
judge may be unable to exercise his judicial functions with the
necessary impartiality because of pressure to generate revenue
for his municipal employer or that a municipal government may
exercise such control over its justice court that it violates
fundamental principles of separation of powers.50 But to prevail
on such claims, a defendant would need to support them with
specific evidence51 and cogent legal argument. Here, because of
the completely deficient briefing and lack of evidence, we must
affirm Goodman’s convictions.
CONCLUSION
¶37 We have subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
constitutional claims in this case and deny Goodman’s motion to
disqualify the Chief Justice. We reject Goodman’s constitutional
challenge to the justice court scheme because he has failed to
provide sufficient argument to rebut the well-established
presumption that statutes enacted by the legislature are
constitutional. Due to a lack of supporting record evidence, we
similarly reject Goodman’s claim that Judge Kunz had an
impermissible conflict of interest. Affirmed.
---
¶38 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish’s
opinion.