State v. Spillers

2007 UT 13
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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State of Utah, No. 20050724
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
F I L E D
Bill Frank Spillers,
Defendant and Respondent. January 26, 2007
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Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn
No. 991921484
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Matthew D. Bates,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for defendant
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
¶1 This case comes before us on a writ of certiorari. The
State of Utah challenges the decision of the court of appeals to
reverse the conviction of Billy Frank Spillers (Defendant) for
first degree murder and to remand the case for a new trial. We
affirm the court of appeals’ holding that Defendant was entitled
to jury instructions on both extreme emotional distress
manslaughter and imperfect legal justification manslaughter.
BACKGROUND
¶2 During the afternoon of October 25, 1999, Defendant and
James Jackson were at Defendant’s home. Witnesses testified that
an argument broke out between the two men, although Defendant
testified that the argument was actually between Jackson and
another man. Witnesses testified that, as the argument
escalated, Defendant brandished a gun and ordered everyone to
leave. Defendant admitted at trial that he told everyone to
leave, but he denied threatening anyone with a firearm.

No. 20050724 2
¶3 Shortly thereafter, Defendant and Jackson left
Defendant’s home. Defendant followed Jackson to Jackson’s home,
where they began arguing. The argument escalated, and Jackson
accused Defendant of snitching on him to drug enforcement agents
regarding a drug deal in Kansas City. Defendant testified that
Jackson retrieved a gun from the living room couch, returned to
the kitchen, and began threatening him, making Defendant feel
nervous. Defendant then turned away from Jackson, at which point
Jackson struck Defendant with the gun on the back of the head.
Defendant testified that the blow left him feeling cloudy, dazed,
uncomfortable, and scared. Defendant stated that, after being
struck, he turned to face Jackson, pushed him backwards, and told
him to back away. Then, according to Defendant, Jackson
approached him with his arm cocked to strike again. At that
point, Defendant pulled a gun from his waistband and shot Jackson
in the chest. At trial, Defendant stated that he recalled
shooting Jackson only once, although evidence revealed that
Jackson was shot three times.
¶4 Two witnesses present in the house at the time of the
shooting testified that they heard Defendant and Jackson arguing,
followed by a series of gunshots. The witnesses differed about
the timing of the three shots.
¶5 Defendant testified that after shooting Jackson, he
took Jackson’s gun, as well as his own, and ran out of the house,
breaking his ankle during his flight and dropping both guns in
the yard. He retrieved Jackson’s gun and fled the scene.
Defendant was apprehended later that evening. He was booked into
the Salt Lake County jail and charged with first degree murder.
¶6 After his arrest, a forensic nurse examined Defendant
and found a two-inch hematoma on the back of his head, consistent
with Defendant’s having received a wound the prior day.
Additionally, she observed that Defendant’s pupils appeared
sluggish, which could have been the result of the blow to the
head.
¶7 The medical examiner testified that Jackson was shot
three times--once in the chest, once in the thigh, and once
through the penis. The first shot was fatal and severed
Jackson’s spine, causing him to collapse immediately, while the
second and third shots were fired as he lay on the floor. The
trajectory of the shots could be consistent with Defendant’s
story, although, according to the medical examiner, the position
of Jackson’s body indicated he may not have been moving forward
to strike Defendant at the time of the first shot.

3 No. 20050724
¶8 Several witnesses testified that Jackson had a
reputation for violence, aggressive behavior, and an explosive
temper.
¶9 The district court concluded that the evidence
presented at trial did not warrant a jury instruction for either
extreme emotional distress manslaughter or imperfect legal
justification manslaughter, and Defendant was convicted of first
degree murder pursuant to Utah Code section 76-5-203 (1999).
Defendant appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals
reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to jury
instructions for both extreme emotional distress manslaughter and
imperfect legal justification manslaughter. We granted
certiorari to determine (1) whether Defendant was entitled to a
manslaughter jury instruction based on extreme emotional
distress, and (2) whether Defendant was entitled to a
manslaughter jury instruction based on imperfect legal
justification. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to Utah Code
section 78-2-2(5) (2002).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 “On certiorari, we review the court of appeals’
decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no
deference.” State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶ 10, 82 P.3d 1106
(citations omitted). Whether a jury instruction on a lesser
included offense is appropriate presents a question of law. See
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). When
considering whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included
offense jury instruction, we “view the evidence and the
inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the defense.” State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah 1983).
In addition, when the defense requests a jury instruction on a
lesser included offense, the requirements for inclusion of the
instruction “should be liberally construed.” State v. Hansen,
734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986).
ANALYSIS
¶11 The State argues that the court of appeals erred in
reversing the trial court’s decision not to instruct the jury on
extreme emotional distress and imperfect legal justification
manslaughter. The State argues that under no rational view of
the evidence could a jury have both acquitted Defendant of murder
and convicted him of manslaughter and that even if an instruction
on lesser included offenses was warranted, that error was
harmless. We disagree.

1 The State argues that the Baker standard is inapplicable
and that this court should consider Defendant’s request for jury
instructions under the test for affirmative defenses. However,
the standards applied when a defendant is entitled to have the
jury instructed on an affirmative defense or on a lesser included
offense are indistinguishable. In either case, a defendant is
entitled to an instruction “if there is any reasonable basis in
the evidence.” State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980);
accord Baker, 671 P.2d at 159.
No. 20050724 4
¶12 In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), this court
held that when the defense requests an instruction on a lesser
included offense, the instruction “must be given if (i) the
statutory elements of greater and lesser included offenses
overlap . . . and (ii) the evidence provides a rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.” State v. Hansen, 734
P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted) (discussing the Baker test for lesser included offense
instructions); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (2003). Thus,
“when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to
alternative interpretations, and one alternative would permit
acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser, a
jury question exists and the court must give a lesser included
offense instruction” when the defendant so requests it. Baker,
671 P.2d at 159.1 Because neither party disputes the first prong
of the lesser included offense test--that the statutory elements
of manslaughter and murder overlap--the only issue before this
court is whether there is a rational basis to acquit Defendant of
murder and convict him of manslaughter.
I. DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JURY INSTRUCTION FOR
MANSLAUGHTER BASED ON EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
¶13 Murder may be reduced to manslaughter where a defendant
caused a person’s death “under the influence of extreme emotional
distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.”
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(i), (3)(d) (1999). “[T]he
reasonableness of an explanation or excuse . . . shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the
then existing circumstances.” Id. § 76-5-203(3)(c).
¶14 A person suffers extreme emotional distress when
exposed to “‘extremely unusual and overwhelming stress’ such that
the average reasonable person” would react by experiencing a loss
of self-control. State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d 94
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Utah 1988)). In
such a situation, a person’s reason would be overwhelmed by

5 No. 20050724
intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, or
excessive agitation. Id.
¶15 In Shumway, this court held that the defendant, a
minor, was entitled to an extreme emotional distress manslaughter
instruction when he stabbed his friend during a sleepover. Id.
¶¶ 2, 10-11, 13. The victim, upset with the defendant for
beating him at video games, retrieved a knife and began lunging
at the defendant. Id. ¶ 10. The defendant gained control over
the knife and repeatedly stabbed the victim. Id. At trial,
witnesses testified that the victim had a tendency towards
aggression. Id. This evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the defense, offered a sufficient rational basis for
a jury to conclude that the defendant was experiencing extreme
emotional distress and to convict on the lesser included offense.
Id. ¶ 13.
¶16 Like Shumway, evidence in this case could be
interpreted to support Defendant’s contention that he experienced
extreme emotional distress and was therefore entitled to a
manslaughter instruction. Defendant testified that he and
Jackson were arguing prior to the altercation and that Jackson
was upset with him, accusing him of snitching to drug enforcement
officers. The tone of the conversation made Defendant nervous.
Defendant stated that Jackson retrieved a firearm and struck
Defendant on the back of the head. Defendant testified that the
blow left him cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scared.
According to the nurse’s testimony, the blow may have resulted in
a two-inch hematoma that was present on Defendant’s head the day
after the shooting. Defendant testified that after being struck,
he turned to face Jackson, who was cocking his arm back to strike
Defendant again. At that point, Defendant shot Jackson three
times, although at trial he testified that he remembered firing
only a single shot. Further, witnesses testified that Jackson
had a reputation for violence. Thus, a rational jury could,
adopting Defendant’s version of events, find that he was
experiencing extreme emotional distress for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse when he shot Jackson.
¶17 The State contends that unlike Shumway, in this case
there was no rational basis in the evidence presented at trial to
warrant the extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction.
Rather, the State maintains that a rational jury could not
conclude that Defendant was overwhelmed such that a reasonable
person would experience a loss of self-control. The substance of
the State’s argument is twofold.
¶18 First, the State’s assertion rests on its own
conclusion that Defendant acted “rationally” throughout the

No. 20050724 6
encounter; however, the question of whether Defendant acted
“rationally” is a question of fact properly belonging to the
jury. While a jury could adopt the State’s version of events and
convict Defendant of murder, a jury could also believe
Defendant’s interpretation of the evidence and conclude that he
was not acting rationally, but rather was under extreme emotional
distress as a result of Jackson’s attack and convict on the
lesser offense of manslaughter.
¶19 Second, the State contends that Defendant did not
present evidence that he was in fact experiencing “extreme
emotional distress.” Rather, the State maintains that Defendant
merely testified that he felt nervous and that the blow to his
head left him feeling cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and
scared--terms not indicative, in the State’s view, of extreme
emotional distress. Contrary to the implications of the State’s
position, a defendant in a criminal case bears no burden of
persuasion. State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980).
“The ultimate burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt remains on the state, whether defendant offers
any evidence in an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not.”
Id.; see also State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981); State
v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975); People v. Tracy, 1 Utah
343, 346 (Utah 1876). “It is sufficient . . . that the evidence
or lack thereof creates a reasonable doubt as to any element of
the crime.” Torres, 619 P.2d at 695; see also State v. Knoll,
712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68
(Utah 1977). A defendant is not required to testify at all, nor
is he required to present any evidence at trial; he “may simply
point to ambiguities or inconsistencies in the evidence presented
by the State and require the State to prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9,
¶ 29, ___ P.3d ___. Accordingly, a defendant is not required to
use particular language or key words in his testimony to identify
his mental state as extreme emotional distress before a jury may
consider that defense in a criminal trial. As long as the
evidence presented at trial supports a defendant’s theory of the
crime and provides a rational basis for a verdict on the lesser
included offense, a defendant is entitled to the jury instruction
if he requests it.
¶20 Reviewing the evidence presented at trial in the light
most favorable to the defense, we hold that there was evidence
from which a jury reasonably could conclude that Defendant was
under the influence of extreme emotional distress at the time of
the shooting. A jury could infer Defendant’s mental state from
the testimony of Defendant and others that supported his theory
of the case. This evidence includes Defendant’s testimony that
he felt nervous and that the blow to his head left him feeling

2 At oral argument, the State conceded that Defendant was
entitled to a perfect self-defense claim.
7 No. 20050724
cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scared. It also includes
Defendant’s rendition of the events that took place the night of
the shooting, the testimony of the nurse regarding Defendant’s
wound, the medical examiner’s testimony of the positioning of
Jackson’s body, the evidence of Jackson’s reputation for
violence, and any other evidence that substantiated Defendant’s
theory of the case. Based on the entirety of the evidence at
trial, a jury could choose to believe Defendant’s version of
events and conclude that Defendant was experiencing extreme
emotional distress at the time of the shooting for which there
was a reasonable explanation or excuse.
II. DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JURY INSTRUCTION FOR
IMPERFECT LEGAL JUSTIFICATION MANSLAUGHTER
¶21 The court of appeals found that the same evidence that
supported Defendant’s theory of extreme emotional distress
manslaughter also supported his theory of imperfect legal
justification manslaughter. State v. Spillers, 2005 UT App 283,
¶ 25, 116 P.3d 985. We agree.
¶22 Under Utah Code section 76-5-203, murder may be reduced
to manslaughter when the defendant caused another’s death “under
a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was
not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing
circumstances.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(ii), (3)(d)
(1999). “[T]he reasonableness of an explanation or excuse . . .
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person
under the then existing circumstances.” Id. § 76-5-203(3)(c).
¶23 At trial, the court found the evidence sufficient to
instruct the jury on perfect self-defense but not on imperfect
legal justification manslaughter.2 This was error. In State v.
Howell, this court stated that for both perfect and imperfect
self-defense, “the same basic facts [are] at issue.” 649 P.2d
91, 95 (Utah 1982) (holding that the court in a murder trial
properly gave a lesser included offense instruction on
manslaughter over the defendant’s objection). Although the State
argues that the testimony at trial could be interpreted only as
finding that Defendant was either guilty of murder or acquitted
under a self-defense theory, we conclude that the evidence could
also be interpreted by a jury that Defendant was entitled to
defend himself against Jackson, but not entitled to use deadly
force when Jackson only struck Defendant with his gun. Thus, as

No. 20050724 8
the court of appeals properly recognized, the conflicting
interpretations of the evidence create a question of fact
appropriately placed before a jury. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d
152, 159 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, we hold that Defendant was
entitled to have the jury instructed on imperfect legal
justification manslaughter.
III. FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR
¶24 Finally, the State argues that any error in the jury
instructions was harmless. “[H]armless error is an error that is
sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable
likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.”
State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ¶ 20, 20 P.3d 888. As recognized in
State v. Knight, “when an element of the crime . . . is in
dispute, and the evidence is consistent with both the defendant’s
and the State’s theory of the case, failing to instruct on the
lesser included offense presumptively affects the outcome of the
trial . . . [and] our confidence in the verdict is undermined.”
2003 UT App 354, ¶ 17, 79 P.3d 969. Clearly, the case at hand
meets these criteria. Therefore, we find the State’s arguments
unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
¶25 We agree with the court of appeals that there was a
sufficient rational basis in the evidence for the jury to acquit
Defendant of murder and convict him of manslaughter.
Accordingly, Defendant was entitled to jury instructions for both
extreme emotional distress and imperfect legal justification
manslaughter. We affirm the court of appeals and remand the case
to the district court for a new trial.
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¶26 Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion.