Slaughter v. Alleman

2026 UT App 85

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN B. ALLEMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE JOHNSON AND APRIL SLAUGHTER,
Respondents.

APRIL SLAUGHTER,
Appellee,
v.
JOHN B. ALLEMAN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20250180-CA
Filed May 29, 2026

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Christine S. Johnson
No. 214402024

Rodney R. Parker, Attorney for Petitioner and
Appellant John B. Alleman
David G. Turcotte, Attorney for Respondent and
Appellee April Slaughter
Stacy R. Haacke, Attorney for Respondent
The Honorable Christine S. Johnson

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN
FORSTER concurred.

TENNEY, Judge:

¶1 April Slaughter and John G. Alleman began divorce
proceedings in 2021. In 2024, they entered into a settlement
Slaughter v. Alleman

agreement to resolve the division of their marital estate, and the
district court soon issued a divorce decree consistent with that
agreement. The decree awarded the parties’ marital residence to
Alleman along with various other items, and in a separate
provision, it ordered Alleman to pay a sum of money to Slaughter
to balance out the division of the marital estate.

¶2 Alleman died before the parties had performed their
respective obligations. After Alleman’s death, his father, John B.
Alleman (Special Administrator), was appointed to act as the
special administrator of Alleman’s estate. 1 When Special
Administrator tendered the required money to Slaughter,
Slaughter refused to transfer ownership of the marital residence
to Alleman’s estate.

¶3 Through counsel, Special Administrator filed a motion to
enforce the divorce decree, and he later filed a motion to
substitute, wherein he sought leave to appear as a party on behalf
of Alleman’s estate. Slaughter opposed both motions, and she also
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that because
Alleman had not paid the required money before he died, the
marital residence was now hers. The district court granted
Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment and awarded the
marital residence to Slaughter. It also awarded attorney fees to
Slaughter, concluding that Slaughter was the prevailing party.
After ruling in Slaughter’s favor on the summary judgment
motion, the court denied Special Administrator’s motion to
substitute, concluding that it was now moot.

1. For clarity, we note that John B. Alleman (who is listed in the
caption as the Petitioner and the Appellant) is the father of John
G. Alleman, who has passed away. Moving forward, we’ll refer to
John G. Alleman as “Alleman,” and as indicated, we’ll refer to
John B. Alleman as “Special Administrator.”

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Slaughter v. Alleman

¶4 Special Administrator has filed both a petition for
extraordinary relief and an appeal, wherein he challenges various
rulings from the district court. For the reasons set forth below, we
conclude that:

• Special Administrator’s petition for extraordinary relief is
procedurally proper insofar as, under the circumstances of
this case, Special Administrator has no other plain or
adequate way in which to assert the rights of Alleman’s
estate;

• the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
Slaughter and that ruling must therefore be vacated; and

• insofar as the attorney fees award and the denial of the
motion to substitute were based on the summary judgment
ruling, they must now be vacated too.

BACKGROUND

¶5 Slaughter and Alleman were married in October 2019, and
in July 2021, Slaughter filed a petition for divorce. The couple did
not have any children together, so the divorce proceedings
focused on how to divide the marital estate. One of the main
assets was a house that Slaughter and Alleman had acquired
during the marriage (the marital residence), which they held in
joint tenancy.

The Settlement Agreement and the Divorce Decree

¶6 On March 4, 2024, Slaughter and Alleman entered into a
settlement agreement (the Agreement). On March 5, 2024, the
district court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
which it “approve[d]” the Agreement “as equitable and just.”
That same day, the court issued a divorce decree (the Decree) that

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distributed the parties’ assets pursuant to the terms outlined in
the Agreement.

¶7 The Decree included the following provision:

4. Property Division. The parties’ real and personal
property shall be divided as follows:

a. To [Slaughter]:

(1) Her vehicle;

(2) Personal property in her possession,
except as limited below;

(3) Furnishings in the marital residence
(except that major appliances shall
stay with the residence); and

(4) All financial accounts in her name.

b. To [Alleman]:

(1) His vehicle;

(2) The marital residence[2] . . . ;

(3) The [Salt Lake] residence . . . ;

(4) Personal property in his possession;

(5) His pinball machine, slot machine,
and coin collection, located in the
marital residence; and

2. This is the same house that we’ve referred to as “the marital
residence.”

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Slaughter v. Alleman

(6) All financial accounts in his name.

c. In order to equalize division of the marital
estate, [Alleman] shall pay [Slaughter]
$200,000 on or before May 31, 2024.

....

f. [Slaughter] agrees that, upon receipt of
the $200,000 payment described above,
she will immediately quitclaim the
[marital residence] to [Alleman],
although she will retain the right to
remain in the residence until May 31,
2024.

Alleman’s Death and the Motion to Enforce

¶8 On April 24, 2024, Alleman died by suicide. At the time of
his death, Alleman had not tendered the $200,000 payment to
Slaughter. On May 24, 2024, Alleman’s father was appointed as
the special administrator of Alleman’s estate.3 On May 31, 2024,
he tendered payment of the $200,000 to Slaughter’s counsel, but
Slaughter’s counsel told him that Slaughter was refusing to accept
the money or sign a quitclaim deed transferring ownership of the
marital residence to Alleman’s estate.

¶9 On June 25, 2024, and pursuant to rule 7B of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Special Administrator filed an ex parte motion
to enforce “paragraph 4 of the . . . Decree.” Special Administrator
argued that the Agreement was “an enforceable contract” and
that the Decree “incorporate[d] the requirement that [Slaughter]
convey” the marital residence to Alleman. Special Administrator
argued that Slaughter’s refusal to accept the payment and sign the

3. There does not appear to be any dispute that Alleman’s father
was properly appointed as the special administrator.

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Slaughter v. Alleman

quitclaim deed was “a blatant and deliberate breach of the
[A]greement” and “also contempt of the [D]ecree.” Special
Administrator sought (1) a determination that Slaughter was “in
contempt of paragraph 4 of the Decree,” (2) an “order requiring
[Slaughter] to vacate the [marital] residence forthwith,” (3) an
“order requiring [Slaughter] to pay the fair rental value of $2,900
per month for the period of time she . . . wrongfully retained
possession,” and (4) attorney fees “pursuant to the [D]ecree” and
under Utah Code section 81-1-203(2).

¶10 In response, Slaughter filed an “Objection” and a
“Counter-Motion for relief,” wherein she sought denial of the
motion to enforce and “a summary Order awarding her sole legal
ownership and possession” of the marital residence. There,
Slaughter advanced essentially two main arguments. First,
Slaughter asserted that because the marital residence had been
held in joint tenancy “with full rights of survivorship,” it “would
automatically pass to [her] upon [Alleman’s] death.” Slaughter
claimed that because Alleman had not paid her the $200,000
before his death, the marital residence had “automatically
transfer[red]” to her at the time of his death, thus “circumventing
the Decree and his estate entirely.” Because of this, she further
argued that Special Administrator could not “try to step into
[Alleman’s] living shoes, . . . act for him when he chose not to,
[and] attempt to subvert what he actually did.” Second, in what
seems to have been something of an alternative argument,
Slaughter asserted that even if Special Administrator could act on
Alleman’s behalf, Special Administrator’s May 31 tender was
invalid because Special Administrator had never delivered the
$200,000 to her “personally” or to her address as she had allegedly
requested through counsel. Either way, Slaughter asserted that
because the $200,000 had not been paid by Alleman or properly
paid by Special Administrator, the marital residence was now
hers.

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Slaughter v. Alleman

¶11 Special Administrator filed a reply in which he asserted
that the Decree had “unconditionally award[ed] the marital
residence” to Alleman. (Emphasis in original.) Special
Administrator also asserted that “[n]othing in the [D]ecree” gave
Slaughter “the right to retain ownership of the [marital
residence]” and that Alleman had become “the sole owner” of the
marital residence “when the court signed the [D]ecree.” Special
Administrator further argued that “even if [Alleman] had not
tendered the money before May 31, [Slaughter’s] remedy would
be to seek enforcement of the payment requirement.” Finally,
Special Administrator argued that the May 31 tender had indeed
been “timely and effective.”

¶12 On the same day that Special Administrator filed this
reply, he also filed a Suggestion of Death and a Motion to
Substitute. The motion to substitute was filed pursuant to rule
25(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and it requested that
Special Administrator “be substituted for [Alleman] in this
action” because the “property awards in the [D]ecree . . .
survive[d]” Alleman’s death and were “enforceable in the divorce
action.”

Slaughter’s Motion for Summary Judgment

¶13 Slaughter subsequently filed a “Motion & Memorandum in
Support of Request for Summary Judgment and Final Order.” In
this filing, Slaughter made arguments consistent with those that
she had made in her opposition to the motion to enforce.
Slaughter asserted that the “Decree, without an additional written
deed signed by Slaughter,” had failed “to sever the Joint Tenancy”
on the marital residence. She also asserted that because the joint
tenancy had “remained in effect at the time [Alleman] . . . died,
[his] undivided interest passed” to Slaughter and had not become
part of his estate. And Slaughter further argued Special
Administrator had no “standing to pursue a claim to the [marital
residence].” She thus asked the court to (1) deny Special

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Administrator’s motion to enforce “and all related claims” and
(2) issue an order declaring the marital residence to be the “sole
and exclusive property of Slaughter, outside the scope of the
estate of [Alleman] . . . and the powers of [Special
Administrator].”

¶14 In response, Special Administrator filed a motion to strike,
asserting that Slaughter had “filed a procedurally improper
motion for summary judgment” and that the motion was
“substantively without merit.” In Special Administrator’s view,
because the court had previously issued the Decree, and because
the case was now “before the court on a motion to enforce the
[D]ecree,” there was “no place for summary judgment in the
present procedural posture of the case.”

¶15 On October 23, 2024, and without having held arguments
on any of the above motions, the district court issued a written
decision granting Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment. In
key part, the court reasoned that “after service of” the motion for
summary judgment, Special Administrator had “failed to timely
defend, respond, request argument or seek any hearing to contest
the factual and legal claims made by [Slaughter] in the Motion.”
As a result, the court concluded, “[T]he factual and legal claims
set forth in the Motion are undisputed and summary judgment is
appropriate.”

¶16 Based on what it regarded as the undisputed facts, the
court then ruled that

• the marital residence had been “held in Joint Tenancy with
rights of survivorship throughout the duration of the
Parties[’] marriage”;

• under Utah law, “when a joint tenant passes away, their
undivided interest . . . automatically transfers to the
surviving joint tenant, avoiding probate”; and

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• “at no time post the entry of the . . . Decree and prior to his
death did [Alleman] act to pay the $200,000 required to
equalize the marital estate and compel [Slaughter] to
transfer the [marital residence] to him,” and, “to date,
[Slaughter] has received . . . no payments from [Special
Administrator] as the executor of [Alleman’s] estate.”

The court thus ruled that the marital residence was “not subject to
probate” and that Slaughter was “the sole and exclusive owner”
of it. Because the court had granted summary judgment to
Slaughter, the court then ruled that the motion to enforce that had
been filed by Special Administrator was “now moot and therefore
denied.” Finally, the court awarded Slaughter attorney fees under
Utah Code section 81-1-203(2).

Special Administrator’s Motion to Reconsider and Subsequent Rulings
from the District Court

¶17 On the same day that the court issued its ruling on the
summary judgment motion, Special Administrator filed a
“Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside Summary Judgment.”
Special Administrator asserted that the ruling was “inconsistent
with Utah law,” pointing to Utah Code section 75-2-804(2), which
states that

a court order, or a contract relating to the division of
the marital estate made between the divorced
individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or
annulment . . . severs the interests of the former
spouses in property held by them at the time of the
divorce or annulment as joint tenants with the right
of survivorship, transforming the interests of the
former spouses into tenancies in common.

Special Administrator argued that upon entry of the Decree, the
joint tenancy had converted to a tenancy in common, and Special
Administrator then argued that under the terms of the Decree,

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Slaughter’s interest as a tenant in common had been awarded to
Alleman. Special Administrator also asserted that Slaughter’s
motion for summary judgment was “procedurally improper.”
This was so, in Special Administrator’s view, because Slaughter
was “seeking affirmative relief that [was] not supported by any
pleading or claim.”

¶18 On December 17, 2024, the court held a hearing on the
motion to reconsider. At the close of the hearing, the court issued
an oral ruling denying the motion and asking Slaughter’s counsel
to prepare the final order. The court also denied Special
Administrator’s motion to substitute as moot. On January 9, 2025,
the court entered an attorney fees award “against [Special
Administrator] as the executor of the [Alleman] estate” in the
amount of $20,700.

The Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Further Ruling from the District
Court, and the Direct Appeal

¶19 On January 10, 2025, Special Administrator filed a petition
for extraordinary relief with this court, arguing that the district
court had

exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion
by (1) its erroneous refusal to grant Special
Administrator’s motion to be substituted as a party
to the divorce action; (2) its improper summary
judgment ruling modifying the [Decree] without a
petition to modify and awarding [Slaughter] real
property belonging to [Alleman’s] estate; and (3) its
award of attorney[] fees against [Special
Administrator] despite having denied [his] request
to appear as a party, and thus having no jurisdiction
over [him].

¶20 On January 13, 2025, the district court issued a written
order denying the motion to reconsider. In that order, the court

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reiterated its views that Special Administrator had not filed “a
timely or proper objection” to Slaughter’s motion for summary
judgment and that this failure “required that the [c]ourt accept as
true all of the undisputed factual allegations” in Slaughter’s
motion. The court then ruled that even if Special Administrator’s
motion to strike was “accepted late as a responsive pleading,”
Special Administrator had “failed to offer facts sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact to avoid the [c]ourt’s award of
Summary Judgment.” Finally, the court denied Special
Administrator’s motion to substitute “on the grounds that it is
now moot.”

¶21 Special Administrator subsequently filed an appeal from
the court’s order granting summary judgment and its order
denying the motion to reconsider. On March 7, 2025, this court
consolidated Special Administrator’s petition for extraordinary
relief with his appeal.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶22 Through both the petition for extraordinary relief and the
direct appeal, Special Administrator challenges a number of the
district court’s rulings. For reasons explained more fully below,
we conclude that the challenge to the summary judgment ruling
is dispositive. “We review a district court’s grant of summary
judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the district
court’s legal conclusions.” Musselman v. Keele, 2024 UT App 143,
¶ 12, 559 P.3d 64 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. The Nature of Our Review

¶23 As noted, Special Administrator filed both a petition for
extraordinary relief and a direct appeal. In the appellate briefing

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and oral argument, Special Administrator and Slaughter have
disputed the extent to which either path is available in this case.
Before addressing the merits of the various rulings, we first
explain the nature of our review.

¶24 Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that “[w]hen no other plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy is available, a person may petition an
appellate court for extraordinary relief referred to in Rule 65B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.” Utah R. App. P. 19(a); see also
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Our supreme court has previously noted
that in some cases, the “reason for seeking appellate review” by
way of a petition for extraordinary relief is “because the
petitioner was not a party below and cannot appeal.” Society of
Pro. Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah
1987); see also Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. v. Utah Down
Syndrome Ass’n, 2012 UT 86, ¶ 9, 293 P.3d 241 (“[P]ersons or
entities that are not parties to a proceeding are not entitled to an
appeal as of right.”). In such cases, the nonparty’s pursuit of
extraordinary relief “is procedurally correct” because the
nonparty “has no alternative course to follow.” Society of Pro.
Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1168 n.1; see also Utah Down Syndrome
Found., 2012 UT 86, ¶ 10 (noting that because “nonparties are not
entitled to an appeal as of right,” a “nonparty who seeks relief
from a lower court’s order that purports to affect the nonparty’s
interests must proceed by way of” a petition for extraordinary
relief).

¶25 Turning to the dispute in this case, we note that it’s settled
in Utah that “a court order dealing with marital property survives
the death of a spouse.” Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 18, 416
P.3d 487. Thus, if a divorce decree was entered and it settled the
parties’ “property rights,” that decree “remains effective” even if
one of the spouses dies “after the entry of” the decree, and this is
so even if an appeal from that decree was pending at the time of
the spouse’s death. Id. ¶ 20 (quotation simplified); see also Mower

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Slaughter v. Alleman

v. Mower, 2023 UT App 10, ¶¶ 12–14, 525 P.3d 110 (holding that
under Porenta, an order “determining the property rights of the
parties” does “not abate on the spouse’s death”). Applied here,
this means that the provisions from the Decree that settled the
property distribution of the marital estate remained effective even
after Alleman’s death.

¶26 As also noted, however, a dispute has now arisen
between Special Administrator (who is acting on behalf of
Alleman’s estate) and Slaughter about those provisions. In the
summary judgment ruling, the district court sided with
Slaughter, ruling that Alleman’s estate has no rights to the marital
residence. But because the court also denied Special
Administrator’s motion to substitute, this deprived Special
Administrator of party status, which means that Special
Administrator has no right to appeal the summary judgment
ruling. We accordingly exercise our discretion to grant Special
Administrator’s petition for extraordinary relief, see Anderson v.
Bates, 2025 UT 51, ¶ 34, 582 P.3d 728, and we review Special
Administrator’s challenge to the summary judgment ruling on
that basis.

¶27 We do note that a nonparty can appeal an order denying a
motion to substitute. See Marriott v. Wilhelmsen, 2025 UT 35, ¶ 1
n.1, 575 P.3d 1106 (noting that the personal representative of the
deceased plaintiff was the “proper appellant before this court”
when the issue being appealed was “the denial of a motion to
substitute” the “personal representative as plaintiff in [the]
litigation”); cf. Tillotson v. Meerkerk, 2015 UT App 142, ¶ 11, 353
P.3d 165 (“An order denying a motion to intervene is a final
disposition of the claims asserted by the applicant for intervention
and is appealable.”). Given this, we conclude that we can review
Special Administrator’s challenge to the denial of the motion to
substitute as part of the direct appeal.

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Slaughter v. Alleman

II. Summary Judgment

¶28 Special Administrator challenges the district court’s
decision to grant Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment. We
agree that this ruling was erroneous. This is so for two reasons. 4

¶29 First, much of the district court’s ruling was driven by its
conclusion that Slaughter’s motion was “unopposed.” In the
court’s view, because Special Administrator “failed to timely
defend, respond, request argument or seek any hearing to contest
the factual and legal claims made by [Slaughter] in the Motion,”
the “factual and legal claims set forth in the Motion” were
undisputed and summary judgment was therefore “appropriate.”

4. As an initial matter, we note that Special Administrator has
argued that this was not a procedurally proper motion for
Slaughter to have filed at all. Again, the Decree awarded the
marital residence to Alleman, after which, following Special
Administrator’s motion to enforce the Decree, Slaughter filed a
“Counter-Motion for relief” and a request for summary judgment.
There, she asked the court to “dismiss[] all claims made by
[Special Administrator]” and “issue an Order declaring” the
marital residence to be her “sole and exclusive property” and thus
“outside the scope of the estate of [Alleman] and the powers of
[Special Administrator].” Although a touch unclear, it seems that
Slaughter was asking for summary judgment on both her
opposition to Special Administrator’s motion to enforce and her
own request for an order declaring that she was entitled to the
marital residence as a matter of law. While we note the procedural
oddity of filing a motion for summary judgment in the context of
an enforcement proceeding, we need not definitively determine
whether this request was procedurally permissible. Instead,
because the summary judgment ruling was predicated on an
incorrect legal interpretation of the Decree, we vacate it for that
reason alone.

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¶30 Under the controlling rule, however, a district court should
grant a motion for summary judgment only “if the moving party
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(a). As we have recently explained, “even where a
summary judgment motion stands unopposed, a district court is
still obligated to examine the filed motion, and the court must still
determine whether the moving party’s pleadings, discovery, and
affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law.” Duffin v. Duffin, 2024 UT App 154, ¶ 39, 560 P.3d 807
(quotation simplified); see also Musselman v. Keele, 2024 UT App
143, ¶ 15, 559 P.3d 64 (“Summary judgment may not be entered
against the nonmoving party merely by virtue of a failure to
oppose . . . .” (quotation simplified)). Thus, to the extent that the
court’s ruling was based on Special Administrator’s non-
opposition, it was erroneous. 5

5. We note that as a practical matter, the district court was
incorrect when it asserted that Slaughter’s summary judgment
motion was “unopposed.” As indicated, Special Administrator
filed a motion to strike that motion, arguing that it was
“procedurally improper” and “substantively without merit.” And
as discussed more fully below, we also point out that as a
procedural matter, it’s not clear that Special Administrator could
have filed a formal opposition. While the parties and the district
court had acted as if Special Administrator was properly involved
in the case, the court had not ruled on the motion to substitute at
the time that the summary judgment motion was filed—and,
indeed, the court later denied that motion to substitute. But our
supreme court has ruled that “acquiescence of [a party] is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.” Utah Down
Syndrome Found., Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Ass’n, 2012 UT 86,
¶ 24, 293 P.3d 241 (quotation simplified); cf. Trapnell & Assocs.,
LLC v. Legacy Resorts, LLC, 2020 UT 44, ¶ 5, 469 P.3d 989 (“Our
(continued…)

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¶31 Second, even on its own terms, we disagree with the
district court’s conclusion that Slaughter was entitled to relief. A
divorce decree that “resolve[s] the controversy between the
parties and conclude[s] the divorce litigation” becomes a final,
enforceable judgment when it is entered. Copier v. Copier, 939 P.2d
202, 203 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Because of this, “proceedings to
modify a divorce decree must be commenced by filing a petition
to modify.” Elder v. Elder, 2024 UT App 68, ¶ 15, 550 P.3d 488
(quotation simplified); see also Potts v. Potts, 2018 UT App 169,
¶ 21, 436 P.3d 263 (“Where there is no petition for modification of
the decree itself, the court does not bear the responsibility of re-
weighing the equities for the parties after they have assented to
the decree; the court’s responsibility is to enforce the provisions
of the decree as they exist.”).

¶32 Here, however, Slaughter claims that she was not required
to file a petition to modify the Decree. According to Slaughter,
even without a petition to modify, she was legally entitled to the
marital residence because of how that residence was owned and
because of how the Decree was structured.

¶33 Slaughter’s arguments largely hinge on the fact that the
marital residence had been held in joint tenancy. In Slaughter’s
view, the Decree did not unconditionally award the marital

rules of civil procedure do not permit [a nonparty] to make itself
a party to an ongoing action simply by declaring it so.”).
As a result, when the district court faulted Special
Administrator for failing to respond to Slaughter’s summary
judgment motion or even seek a hearing on it, the court was doing
so even though Special Administrator did not have party status at
that time. To avoid procedural and jurisdictional oddities such as
this one, we encourage courts in future cases to resolve any
motions relating to party status before ruling on motions
regarding the underlying substantive issues that may affect the
interests of those potential parties.

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residence to Alleman; instead, Slaughter claims that the provision
awarding the marital residence to Alleman was conditional upon
Alleman paying Slaughter $200,000 before May 31, 2024. Because
this had not occurred by the time of Alleman’s death, Slaughter
claims that she retained ownership of the marital residence as a
surviving joint tenant and the residence did not belong to
Alleman’s estate. We disagree.

¶34 Utah Code section 75-2-804(2)(b) states that

[e]xcept as provided by the express terms of a
governing instrument, a court order, or a contract
relating to the division of the marital estate made
between the divorced individuals . . . , the divorce
or annulment of a marriage . . . severs the interests
of the former spouses in property held by them at
the time of divorce . . . as joint tenants with the right
of survivorship, transforming the interests of the
former spouses into tenancies in common.

(Emphasis added.) Here, we see no “express term” from the
Decree that states that the joint tenancy in the marital residence
was not being severed. Slaughter’s argument fails for this reason
alone.

¶35 Regardless, we read the Decree differently than Slaughter
and the district court. As noted, the introductory language to
paragraph 4 of the Decree stated that the parties’ property “shall
be divided as follows,” after which paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b)
separately set forth what property was awarded to Slaughter and
what property was awarded to Alleman. In paragraph 4(b)—
which was the paragraph that identified the property that was
awarded to Alleman—the Decree stated that Alleman was
awarded “[t]he marital residence.” Then, paragraph 4(c) stated
that “[i]n order to equalize division of the marital estate,
[Alleman] shall pay [Slaughter] $200,000 on or before May 31,
2024.” And finally, paragraph 4(f) stated that “upon receipt of the

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$200,000 payment described above,” Slaughter was required to
“immediately quitclaim the [marital residence] to [Alleman],
although she [would] retain the right to remain in the residence
until May 31, 2024.”

¶36 We think it’s significant that paragraph 4(c) did not link
Alleman’s obligation to pay Slaughter $200,000 to the parties’
ownership interests in the marital residence itself. Rather, it more
broadly stated that the $200,000 payment was intended to
“equalize division of the marital estate.” (Emphasis added.) And
the Decree then made no effort to determine how much of the
$200,000 was linked to the marital residence as opposed to any
other item of property that had been awarded to Alleman. As a
result, if it were true that the provision awarding the marital
residence to Alleman was somehow conditional on his payment
of the $200,000, it would also seem true that any non-payment
from Alleman would seemingly affect his interest in the other
items too.

¶37 But the “purpose of divorce is to end marriage and allow
the parties to make as much of a clean break from each other as is
reasonably possible.” Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079
(Utah 1988). For this reason, in a domestic case, a district court has
a “responsibility to equitably distribute marital property with a
view toward allowing each party to go forward with his or her
separate life.” Merrill v. Merrill, 2024 UT App 125, ¶ 73, 556 P.3d
1070 (quotation simplified). In light of these foundational
principles, as well as the plain language of the Decree itself, we
think the best reading of paragraph 4 is straightforward: as it
stated at the outset, it was a “property division” provision, and it
awarded some items of marital property (including the marital
residence) to Alleman and others (including $200,000) to
Slaughter. We don’t regard this provision as having put forward
a scheme whereby the division of the marital assets was in any
way conditional, such that the carefully prescribed division of
assets would somehow be undone if one party did not comply

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Slaughter v. Alleman

with his or her own obligations. While paragraph 4(f) did state
that, “upon receipt of the $200,000 payment,” Slaughter was
required to “immediately quitclaim the [marital residence] to
[Alleman],” we view this as a sequence-of-performance provision,
as opposed to being a provision that could conditionally nullify
the otherwise carefully-delineated division of the various marital
assets.

¶38 Because of this, we conclude that by operation of law, the
joint tenancy was severed at the time the court issued the Decree.
From that point forward, the parties’ interests had been
transformed into tenancies in common, Slaughter’s interest in the
marital residence as a tenant in common had been awarded to
Alleman, and Slaughter was obligated to perform by signing a
quitclaim deed once Alleman performed by paying her the
$200,000. As discussed above, this remained so even though
Alleman passed away after the Decree was entered. See Porenta,
2017 UT 78, ¶¶ 18, 20. And if Alleman (or, as it turns out, his
estate) did not pay the $200,000 that he was required to pay,
Slaughter’s remedy would be to bring an enforcement action of
her own to obtain payment of the money she was owed. But
nothing in the Decree said that Slaughter would continue to have
a remaining ownership interest in the marital residence, much less
that she would have a joint tenancy if Alleman did not perform
his obligations. Simply put, after issuance of the Decree, the only
remaining question was when—not whether—Slaughter would
officially transfer her interest as a tenant in common.

¶39 In short, because the district court’s summary judgment
ruling was premised on its incorrect legal conclusion that a joint
tenancy remained, we reverse it. 6

6. As discussed, the parties also disputed whether the Special
Administrator’s tender was legally effective. But as we
(continued…)

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Slaughter v. Alleman

III. Remaining Rulings

¶40 Special Administrator also challenges the district court’s
rulings that (A) awarded attorney fees to Slaughter and (B) denied
Special Administrator’s motion to substitute.

A. Attorney Fees

¶41 As noted, in conjunction with its ruling granting
Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment, the district court
awarded Slaughter attorney fees against Special Administrator
under Utah Code section 81-1-203(2), which provided that in an
“action to enforce . . . [a] division of property in a domestic case,
the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining
that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.”

understand it, the district court’s ruling was premised on its
conclusion that ownership in the marital residence was held in
joint tenancy at the time of Alleman’s death, so the court did not
definitively resolve that question. We do note that the court
observed in passing that, “to date, [Slaughter] has received . . . no
payments from [Special Administrator] as the executor of
[Alleman’s] estate.” (Emphasis added.) If this issue arises again
during further proceedings on remand, we again note the
property division set forth in the Decree (including the award of
the marital residence to Alleman) survived Alleman’s death. See
Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶¶ 18, 20, 416 P.3d 487. And we
further note that it’s settled in Utah that “one party to a contract
cannot by willful act or omission make it impossible or difficult
for the other to perform and then invoke the other’s non-
performance as a defense.” Tooele Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Tooele City,
2012 UT App 214, ¶ 31, 284 P.3d 709 (quotation simplified). Thus,
insofar as it seems undisputed that Special Administrator had
been properly appointed to represent Alleman’s estate, Slaughter
would not be able to avoid complying with her obligations by
refusing to accept an otherwise valid tender of the $200,000.

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Slaughter v. Alleman

Because we have now reversed the summary judgment decision
that this award was based on, we reverse the attorney fees award
as well. 7

7. The parties have disputed whether our review of the attorney
fees award would be proper under the petition for extraordinary
relief, the direct appeal, both, or neither. We need not definitively
resolve that question. As discussed, we have reversed the
summary judgment ruling through the petition for extraordinary
relief, and the attorney fees ruling was expressly based on the
summary judgment ruling. If it were true that Special
Administrator is not entitled to directly appeal the attorney fees
award, he would then be entitled to seek extraordinary relief
because no other plain or adequate remedy would be available.
Also, as a separate matter, we note that we’re somewhat
puzzled by the district court’s decision to award these fees, at least
on the rationale given and the procedural posture of this case. As
indicated, the district court chose to rule on the summary
judgment motion before it ruled on the motion to substitute. And
when it finally did, it denied the motion to substitute. Thus, in the
attorney fees ruling, the district court awarded prevailing party
attorney fees against an entity that, in the court’s view, was not
and never had been a party. Neither the district court nor
Slaughter have pointed to any authority allowing a court to award
prevailing party attorney fees against a non-party. Cf. Nielsen v.
Cronquist, 2026 UT App 65, ¶ 52, – P.3d – (noting that a court
cannot “award[] relief to a non-party over whom it ha[s] no
jurisdiction”); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 12 P.2d 364, 365 (Utah 1932)
(holding that a judgment “in favor of a person who is not a party
to the action or proceeding is void because the court has no
jurisdiction to make it”).
In expressing this concern, we again recognize the
procedural oddity of how the district court treated Special
Administrator in the various proceedings. The court considered
(continued…)

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Slaughter v. Alleman

B. Motion to Substitute

¶42 As noted, after the court granted Slaughter’s motion for
summary judgment, it ruled that the motion to substitute was
“now moot.” This seems to have been based on the court’s
conclusion that the marital residence belonged to Slaughter and
was thus “beyond the estate of . . . Alleman.” Because we have
now reversed the summary judgment ruling, we also reverse the
denial of the motion to substitute, insofar as that denial was
predicated on the summary judgment ruling.

¶43 We note that in the briefing and arguments on appeal, the
parties have gone further and disputed whether substitution
would be proper under rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure under the facts and circumstances of this case. But we
have no ruling from the district court on this substantive question,
and we have no need to resolve that dispute here. Instead, having
reversed the underlying summary judgment ruling, we remand
this case with directions for the district court to determine in the
first instance whether substitution is warranted under rule 25 and
the facts of this case.

and ruled on various motions filed by Special Administrator in
this case, faulted Special Administrator for not filing an
opposition to Slaughter’s summary judgment motion or seeking
a hearing on it, and awarded prevailing party attorney fees
against Special Administrator. And yet the court did all this
before ruling on Special Administrator’s motion to substitute, and
when it finally considered that motion, the court denied it. On
remand, the district court should first determine whether Special
Administrator is a proper party to this case, and it should only
allow Special Administrator to participate if it grants the motion
to substitute.

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Slaughter v. Alleman

CONCLUSION

¶44 For the reasons set forth above, we grant the petition for
extraordinary relief and reverse the district court’s decisions
granting Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment, awarding
attorney fees to Slaughter, and denying Special Administrator’s
motion to substitute as being moot. We remand this case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 8

8. Special Administrator has requested an award of attorney fees
and costs pursuant to Utah Code section 81-1-203(2). As noted
above, that statute provides that “[i]n an action to enforce an order
of . . . division of property in a domestic case, the court may award
costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.” Utah Code
§ 81-1-203(2) (emphasis added). But the district court did not
award fees to Special Administrator below—and, indeed, the
district court did not even recognize Special Administrator as a
party. Special Administrator has not pointed to any authority
allowing us to award fees under this provision in the first
instance, let alone authority permitting us to award fees to an
entity that was not afforded party status below (even if that entity
has prevailed in an initial appeal). In these fairly unique
circumstances, we decline to award fees at this time, but we leave
open Special Administrator’s ability to later request attorney
fees—including fees incurred in pursuing this appeal—during
future proceedings in this case.

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