State v. Meguerditchian

2026 UT App 73

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
LEVON GARO MEGUERDITCHIAN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240108-CA
Filed May 7, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills
No. 211909498

Nathalie S. Skibine, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jonathan S. Bauer,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Late at night in a residential neighborhood, Levon Garo
Meguerditchian fired several shots at a vehicle that had just left a
party at his home. He was responding to a supposed theft of a
bottle of vodka, but it turned out the alleged thieves were in a
different vehicle. Knowing police might soon be summoned,
Meguerditchian and others quickly collected the shell casings,
and Meguerditchian and his wife ordered other partygoers—who
were minors—back into the house and ultimately into a hiding
place to keep them from being discovered by police.

¶2 Meguerditchian would later learn that he killed the driver.
He was charged with murder, felony discharge of a firearm,
obstruction of justice, and multiple counts of aggravated
State v. Meguerditchian

kidnapping. Now on appeal, Meguerditchian claims the district
court erred in not granting a motion for a directed verdict on
several of the aggravated kidnapping counts. He further claims
he received ineffective assistance, asserting his counsel should
have moved to exclude certain evidence and should not have
stipulated to the introduction of body camera footage. Finally,
Meguerditchian claims the district court erred in refusing to give
instructions on mistake of fact and voluntary intoxication. We
reject all these claims and affirm the convictions.

BACKGROUND 1

The Murder and Kidnappings

¶3 Meguerditchian hosted a party at his house in August 2021.
Among those present were Carl and his minor girlfriend, Lydia. 2
Other minors at the party included Jane, Dennis, Ursula, and
Steve.

¶4 The party proceeded without incident, with the attendees
drinking and dancing until around 3:30 a.m., when some girls at
the party allegedly stole a bottle of vodka and were seen leaving
the house. Meguerditchian’s niece (Niece) pursued the girls
outside as they ran to their vehicle. At about the same time, Carl
left the house and went to his car. The girls then drove off, with
Carl leaving in his car shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, Niece
informed Meguerditchian about the vodka theft. Meguerditchian
ran to the backyard, apparently to retrieve something, and then
went out the front door and pulled out a gun. As Carl was driving

1. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly.” State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346 (cleaned up).

2. For ease of reading, we use pseudonyms rather than initials for
the murder victim and the minors involved in this case.

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State v. Meguerditchian

away, Meguerditchian fired two or three shots at his car. The
sound of a car crashing about two seconds later can be clearly
heard on the video from a nearby doorbell camera. Two
neighborhood eyewitnesses identified the likely shooter as a man
wearing a black shirt with writing on it that was white or neon
orange or neon green. Meguerditchian and his wife (Wife) then
told the partygoers who had gone outside to “get the fuck inside.”
While Meguerditchian apparently did not realize it at the time,
one of the bullets he fired struck Carl in the head and killed him.
Carl’s car had traveled about half a block before it crashed into a
house around the corner.

¶5 After going into the house, Meguerditchian and Wife had
Lydia go outside with them to look for casings from the rounds
that were fired. When they went back inside the house, Wife told
everyone to stop using their phones. Nevertheless, Lydia began
calling Carl’s number and “begged” for permission to leave to go
look for him. Although Meguerditchian and Wife initially
“weren’t letting anyone leave,” Meguerditchian eventually
allowed Lydia to leave to look for Carl. She went to Carl’s house
to see if his car was there, but she did not see it.

¶6 A neighbor who had heard the gunshots and had seen
people leaving the party called the police. When officers arrived
shortly after 4:00 a.m., Meguerditchian and Wife directed several
partygoers, including Ursula, Dennis, Jane, and Steve, into a
closet or laundry room, where they were held for twenty to forty
minutes. Meanwhile, Meguerditchian went out and spoke with
the officers, who told him they were responding to reports of
someone with a gun shooting at a car. As relevant here,
Meguerditchian was wearing a black t-shirt with neon green
lettering that read, “Do I look like I give a fuck?” Meguerditchian
lied to the police, telling one of the officers that he heard a “couple
of bangs” that sounded “more like fireworks than gunshots.”
Meguerditchian mentioned nothing about his involvement in the
shooting and did not claim that he acted in self-defense.

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State v. Meguerditchian

¶7 After the police left, Meguerditchian went inside and—
along with Wife—began to interrogate the partygoers about who
had invited the girls allegedly responsible for taking the alcohol.
Jane admitted that she had invited one of the girls, which led her
to be “targeted” by Meguerditchian, Wife, and Niece. While
hovering over Jane, Wife made Jane go through all her phone
contacts in an effort to determine if she had texted anyone about
the alcohol theft. Wife then took Jane’s phone and started choking
her. On Meguerditchian’s orders, Wife forced Jane into an
upstairs bedroom. Once in the bedroom, Wife began hitting Jane,
slapping her, punching her in the face, and kneeling on her
stomach, all while continuing the questioning. At some point, a
“very angry” Meguerditchian entered the bedroom and “grabbed
something off the dresser and hit [Jane] very hard on [her] head.”
He struck her a second time with his fist. During this time,
Meguerditchian also threatened to put his gun, which he had
brandished, in her mouth.

¶8 Lydia returned to the house after looking for Carl. By this
point, the partygoers—with the exception of Jane—were outside
the house. The group knocked on the door to see if Jane was
inside, but Meguerditchian came out and told them that she had
left with some boys, an assertion that he knew was untrue since
he had just taken part in her interrogation in the house. While
Lydia was charging her phone on the front porch, Meguerditchian
left the house, apparently to get some cocaine. Lydia and Dennis
took the opportunity to go into the house to find Jane, and they
concluded that she was with Wife. Meguerditchian returned at
this point, and Dennis confronted him: “We know she’s in the
house. Bring her out.” Meguerditchian responded by hitting
Dennis. Lydia and Dennis then called the police. Meanwhile, Wife
escorted Jane out of the house and to a neighbor’s garage.

¶9 At around 7:00 a.m., police again arrived at the house. It
was around this same time that Lydia found Carl’s crashed car
and his lifeless body around the corner from the house. When

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State v. Meguerditchian

officers arrived at the crashed car, they had to pull Lydia out of
the open driver side as she clung to Carl’s body. A few minutes
later, Meguerditchian lied to police officers by telling them that
Jane had left the house hours before. In fact, Meguerditchian
knew Jane was with Wife in the neighbor’s garage because he had
been texting Wife about the situation. Again, Meguerditchian
made no mention of his involvement in the shooting and did not
assert that he had acted in self-defense. A few hours later, police
officers discovered Jane and Wife in the neighbor’s garage.

¶10 Meguerditchian was arrested and interviewed at the police
station. In that interview, he said that he was told at one point
during the party that a bottle of vodka had been stolen, but he
insisted that he remained on the porch of his house even after
others ran out toward the street. He told the detective that the
entire incident wasn’t really about the bottle of stolen vodka but
about having people in his house who would steal from him. He
denied knowing anything about the shooting and asserted that he
did not fire a gun during the events. He repeated his initial
statement that he heard some “bangs” that sounded like
“fireworks.”

¶11 As relevant to this appeal, Meguerditchian was charged
with murder, felony discharge of a firearm, obstruction of justice,
and five counts of aggravated kidnapping for his actions related
to Jane, Lydia, Ursula, Steve, and Dennis.

The Trial

¶12 In its opening statement, the State summarized
Meguerditchian’s actions as described above, focusing in
particular on the shooting that caused Carl’s death and the
corralling and detention of the partygoers in the house—all in
response to a bottle of stolen vodka. The prosecutor then posed
this rhetorical statement:

20240108-CA 5 2026 UT App 73
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[Y]ou may still be wondering, why does it make
sense that he would do this over a bottle of alcohol?
But in his own words with police afterwards, “I
don’t think it’s about the bottle of vodka. It’s about
having people in our home that’s going to steal from
us.” Or maybe he really doesn’t care about that
vodka. Maybe he really doesn’t care about [Carl].
Maybe he doesn’t care about [Lydia] or the others.
Maybe it’s just like the neon green words on the
back of his black shirt suggests, “Do I look like I give
a fuck?”

Meguerditchian’s counsel (Counsel) did not object to this
statement. Instead, he argued that Meguerditchian had heard a
gunshot and, believing Niece was in danger, “pulled out his
pistol and . . . fired in defense of himself, in defense of his niece,
and defense of his home.” Counsel also argued that it was Wife—
not Meguerditchian—who threatened the partygoers, insisting
that he “wasn’t even there” to see the things going on inside the
house: “He’s no accomplice to kidnapping or anything of
that sort, because he wasn’t there and he didn’t even know about
it.”

¶13 The State then presented its case by first offering the
testimony of responding police officers and one officer’s body
camera video of finding Carl’s car. Counsel indicated he had
reviewed the exhibit of the body camera video and stipulated to
its admission, and he stipulated to the admission of photographs
of the car’s bloody interior and Carl’s body on the sidewalk after
he had been removed from the car. 3

3. Prior to the arrival of the jury, Counsel informed the court that
he was “getting rid of a lot of [the State’s] witnesses” with “a
bunch of stipulations.” Accordingly, the stipulation to the
(continued…)

20240108-CA 6 2026 UT App 73
State v. Meguerditchian

¶14 Before the video was shown, the officer (whose body
camera had recorded the video of the crash scene) described how
he had discovered Lydia leaning into the crashed car over Carl’s
body. He said that Lydia was crying and saying, “He’s gone.” He
further testified how he and another officer removed Carl from
the car and performed CPR to try to revive him. The video
showed the officer’s view as he walked toward the wrecked
vehicle and then forcibly pulled Lydia—who was visibly
distressed and clutching Carl’s body—from the car. Afterward,
the officer is shown assisting other officers in removing Carl’s
body from the vehicle to administer CPR.

¶15 The other partygoers then testified consistently with the
events as detailed above. The State also presented video taken by
a nearby house’s doorbell camera showing the girls who allegedly
stole the alcohol driving away from Meguerditchian’s house in
their car, followed shortly thereafter by Carl leaving in his car.
This doorbell video also depicted Meguerditchian firing at
Carl’s car as he left. Two shots can be heard on the recording,
followed about two seconds later by the sound of a loud crash off
screen.

¶16 After the State rested, Meguerditchian moved for a
directed verdict on the aggravated kidnapping charges, arguing
that there was insufficient evidence that he was responsible for
detaining the partygoers, either directly or as an accomplice. The
court denied the motion.

admission of the evidence, including the body camera video,
appears to have constituted an intentional strategic attempt to
limit the number of witnesses the State would call to testify.
Indeed, the officer whose body camera video of the crash scene
was played testified only briefly (roughly seven pages of
transcript) about the crash scene before the video was played for
the jury.

20240108-CA 7 2026 UT App 73
State v. Meguerditchian

¶17 Meguerditchian then testified in his own defense. He
stated that when he heard Niece say that she had been robbed, he
got his gun and ran outside, where he thought he saw Niece
“literally . . . getting drug under a car.” He admitted that he fired
shots at Carl’s car, but he asserted that he had first heard what
“sounded like a gunshot.” He stated that he was “irate,” was
under the influence of alcohol, and fired in the direction of Carl’s
car “just to neutralize the situation.” However, he denied that he
was “shooting at someone specifically.” He admitted that he told
everyone to get inside the house after the shooting, but he claimed
to do so only because he thought it was dangerous for them to be
outside. He said that he lied to the police about the gunshots being
fireworks because he “didn’t want to make it a bigger deal” than
it was and he wanted to “avoid problems.” He denied that he
ordered anyone into a closet, threatened anyone, or held the
partygoers against their will. He also denied any involvement in
assaulting Jane. He admitted that he gave the gun he had fired to
a friend shortly after the shooting. The defense rested after
Meguerditchian testified.

¶18 The court then instructed the jury on the elements of each
charge, on self-defense, on defense of others, and on extreme
emotional distress. The jury also received instructions on the
State’s burden to prove each element and on the required mental
state. Meguerditchian had requested two additional instructions
related to mental state. First, he asked for a voluntary intoxication
instruction, which stated in relevant part, “Intoxication, due to the
consumption of alcohol or drugs is a defense if there is reasonable
doubt that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly
because he was intoxicated.” Second, he asked for a mistake-of-
fact instruction: “An act committed or an omission made under
an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable
mental state is a defense for that crime.” As to the voluntary-
intoxication instruction, the court noted that there had to be
evidence suggesting more than just that Meguerditchian was
impaired by his alcohol use. See State v. Bell, 2016 UT App 157,

20240108-CA 8 2026 UT App 73
State v. Meguerditchian

¶ 30, 380 P.3d 11 (“It is not enough to merely present evidence
showing that the defendant was intoxicated. Rather, to establish a
viable voluntary intoxication defense, the defendant must point
to evidence showing that he was so intoxicated that he was
incapable of forming the requisite mental state for the crimes
committed.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, the court declined to
give the instruction because Meguerditchian had not “presented
sufficient evidence to support a voluntary intoxication defense.”
Concerning the mistake-of-fact instruction, the court declined to
provide it because “the other instructions” gave “sufficient . . .
direction” to address the required mental state.

¶19 In its closing argument, the State twice referenced the
message on Meguerditchian’s t-shirt, which Meguerditchian
was shown wearing in photographs and in body camera
video that had been admitted into evidence. First, the prosecutor
stated,

Now, this question [namely, “Do I look like I give a
fuck?”] is rhetorical. Obviously it answers itself. I
submit to you that’s his answer with regards to
whether he’s willing to tell the truth to the police or
to you. I submit that that is his answer about who is
going to die when he pops off two shots in his
neighborhood, homes everywhere, car driving
away, a car that he likely thought just had a half
bottle of [vodka] in it. I submit to you that that’s his
answer to the pain that [Jane] suffered when he hit
her at least twice and when he told her to open her
mouth so he could put his gun in it. I submit to you
that that’s his answer to detain minors so that they
can’t talk to the police and implicate him firing two
rounds in his neighborhood and in concealing
evidence of his crimes.

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State v. Meguerditchian

And in his rebuttal, the prosector again referenced the question
on Meguerditchian’s shirt: “So give him the answer to what’s on
the back of his shirt and find him guilty.”

¶20 As relevant here, the jury convicted Meguerditchian of
felony discharge of a firearm, obstruction of justice, and murder,
specifically rejecting his claims of imperfect self-defense, defense
of others, defense of habitation, and extreme emotional distress. It
also convicted him of aggravated kidnapping of Jane, concluding
that he had the intent to hinder the reporting of a felony and to
inflict bodily injury on her. And he was convicted on four counts
of aggravated kidnapping for unlawfully detaining Lydia,
Dennis, Ursula, and Steve with the intent to hinder the reporting
of a felony. Meguerditchian appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶21 Meguerditchian first claims that the district court erred
when it denied his motion for a directed verdict on the four
aggravated kidnapping charges related to Lydia, Dennis, Ursula,
and Steve. We review the denial of a motion for a directed verdict
for correctness. State v. Garcia, 2025 UT App 119, ¶ 23, 576 P.3d
1111, cert. denied, 581 P.3d 555 (Utah 2025). But “when a defendant
challenges the denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on
the sufficiency of the evidence, the applicable standard of review
is highly deferential, and we will uphold the district court’s denial
if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, some
evidence exists from which the elements of the crime could be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Graydon, 2023 UT
App 4, ¶ 26, 524 P.3d 1034 (cleaned up).

¶22 Meguerditchian next asserts that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel in several ways: (1) Counsel failing to (a)
move to exclude evidence of the writing on Meguerditchian’s t-
shirt or (b) object to the prosecutor’s comments about the message
that writing conveyed and (2) Counsel stipulating to the

20240108-CA 10 2026 UT App 73
State v. Meguerditchian

admission of body camera video of Lydia clinging to Carl and
officers finding Carl in his crashed car and attempting to
resuscitate him. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower
court ruling to review and we must decide whether the defendant
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of
law.” State v. Johnson, 2025 UT App 63, ¶ 23, 569 P.3d 1082 (cleaned
up).

¶23 Meguerditchian’s third claim is that the court erred in
declining to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication or mistake
of fact. “The refusal to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse
of discretion, although in some circumstances that discretion will
be narrowly constrained. That is, in certain circumstances a
district court’s discretion will be constrained such that a party is
legally entitled to have a particular instruction given to the jury.
In those circumstances, refusal constitutes an error of law, and an
error of law always constitutes an abuse of discretion.” State v.
Farmer, 2025 UT App 57, ¶ 40, 569 P.3d 267 (cleaned up), cert.
denied, 574 P.3d 522 (Utah 2025); see also State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54,
¶¶ 45–46, 582 P.3d 772 (stating that whether the point of a
proposed instruction “is properly covered in other instructions”
falls “within the district court’s discretion” and is “subject to an
abuse of discretion standard” but that “other jury instruction
issues will present a question of law, subject to a correctness
standard,” such as whether “the defendant was legally entitled”
to an instruction on “an affirmative defense for which there was
an evidentiary basis” (cleaned up)).

¶24 Finally, Meguerditchian asserts that the cumulative effect
of the alleged errors was prejudicial. “Under the cumulative error
doctrine, we apply the standard of review applicable to each
underlying claim of error. And we will reverse only if the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence
that a fair trial was had.” State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶ 16,
302 P.3d 844 (cleaned up), aff’d, 2016 UT 3, 365 P.3d 699.

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State v. Meguerditchian

ANALYSIS

I. Denial of Directed Verdict

¶25 Meguerditchian first asserts that the district court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict on the four kidnapping
charges related to Lydia, Dennis, Ursula, and Steve, arguing that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain those convictions. More
specifically, Meguerditchian claims that there was no evidence
that he intended that the four minors be detained or that he was a
party to the offense. We conclude that this issue is inadequately
briefed. But the reason for that inadequacy is somewhat nuanced
and thus requires explanation.

¶26 Meguerditchian was convicted of aggravated kidnapping
with respect to the four minors. “An actor commits aggravated
kidnapping if the actor, in the course of committing unlawful
detention or kidnapping . . . acts with the intent to. . . hinder or delay
the discovery of or reporting of a felony . . . .” Utah Code § 76-5-
302(2)(b)(iii) (emphasis added). Thus, as relevant here, two
alternative underlying offenses could support a conviction for
aggravated kidnapping: unlawful detention and kidnapping.
Significantly, the elements of unlawful detention differ somewhat
from those of kidnapping:

• “An actor commits unlawful detention of a minor if the
actor is at least four or more years older than the minor,
and intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law,
and against the will of the minor, coerces or exerts influence
over the minor with the intent to cause the minor to remain
with the actor for an unreasonable period of time under the
circumstances.” Id. § 76-5-304(2)(b) (emphasis added).

• “An actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or
knowingly, without authority of law, and against the will
of an individual . . . detains or restrains a minor without the
consent of the minor’s parent or legal guardian or the

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State v. Meguerditchian

consent of a person acting in loco parentis . . . .” Id. § 76-5-
301(2)(d) (emphasis added).

As is obvious from the text of the statutes, kidnapping is the more
egregious offense in the sense that it requires the actor to detain
or restrain the minor, while unlawful detention requires only
coercion or exerting influence to cause the minor to remain with
the actor. See State v. Wilder, 2016 UT App 210, ¶ 20, 387 P.3d 512
(“While the ‘kidnapping’ alternative under the aggravated
kidnapping statute may require detaining or restraining the
victim . . . , the ‘unlawful detention’ alternative does not.” (cleaned
up)), aff’d, 2018 UT 17, 420 P.3d 1064. In other words, unlawful
detention focuses on exerting psychological manipulation or
pressure over a minor and does not require the physical force or
restraint characteristic of kidnapping.

¶27 Meguerditchian was convicted of aggravated kidnapping
of the four minors under the unlawful detention alternative of the
statute. But on appeal, Meguerditchian focuses almost exclusively
on the element of detention in the kidnapping alternative.
Specifically, he argues that “the State presented no evidence for
the essential element of detention” so the court erred when it
denied the directed verdict motion on the four aggravated
kidnapping charges. And while Meguerditchian acknowledges
that he was convicted under the unlawful detention alternative,
he makes no attempt to address the specific elements of that
alternative as identified in the statute—namely, coercing or
exerting influence over the minors to cause them to remain with
him. See Utah Code § 76-5-304(2)(b). Instead of addressing the
elements of unlawful detention head on, Meguerditchian
essentially conflates these elements with the “detains” element of
kidnapping. Given this oversight—or perhaps lack of precision—
we conclude this issue is inadequately briefed. “Briefs must
contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. An
issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue
is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the

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State v. Meguerditchian

reviewing court.” State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ¶ 13, 72 P.3d
138 (cleaned up). This is what has happened here.
Meguerditchian’s briefing regarding the unlawful detention
alternative—which was the basis of his conviction—is so
superficial and cursory that it does not offer a substantive
foundation for us to examine this issue. Given this fundamental
deficiency, we decline to thoroughly examine this claim of error.4

4. Nevertheless, had we considered this issue substantively under
the kidnapping alternative, we would have concluded that the
district court did not err in denying the directed verdict motion.
We will affirm a denial for a directed verdict “if, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the State, some evidence exists from
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Andrus,
2025 UT 32, ¶ 27, 575 P.3d 1071 (cleaned up).
And the State certainly provided some evidence that
Meguerditchian “unlawfully detained or restrained” the four
minors and “did so intentionally or knowingly.” State v. Wright,
2019 UT App 66, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d 1185 (cleaned up). “‘Detains or
restrains’ refers to restriction of the victim’s movement,” but these
terms do not require “complete confinement or imprisonment.”
Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, the State needed to prove only that
Meguerditchian “intentionally acted, however briefly, to impair
the [four minors’] ability to move freely.” Id. (cleaned up). The
State presented evidence that Meguerditchian knowingly
detained the four minors in his home following a shooting and
that he was a party to Wife’s efforts to do the same. Testimony
confirmed that Meguerditchian and Wife ordered the group to
“get the fuck inside” after the shooting. Even when Lydia
returned to the house after helping Meguerditchian and Wife look
for shell casings, she had to beg for permission to go and find Carl
because “they weren’t letting anyone leave.”
(continued…)

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State v. Meguerditchian

II. Ineffective Assistance Claims

¶28 Meguerditchian next argues that he received ineffective
assistance concerning the message on his t-shirt and the
stipulation to showing the body camera video taken when officers
discovered Carl dead in his car.

While Meguerditchian argues that Lydia was not detained
because he eventually granted her permission to leave to find
Carl, this permission merely marked the end of her detention. It
does not negate the evidence that, prior to being released, she was
held against her will along with the other minors. And even if
Wife directed much of the activity related to detaining the minors
(e.g., forcing them to hide in a closet or laundry room) while
Meguerditchian went out to speak with the police responding to
the report of shots being fired, the record is clear that
Meguerditchian participated and assisted in the activity. See State
v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 628 (“To show that a
defendant is guilty under accomplice liability, the State must
show that an individual acted with both the intent that the
underlying offense be committed and the intent to aid the
principal actor in the offense.”). Indeed, in his directed verdict
motion on this point, Counsel admitted that there was some
evidence that Meguerditchian was a party to the offense: “The
witnesses that we had said that there was conflicting evidence.
Some of them said that [Wife] told them to get in the closet. But
one witness said that [Meguerditchian] asked them to get in the
closet so that the cops wouldn’t see them.” Thus, even
Meguerditchian’s framing of the directed verdict motion
conceded that that there was some evidence—albeit conflicting in
his estimation—of his participation in the kidnapping of the
minors.
And, we might add, if there was some evidence that
Meguerditchian kidnapped the four victims, there is, a fortiori,
some evidence to support the unlawful detention alternative.

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State v. Meguerditchian

¶29 “A defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel
must meet the two-prong Strickland test: (1) counsel’s
performance was objectively deficient and (2) the deficient
performance resulted in prejudice.” State v. Chase, 2025 UT App
158, ¶ 43, 580 P.3d 421 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 581 P.3d 560 (Utah
2025). “And we need not address both Strickland prongs where we
can dispose of the claim on one of the prongs.” Id.

¶30 To establish deficient performance, a defendant “must
demonstrate counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” State v. Sandoval, 2024 UT App 186,
¶ 19, 562 P.3d 731 (cleaned up). “The deficient performance
inquiry should focus on whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances, and it must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. (cleaned up). And
“if an attorney’s decisions can be explained by a reasonable trial
strategy, the defendant has necessarily failed to show deficient
performance.” State v. Hunter, 2021 UT 44, ¶ 68, 496 P.3d 119
(cleaned up). “The ultimate question is not whether some strategy
other than the one that counsel employed looks superior given the
actual results of trial but, rather, whether a reasonable, competent
lawyer could have chosen the strategy that was employed in the
real-time context of trial.” State v. Mendoza, 2025 UT App 140, ¶ 27,
585 P.3d 140 (cleaned up).

¶31 To show prejudice, “the defendant must present
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” State v. Miller, 2023 UT App 85, ¶ 27, 535 P.3d 390
(cleaned up). ”In evaluating whether prejudice exists, we consider
the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have
an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by

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the record.” State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, ¶ 21, 441 P.3d 1166
(cleaned up).

A. Not Objecting to the Admission of the T-Shirt Message

¶32 Meguerditchian first asserts that Counsel’s performance
was deficient because he should have “objected to the jury
learning the content of the writing on the t-shirt.” He argues that
the writing was “inadmissible” under rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, which enables a court to “exclude relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
. . . unfair prejudice.” Specifically, he claims that the writing was
unfairly prejudicial because it cast him in a bad light before the
jury. And he suggests that the “content of the writing could have
been redacted without affecting” the probative value of the
evidence. 5

¶33 We assume for the sake of argument that Counsel should
have objected to the message on the t-shirt being admitted. Even
so, Meguerditchian has not established he was prejudiced by the
jury learning the content of the t-shirt’s message. In other words,
he has not persuaded us that “the result of the proceeding would
have been different,” see Miller, 2023 UT App 85, ¶ 27 (cleaned
up), because he has not shown a reasonable likelihood that even
if he had succeeded in redacting all photographs and videos that
included the t-shirt message, he would have received a more
favorable outcome in light of the overwhelming evidence against
him.

¶34 The evidence of Meguerditchian’s guilt included doorbell
camera video of him shooting at Carl’s car and the absence of a

5. In fact, the message on the t-shirt also appears repeatedly in
body camera video of Meguerditchian talking with police officers.
On appeal, Meguerditchian makes no attempt to explain how
these other instances of the t-shirt message being shown could
have effectively been redacted.

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gunshot preceding this action, directly contradicting his claim of
self-defense. And there were multiple corroborated accounts of
Meguerditchian participating in the unlawful detention of the
minors. Moreover, there was uncontroverted evidence that
Meguerditchian lied to the police to cover up these two crimes.
He fabricated an explanation that the gunshots—that he fired—
sounded “more like fireworks,” all to dissuade police officers
from investigating further when they went to his house the first
time. And he again lied to the police when they asked about Jane,
telling them that she had left hours before even though he knew
Wife was holding her captive in their neighbor’s garage. This
evidence led to but one conclusion for the jury: Meguerditchian
shot and killed Carl, detained witnesses to prevent them from
reporting the shooting to the police, and then repeatedly lied to
cover up the crimes. In other words, the problem for
Meguerditchian arose not from the devil-may-care message on his
shirt but from the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance fails under
Strickland’s prejudice prong.

B. The Prosecutor’s Remarks About the T-Shirt Message

¶35 Meguerditchian also argues that Counsel should have
objected when the prosecutor referred to the message on the t-
shirt. He asserts that in making these remarks, the prosecutor
called the jurors’ attention to matters that they should not have
considered in reaching a verdict. Specifically, Meguerditchian
claims that “[d]rawing inferences about a life philosophy based
on the t-shirt was not a justifiable basis for a verdict” and that the
“only possible relevance the writing had was as impermissible
evidence of character.”

¶36 In both opening statements and closing arguments,
“[c]ounsel for both sides have considerable latitude.” State v.
Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 76, 353 P.3d 55 (cleaned up); see also State
v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (“The purpose of an

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State v. Meguerditchian

opening statement is to advise the jury of the facts relied upon and
of the questions and issues involved, which the jury will have to
determine, and to give them a general picture of the facts and the
situations, so that they will be able to understand the evidence.”).
In this context, attorneys “have the right to fully discuss from their
perspectives the evidence and all inferences and deductions it
supports.” State v. Reid, 2018 UT App 146, ¶ 49, 427 P.3d 1261
(cleaned up). “And the law recognizes the prerogative of
opposing counsel to swallow their tongue instead of making an
objection that might have the risk of highlighting problematic
evidence or even just annoying the jury.” State v. Hummel, 2017
UT 19, ¶ 110, 393 P.3d 314. Indeed, our review of ineffective
assistance claims in this context centers not on “whether the
prosecutor’s comments were proper, but whether they were so
improper that counsel’s only defensible choice was to interrupt
those comments with an objection.” Reid, 2018 UT App 146, ¶ 49
(cleaned up).

¶37 The prosecutor’s comments regarding Meguerditchian’s t-
shirt did not rise to the level that Counsel’s only choice was to
object. Counsel could have reasonably determined that the
prosecutor was operating within the broad latitude allowed for
commenting on the evidence. In both the opening statement and
the closing argument, the thrust of the prosecutor’s references to
Meguerditchian’s t-shirt suggested that his behavior
demonstrated an indifference to the welfare of others. This
argument was supported by Meguerditchian’s violent reactions—
specifically shooting at Carl’s car, kidnapping minors, and
beating Jane—being disproportionate to the alleged vodka theft
that precipitated the conflict. In short, it was permissible for the
prosecutor to argue that the evidence indicated Meguerditchian’s
lack of care for his victims and to point out that this attitude was
consistent with the message on his t-shirt. A competent attorney
could reasonably conclude that objecting would serve only to
highlight the t-shirt’s profane message rather than to change the
overall evidentiary landscape or arguments presented to the jury.

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State v. Meguerditchian

¶38 As with the admission of the t-shirt message itself,
Meguerditchian has likewise not demonstrated sufficient
prejudice arising from the prosecutor’s statements about how it
revealed Meguerditchian’s attitude. To put it bluntly, it was
Meguerditchian’s calloused actions of shooting a teenager over a
stolen bottle of vodka and then detaining multiple minors to
conceal his misdeeds that established his indifference to human
life and selfish disrespect for other human beings. The
prosecutor’s comments about the t-shirt message merely drove
home a point that was already abundantly clear from the
evidence. In short, Meguerditchian was convicted on the evidence
of his actions, not the prosecutor’s commentary on the t-shirt
message.

¶39 Accordingly, Meguerditchian has not shown deficient
performance or prejudice, so this claim of ineffective assistance
necessarily fails.

C. Body Camera Video of the Crash Scene

¶40 Meguerditchian next argues that Counsel should have
objected to the introduction of body camera video “showing an
emotional scene where the police had to pull [Lydia] from [Carl],
extract him from the crashed car, and perform CPR.” He argues
that “[w]hatever minimal probative value the video might have
had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice” by creating “sympathy for [Carl] while generating
horror and contempt for Meguerditchian, who did not dispute
that he fired the shot that killed” Carl. Notably, Meguerditchian
makes no claim Counsel should have objected to the officer’s
description of the scene—including Lydia’s emotional state and
the efforts to revive Carl by administering CPR—or to the
admission of photographs of the bloody interior of the car and
Carl’s body on the sidewalk.

¶41 When evaluating whether counsel rendered deficient
performance for failing to object to evidence under rule 403, the

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legal standard requires more than proving the evidence was
objectionable in the abstract. Instead, the inquiry focuses on
“whether a reasonable, competent lawyer could have chosen the
strategy that was employed in the real-time context of trial.”
Mendoza, 2025 UT App 140, ¶ 27 (cleaned up). In the context of
stipulated evidence, deficient performance takes on an added
layer because this circumstance requires us to consider whether
“[c]ounsel’s decision to enter into the stipulation . . . was
unquestionably a strategic one.” State v. James, 2026 UT App 20,
¶ 40, 586 P.3d 551, petition for cert. filed, Apr. 13, 2026 (No.
20260421). This is because “an attorney’s reasonably informed
strategic choices are almost unassailable in a deficient
performance inquiry.” Id. ¶ 39 (cleaned up). Accordingly, a
“decision by counsel that reasonably weighs the risks and benefits
of available strategic approaches before choosing one as
preferable to others cannot support a claim that counsel was
deficient in either strategy or performance, even if the approach
did not lead to the desired result. In such cases, so long as counsel
could have reasonably chosen the strategy in question, and so
long as the strategy is itself reasonable, the claim must fail.” State
v. Rivera, 2022 UT App 44, ¶ 38, 509 P.3d 257 (cleaned up).

¶42 Here, we perceive no deficient performance in Counsel’s
action because the record indicates that Counsel had a deliberate
strategic purpose in mind when he stipulated to the admission of
the video. Indeed, Counsel explicitly stated as much when he told
the district court that he was “getting rid of a lot of [the State’s]
witnesses” with “a bunch of stipulations.” This statement leaves
little doubt that the stipulation to the admission of the evidence,
including the body camera video, constituted an intentional
strategic attempt to limit the number of witnesses the State would
call to testify. By agreeing that the video could be played, Counsel
was able to avoid the parade of witnesses who would have
described the emotional crash scene in painstaking detail.
Moreover, we do not know exactly what was traded away in the
bargain Counsel struck with the State by way of stipulation, but

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State v. Meguerditchian

we have to presume that it was worthwhile and reflected sound
trial strategy. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)
(“Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy.” (cleaned up)).

¶43 Admittedly, the video was not obviously beneficial to
Meguerditchian’s case, but it was brief and it seems likely that
Counsel determined that showing it was better than having
multiple witnesses describe the scene before the jury—which may
have been even more detrimental to Meguerditchian’s case—in
addition to side-stepping whatever else was avoided by way of
the stipulation. After all, there was abundant evidence related to
the crash scene, including photographs depicting Carl’s body on
the sidewalk after police officers had removed him from the
crashed car and photographs of the the bloody interior of the car.
In stipulating to the video, Counsel likely sought to avoid the
jury’s exposure to even more such evidence. And we have to
assume that the trade was worthwhile and represented a sound
tactical strategy on Counsel’s part. See id. With the video, the
evidence was at least presented in a succinct and contained
manner, thus avoiding protracted witness testimony that would
have served only to emphasize the tragic results of
Meguerditchian’s actions. And just because a different attorney
might have chosen another path, that possibility, standing alone,
does not mean that Counsel’s decision to stipulate to admission
of the video was deficient. See id. (“There are countless ways to
provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best
criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in
the same way.”).

¶44 Therefore, given the strategically motivated stipulation to
its admission, we see no deficiency in Counsel’s performance with

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State v. Meguerditchian

respect to this video. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective
assistance fails for lack of deficient performance.

III. Denial of Requested Jury Instructions

¶45 Meguerditchian next claims that the court erred when it
declined to provide two of his requested jury instructions.

¶46 First, he asserts that the court should have given his
instruction on mistake of fact, which stated, “An act committed or
an omission made under an ignorance or mistake of fact which
disproves the culpable mental state is a defense for that crime.”
Meguerditchian argues that “[m]istake of fact was an important
concept that the court needed to clarify for the jury” because his
“defense to murder and felony discharge of a firearm was
centered on the claim that, although he was ultimately mistaken,
[he] believed that a serious robbery, possibly involving a
dangerous weapon, had just occurred and that someone had fired
a gun before [he] returned fire in that direction.” He also claims
that mistake of fact was important regarding the four kidnapping
charges. On this point, Meguerditchian claimed he wanted
everyone to go inside based on his belief that they might have
been in danger if they remained outside, which would negate his
intent to unlawfully detain anyone. As to the kidnapping of Jane,
he claims the mistake-of-fact instruction was important because it
would have negated his intent to aid in her kidnapping if the jury
believed that he was mistaken about the reason she was being
kept under the supervision of Wife.

¶47 Second, Meguerditchian asserts that the court erred in
declining to give the jury his proposed instruction on voluntary
intoxication, which provided that “[i]ntoxication, due to the
consumption of alcohol or drugs is a defense if there is reasonable
doubt that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly
because he was intoxicated.” Meguerditchian argues that because
he had testified that he was under the influence of alcohol at the
time of the incident, there was “evidence that he did not have the

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State v. Meguerditchian

culpable mental state for the charged crimes” and the jury should
have been so instructed.

¶48 Thus, Meguerditchian argues, the mistake-of-fact and
voluntary-intoxication instructions would have informed the jury
to acquit him if he lacked the culpable mental state to commit the
crimes he was charged with. We are not persuaded.

¶49 We review jury instructions “in their entirety to determine
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instructed the
jury about the applicable law.” State v. Seach, 2021 UT App 22,
¶ 17, 483 P.3d 1265 (cleaned up). And while “we review the trial
court’s failure to give requested jury instructions for correctness,
granting the trial court no particular deference in its
determination,” we will reverse only if omission of the proposed
instruction “tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the
jury on the law.” State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶ 17, 17 P.3d
1153 (cleaned up). Even if certain jury “instructions could have
been slightly more accurate or more complete does not mean they
were inaccurate, incomplete, or erroneous—nor does it mean they
were prejudicial.” State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶ 47, 355 P.3d 1031.
As our supreme court recently stated,

A party is not entitled to have the jury instructed
with any particular wording. So long as they
correctly state the law, the precise wording and
specificity of jury instructions is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Moreover, a district
court does not necessarily abuse its discretion when
it refuses to give every instruction requested by a
party. To the contrary, if the point is properly
covered in other instructions, and the instructions,
read as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on applicable
law, the court has discretion to refuse a request for
a particular jury instruction.

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State v. Meguerditchian

State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 60, 582 P.3d 772 (cleaned up).
Moreover, “while a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed on the law underlying his or her theory of the case if
the evidence supports such an instruction, a defendant has no
right to multiple instructions setting forth his or her theory of the
case.” State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1986) (cleaned up);
see also State v. Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, ¶ 32, 354 P.3d 775
(“[T]he defense is not entitled to further instruction regarding the
defense’s theory of the case when the other instructions already
fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to that theory.”).

¶50 In the present case, Meguerditchian’s proposed
instructions addressed the necessity of finding that he acted with
a culpable mental state. But the existing instructions adequately
addressed this very issue. Indeed, the instructions provided to the
jury defined reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence,
explained the State’s burden to prove Meguerditchian’s mental
state, defined the various levels of mental culpability, and
outlined the elements of the charged crimes—including murder,
aggravated kidnapping, obstruction of justice, and felony firearm
discharge—requiring the State to prove the necessary mental state
for each beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the general
instructions regarding the necessary mental state and the
elements of the crimes were sufficient to guide the jury on the
defenses of mistake of fact and voluntary intoxication, the district
court did not err in declining to give the unnecessarily duplicative
instructions on those points as requested by Meguerditchian.

¶51 And concerning the voluntary-intoxication instruction, we
see no error in the district court’s conclusion that Meguerditchian
was not even entitled to such an instruction. “To prevail on a
voluntary intoxication defense, . . . it is not enough to merely
present evidence showing that the defendant was intoxicated.
Rather, to establish a viable voluntary intoxication defense, the
defendant must point to evidence showing that he was so
intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the requisite mental

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State v. Meguerditchian

state for the crimes committed.” State v. Bell, 2016 UT App 157,
¶ 30, 380 P.3d 11 (cleaned up). While there was evidence that
Meguerditchian was drinking and may have been intoxicated, the
evidence simply did not show that his intoxication vitiated his
intent to fire his gun at Carl’s car or detain the minors. Cf. id. ¶ 32
(concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a voluntary-
intoxication instruction when, among other things, neither the
defendant “nor anyone else testified that his intoxication caused
him to think he was wielding a carrot rather than a knife”).
Despite the evidence showing that Meguerditchian was agitated
and angry—and it can be inferred that those emotions were
perhaps exacerbated by his consumption of alcohol—there is no
evidence that he was so drunk that he was acting without the
requisite mental state. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that
Meguerditchian very much had his wits about him. After all, he
was able to shoot at and hit the driver of a car speeding away,
organize others to search for spent shell casings, detain minors so
that they wouldn’t reveal his crime to the police, stash the gun he
had used to kill Carl, and repeatedly lie to the police as they
investigated the shooting. These are not the actions of a man who
was so intoxicated as to be deprived of the necessary mental state.

IV. Cumulative Prejudice

¶52 Meguerditchian also asserts that the cumulative effect of
the purported errors he alleges on appeal was prejudicial.
“Sometimes, an appellant may show prejudice when a single error
may not constitute grounds for reversal, but many errors, when
taken collectively, do.” Martin v. Kristensen, 2019 UT App 127,
¶ 50, 450 P.3d 66 (cleaned up), aff’d, 2021 UT 17, 489 P.3d 198. “To
reverse under the cumulative error doctrine, this court must
determine that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error, standing alone,
has a conceivable potential for harm, and (3) the cumulative effect
of all the potentially harmful errors undermines its confidence in
the outcome.” State v. Haynes, 2025 UT App 75, ¶ 73, 571 P.3d 1197
(cleaned up), cert. denied, 578 P.3d 749 (Utah 2025).

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State v. Meguerditchian

¶53 The claims that give rise to potential prejudice were those
concerning the admission of the t-shirt message and the
prosecutor’s references to that message. “For purposes of this
analysis, we assume that each of these errors, standing alone, had
a conceivable potential for harm. We next examine whether the
cumulative effect of these . . . errors prejudiced” Meguerditchian.
See id. Even without the t-shirt message and related comments,
there is simply no likelihood that the jury would have acquitted
him on any of the charges. The evidence in this case
overwhelmingly demonstrated Meguerditchian’s guilt. There
was video evidence of him shooting at Carl’s car, and there were
multiple corroborated accounts that he participated in the
kidnappings. The evidence also made clear he repeatedly lied to
the police in his attempts to cover up the murder. The cumulative
effect of the alleged errors simply does not undermine our
confidence in the outcome since there is no reasonable probability
that Meguerditchian would have been acquitted in the absence of
the t-shirt message and the prosecutor’s comments. The t-shirt
message and the prosecutor’s comments certainly didn’t help
Meguerditchian’s defense, but that does not mean that they led to
his conviction. Instead, Meguerditchian was convicted because
the jury was convinced of his guilt by the vast array of other
incriminating evidence. Accordingly, Meguerditchian’s
cumulative prejudice claim falls short.

CONCLUSION

¶54 We reject each of Meguerditchian’s challenges to his
convictions for murder, felony discharge of a firearm, aggravated
kidnapping, and obstruction of justice. He has inadequately
briefed his assertion that the district court erred in denying his
directed verdict motion on the kidnapping charges, he did not
receive ineffective assistance with regard to the message on his t-
shirt or the admission of the body camera video, the district court
did not err in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary

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State v. Meguerditchian

intoxication or mistake of fact, and the cumulative prejudice
arising from the alleged errors does not undermine our
confidence in the verdict rendered.

¶55 Affirmed.

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