State v. Taylor

2026 UT App 53

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ANDREW RAYMOND TAYLOR,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230210-CA
Filed April 9, 2026

First District Court, Brigham City Department
The Honorable Brandon J. Maynard
No. 201100010

Ramon Ortiz, Debra M. Nelson, Benjamin Miller, and
Wendy M. Brown, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jeffrey G. Thomson,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY
concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 Andrew Raymond Taylor appeals from his conviction of
one count of violation of a protective order and four counts of
domestic violence in the presence of a child. He argues that the
trial court plainly erred by (1) allowing testimony that disclosed
improper character evidence and (2) providing the jury with a
special verdict form that improperly shifted the State’s burden of
proof to him. We conclude that Taylor has not met his burden to
show harm resulting from either alleged error, and we therefore
affirm his convictions.
State v. Taylor

BACKGROUND

¶2 Taylor was previously in a relationship with a woman
(Mother) with whom he had three children. Mother later obtained
a protective order against Taylor. The order generally prohibited
Taylor from contacting Mother or her five children (three of
whom were the children she shared with Taylor) in any way, and
the order specifically prohibited Taylor from coming within “50
feet” of Mother, her home, her workplace, her place of worship,
or her vehicle. The order did, however, allow Taylor parent-time
with his children “provided [he] arrange[d] those visits through
[Mother’s] lawyer.” The protective order was served on Taylor on
November 13, 2019.

¶3 On November 16, 2019, Mother was traveling with four of
her children (three of whom were the children she shared with
Taylor) to a birthday celebration. Along the way, she stopped at a
gas station to fuel up, and there she had an encounter with Taylor.
According to Mother, she had just started the gas pump and was
returning to wait inside the car when “[Taylor’s] truck came just
out of nowhere” and “came flying up beside” her on the other side
of the pump. She said that Taylor’s “door flung open as he was
putting [the truck] in park” and that the truck “was almost
basically still moving as he was trying to jump out.” Mother saw
Taylor “coming for [her] car at a fast pace,” and she was fearful
that Taylor “was going to attack” her. Mother said that Taylor
“walked past” her, went to the passenger side of the car, and
began “banging on the window and trying to open the door,”
which caused the children inside to begin “screaming” for Mother
to call the police. Mother “grabbed [her] phone” from inside the
car, “started recording,” and yelled at Taylor “to get away from
[her] car.” Mother’s recording captured video of Taylor as he was
returning to his car, shifting it into gear, and pulling away. Mother
then called 911 to report the incident and request police help. She
was in tears at the time.

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State v. Taylor

¶4 After Taylor left the gas station, he also called 911 about the
incident. He explained to the 911 operator, “I went to see my kids
‘cause they pulled up to the gas station and I walked over, told
them I love them, and waved at them and walked away. My ex is
probably calling you guys on the phone right now trying to have
me arrested . . . .” He further explained that he was at the gas
station first and had seen Mother pull up, that he had not seen his
children in over eight months so he “walked over to the car,” but
that when Mother started threatening to kill him, he just told the
children he loved them and then walked away. Taylor then
repeatedly asked the 911 operator if he needed to come turn
himself in, and he indicated that he was willing to do so if
necessary.

¶5 As a result of the encounter, Taylor was charged with one
count of violation of a protective order and four counts of
domestic violence in the presence of a child (one count for each of
Mother’s children that witnessed the encounter). 1 At the ensuing
trial, Taylor exercised his right to represent himself, although he
also retained an attorney to function as standby counsel.

¶6 As part of the State’s case, the jury heard Mother’s
testimony and the audio recordings of both 911 calls. The jury was
also shown the brief video Mother had recorded with her phone.

¶7 Mother’s testimony set forth her view of the encounter as
recounted above. On cross-examination, Taylor questioned
Mother, in part, as follows:

[Taylor:] So all [the] kids were saying, “Call the
cops, Mommy. Call the cops. Call the cops,
Mommy”?

1. The term “domestic violence” is defined to include the violation
of a protective order. See Utah Code § 77-36-1(4)(b)(xiii).

20230210-CA 3 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

[Mother:] They’ve watched me be abused by you, so
yeah.

[Taylor:] And what abuse did I ever do to you,
please?

[Mother:] You put staples in the back of my head.

[Taylor:] Objection, Your Honor. She’s lying.

[The court:] Overruled. You asked the question.

[Taylor:] Okay.

[Mother:] You punched me in the face while I was
holding a child.

[Taylor:] Wow.

[Mother:] And you’ve hit me in the chest while I was
pregnant.

[Taylor:] When were all these occurrences? Can you
please name the dates and times, the issue which—
I don’t even know how to ask a question because
these didn’t happen. But could you please [tell] the
date and times.

[Mother:] One of the times before I got a protective
order, the time that I got staples in the back of my
head you begged me not to tell on you, so I told
them that a shelf fell on my head.

[Taylor:] I’m sorry, ma’am. Could you please repeat
that? I begged you to do what?

[Mother:] Not to tell on you.

20230210-CA 4 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

[Taylor:] Too bad we can’t have a lie detector test in
here.

After this exchange, the trial court reminded Taylor that he was
not allowed to “make comments after the witness testifie[d],” and
Taylor moved on to another topic.

¶8 During redirect, the prosecutor asked Mother about her
reasons for seeking a protective order, and in her subsequent
string of answers, Mother alleged prior bad and abusive actions
by Taylor:

I got it because . . . we were kind of going
back and forth in our relationship, and I was trying
to leave multiple times, and he kind of manipulated
me to come back, told me everything was going to
get better.

At this time we went down to his sister’s
house in Layton. We were down there for maybe a
couple weeks. And at that time he was having an
affair with his current wife. And the night that I
ended up having to call 911 to get out of his sister’s
house, his nephews told me that—or he was
planning to take me, I guess, on a date to the movies.
And his nephew told me not to get in the car. That
he was going to be taking me up to the mountains
and, and I wouldn’t be coming back.

So I locked myself in the bathroom, and I
called 911, and I had them come get me out of the
home. And at that point, that was the last time that
I ever wanted to have contact with him. That scared
me so bad. I feared for my life for—even to this day
I still fear for my life.

....

20230210-CA 5 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

. . . [Taylor’s nephew told me that Taylor] was
taking me into the mountains and I wouldn’t be
coming back. That [Taylor] was going to give him
$3,000 to let him borrow his car and he’d make sure
that there was no evidence left behind.

....

. . . [Taylor] threatened me all the time. I have
text messages of him telling me that he was going to
take my life, that he had a shooting record, that
maybe I don’t know his shooting record, and [he]
would name all the medals that he has gotten in his
shooting competitions.

He—my mom was blind and he would text
her phone and tell her that her daughter was going
to die. And he would tell me that if I ever left he
would kidnap me and have people gang rape me.

....

When our first child that we had together
was a baby, he, like, came up behind me, grabbed
me, like, I was trying to put my shoes on at the stairs,
we were kind of fighting. And I tried to put my
shoes on at the stairs and he came up and he
grabbed me, and I turned around and I had a shelf
next to—it was kind of like a shelf next to the door
and he grabbed it and threw it on top of me and it
busted and went at the back of my head. And like
almost hit our daughter. My daughter was sitting
right there.

And then he punched me in the face at his
dad’s house when I was sitting in the front seat of
my car trying to leave.

20230210-CA 6 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

One time when I was at my mom’s house, he
came to my mom’s house and I was holding the kids
and I had two of the children in the car, in his
vehicle. He was wanting to see the kids and he was
accusing me of cheating on him and that I was
seeing all these people and he hit me in the side of
the face and then in the chest while I was pregnant
and holding one of my children.

....

There is something being investigated right
now about . . . my oldest daughter that’s not his,
about sexual abuse that she has came out about.

....

[There] was a time that he threw the shelf
down on top of me, big, I guess, kind of like a shelf
and the part—he literally ripped it like in half and
the part that he grabbed like flew at me and hit me
in the back of the head.

....

I had to get staples in the back of [my] head.

¶9 Both Taylor and his current wife testified as defense
witnesses. Taylor’s wife related that she and Taylor had stopped
at the gas station convenience store and they saw Mother as they
were leaving. Taylor’s wife said that when they were “basically at
the exit,” she heard “little girls” saying, “Daddy, Daddy, Daddy,”
and that the “[n]ext thing [she] kn[ew],” Taylor stopped the
vehicle and jumped out. She testified that when the truck stopped,
it was over sixty to seventy feet away from Mother’s vehicle, but
she also admitted that she “couldn’t see whether or not [Taylor]
approached [Mother]” because the gas pumps were blocking her

20230210-CA 7 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

line of sight. However, she stated that by the time she “shuffl[ed]
to get [herself] out of the seatbelt”—an action she estimated took
her “[t]hirty seconds to a minute” due to some medical issues—
Taylor was already “approaching the [truck]” again, and the two
quickly left the gas station.

¶10 Taylor testified that he and his wife were “at the gas station
first” and that when he saw Mother, he started to leave. But he
said he stopped his truck near the exit because something was
rubbing on his tires. He asserted that the video Mother recorded
was zoomed in to make him appear closer than he was and just
showed him—when he was parked “60 to 80 feet away” from
Mother—going back to his truck after he “got out and looked
underneath the front end.”

¶11 At the end of trial, the jury was instructed as to the
elements of the charged offenses and certain relevant definitions.
The jury was instructed that domestic violence includes the
violation of a protective order “by one cohabitant against
another.” And the jury was provided with the following
definition of “cohabitant”:

[A]n individual who is 16 years old or older who:

• is or was a spouse of the other party;

• is or was living as if a spouse of the other
party;

• has or had one or more children in common
with the other party;

• resides or has resided in the same residence
as the other party; or

• is or was in a consensual sexual relationship
with the other party.

20230210-CA 8 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

Along with the verdict form, the jury was presented with a special
verdict form that read as follows:

We, the Jury, have found the defendant,
[Taylor], guilty of VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE
ORDER. We also unanimously find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the State:

_____ has

_____ has not

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Taylor] and [Mother] were cohabitants at the time
of this offense.

¶12 The jury thereafter found Taylor guilty as charged,
including indicating on the special verdict form that the State had
proved cohabitation beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor now
appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 Taylor argues that Mother was improperly allowed to
provide testimony as to his character and that the jury was given
a constitutionally deficient special verdict form. He recognizes
that neither argument was preserved for appeal, so he raises each
issue under the plain error exception to the preservation
requirement. “Because a claim of plain error . . . involves no lower
court ruling, we decide the claim in the first instance as a matter
of law.” State v. Dew, 2025 UT App 22, ¶ 28, 566 P.3d 53, cert.
denied, 568 P.3d 264 (Utah 2025).

20230210-CA 9 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

ANALYSIS

¶14 Taylor makes two assertions of plain error, one based on
Mother’s testimony regarding his character and one based on the
special verdict form. “Under the plain error standard of review, a
defendant must demonstrate that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the [trial] court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant.” State v. Johnson, 2023
UT App 145, ¶ 22, 540 P.3d 744 (quotation simplified). “If any one
of these requirements is not met, plain error is not established.”
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 15, 95 P.3d 276 (quotation simplified).

¶15 For each of Taylor’s assertions, we rest our decision on his
failure to meet the third requirement of a successful plain error
claim; that is, we determine that even if the issues he raises were
in fact errors that should have been obvious to the trial court, he
has not shown that they were harmful. We address each asserted
error in turn.

I. Mother’s Testimony

¶16 Taylor argues that the trial court plainly erred by allowing
Mother to testify to improper character evidence. This argument
is based on Mother’s various statements during the redirect
examination by the prosecutor alleging Taylor had participated in
a murder plot, infidelity, and various instances of physical and
sexual abuse. He argues that these statements were inadmissible
under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides,
“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in conformity with the character.” Utah
R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, even assuming, without deciding,
that it was obvious error for the trial court to fail to take some
action in response to these statements, Taylor has not shown a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for him had
the court done so.

20230210-CA 10 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

¶17 First, the jury was initially exposed to most of the abuse
allegations during Taylor’s cross-examination of Mother. He had
asked her, “[W]hat abuse did I ever do to you, please?” And in
response, Mother told the jury about various occasions of physical
abuse.

¶18 Second, because the State’s case was incredibly strong,
there is little likelihood of a different result here even had the trial
court responded differently. See State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92,
¶ 30, 325 P.3d 855 (“When assessing an error’s harmfulness, we
look, in part, to the overall strength of the State’s case: the more
evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there was harmful
error.” (quotation simplified)). For the point at issue—whether
Taylor violated the protective order by coming within fifty feet of
Mother, her children, or her vehicle—the evidence presented to
the jury was overwhelming.

¶19 Mother testified that Taylor quickly exited his truck and
came toward her vehicle “at a fast pace” and tried to get to the
children before retreating to his truck. This matches the
information relayed in both 911 calls and the video Mother took
on her phone. Indeed, Taylor himself admitted in his 911 call, “I
went to see my kids ‘cause they pulled up to the gas station and I
walked over, told them I love them, and waved at them and
walked away.” And a second time in that call he acknowledged
that he “walked over to the car.” Additionally, when he told the
911 operator that he was willing to come turn himself in, he
impliedly acknowledged he had violated the protective order.

¶20 As to the evidence presented by Taylor, it did little to rebut
the evidence that he had approached Mother’s vehicle. Indeed,
Taylor’s wife’s testimony was consistent with such an inference.
She testified that right after she heard “little girls” calling “Daddy,
Daddy, Daddy,” Taylor quickly stopped and exited the truck.
And although she stated that she “couldn’t see whether or not
[Taylor] approached [Mother]” because the gas pumps were

20230210-CA 11 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

blocking her line of sight, she did not testify that she saw Taylor
doing anything else (like going toward the front of the truck,
which would presumably have been in her line of sight). And the
additional facts to which she testified—that Taylor’s truck was
parked over sixty to seventy feet away from Mother’s vehicle or
that he returned to his truck quite quickly—could also be
consistent with Mother’s version of events.

¶21 Considering all this, we are convinced there is no
reasonable likelihood that had the trial court taken further action
to address the character evidence testimony, the jury would have
believed Taylor’s uncorroborated assertion (inconsistent with
even his own prior statements) that he exited his truck only to
check under the vehicle and did not come within fifty feet of
Mother, her children, or her vehicle. Thus, his assertion of plain
error on this point fails.

II. The Special Verdict Form

¶22 Taylor also argues that the trial court plainly erred by using
a special verdict form that improperly “shifted a burden” from the
State to him. Specifically, he argues that the special verdict form
addressing cohabitant status was constitutionally deficient
because its phrasing “suggest[ed] an element had to be
disproved” and “impermissibly shifted the burden” to him to
disprove the cohabitant status. And he generally asserts that this
phrasing “was harmful because it lowered the prosecution’s
burden.”

¶23 But again, we see no harm to Taylor, even assuming
obvious error on the special verdict form. This is because the
element addressed by the special verdict form—the cohabitant
status of Taylor and Mother—was effectively undisputed. At trial,
Mother testified that she “was in a relationship with [Taylor] for
seven years and [they] ha[d] three children together.” Taylor
agreed to these facts in his testimony, acknowledging that he had
been “in a relationship with” Mother and “had kids with” her.

20230210-CA 12 2026 UT App 53
State v. Taylor

And Taylor points us to nothing in the record that runs contrary
to these assertions of fact.

¶24 The jury was correctly instructed that the term
“cohabitant” included “an individual who is 16 years old or older
who . . . is or was living as if a spouse of the other party; has or
had one or more children in common with the other party; resides
or has resided in the same residence as the other party; or is or was
in a consensual sexual relationship with the other party.”
(Emphasis added.) See Utah Code § 78B-7-102(7)(a) (defining
“cohabitant”). And the facts as asserted by both Mother and
Taylor clearly satisfy that definition. Thus, even had the special
verdict form been phrased differently to more accurately express
the State’s burden, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have found that Taylor and Mother were not cohabitants.
Because Taylor cannot show harm, this assertion of plain error
also fails. 2

CONCLUSION

¶25 For each of his plain error arguments, Taylor has failed to
show that the asserted error was harmful. Therefore, we affirm.

2. Taylor alternatively argues that if the plain error doctrine does
not apply, there is “no avenue available for review” here, which
“should justify exceptional-circumstances review.” See generally
State v. Centeno, 2023 UT 22, ¶ 57, 537 P.3d 232 (explaining that the
exceptional circumstances exception to the preservation rule “is
applied sparingly,” is “reserved for the most unusual
circumstances,” and requires “a showing of a rare procedural
anomaly” (quotation simplified)). But because we address the
claimed error in the special verdict form under the plain error
doctrine, we do not reach Taylor’s alternative argument.

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