State v. Thalab

2026 UT App 43

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
UMAR AKEEM THALAB,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240351-CA
Filed March 26, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Linda M. Jones
No. 171909460

Lori J. Seppi, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Joshua J. Prince,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

TENNEY, Judge:

¶1 Umar Thalab appeals the denial of a motion to expunge his
conviction for attempted stalking. This denial was based, in part,
on the district court’s conclusion that, at the time of Thalab’s
sentencing in 2017, the sentencing court violated a statutory
obligation by not issuing a permanent criminal stalking
injunction. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the
district court. We therefore affirm. 1

1. As indicated, this appeal focuses on a determination by the
district court in 2023 that the court should have imposed a
permanent criminal stalking injunction at Thalab’s sentencing in
(continued…)
State v. Thalab

BACKGROUND

Charge and Sentencing

¶2 In early September 2017, Thalab was charged with one
count of stalking, a third-degree felony. This charge was based on
conduct that occurred between July and September 2017. At a
hearing later that month, Thalab pled guilty to attempted stalking,
a class A misdemeanor.

¶3 At the sentencing hearing in November 2017, the
sentencing court ordered Thalab to serve 365 days in jail with 302
days suspended and credit for 63 days served. The court also
ordered Thalab to serve 24 months of probation. During this
hearing, the parties and the court discussed a temporary civil
stalking injunction that was in place at the time. At the close of
that discussion, the sentencing court did not issue a permanent
criminal stalking injunction against Thalab.

¶4 Thalab completed all the conditions of his probation, and
in October 2018, he was approved for early termination of
probation. The court also later granted Thalab’s motion to reduce
his conviction to a class B misdemeanor.

2017. We note here that the case was transferred during the
intervening years to a different judge. And although both
decisions occurred within the same criminal case, for clarity, we’ll
generally refer to the court in 2017 as “the sentencing court,” and
the court in 2023 as “the district court.”
Also, the injunction at issue is statutorily referred to as a
“permanent criminal stalking injunction.” Various courts
(including the district court here and Utah appellate courts in past
decisions) have employed different shorthands for this phrase,
and we’ll generally leave those untouched.

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Expungement Proceedings

¶5 In May 2023, Thalab filed a petition to expunge his
attempted stalking conviction. The State opposed this petition,
arguing that the victim had been “statutorily entitled to a
permanent stalking injunction at the time of . . . Thalab’s
conviction and, had one been issued, . . . Thalab would be
statutorily ineligible for an expungement.” Contemporaneous
with this opposition, the State filed a motion to correct Thalab’s
sentence. The State advanced two rationales for this motion. First,
the State argued that under the statutory scheme in effect at the
time of sentencing (and, of note, under the interpretation of that
statutory scheme set forth in State v. Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, 360
P.3d 1), the sentencing court had been legally required to impose
a permanent criminal stalking injunction. In the State’s view, if “a
permanent criminal stalking injunction was not issued in this
case,” then the sentencing court had issued an illegal sentence that
must be corrected pursuant to rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Second, the State alternatively argued that
the sentencing court had intended to issue a permanent criminal
stalking injunction but that “a clerical error prevented the order
from being uploaded into the court record.”

¶6 Thalab opposed the State’s motion to correct the sentence.
With respect to the State’s rule 22(e) argument, Thalab asserted
that a permanent criminal stalking injunction was not mandatory
in 2017, so the sentence was not illegal. And with respect to the
State’s clerical error argument, Thalab asserted that there was no
indication that the sentencing court had intended to issue a
permanent criminal stalking injunction but that the injunction had
somehow not been properly issued.

¶7 At a hearing on the State’s motion to correct, the district
court agreed with the State that it was “appropriate” to “correct
an illegal sentence under Rule 22(e).” In the court’s view, the
statute that was in effect at the time of sentencing required the

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court to impose a permanent criminal stalking injunction, so the
failure to do so “amounted to the omission of a term required to
be imposed by statute.” The district court then set a hearing to
address the terms of the injunction that would be issued and to
also resolve Thalab’s expungement petition.

¶8 At that subsequent hearing, the district court reiterated its
conclusion that Thalab’s conviction required a “mandatory
permanent stalking injunction” under the statute that was in
effect at the time of sentencing. In addition, the court stated its
view that the sentencing court had “expressly intended to enter a
permanent stalking injunction” but that the injunction had not
been entered for reasons that were “unclear.” In this sense, the
court appeared to accept both of the State’s contentions—namely,
that a permanent criminal stalking injunction should now be
issued to correct either (1) an illegal sentence or (2) a clerical error.
Having made this decision, the court explained the terms of the
injunction to Thalab, and Thalab expressed his understanding of
its terms. The court then officially issued the permanent criminal
stalking injunction.

¶9 The court then turned to Thalab’s petition for
expungement. The court noted that a petitioner is statutorily
ineligible for expungement “if there is a criminal protective order
or a criminal stalking injunction in effect for the case.” Because
this was now the case, the court denied Thalab’s petition.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10 On appeal, Thalab first challenges the district court’s
decision to correct his sentence and issue a permanent criminal
stalking injunction. To the extent that this ruling turned on the
court’s interpretation of rule 22(e), our review is for correctness.
See State v. Wynn, 2017 UT App 211, ¶ 11, 407 P.3d 1113. And to
the extent that this ruling turned on questions of statutory

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State v. Thalab

interpretation, our review is also for correctness. See State v. Kropf,
2015 UT App 223, ¶ 7, 360 P.3d 1.

¶11 Thalab next argues that the court erred in denying his
petition for expungement. In this context, we “review the district
court’s underlying factual findings for clear error” and “its legal
determinations for correctness.” State v. Malo, 2020 UT 42, ¶ 14,
469 P.3d 982.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence

¶12 A district court’s jurisdiction over a criminal defendant
ordinarily “ends upon imposition of a valid sentence and entry of
final judgment.” State v. Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 10, 360 P.3d 1.
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure “governs
challenges to illegal sentences,” however, and it sets out certain
circumstances in which “a court must correct a convicted criminal
defendant’s sentence.” State v. Mullins, 2025 UT 57, ¶¶ 11, 15, —
P.3d —. Of note for this appeal, rule 22(e)(1)(F) states that a court
“must correct a sentence when the sentence imposed . . . omits a
condition required by statute.” And rule 22(e)(3) further provides
that a motion to correct a sentence under this subsection “may be
filed at any time.”

¶13 Here, the district court concluded that Thalab’s sentence
was illegal because under the relevant version of Utah Code
section 76-5-106.5 (the Stalking Statute), the sentencing court was
“required to issue a permanent stalking injunction at the time of
conviction.” Thalab challenges this conclusion on appeal, arguing
that issuance of a permanent criminal stalking injunction was not
statutorily mandated at the time but was instead subject to the
discretion of the district court. We disagree.

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State v. Thalab

¶14 At the time of Thalab’s conviction, the Stalking Statute
provided, in relevant part, as follows:

(9)(a) The following serve as an application for a
permanent criminal stalking injunction limiting the
contact between the defendant and the victim:

(i) a conviction for:

(A) stalking; or

(B) attempt to commit stalking; . . .

....

(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall
be issued by the court at the time of the conviction.
The court shall give the defendant notice of the right
to request a hearing.

Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(9)(a)–(b) (2017).

¶15 The question here is whether, under this statute,
imposition of a permanent criminal stalking injunction was
mandatory. This issue was squarely presented to this court in
Kropf, so we’ll begin our analysis there. 2

2. As something of an upfront guide for the reader, we note that
our decision in State v. Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, 360 P.3d 1,
interpreted a 2008 version of the Stalking Statute, and in the
course of our analysis, we also discussed certain amendments that
had been made to that statute in 2012. As will be discussed later
in this opinion, the legislature made more changes to that statute
that took effect in early 2017 (and, thus, before Thalab’s
sentencing), as well as yet more changes to the statute in 2020 that
(continued…)

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A. State v. Kropf

¶16 Kropf pled guilty in 2010 to stalking, and the district court
did not issue a permanent criminal stalking injunction at Kropf’s
sentencing. See Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 2. This came to the
attention of the district court a few years later when the victim of
Kropf’s stalking asked the court to impose a permanent criminal
stalking injunction against him. See id. ¶ 3. The victim asserted
that the version of the Stalking Statute in effect at the time of
Kropf’s sentencing “provide[d] for permanent criminal stalking
injunctions for victims of the crime of stalking to be automatically
imposed upon conviction,” and the victim further asserted that
the court’s “failure to enter the injunction . . . resulted in Kropf
receiving an illegal sentence, which the court had the authority to
correct under rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.”
Id. (quotation simplified). The district court agreed and corrected
Kropf’s sentence accordingly, thereby issuing a permanent
criminal stalking injunction. See id. ¶ 5.

¶17 Kropf challenged that decision on appeal, but we affirmed.
See id. ¶ 1. We held that “the plain language of the [S]talking
[S]tatute demonstrate[d] that imposition of a permanent criminal
stalking injunction [was] mandatory upon conviction for
stalking.” Id. ¶ 23. The crux of our decision was a textual analysis
of subsection (9)(b) from the 2008 version of the statute, which
was the version that controlled Kropf’s case. See id. ¶¶ 3 n.1, 12,
15–17. Subsection (9)(b) of that version of the statute read:

A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be
issued by the court without a hearing unless the

moved some key provisions to a different statute entirely. Our
references to “the Stalking Statute” are intended to refer to section
76-5-106.5 generally, and where warranted, we’ll note through
either textual cues or citations which version of the statute we’re
discussing at any particular point.

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State v. Thalab

defendant requests a hearing at the time of the
conviction. The court shall give the defendant notice
of the right to request a hearing.

Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(9)(b) (2008). We stressed that as a rule of
ordinary usage, the word “shall” “is usually presumed
mandatory.” Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 15 (quotation simplified).
We then concluded that this language “unambiguously
mandate[d] issuance of a permanent criminal stalking injunction
once a defendant [was] convicted of stalking.” Id.

¶18 In doing so, we acknowledged but rejected several of
Kropf’s arguments to the contrary. First, Kropf argued that “the
word ‘shall’” did not actually “amount to a mandate to issue the
injunction” but was instead “a constraint on the process for
imposing an injunction.” Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis added). Thus, in
Kropf’s view, the district court was “required to issue a stalking
injunction only if the defendant” did “not request a hearing,” but
if a hearing was requested, “only the hearing [was] mandatory,
not the injunction.” Id. We rejected that argument, however,
concluding that the only qualifier on “shall” in the version of the
Stalking Statute in effect at the time was “the provision that the
‘injunction shall be issued by the court without a hearing unless the
defendant requests a hearing.’” Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Utah Code § 76-5-
106.5(9)(b) (2008), emphasis added by Kropf). In our view, the
emphasized language did “not mean that the court” had
“discretion to determine whether to impose the permanent
criminal stalking injunction upon conviction.” Id. Rather, it meant
“simply that if the defendant request[ed] a hearing, a hearing
must be held before the injunction issue[d].” Id.

¶19 Second, Kropf also pointed to subsection (9)(a), which
stated that a “conviction for stalking . . . serves as an application
for a permanent criminal stalking injunction.” Utah Code § 76-5-
106.5(9)(a) (2008). Kropf argued that “the word application
ordinarily means request, petition, or a form used in making a

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request” and, thus, that the statute contemplated that “a
conviction merely serve[d] as a request that the court consider an
injunction” or “as an application initiating the process of deciding
whether or not to impose one.” Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 13
(quotation simplified, emphasis in original). But we rejected this
argument as well. We acknowledged that “the ‘application’
language Kropf cite[d] could be read in support of his
interpretation,” but we nevertheless concluded that when the
statutory language was “read as a whole,” it “unambiguously
mandate[d] issuance” of the permanent criminal stalking
injunction. Id. ¶ 15. In doing so, we pointed to another provision—
subsection (10)—that gave “the court options about the terms of
the injunction.” Id. ¶ 16; see also Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(10) (2008)
(stating that “[a] permanent criminal stalking injunction may
grant the following relief” and then setting out a list of conditions
that may be included). We held that subsection (10), read in
connection with subsection (9)(b), showed that while “the court
must enter a permanent criminal stalking injunction,” it had
“some discretion as to its terms.” Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 17.
Thus, contrary to Kropf’s assertions, we concluded that the
“‘application’ concept” was still consistent with the mandatory
language in subsection (9)(b). Id. ¶ 18. In our view, “[b]y having
the conviction serve as an automatic application for an injunction
rather than simply imposing the injunction automatically on
conviction,” the Stalking Statute provided “the defendant, the
victim, and the district court an opportunity to address the details
of an injunction’s terms before the injunction [was] imposed,
while still ensuring that a permanent criminal stalking injunction
in some form [would] issue as a consequence of the conviction.”
Id.

¶20 Third, Kropf pointed to certain provisions from the 2012
amendments to the Stalking Statute, arguing that these
amendments supported his contention that a permanent criminal
stalking injunction was discretionary. See id. ¶¶ 20–22. Kropf
initially cited language in the 2012 version of subsection (9)(d),

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which read, “If the conviction was entered in a justice court, a
certified copy of the judgment and conviction . . . shall be filed by
the victim in the district court as an application and request for a
hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction.” Utah Code
§ 76-5-106.5(9)(d) (2012). Kropf argued that this language showed
“that a conviction [did] not automatically trigger the issuance of a
permanent stalking injunction but rather permit[ted] the victim to
ask the court to grant such relief.” Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 20
(quotation simplified). But we again disagreed. We reasoned that
“the use of ‘application’ in subsection (9)(d) . . . refer[red] only to
the initiation of the permanent criminal stalking injunction
process, the result of which must be the imposition of the
injunction.” Id. We also concluded that subsection (9)(d)’s
reference to “the fact that when the conviction arises in justice
court, the victim must take the additional step of actually filing an
application” was “merely a reflection of the limited authority of
the justice court, which does not have the power to order a
permanent stalking injunction, thus requiring the filing of an
actual application in the district court, which does.” Id.

¶21 Finally, Kropf cited subsection (11), which was also added
in 2012, and which addressed parent-time and custody after a
permanent criminal stalking injunction was issued. See id. ¶ 22.
That provision stated, in relevant part:

If the court issues a permanent criminal stalking
injunction, but declines to address custody and
parent-time issues, a copy of the stalking injunction
shall be filed in any action in which custody and
parent-time issues are being considered and that
court may modify the injunction to balance the
parties’ custody and parent-time rights.

Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(11) (2012). Kropf argued that because
subsection (11) used the word “if . . . rather than when (or some
other phrase that suggests that imposition of the injunction is

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mandatory), the legislature must not have intended for all
convictions to warrant the imposition of a permanent injunction.”
Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 22 (quotation simplified). We rejected
this argument as well. We first noted that “this language was . . .
not contained within the [Stalking Statute] that [was] applicable
to Kropf, the 2008 version.” Id. But we nevertheless then rejected
the argument on its own terms, concluding that even if this
language could somehow “inform the meaning of the 2008
version” of the Stalking Statute, it was “clear that the legislature
used ‘if’ to refer to the possibility that the mandatory injunction
did not address parent-time or custody, not the possibility that a
criminal stalking injunction had not issued at all.” Id.

¶22 In light of all of this, we concluded that the plain language
of the Stalking Statute demonstrated that the imposition of a
permanent criminal stalking injunction was mandatory upon a
conviction for stalking. See id. ¶ 23. We accordingly held that the
sentencing court’s failure “to enter the injunction amounted to an
omission of a term required to be imposed by statute” and that, as
a result, the district court had “correctly concluded . . . that there
was a basis under rule 22 to correct the judgment to include the
injunction.” Id. (quotation simplified).

B. Thalab’s Appeal

¶23 Thalab’s appeal raises the same broad question under the
same statutory scheme—whether a permanent criminal stalking
injunction is mandatory at the time of sentencing. And Thalab
makes many of the same arguments that were raised in Kropf. Like
Kropf, for example, Thalab argues that subsection (9)(a)’s use of
the word “application” indicates that the district court has
discretion as to whether to issue a permanent criminal stalking
injunction. Like Kropf, Thalab argues that the use of the word
“shall” in subsection (9)(b) only imposes “a timing requirement”
and only refers to the court’s mandate to provide a hearing if a
hearing is requested. And like Kropf, Thalab argues that

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State v. Thalab

subsection (11)’s use of the word “if” indicates that a permanent
criminal stalking injunction is discretionary.

¶24 On its face, Kropf is thus clearly applicable to these
questions. “Stare decisis dictates that the first decision by a court
on a particular question of law governs later decisions by the same
court,” State v. Garcia-Lorenzo, 2022 UT App 101, ¶ 42, 517 P.3d 424
(quotation simplified), and it’s established in Utah that
“horizontal stare decisis requires that a court of appeals follow its
own prior decisions,” Sterling Fiduciaries LLC v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank NA, 2017 UT App 135, ¶ 14, 402 P.3d 130 (quotation
simplified). As a result, Kropf controls unless Thalab persuades us
that it’s either distinguishable or that it should be overruled.
Thalab chooses the latter path, and he attempts to do so on two
fronts: first, he asks us to overrule Kropf ourselves; and second, he
argues that Kropf has been legislatively abrogated. We address
each argument in turn.

1. Judicial Overruling

¶25 “Because stare decisis is so important to the predictability
and fairness of a common law system, we do not overrule our
precedents lightly.” Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 21, 345
P.3d 553 (quotation simplified). “Before we will cast aside our
caselaw, a party must address: (1) the persuasiveness of the
authority and reasoning on which the precedent was originally
based, and (2) how firmly the precedent has become established
in the law since it was handed down.” Burton v. Chen, 2023 UT 14,
¶ 51, 532 P.3d 1005 (quotation simplified). The first factor is
concerned with “the correctness of the precedent,” while the
second factor requires us to “assess the practical effect of the
precedent.” Garcia-Lorenzo, 2022 UT App 101, ¶ 45. A party
arguing for the overruling of precedent “must demonstrate that
both of these factors favor overruling”; thus, where one “factor[]
is not met, we need not discuss the other.” In re Discipline of Bowen,
2021 UT 53, ¶¶ 70, 84 n.20, 500 P.3d 788.

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¶26 Here, we need only address the first factor. In the statutory
interpretation context, this factor requires us to “consider whether
the prior interpretation is reasonable given the statutory
framework in existence at that time.” State v. Robertson, 2017 UT
27, ¶ 31, 438 P.3d 491 (quotation simplified). Thalab makes four
main arguments as to why he believes our interpretation of the
Stalking Statute was so incorrect that it should now be overruled:
(1) “Kropf did not employ the ordinary meaning of the word
‘application’ in subsection (9)(a) or (9)(d)”; (2) Kropf “overlooked
the plain meaning of the word ‘unless’” in subsection (9)(b) and
“interpreted this provision as if it had no qualifier at all”;
(3) “Kropf failed to employ the ordinary meaning [of] the word
‘may’” in subsection (10); and (4) “Kropf overlooked the due
process concerns of denying a defendant a meaningful hearing
before imposing a permanent criminal stalking injunction.”

¶27 But each of these arguments echoes—if not outright
replicates—an argument that we specifically addressed and
rejected in Kropf. See 2015 UT App 223, ¶¶ 13, 15, 18 (addressing
and rejecting the argument regarding the word “application” in
subsection (9)(a)); id. ¶¶ 12, 15–17 (addressing and rejecting the
argument regarding the word “shall” in subsection (9)(b)); id.
¶¶ 16–17 (employing the ordinary meaning of the word “may” in
subsection (10) to indicate discretion and juxtaposing such use
there with the mandatory “shall” in subsection (9)(b)); id. ¶¶ 28–
33 (addressing and rejecting the contention that Kropf was
deprived of due process). As explained below, Thalab has not
persuaded us that our prior conclusions were so incorrect or
unreasonable that they should now be overturned.

¶28 First, in Kropf, we agreed that “the ‘application’ language
Kropf cite[d] could be read in support of his interpretation,” but
we then concluded that when considering “the statutory language
. . . as a whole”—including, most essentially, subsection (9)(b)—
the Stalking Statute “unambiguously mandate[d] issuance of a
permanent criminal stalking injunction once a defendant [was]

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convicted of stalking.” Id. ¶ 15. We’re not persuaded that, as
Thalab now contends, Kropf failed to employ the ordinary
meaning of the word “application.” Rather, in our view, we
determined that “the context of [the whole] statute . . .
eliminate[d] [a] potential interpretation[] of [that particular]
statutory phrase” that might have otherwise indicated discretion.
Robertson, 2017 UT 27, ¶ 32. This conclusion was reasonable at the
time, and it remains so now.

¶29 Second, contrary to Thalab’s assertion, our decision in
Kropf did acknowledge that the word “unless” functioned as a
qualifier on the word “shall” in subsection (9)(b). See 2015 UT App
223, ¶ 15. But we then concluded that the qualifying effect of the
word “unless” did not alter the fact that a permanent criminal
stalking injunction “shall” be imposed in any given case. See id.
And we instead determined that the word “unless” merely set
forth two possible scenarios upon conviction: (1) an injunction
shall be imposed without a hearing if one is not requested by the
defendant or (2) an injunction shall be imposed with a hearing if
one is requested by the defendant. See id. Thalab has failed to
convince us that this interpretation was not reasonable. 3

3. In connection with this point, Thalab argues that “[i]f issuing a
permanent injunction was mandatory, the hearing permitted by
the statute would be rendered practically meaningless.” But we’re
not convinced this would be the case. As the State points out, even
if the Stalking Statute is read to impose a requirement for a
permanent criminal stalking injunction, there’s still reason to
afford the defendant a hearing. After all, the court retains some
discretion as to the scope and terms of the injunction. And we
made this very point in Kropf. See 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 16 (“The
purpose for requiring a hearing if the defendant requests one is to
give the defendant an opportunity to address the particular terms
of the mandatory injunction.”).
(continued…)

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¶30 Third, we are also not convinced that, in Kropf, we failed to
employ the ordinary meaning of the word “may” in subsection
(10). Again, any analysis of this subsection must be viewed in the
context of the statute as a whole. See LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39,
¶ 20, 337 P.3d 254 (“[W]e read the plain language of the statute as
a whole . . . .”). The reason that we addressed subsection (10) in
Kropf was to juxtapose its use of the word “may” with subsection
(9)(b)’s use of the word “shall.” See id. ¶¶ 16–17. We specifically
noted that “each term is intended to have its ordinary meaning.”
Id. ¶ 17. And we acknowledged that the “ordinary use of ‘may’ is
permissive.” Id. ¶ 16. Even so, we then said that the reason we
were not concluding that subsection (10) made the imposition of
an injunction discretionary was that subsection (10) made no
reference to the imposition of an injunction—rather, subsection
(10) was concerned only with the scope and terms of the injunction.
See id. ¶¶ 16–17.

¶31 Finally, in Kropf, we addressed Kropf’s due process
concerns at length. See id. ¶¶ 28–33. Thalab makes no meaningful
effort to address our reasoning there, let alone explain why it was
not reasonable. We accordingly see no reason to overrule this
aspect of this decision or the conclusions that flow from it.

¶32 In sum, we’re not persuaded that we should overrule Kropf
based on any flaw in its reasoning, and our reluctance to do so is

Having considered the matter anew in this appeal, we’re
still not persuaded that, just because the defendant is entitled to a
hearing, this can only mean that issuance of a permanent criminal
stalking injunction is discretionary. By way of loose analogy, we
note that some criminal offenses carry mandatory sentences. Yet
even so, a defendant is entitled to a sentencing hearing at which
he or she has the right to allocution. In this sense, even though the
end result may be mandatory, the hearing can serve other
purposes. In our view, something of a similar dynamic is in play
in this context as well.

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particularly warranted given the important interests served by
stare decisis. We therefore decline Thalab’s invitation to overrule
that decision ourselves.

2. Legislative Abrogation

¶33 Because the legislature has power to enact a statute, it also
has power to amend a statute in such a way that may abrogate or
essentially overrule a judicial decision that has interpreted it.
We’ve recognized this before, holding that courts should not
“steadfastly cling to [a prior opinion] as persuasive authority . . .
when that opinion’s interpretation of a Utah statute has been
countermanded by the very legislature that enacted it.” In re
E.H.H., 2000 UT App 368, ¶ 16, 16 P.3d 1257; see also Patterson v.
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 37, 266 P.3d 828 (“It is axiomatic that our
precedent must yield when it conflicts with a validly enacted
statute.”); State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, ¶ 48, 989 P.2d 1091
(noting that caselaw that was “inconsistent” with a particular
statute had “been legislatively overruled”). Thus, when caselaw
“directly conflicts” with subsequent statutory amendments, that
caselaw “must give way to the statute.” Patterson, 2011 UT 68,
¶ 37.

¶34 Here, Thalab argues that Kropf was legislatively abrogated
by two amendments to the Stalking Statute from 2012, another
amendment from 2017, and yet another from 2020. We address
each in turn.

¶35 2012 Amendments. As discussed above, Kropf was issued
in 2015. And although the sentencing there had occurred in 2010,
our decision discussed several provisions from the 2012
amendments. This sequence presents something of a conceptual
hurdle for Thalab, insofar as he’s arguing that Kropf was
legislatively abrogated by a statute that predated it and that was
even discussed in the opinion itself. While acknowledging this
potential problem, Thalab nevertheless maintains that the

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State v. Thalab

provisions he points to in this appeal were not adequately
considered by Kropf. We’re not convinced.

¶36 Thalab first points to amendments that were made in 2012
to subsection (10). Compare Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(10) (2008) (“A
permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following
relief . . . .”), with id. § 76-5-106.5(10) (2012) (“A permanent
criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the district court
granting the following relief where appropriate . . . .”). Thalab
argues that the “2012 change put the court in the driver’s seat”
because adding the phrase “‘where appropriate’ indicates
discretion.” But we disagree with the contention that, taken as a
whole, this amendment conflicts with the overall interpretation of
the Stalking Statute that we advanced in Kropf. Thalab focuses on
the addition of the phrase “where appropriate” to subsection (10),
but we think it’s significant that the legislature also added the
phrase “shall be issued,” which reinforces the overall notion that
the injunction was mandatory. Moreover, we believe that
Thalab’s argument might have more weight if the phrase “where
appropriate” had followed the phrase “shall be issued” (i.e., if the
amended statute had read, “A permanent criminal stalking
injunction shall be issued by the district court where
appropriate . . . .”). But this is not what the legislature did.
Instead, the phrase “where appropriate” comes after the phrase
“granting the following relief,” after which subsection (10) listed
several kinds of provisions that might be included in the
injunction. See id. § 76-5-106.5(10) (2012). And some of these
provisions were either vague or outright discretionary in nature.
Subsection (10)(c), for example, allowed a court to impose “any
other orders the court consider[ed] necessary to protect the victim
and members of the victim’s immediate family or household.” Id.
§ 76-5-106.5(10)(c) (2012). Taken together, this sequence suggested
that the phrase “where appropriate” was a reference to the court’s
discretion in determining the type of relief that could be included
in the injunction, not whether the injunction should be imposed
at all.

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State v. Thalab

¶37 Thalab next points to subsection (11), which was a
provision that was added to the statute in 2012 that addressed the
interplay between a permanent criminal stalking injunction on the
one hand and custody and parent-time rights on the other. See id.
§ 76-5-106.5(11) (2012). 4 In Thalab’s view, the word “if” in that
provision showed that imposition of the injunction was
discretionary. As discussed above, however, we expressly
considered and rejected that very argument in Kropf. See 2015 UT
App 223, ¶ 22. In doing so, we said that “in context, it is clear that
the legislature used ‘if’ to refer to the possibility that the
mandatory injunction did not address parent-time or custody, not
the possibility that a criminal stalking injunction had not issued
at all.” Id. (quotation simplified). We find our reasoning there
persuasive. And we certainly don’t see anything in that 2012
amendment that so conflicts with our ultimate conclusion in Kropf
that it constituted a legislative abrogation.

¶38 Finally, we note that we would reach this conclusion
regardless of whether the 2012 amendments to subsections
(10) and (11) are considered individually or instead together. As
discussed, in Kropf, we placed great emphasis on subsection (9)(b).
See id. ¶¶ 15, 19, 22. In doing so, we noted that the 2012 version of
the Stalking Statute had amended subsection (9)(b) in a way that
“grammatically disentangl[ed] the requirement to impose the
injunction from the defendant’s right to a hearing.” Id. ¶ 19. And
we observed that, with this change, “the legislature . . . more
plainly expressed its intent that the injunction be a mandatory
consequence of a stalking conviction.” Id. Compare Utah Code
§ 76-5-106.5(9)(b) (2008) (“A permanent criminal stalking
injunction shall be issued by the court without a hearing unless
the defendant requests a hearing at the time of the conviction. The
court shall give the defendant notice of the right to request a
hearing.”), with id. § 76-5-106.5(9)(b) (2012) (“A permanent

4. This is the same passage that we cited and block-quoted above
in paragraph 21.

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State v. Thalab

criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the court at the time
of the conviction. The court shall give the defendant notice of the
right to request a hearing.”). This conclusion retains equal force
now.

¶39 For these reasons, we conclude that neither of the 2012
amendments that Thalab points to in this appeal had the effect of
legislatively abrogating Kropf.

¶40 2017 Amendment. 5 Thalab next turns to one of the
amendments to the 2017 version of the Stalking Statute. There, the
legislature added a provision providing that, in addition to a
conviction for stalking, a conviction for attempted stalking would
“serve as an application for a permanent criminal stalking
injunction.” See id. § 76-5-106.5(9)(a)(i)(B) (2017). With this as the
springboard, Thalab points to a passage in Kropf in which we
discussed what we saw as the “good reason[s]” why the
legislature required issuance of a permanent criminal stalking
injunction after conviction. See 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 18. These
reasons included providing “an efficient and effective remedy
against the threat inherent in the crime of stalking, a threat that is
unlikely to have disappeared with the termination of a prison
sentence or supervision.” Id. And we also recognized that the
“nature of the crime often involves an obsessive and threatening
focus that can leave a victim with the kind of long-term anxiety
that only a permanent legal constraint on the stalker can begin to
address.” Id. In Thalab’s view, attempted stalking “doesn’t carry
the same implications as stalking.” As a result, Thalab argues that
the legislature’s inclusion of attempted stalking in the 2017 statute

5. The 2017 amendments to the Stalking Statute went into effect
on May 9, 2017, see Utah Code § 76-5-106.5 (2017), while the
conduct at issue in this case occurred from July through
September 2017 and Thalab’s sentencing hearing was held in
November 2017. The particular 2017 amendment at issue in
Thalab’s argument was therefore applicable to his sentencing.

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State v. Thalab

effectively “undermined” what he saw as a key piece of “Kropf’s
reasoning for reading the Stalking Statute to require a permanent
injunction.”

¶41 We’re not convinced. In our view, the result in Kropf was
primarily dictated by the textual analysis discussed above—most
notably, the mandatory “shall” in subsection (9)(b)—and any
discussion of policy implications was secondary. And the
inclusion of attempted stalking did not change that textual
analysis at all.

¶42 In any event, we think that many of the same policy
concerns still apply to attempted stalking. To be convicted of
attempted stalking, a defendant must have engaged in conduct
“constituting a substantial step toward” stalking, with the intent
to commit stalking or with the “awareness that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause that result.” Utah Code § 76-4-
101(1)(a)–(b). We see no reason to conclude that such conduct
would not “often involve[] an obsessive and threatening focus
that [could] leave a victim with the kind of long-term anxiety that
only a permanent legal constraint on the stalker [could] begin to
address.” Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 18. And we also see no
support for Thalab’s apparent assertion that a victim of attempted
stalking would not learn of the “obsessive or threatening
behavior” or suffer “long-term anxiety” from it. After all, to result
in a prosecution and then conviction, someone had to have learned
of the relevant conduct, and it’s difficult to imagine many
scenarios in which that person would be someone other than the
victim (i.e., where the victim would have been kept entirely in the
dark).

¶43 Thus, like a victim of completed stalking, it seems that a
victim of attempted stalking would also likely benefit from the
protections afforded by a permanent criminal stalking injunction.
At minimum, we don’t think the contrary arguments presented

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State v. Thalab

here are so clear that the inclusion of attempted stalking
constituted a legislative abrogation of our decision in Kropf.

¶44 2020 Amendment. Finally, Thalab points out that in 2020,
the legislature amended subsection (9)(a) of the Stalking Statute
to state that a “permanent criminal stalking injunction limiting the
contact between the defendant and victim may be filed in
accordance with Section 78B-7-902.” Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(9)(a)
(2020) (emphasis added). 6 The legislature then moved many of the
substantive provisions from the Stalking Statute that we’ve
discussed above into that new statute. These included the 2017
versions of subsections (9)(a), (9)(b), (9)(d), (10), and (11). Compare
id. § 76-5-106.5(9)–(12) (2017), with id. § 78B-7-902(1)–(4) (2020).

¶45 Thalab argues that this change “reinforce[d] that imposing
a permanent criminal stalking injunction is discretionary,”
primarily because it stated that a court “may” file a permanent
criminal stalking injunction in accordance with the standards that
are now set forth in that separate statute.

¶46 In the briefing, the parties disagree about whether the 2020
amendment is even relevant to the question before us. In the
State’s view, it’s not, because what’s at issue is the state of the law
in 2017, which was when Thalab was sentenced. In Thalab’s view,
however, it is relevant because (1) the 2020 amendment was relied
on by the district court in its 2023 ruling and (2) the 2020
amendment reinforced Thalab’s view of the 2017 amendment and
acted as a clarification for what he believes the legislature
intended all along. We need not resolve this dispute, however,
because we’re not persuaded that the changes made in the 2020
amendment were inconsistent with our conclusion in Kropf at all.

6. As the result of yet more amendments that have been enacted
since 2020, a substantially similar version of this particular
language is now found in Utah Code section 76-5-106.5(7)(a)
(2025).

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State v. Thalab

¶47 It’s true, as Thalab points out, that the 2020 version of
subsection (9)(a) of the Stalking Statute used the word “may.” But
it did so in the context of referring to the new statute. And that
statute then included the very same language that was previously
included in the Stalking Statute and that drove our analysis in
Kropf—including, of note, the language stating that a court “shall
issue a permanent criminal stalking injunction at the time of
conviction” (which was put into section 78B-7-902(1)(b)(i)), as
well as the language stating that a “court shall issue a permanent
criminal stalking injunction granting the following relief where
appropriate” (which was put into section 78B-7-902(2)). Indeed, as
Thalab himself acknowledges, “the instruction on when and how
to impose a permanent injunction remained the same” once
placed in the new statute, with the exception of “some stylistic
changes.” We’re accordingly not persuaded that, even if the 2020
version of the Stalking Statute were somehow applicable, it is so
inconsistent with the version of the Stalking Statute that we
considered in Kropf that we can now conclude that Kropf has been
legislatively abrogated.

¶48 For these reasons, we conclude that Kropf remains good
law and controls this issue. In light of this, we conclude that the
sentencing court was required to issue a permanent criminal
stalking injunction at Thalab’s sentencing, and because it did not,
it issued an illegal sentence. Under rule 22(e), the district court
therefore properly corrected Thalab’s sentence. 7

7. In his brief, Thalab also argued that the district court erred
when it “reopened the judgment . . . and imposed a permanent
injunction” on the basis of its conclusion that there was a clerical
error. As discussed, however, rule 22(e) is, alone, an appropriate
basis on which the court could correct Thalab’s sentence. See Kropf,
2015 UT App 223, ¶ 9. Thus, we need not also decide whether the
court appropriately corrected a clerical error.

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State v. Thalab

II. Petition for Expungement

¶49 In light of the above, we also affirm the district court’s
denial of Thalab’s petition for expungement. Utah Code section
77-40a-303(2)(f) states that a petitioner is “not eligible” for
expungement if “there is . . . a criminal stalking injunction against
the petitioner that is in effect.” 8 Thus, once the district court
concluded that the sentencing court was required to issue a
permanent criminal stalking injunction against Thalab in 2017,
and once the district court corrected Thalab’s sentence to include
one, Thalab was ineligible for expungement. For this reason, we
affirm the district court’s denial of Thalab’s petition.

CONCLUSION

¶50 For the reasons set forth above, we see no error in the
district court’s decision to correct Thalab’s sentence to impose a
mandatory permanent criminal stalking injunction, nor do we see
any error in its decision to deny Thalab’s petition for
expungement. We accordingly affirm.

8. This statute has been amended several times since Thalab filed
his expungement petition in 2023. See, e.g., Utah Code § 77-40a-
303 (2024); id. § 77-40a-303 (2025). Because the relevant statutory
language remains substantively unchanged, we cite the current
version for convenience.

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