Reese v. Reese

2026 UT App 31

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MAKAIBREE MARIE REESE,
Appellee,
v.
KYLAN REESE,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240830-CA
Filed March 5, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Laura Scott
No. 214903213

Joshua Lucherini, Attorney for Appellant
Steve S. Christensen and Clinton R. Brimhall,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 MaKaibree and Kylan Reese were divorced in an
uncontested proceeding in 2021. 1 Years after the decree was
entered, Kylan realized that he agreed to pay more than double in
child support than what he otherwise would have paid under the
applicable law. He filed a motion to set aside the child support
provision of the decree under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

1. “As is our practice in cases where both parties share a last name,
we refer to the parties by their first name with no disrespect
intended by the apparent informality.” Smith v. Smith, 2017 UT
App 40, ¶ 2 n.1, 392 P.3d 985.
Reese v. Reese

Procedure, claiming that the provision was void. The district
court denied his motion. Kylan appeals this denial, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 MaKaibree and Kylan were married in 2015 and share two
children. In early 2017, the parties executed a postnuptial
agreement, under which Kylan agreed to pay monthly child
support in the amount of either $2,500 or half of his monthly
salary, whichever was greater, in the event the parties divorced.
MaKaibree filed a petition for divorce through counsel in January
2021. Kylan did not retain counsel, and the parties filed a
stipulated settlement agreement. The district court entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law and issued a divorce
decree in June 2021. Each of these documents incorporated the
postnuptial agreement’s child support provision.

¶3 In January 2024, Kylan filed a motion seeking to set aside
the decree’s child support provision for voidness under rule
60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Specifically, Kylan
argued that the child support provision was void ab initio because
Utah law bars parties from entering into a premarital agreement
that would affect the right of a child “to support, health and
medical provider expenses, medical insurance, and child care
coverage.” (Quoting Utah Code § 81-3-203(2).) The court
concluded, as relevant on appeal, that the statute applies only to
“premarital agreements” and does not bar parties from “dictating
future child support obligations with a postnuptial agreement.”
Consequently, the court determined that the decree’s child

2. In the motion, Kylan also cited rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Based on how Kylan briefs the
issue on appeal, however, it’s clear that the actual basis for the
motion was rule 60(b)(4).

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Reese v. Reese

support provision was not void, and it therefore denied the
motion to set aside as untimely.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶4 On appeal, Kylan asserts that the district court erred in
determining that the child support provision of the decree was
not void under rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 3
“Normally, we review a district court’s denial of a 60(b) motion
under an abuse of discretion standard of review. But when
dealing with a rule 60(b)(4) motion seeking to set aside a judgment
as void, we review the district court’s decision for correctness.”
Sanders v. Sanders, 2021 UT App 122, ¶ 4, 502 P.3d 1230 (cleaned
up).

ANALYSIS

¶5 Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “[o]n motion and upon just terms, the court may relieve a
party or its legal representative from a judgment, order, or
proceeding” if “the judgment is void.” Rule 60(b)(4) motions
typically “must be filed within a reasonable time.” Utah R. Civ. P.
60(c); see In re Estate of Willey, 2016 UT 53, ¶ 17, 391 P.3d 171
(“Although the language of rule 60(c) states that all motions under

3. Kylan raises two other issues on appeal. First, he argues that the
district court should have applied section 81-3-203 of the Utah
Code to the parties’ postnuptial agreement. Second, he claims that
the court erroneously determined that the “child support order
was a product of [a] settlement agreement executed in the context
of a divorce proceeding rather than the product of a postnuptial
agreement.” However, the rule 60(b)(4) issue is dispositive
because the decree was not void and Kylan did not timely file his
motion under any other provision of rule 60(b). We therefore do
not address the other two issues.

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Reese v. Reese

paragraph (b) must be filed within a reasonable time, this court
has held that where the judgment is void because of a fatally
defective service of process, the time limitations of rule 60(b) have
no application.” (cleaned up)).

¶6 Kylan asserts that the decree’s child support provision was
“illegal, and therefore void [under rule 60(b)(4)], because it was
incorporated into the parties’ decree pursuant to [the] terms of
[the parties’] postnuptial agreement.” As support for his
argument, Kylan points to section 81-3-203(2) of the Utah Code,
which provides that “[t]he right of a child . . . to support, health
and medical provider expenses, medical insurance, and child care
coverage may not be affected by a premarital agreement.” But by
its plain terms, the statute applies only to “premarital
agreements,” not to postnuptial agreements. See Utah Code § 801-
3-203(2). And where statutory language is clear, we will not
rewrite the statute on policy grounds. 4 See, e.g., Federated Cap.
Corp. v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, ¶ 26, 384 P.3d 221 (“It is not the court’s
prerogative to rewrite the statutory language or to question the
wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying it.”
(cleaned up)).

¶7 Moreover, “we narrowly construe the concept of a void
judgment in the interest of finality.” Migliore v. Livingston Fin.,
LLC, 2015 UT 9, ¶ 26, 347 P.3d 394. Our supreme court has
identified three situations in which a judgment is void: (1) the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the court lacked
personal jurisdiction, or (3) the court entered the judgment when
a party didn’t receive “the notice required by due process.” Id.
(cleaned up); see also 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice

4. Even were we to consider rewriting the statute on policy
grounds—which, again, we cannot do—it bears mention that “a
party may agree to pay child support in excess of” the child
support guidelines under Utah law. Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App
311, ¶ 17 n.11, 263 P.3d 520.

20240830-CA 4 2026 UT App 31
Reese v. Reese

& Procedure § 2862 (3d ed. 2025 update) (noting that a court will
deny a motion under the federal rule when it “finds that there was
subject-matter or personal jurisdiction, or that no due-process
violation has occurred” (cleaned up)).

¶8 Here, Kylan does not argue that the district court lacked
subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Nor does he assert that he
did not receive adequate notice for due process purposes. In other
words, the child support provision does not fall under any of the
circumstances that the supreme court has said constitutes a void
judgment.

¶9 For these reasons, the court was correct in concluding that
the child support provision was not void and that the motion was
therefore otherwise untimely. Consequently, Kylan is not entitled
to the relief he seeks on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶10 The district court correctly concluded that the child
support provision of MaKaibree and Kylan’s divorce decree was
not void for purposes of rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and that Kylan’s motion to set aside the provision was
otherwise untimely. We therefore affirm the court’s denial of the
motion.

20240830-CA 5 2026 UT App 31