CourtListener 10736823•State v. Grundvig
Full text
2025 UT App 164
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
NATHAN DANIEL GRUNDVIG,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20230566-CA
Filed November 13, 2025
First District Court, Brigham City Department
The Honorable Brandon J. Maynard
No. 221100195
Freyja Johnson, Melissa Jo Townsend, and Emily
Adams, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Christopher A. Bates,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 Nathan Daniel Grundvig and his girlfriend (Kristina) got
into an argument. 1 The incident escalated to the point where
Grundvig prevented Kristina from leaving their home, threatened
her, placed his hand over her mouth, choked her, slapped her, and
punched her repeatedly. Because Kristina’s memory of the assault
was foggy, police bodycam videos recorded after the incident
were presented during trial as exhibits to jog her memory, and
these videos accompanied the jury into deliberations. During its
examination of witnesses at trial, the State referred to Grundvig’s
prior acts of domestic violence against Kristina. On appeal,
1. We employ pseudonyms for the nonparties in this opinion.
State v. Grundvig
Grundvig argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his attorney (Counsel) failed to object to (1) the introduction
of the other-acts evidence and (2) the video exhibits going with
the jury into its deliberations. We reject these claims and affirm
Grundvig’s convictions.
BACKGROUND 2
¶2 Grundvig and Kristina lived together with another couple,
Josh and Angela. One day in May 2022, while Josh and Angela
were out grocery shopping, Grundvig and Kristina got into an
argument about one of their cats. This conversation upset
Grundvig, who expressed his displeasure by throwing a can of cat
food at the back of Kristina’s head. Kristina told Grundvig she
would not put up with such behavior and said that she was going
on a walk. As Kristina made her way to the door, Grundvig told
her that she was “not going to leave like that” and pushed her
“away from the door,” causing her to fall. Grundvig then held
Kristina down, and she started screaming and telling him to get
off her. Grundvig muffled her screams by holding his hand over
her mouth, meanwhile telling her that “he wasn’t going to stop,”
that “he was going to hurt” her, and that “he was going to kill”
her. Kristina recalled being unable to breathe and that Grundvig
also choked her. Kristina eventually pushed Grundvig off and
fled to the bedroom. Grundvig apparently caught her and began
slapping her hands and legs. Indeed, Grundvig slapped her with
such force that he left a “hand mark” on Kristina’s thigh. He also
slapped her buttocks. She reported, “[H]e kept spanking me for
some reason. I don’t know why. Telling me I don’t listen . . . .”
Kristina broke free of Grundvig again and sought refuge in the
2. “We review the record facts in a light most favorable to the
jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly, presenting
conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised
on appeal.” State v. Mendoza, 2025 UT App 46, n.1, 568 P.3d 265
(cleaned up), cert. denied, 570 P.3d 661 (Utah 2025).
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State v. Grundvig
bathroom. But Grundvig pushed the door open and began
“pulling [her] hair and tossing [her] around.” When Kristina
grabbed his beard, Grundvig “freaked out and started punching
[her] over and over in [the] face.”
¶3 Josh and Angela returned at about this point, and the
assault ended. They were alarmed when they saw a gash on
Kristina’s forehead, and Angela called 911. Before Kristina was
transported by ambulance to the hospital, a police officer briefly
interviewed her at the house. In that interview, she told the officer
that she and Grundvig had an argument and she had tried to flee
to the bathroom, but Grundvig followed her and hit her. The
officer also interviewed Kristina while she was at the hospital.
These interviews were recorded on the officer’s bodycam.
Kristina received six stitches to close the gash on her forehead.
¶4 The State charged Grundvig with one count of kidnapping
for refusing to allow Kristina to leave, one count of forcible sexual
abuse for slapping her buttocks during the attack, two counts of
aggravated assault for placing his hand over her mouth and for
choking her, and one count of assault resulting in substantial
bodily injury for throwing the can of cat food at her, grabbing her
hair, throwing her, and punching her with a closed fist.
¶5 At trial, the State’s case included testimony from Kristina,
Josh, and Angela. When Kristina testified, she said her memory of
the incident after Grundvig pushed her to the floor as she tried to
leave was “a little bit fuzzy.” To refresh Kristina’s memory, the
State moved to offer four exhibits consisting of the bodycam
video:
• Exhibit 22 showed Kristina when she was interviewed at
the house. She was sitting on a couch and holding a
bloodied towel in her hand. She explained that she and
Grundvig got into an argument that “got way heated,” she
locked herself in the bathroom but “it didn’t work,” and
Grundvig hit her.
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State v. Grundvig
• Exhibit 23 showed Kristina lying on a hospital bed. The
gash on her forehead and bruises on her legs were visible.
Kristina explained that Grundvig threw a can of cat food at
her, stopped her from leaving, held her down, put his hand
over her mouth, and said that he was going to kill her. In
addition, Kristina said Grundvig pulled her hair and
punched her in the bathroom. She then stated that the
assault ended when Josh and Angela returned.
• Exhibit 24 also showed Kristina at the hospital. She said
that Grundvig covered her mouth and nose with his hand
and that she thought she lost consciousness or was close to
losing consciousness. Kristina also explained that
Grundvig had “choked [her] before” to the point that she
had passed out. She further revealed that he had used
“[b]oth hands” to choke her and he would “put [her] in [a]
wrestling move where . . . his legs” would hold her arm
above her head.
• Exhibit 25 was also from the hospital interview. Kristina
stated that the bruises on her thighs were from Grundvig
holding and slapping her. She also stated that Grundvig
kept “spanking” her because she didn’t listen.
Counsel did not object to the admission of these video exhibits.
The State subsequently played them to assist Kristina when she
testified about the assault.
¶6 On cross-examination, Counsel immediately asked
Kristina if her relationship with Grundvig was “tumultuous.” She
said that it was. Counsel then asked, “And as a part of your
relationship were you two involved in any use of illegal
substances?” Kristina admitted that they frequently used
methamphetamine and had, in fact, taken the drug on the
morning of the incident. She testified, “I really think that drugs
was a big factor in a lot of this because [Grundvig] turned into
something that I had never seen before and I’ve known him for
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State v. Grundvig
years. But the drugs took over. I think he was trying to run from
something and he didn’t know how to cope with it. So he used
more and more and more.”
¶7 Counsel then played a portion of the bodycam video from
Exhibit 25 that had not yet been played. In this portion, the officer
asked Kristina if Grundvig had ever used a weapon against her or
threatened to kill her. Kristina said that he had. But she also told
the officer that Grundvig was not “violent,” “control[ling],” or
“jealous.” After the video was played, Counsel asked Kristina
about some of what she had said in the video. Specifically, he
asked Kristina to confirm that Grundvig was “not controlling,”
did not “leave [her] threatening messages,” and did not “spy” on
her. Kristina confirmed that he did not engage in such behavior.
Counsel also had the following exchange with Kristina:
Counsel: [I]s this an event that happened frequently
or is this something that just happened one
time?
Kristina: We’ve gotten into some arguments, but we
always ended up pretty well by just
separating.
Counsel: And you don’t actually remember being
assaulted?
Kristina: No.
¶8 On redirect, the prosecutor picked up where Counsel had
left off, asking about Kristina’s “history with the defendant” and
whether Grundvig had “ever physically assaulted” her prior to
the incident in question. Kristina responded, “Yes, but I had also
hit him as well.” The prosecutor then asked Kristina about a
statement she made to the officer in her interview at the hospital:
Prosecutor: [I]n the video you mentioned that he’d
strangled you to unconsciousness before.
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State v. Grundvig
Kristina: Yes.
Prosecutor: Do you remember that?
Kristina: I do.
Prosecutor: Tell us a little bit about that.
Kristina: We had gotten into an argument a couple
of times before that, and I don’t
remember exactly what happened . . . .
[B]ut I think I threw some pizza at him
and I had hit him a couple of times and
then the next thing I remember is like
waking up on the ground and I’m not
really sure how.
Kristina stated that Grundvig had “tried to stop [her] from leaving
a couple of times” after arguments, explaining that Grundvig
“was really trying to figure out something that [they] could do to
help [themselves] because he didn’t want this to happen again.”
The prosecutor also asked Kristina if Grundvig “had been aware
of all the prior times he had hurt” her. Kristina responded, “Yes.
And I was aware of what I had done as well.”
¶9 Josh and Angela also testified. Josh stated that when he and
Angela returned from the grocery store, Kristina said she couldn’t
breathe and was asking for help. He said Kristina had a gash on
her forehead. Josh also said that he had “pulled [Grundvig] off of
[Kristina] a couple of times” over the course of their relationship.
Angela testified that while she had never seen Grundvig hit
Kristina, there was an occasion when Josh had to pull Grundvig
off Kristina. Angela stated that she saw Kristina bleeding when
they returned. She also testified that the police had been called to
the house in the past because “there was a lot of fighting” between
Kristina and Grundvig.
¶10 Grundvig did not call any witnesses or testify in his own
defense.
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State v. Grundvig
¶11 Pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the
court instructed the jury that evidence Grundvig “engaged in
physical altercations . . . before the acts charged in this case . . .
was not admitted to prove a character trait of [Grundvig] or to
show that he acted in the manner consistent with that trait” and
that the jury “may consider this evidence, if at all, for the limited
purpose of [Grundvig’s] intent, knowledge, [or] absence of
mistake.” The jury convicted Grundvig as charged.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12 On appeal, Grundvig advances two claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel. First, Grundvig argues that Counsel should
have objected on other-acts-evidence grounds when the State
elicited testimony about his prior acts of domestic violence.
Second, he claims Counsel unreasonably failed to object to the
four video exhibits that the jury was permitted to take into
deliberations. Claims of ineffective assistance raised for the first
time on appeal present a question of law that we review for
correctness. State v. Ames, 2024 UT App 30, ¶ 16, 546 P.3d 356, cert.
denied, 550 P.3d 993 (Utah 2024).
ANALYSIS
¶13 To establish ineffective assistance, Grundvig must
demonstrate that Counsel’s performance was deficient and
prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). It
is unnecessary for the court to address both prongs of this analysis
when a party fails to establish one of the prongs. Id. Here, we limit
our analysis to the deficient performance prong. To prove
deficient performance, Grundvig “must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (cleaned up).
“The question of deficient performance is not whether some
strategy other than the one that counsel employed looks superior
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State v. Grundvig
given the actual results of trial. It is whether a reasonable,
competent lawyer could have chosen the strategy that was
employed in the real-time context of trial.” State v. Florreich, 2024
UT App 9, ¶ 27, 543 P.3d 795 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 547 P.3d
828 (Utah 2024). In other words, “the performance inquiry will
often include an analysis of whether there could have been a
sound strategic reason for counsel’s actions.” State v. Scott, 2020
UT 13, ¶ 35, 462 P.3d 350. And “if the court concludes that the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy, it
follows that counsel did not perform deficiently.” Id. (cleaned up).
I. Other-Acts Evidence
¶14 Grundvig first argues that Counsel performed deficiently
when he repeatedly failed “to object to inadmissible 404(b)
evidence” introduced at trial. Specifically, Grundvig asserts that
evidence of his “prior assaults against [Kristina] and physical
altercations with” Josh was inadmissible under the plain language
of rule 404(b) and that Counsel should have objected when
Kristina, Josh, and Angela testified about the prior assaults.
¶15 Because we have no trouble identifying a sound trial
strategy for Counsel’s decision not to object to the other-acts
evidence, we conclude that Counsel did not perform deficiently,
given the circumstances of the case. First, the physical evidence
that Kristina had been assaulted was abundant. Josh and Angela
returned to the residence to find Kristina with a gash on her
forehead. The police were called, and Kristina’s injuries—the gash
and the bruising on her body—were photographed. Second,
Kristina had difficulty remembering what happened during the
attack, so Counsel knew that the bodycam videos would be
admissible. See Utah R. Evid. 803(5) (stating that a “record that:
(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot
recall well enough to testify fully and accurately; (B) was made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s
memory; and (C) accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge” is
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State v. Grundvig
not excluded by the rule against hearsay). 3 Counsel had viewed
these videos and knew that they contained Kristina’s detailed
account of the assault soon after it happened.
¶16 Given the damaging evidence and admissibility of the
bodycam videos, Counsel could have decided to make the best of
a bad situation by highlighting Kristina’s statements in Exhibit 25
that Grundvig was not violent, controlling, or jealous and that he
didn’t spy on her or send her threatening messages. Counsel even
asked Kristina if something like the attack “happened frequently”
or if it “just happened one time,” to which she replied that she and
Grundvig had “gotten into some arguments” but had “always
ended up pretty well by just separating.” By eliciting this
favorable testimony from Kristina, it appears that Counsel could
have been attempting to dispel the overwhelmingly negative
image of Grundvig established by the other evidence.
¶17 Moreover, Counsel elicited testimony from Kristina that
she had hit Grundvig in the past. Indeed, in closing, Counsel
emphasized Kristina’s admission that she and Grundvig
“engaged in mutual hitting a lot,” showing that “there was a lot
going on in that house that shouldn’t have been and it wasn’t just
[Grundvig] who was involved in it.”
¶18 But Counsel could not have it both ways. By highlighting
evidence that Grundvig was not violent, controlling, or jealous
and that Kristina may have been violent herself, Counsel opened
the door for the State to also address the evidence of Grundvig’s
prior physical altercations with Kristina. See State v. Ramos, 882
P.2d 149, 154 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (acknowledging that a
defendant cannot attack on appeal the admission of other-acts
evidence when “he himself opened the door to its introduction on
cross-examination”). This is a quintessential tactical decision and
therefore cannot be the basis for showing deficient performance.
3. Indeed, on appeal Grundvig concedes that the bodycam videos
were admissible.
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State v. Grundvig
This point is well illustrated in State v. Whitchurch, 2024 UT App
108, 554 P.3d 1166, cert. denied, 564 P.3d 960 (Utah 2025). In
Whitchurch, this court found no deficient performance when
counsel did not object to the admission of a jailhouse letter that
contained both helpful and harmful information. Id. ¶¶ 56–58.
There, we concluded that counsel could have strategized that the
harmful information was “outweighed by the potential benefits”
of other information in the letter and that the “decision not to
object to the letter’s admission into evidence did not amount to
deficient performance.” Id. ¶ 61. So too here. The only way for
Counsel to get to Kristina’s testimony that Grundvig was not
controlling or violent was to address the dynamics of their past
relationship, which was a tactic not without risk. But “deciding
between the pros and cons of allowing the jury to hear evidence
that has the potential to cut both for and against a defendant’s case
is a quintessentially tactical decision, which we will not question
unless there is no reasonable basis supporting it.” Id. ¶ 58 (cleaned
up).
¶19 Having introduced evidence concerning the mutually
combative nature of the relationship, Counsel ran the risk that the
State would elicit further testimony on redirect to refute that
defense theory, which, indeed, is what the State did. However,
that Counsel’s decision was not without this risk does not mean it
was unsound from a strategic perspective, especially given the
difficult facts Counsel faced. And because Counsel employed a
reasonable tactical strategy, his decision to refrain from objecting
to the State’s line of questioning cannot form the basis for deficient
performance. See id. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective
assistance necessarily fails. 4
4. Grundvig articulates an ancillary ineffective-assistance claim,
arguing that Counsel should have specifically requested pretrial
notice of evidence concerning Grundvig’s other acts of domestic
violence against Kristina. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2)(A) (“On
(continued…)
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State v. Grundvig
II. Exhibits in Jury Deliberation
¶20 Grundvig next argues that Counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the bodycam videos of Kristina’s interview
statements accompanying the jury into deliberations, contending
that the jury’s “unfettered access to the videos placed undue
emphasis on [Kristina’s] video statements without the
counterpoint of her conflicting and equivocal trial testimony.” But
we conclude that Counsel’s failure to object did not constitute
deficient performance for two reasons.
¶21 First, under rule 17(k) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, “[u]pon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take
with them . . . all exhibits which have been received as evidence,
except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in
the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size,
weapons or contraband.” As our supreme court has observed,
“[r]ule 17(k) expressly allows the jury to take all exhibits back to
deliberations except those which the court decides in its discretion
the jury should not have.” Wyatt v. State, 2021 UT 32, ¶ 19, 493
P.3d 621. The court noted that the rule “contemplates a
cumbersome or dangerous exhibit” as “inappropriate for the jury
room.” Id. The court specifically observed that the rule doesn’t
include a “testimonial” exhibit on its list of inappropriate exhibits
for the jury room. Id. “[N]othing in the language of the rule,” the
court noted, “purports to bar testimonial exhibits from going back
request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must . . .
provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any [other-acts]
evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial.” (emphasis
added)). Our resolution of the first issue obviates the need to
address this claim. Since there is no indication that the State
intended to introduce the other-acts evidence until Grundvig
opened the door to its admission, this claim of ineffective
assistance necessarily fails. Stated simply, the State could not have
provided notice of its intent to introduce character evidence
when, in fact, it did not intend to introduce that evidence.
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State v. Grundvig
with the jury.” Id. Given this clear directive from our supreme
court, we cannot conclude that Counsel performed deficiently in
declining to lodge an objection that would have certainly failed.
See State v. Soto, 2022 UT App 107, ¶ 31, 518 P.3d 157 (“A futile
objection necessarily fails both the deficiency and prejudice
prongs of the Strickland analysis because it is not unreasonable for
counsel to choose not to make an objection that would not have
been granted, and forgoing such an objection does not prejudice
the outcome.” (cleaned up)).
¶22 Second, Counsel may have wanted the videos to
accompany the jury for tactical reasons. As noted, the videos
contained information favorable to Grundvig: Kristina’s
statements that he was not violent, controlling, or jealous. The
only way that the jury could view these statements again—limited
in helpfulness though they may have been—was to allow the
videos to go back with the jury. Thus, “where rule 17 does not
generally preclude testimonial evidence from being sent back
with the jury and where Counsel could have made the reasonable
strategic decision to allow [the bodycam videos] to go back with
the jury because he clearly considered . . . details therein as
supportive of the defense’s theory of the case, Counsel did not
perform deficiently by failing to raise an objection under rule 17.”
State v. Moore, 2025 UT App 26, ¶ 53, 566 P.3d 69, cert. denied, 570
P.3d 658 (Utah 2025).
¶23 For these reasons, Grundvig’s second claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel also founders for lack of deficient
performance.
CONCLUSION
¶24 Grundvig has not demonstrated that Counsel rendered
deficient performance in failing to object to (1) the other-acts
evidence presented at trial and (2) the bodycam videos
accompanying the jury into deliberations. Because he has not
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State v. Grundvig
established deficient performance on either point, his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily fall short. We
therefore affirm his convictions.
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