State v. Hansen

2025 UT App 121

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
STEPHANIE HANSEN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20220178-CA
Filed August 14, 2025

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Christine Johnson
No. 201402201

Jennifer L. Foresta, Attorney for Appellant
Jeffrey S. Gray, Jared Perkins, and
Christopher D. Ballard, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

TENNEY, Judge:

¶1 Stephanie Hansen was charged with one count of child
abuse for slapping and choking her five-year-old daughter. Before
trial, Hansen filed a motion to suppress some incriminating
statements that she had made to a Division of Child and Family
Services (DCFS) caseworker and, later, to a detective, arguing
that she had been subjected to a custodial interrogation
without first receiving the Miranda warnings. The district court
denied the motion, and Hansen was later convicted at the close of
a jury trial.

¶2 Hansen now appeals, arguing that the district court erred
in denying the motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth
below, we conclude that Hansen was not subjected to a custodial
State v. Hansen

interrogation. We accordingly reject Hansen’s arguments and
affirm her conviction.

BACKGROUND 1

Allegations and Interviews

¶3 In May 2020, Hansen bought a kitten for her five-year-old
daughter, Iris. 2 On July 8, Iris told Hansen that she had just killed
the kitten and that she had done so on purpose. Iris said that “she
wanted the cat to die,” and she also told Hansen that she wanted
Hansen “to die.” Hansen was very upset and yelled at Iris, and
the two had an argument. That same day, Hansen called both
Iris’s grandmother (Grandmother) and Iris’s father (Father).
During those conversations, she told each of them about Iris
killing the kitten, and she also told each of them that, during the
ensuing argument, she had slapped Iris across the face.

¶4 Two days later, at around 3:30 p.m., a DCFS caseworker
(Caseworker) arrived at Hansen’s apartment, accompanied by
two police officers (Officer 1 and Officer 2). 3 Caseworker was

1. As discussed in more detail below, the facts at issue were
developed at both an evidentiary hearing and at a subsequent
trial. On appeal, Hansen only challenges the denial of her motion
to suppress, so we “recite the facts in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s findings.” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 4 n.1,
428 P.3d 1052 (quotation simplified).

2. A pseudonym.

3. The events at the apartment were recorded on the bodycams of
the officers. Footage from both bodycams was submitted below
and is in the appellate record. It includes clear audio and video
and is consistent with the district court’s findings following the
(continued…)

20220178-CA 2 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

wearing jeans and a polo shirt, while the two officers were in full
uniforms. After Caseworker knocked on the door, Hansen opened
the door and let Caseworker and the two officers inside.

¶5 As the men were entering, Hansen said, “I’m really
nervous.” When Officer 2 went to close the door, Hansen asked
him to keep it open, and he complied. Hansen said to the group
that she had received a “threatening phone call” telling her that
she would “receive people here.” Iris was in the front room at the
time, and Caseworker turned to her and asked her to go to her
room so that he could speak to her mom privately. Hansen then
suggested that she could speak with Caseworker and the officers
outside with the door shut, thus leaving Iris inside. In response,
Officer 2 offered to stay inside with Iris while Hansen,
Caseworker, and Officer 1 went outside. At that point,
Caseworker and Officer 1 walked outside. Hansen started to
follow them, but when she reached the open doorway, she
hesitated and stopped, saying, “No, I’m . . . no.” Hansen then
expressed her discomfort with the idea of going outside while
leaving Officer 2 behind, saying that she didn’t want Officer 2 to
speak to Iris without her. Hansen suggested, again, that they
should leave Iris inside while the adults went outside and spoke
on the walkway that ran outside her apartment door.

¶6 The following exchange then took place:

Officer 2: You don’t have a choice right now. You
need to go outside and talk to them. And I have to
be with her.

Officer 1: You gotta come outside and talk to this
man right here.

suppression hearing. Our account of the events at the apartment
(including the verbal exchanges) is drawn from that footage.

20220178-CA 3 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

Hansen: Well, then—well, I want—

Officer 2: You don’t want her to hear the
conversation about to happen.

Officer 1: Stephanie, you have to come outside and
talk to this man right here, please. Please come
outside and talk to him.

Hansen: You’re telling me I can’t hear what you’re
going to tell my five-year-old?

Officer 2: I’m not gonna talk to your five-year-old,
but I don’t want her to hear the conversation you’re
gonna have with this gentleman and this officer.

Hansen: Well, I understand that.

Officer 2: So, step outside and I’ll be right here. And
there’s a body camera going, okay? Nothing’s
gonna happen. The door won’t be shut, I’ll crack it.
But I’m gonna stay right here and you’re gonna go
talk to them. Okay? That’s how it has to be.

¶7 After a four-second pause, Officer 1 said, “Please come
outside, Stephanie.” As he said this, Hansen relented and stepped
outside to the walkway. Caseworker and Officer 1 were already
there, and Officer 2 remained inside with Iris with the front door
slightly cracked open.

¶8 Once outside, Hansen stood against the banister that ran
along the walkway. Hansen’s apartment was on the second floor,
and the walkway overlooked an adjacent parking lot. There was
a public stairway at the end of the walkway, and over the course
of the ensuing conversation, several people walked up or down
the stairs. There was a busy road near the parking lot, and during
the recorded conversation, a steady stream of cars passed by.

20220178-CA 4 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

¶9 Caseworker stood a few feet away from Hansen on her left
side, while Officer 1 stood a few feet away on her right side. At
the beginning of the conversation, Officer 1 told Hansen to “talk
to him” (meaning, Caseworker), so Hansen turned and faced
Caseworker. Officer 1 then stayed a few feet behind Hansen
during the conversation and did not meaningfully participate in
what followed. 4

¶10 Caseworker started by asking Hansen to tell him about the
“threatening phone call” that she had mentioned earlier. Hansen
clarified that it had actually been a threatening “text message,”
not a phone call, that she had received it from Father, and that
Father had told her that people were coming to take Iris away
from her. Caseworker said, “That’s not my goal, okay. I know it
looks that way. That’s not my goal.” Caseworker then told
Hansen that he had received a report asserting that Hansen had
“hit” Iris. Caseworker asked Hansen if that had happened, and
Hansen responded that there had been an “incident” in which she
“smack[ed]” Iris “on the cheek.” Caseworker asked Hansen to
explain more about what had happened, and over the course of
several minutes, Hansen recounted the circumstances detailed
above—namely, that Iris had killed the kitten, the two had argued
about it, and Hansen had “smacked” Iris during that argument.
In response to further questioning, Hansen volunteered that she
had “hit [Iris] hard on the cheek” with an “open palm” and that
she had left “a mark there.” Caseworker told Hansen that he had
also heard that she had “strangled” Iris and “grabbed her around
the neck,” but Hansen shook her head and said “no.”

4. Around three minutes into the conversation on the walkway,
Hansen expressed some discomfort about what was going on
inside her apartment, which prompted Officer 1 to assure Hansen
that Iris was “fine” and that Officer 2’s “bodycam [was] rolling.”
But Officer 1 did not otherwise participate in the discussion
between Hansen and Caseworker about the alleged abuse.

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State v. Hansen

¶11 At one point during the conversation, Hansen moved
toward the door and repositioned herself. At another point,
Hansen opened the front door a little wider and looked in to check
on Iris. In those moments, neither Caseworker nor Officer 1
stopped Hansen from moving around. Throughout the
conversation, Caseworker remained soft-spoken and polite, and
he never raised his voice.

¶12 Around ten minutes into this interview, Grandmother
arrived on the walkway, approached Hansen, and asked if she
was okay, to which Hansen replied, “We’re talking.” Officer 1 told
Grandmother to wait out of the way and said that she could talk
to “them” momentarily.

¶13 About three minutes after that interaction, Caseworker,
Hansen, and Officer 1 moved inside so that Caseworker could
speak with Iris. When he sat down with her, Caseworker saw a
mark on Iris’s cheek and a bruise on the back of her neck.
Caseworker then spoke with Iris. During that discussion, Iris told
Caseworker that Hansen had kicked her after she killed the kitten.
After showing Caseworker the bruise on the back of her neck, Iris
said, “My mommy just did it.” Iris was nonresponsive when
Caseworker asked her about the mark on her cheek.

¶14 Officer 1 stepped outside, called the detective who was
working on the case (Detective), and asked him to come to the
apartment. Detective arrived a short time later, at which point he
asked Officer 1 to escort Hansen to the police station. Outside the
presence of Iris, Officer 1 said to Hansen, “I’m not arresting you,
but I do need to take you to the station so that a detective can talk
to you,” and he told Hansen that she wouldn’t be handcuffed if
she was “cooperative.” Hansen left Iris with Grandmother, and
Officer 1 then drove Hansen to the station in his car.

20220178-CA 6 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

¶15 Once there, Detective interviewed Hansen. 5 At the
beginning of the interview, Detective verbally informed Hansen
of her Miranda rights. In response to questions from Detective,
Hansen indicated that she understood her rights and that she did
not have any questions about them. Detective told Hansen that if
he asked a question that she didn’t “like,” she didn’t “have to
answer that question.” Detective asked Hansen to sign a written
waiver of her Miranda rights, but Hansen refused, expressing
concerns about how it might be used by Father and Grandmother.
Although she was unwilling to sign the written waiver, Hansen
agreed that she was willing to answer some questions. 6

¶16 During the interview, Hansen repeatedly admitted to
slapping Iris. She said, “I smacked her across the face on her cheek
and left a mark on her face,” and she later said, “I slapped her
hard.” But when Detective brought up the bruises on Iris’s neck,
Hansen repeatedly denied choking Iris, at one point asking,
“[A]re you trying to coerce me into telling you I did that?” When
Detective later asked whether there was “anything that might
have been accidental . . . versus choking,” Hansen replied,
“[M]aybe . . . I don’t know.” Hansen later suggested, however,
that the bruising on Iris’s neck might have been caused by Iris
falling off a chair or bumping into the ladder on her bunk bed.

Charge and Motion to Suppress

¶17 In July 2020, Hansen was charged with one count of child
abuse, a class A misdemeanor. In the information, the State
alleged that Hansen had “intentionally or knowingly inflict[ed]

5. This interview was recorded, and that recording was later
submitted to the district court and is in the appellate record.

6. Hansen has not argued on appeal that her verbal waiver of the
Miranda rights was invalid because she did not sign the written
waiver.

20220178-CA 7 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

physical injury” on Iris, thus violating Utah Code sections 76-5-
109(2) and (3)(a).

¶18 Hansen later filed a motion to suppress the statements that
she had made to Caseworker at the apartment, as well as the
statements she made to Detective at the police station. 7 Hansen
first argued that the statements she made at the apartment should
be suppressed because she was subjected to a custodial
interrogation without first receiving the Miranda warnings. In
Hansen’s view, she was “in custody,” in part, because “the
officers specifically told [her] that she had to answer”
Caseworker’s “questions about the allegations of abuse,” and
because, on the walkway, the positioning of Officer 1,
Caseworker, and the banister “effectively block[ed] her from
leaving unless she chose to jump off.” Hansen then argued that
although she received the Miranda warnings once at the police
station, the statements she made to Detective should be
suppressed because the second interrogation was “so close in time
to the first” and her answers naturally flowed from the earlier
interrogation. Hansen claimed that Detective had “asked her
questions which elicited essentially the same information she
provided in response to the questioning” from Caseworker at her
apartment. At the close of her motion to suppress, Hansen asked
the court to hold an evidentiary hearing.

¶19 In response, the State filed a notice reserving the right to
file a written opposition to the motion until after the court held an
evidentiary hearing. At the subsequent evidentiary hearing,

7. Hansen’s motion also asked the court to suppress statements
she made to the officers at the apartment. But Hansen has not
pointed to anything incriminating that she said to the officers;
instead, her arguments have been directed at various things she
said to Caseworker (albeit in the presence of Officer 1 while on the
landing), and, later, Detective. Regardless, our analysis below
would apply with equal force to anything she said to the officers.

20220178-CA 8 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

Officer 1, Officer 2, Caseworker, and Detective all testified, and
the court also received the footage from both officers’ bodycams.
Through questioning of the officers and playing the bodycam
footage, the State showed that, at the apartment, the officers never
told Hansen that “she was not free to leave,” never drew their
weapons, and never physically touched or restrained Hansen.

¶20 The State later filed a written opposition to the motion to
suppress. There, the State argued that Hansen was not subjected
to a custodial interrogation at the apartment. This was so,
according to the State, because the interview occurred at Hansen’s
apartment, she “was not detained by police,” and there were “no
objective indicia of arrest,” such as “police lights or sirens,”
“locked doors,” or “readied handcuffs.” In the State’s view, the
discussion with Caseworker was entirely “consensual[].” From
there, the State argued that Hansen’s statements at the police
station should not be suppressed. The State reiterated its view
that there had not been a Miranda violation at the apartment,
thus responding to Hansen’s main argument about the
statements she had made to Detective. The State also argued that
there had been a sufficient break between the two interviews, that
Hansen had been given the Miranda warnings before she
answered any questions from Detective, and that she chose to
waive those rights.

¶21 At the close of a subsequent hearing, the district court
issued a ruling from the bench denying Hansen’s motion to
suppress. The court first ruled that the interview at the apartment
did not constitute a custodial interrogation. In doing so, the court
found that although the interview occurred on a “narrow
walkway,” there “was nothing blocking the door,” Hansen “had
a clear route back inside her apartment,” and Hansen was able to
“reach[] out and push[] the door open a bit” at one point when
she was “dissatisfied that it was [not] cracked enough.” The court
also found that neither officer had “flashed a badge, handcuffs, a
gun, [or] anything of that nature.” And the court expressed its

20220178-CA 9 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

opinion that there was “no show of authority” or “sign[] of
custody.”

¶22 The court also stressed that the “idea of talking outside on
. . . the balcony walkway area was Ms. Hansen’s idea.” The court
acknowledged that one of the officers subsequently told Hansen
that “she didn’t have a choice.” While the court agreed that, “in a
vacuum,” that statement “might appear to be problematic,” the
court concluded that, “in context,” the officer was simply saying
that Hansen didn’t have a choice about where the interview
would occur, not that Hansen had no choice about whether it
would occur at all.

¶23 The court thus determined that, under these
circumstances, “a reasonable person would have felt that he or
she was at liberty to leave,” and the court further determined that
the circumstances of the interview did not present the “inherently
coercive pressures” associated with an arrest. For these reasons,
the court ruled that Hansen was not “in custody for purposes of
Miranda” at the apartment and that Miranda warnings were not
required for that interview. Because there had been no Miranda
violation at the apartment, the court then ruled that there was no
basis for suppressing the statements made during the interview
with Detective at the police station.

Trial and Conviction

¶24 The case later went to trial. During the State’s case,
Grandmother and Father each testified that on the day of
Hansen’s confrontation with Iris, Hansen had called and said that
she had hit Iris. Caseworker testified about his interactions with
Hansen at the apartment a few days later, including Hansen’s
admissions that she had “slapped” Iris, as well as his observations
of a “slap mark” or a “handprint” on Iris’s cheek and a “mark on
the back of her neck.” The State played the bodycam footage from
the officers in which Hansen made incriminating statements.
Finally, the State called Detective, who recounted the admissions

20220178-CA 10 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

that Hansen made during his interview with her later that day,
and the State played the audio of that interview for the jury. At
the close of trial, the jury convicted Hansen of child abuse.

ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶25 On appeal, Hansen challenges the district court’s denial of
her motion to suppress. “We review a denial of a motion to
suppress as a mixed question of law and fact and will disturb the
district court’s factual findings only when they are clearly
erroneous, but we afford no deference to the district court’s
application of law to the underlying factual findings.” State v.
Goddard, 2021 UT App 124, ¶ 10, 501 P.3d 1188 (quotation
simplified). The question of whether there was a “custodial
interrogation for Miranda purposes” is a question of law that is
reviewed “for correctness.” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 12, 428
P.3d 1052.

ANALYSIS

¶26 As she did below, Hansen argues that she was subjected to
a custodial interrogation at the apartment and that, as a result, the
statements she made at the apartment and in the subsequent
interview at the police station should be suppressed. We disagree.

¶27 Officers are not required to give the Miranda warnings
“every time [they] ask someone questions.” State v. Jessop, 2023 UT
App 140, ¶ 38, 540 P.3d 713, cert. denied, 550 P.3d 998 (Utah 2024).
Instead, the “Miranda warnings must be given to a defendant
subject to custodial interrogation.” Id. (quotation simplified). For
Miranda purposes, “‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies
circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious
danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09 (2012).

20220178-CA 11 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

¶28 The question of whether a person was in “custody” for
Miranda purposes is “analyzed using a two-step analysis.” Jessop,
2023 UT App 140, ¶ 40. The “initial step” asks the court to
“ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was
not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes, 565
U.S. at 509 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Fredrick, 2019 UT
App 152, ¶ 30, 450 P.3d 1154 (recognizing that the question of
“whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave” is “an
objective one”). To determine “how a suspect would have gauged
his freedom of movement,” courts examine “all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Relevant factors
include, but are not limited to, the location of the questioning, its
duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or
absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the
release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Jessop,
2023 UT App 140, ¶ 41 (quotation simplified).

¶29 If the court concludes “that an individual’s freedom of
movement was not curtailed, then the person was not in custody
for Miranda purposes and the court’s analysis ends there.” Id. ¶ 40.
Conversely, if the court concludes that the individual’s freedom
of movement was curtailed, the court moves to the second step,
which asks “whether the relevant environment presents the same
inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house
questioning at issue in Miranda.” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49,
¶ 21, 428 P.3d 1052 (quotation simplified). Put slightly differently,
the question at the second step is whether “there was a formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Goddard, 2021 UT App
124, ¶ 44, 501 P.3d 1188 (quotation simplified). 8

8. It may seem a touch counterintuitive (particularly to a
layperson) to suggest that a suspect might not be in “custody”
(continued…)

20220178-CA 12 2025 UT App 121
State v. Hansen

¶30 In describing the kind of environment that would present
the “same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station
house questioning at issue in Miranda,” Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 21
(quotation simplified), we’ve noted that a station house
interrogation “frequently is prolonged” and is one “in which the
detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until” the
detainee provides the “interrogators the answers they seek, and
in which the subject feels completely at the mercy of the police,”
State v. MacDonald, 2017 UT App 124, ¶ 24, 402 P.3d 91 (quotation
simplified). The United States Supreme Court has held that “the
paradigmatic Miranda situation” is one in which “a person is
arrested in his home or on the street and whisked to a police
station for questioning,” such that the “detention represents a
sharp and ominous change” in which “the shock may give rise to
coercive pressures.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 511.

¶31 One of the hallmarks of such an environment is isolation
from the public. As explained by the Supreme Court, “exposure
to public view both reduces the ability” of an officer “to use
illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and
diminishes [a suspect’s] fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will
be subjected to abuse.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438
(1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda itself is
illustrative of this. There, the Court considered the consolidated
appeals of four defendants who each raised the same issue (albeit

even though the suspect’s movement has been restrained. But the
cases clearly draw this distinction. According to the United States
Supreme Court, the “freedom-of-movement test identifies only a
necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.”
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010). When illustrating this
distinction, we’ve noted that “a driver is not free to leave during
a traffic stop, nor a pedestrian during a Terry stop. But these
temporary and relatively nonthreatening detentions do not
constitute Miranda custody.” State v. MacDonald, 2017 UT App
124, ¶ 24, 402 P.3d 91 (quotation simplified).

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State v. Hansen

on individual facts). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436, 491–
99 (1966). In concluding that all four suspects had been subjected
to custodial interrogations, the Court noted each of the
interrogations “share[d] salient features—incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,”
where the individual in question was “cut off from the outside
world,” “thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere,” and “run
through menacing police interrogation procedures.” Id. at 445,
457.

¶32 In addition to considering the location, courts also consider
any other circumstances that are relevant to the degree of coercive
pressure. In Goddard, for example, we held that an interrogation
did not present sufficiently coercive pressure where there was “no
suggestion that the officers brandished firearms, threatened [the
defendant], or employed any kind of physical force,” and where
the defendant “was not handcuffed, physically restrained, or even
placed in the back of a police vehicle for questioning.” 2021 UT
App 124, ¶ 51. And this was so even taking into account “the aura
of authority surrounding” the “armed, uniformed officer” and
“the knowledge that the officer [had] some discretion in deciding”
the outcome of the interaction. Id. (quotation simplified).

¶33 With this as the legal backdrop, we turn to the question of
whether Hansen was subjected to a custodial interrogation at the
apartment. Again, the first step asks whether, “in light of the
objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person
would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (quotation
simplified). The district court concluded that in these
circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to
terminate the interrogation and leave, but we disagree.

¶34 The court placed great emphasis on the fact that it was
initially Hansen’s idea to go out to the walkway. And this is true.
But that suggestion from Hansen has to be placed in context.

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Hansen told Caseworker that she had just received a “threatening
phone call” (which she later clarified was a text) from Father
telling her that people were coming to take Iris away from her.
And then, sure enough, a DCFS caseworker arrived at her door
with two armed officers in tow. Thus, from the outset, this wasn’t
a “nonthreatening” encounter, MacDonald, 2017 UT App 124, ¶ 24
(quotation simplified), nor was it an encounter or interview that
Hansen had in any way volunteered for or initiated. Instead,
Hansen made the suggestion to go to the walkway only after
Caseworker and two officers had entered her apartment and
indicated that they were going to talk to her about what had
happened with Iris.

¶35 At that point, Hansen did suggest that the conversation
could happen outside. But after she made that suggestion, Hansen
resisted when Officer 2 responded that Iris would be left alone
inside with him while the conversation occurred. When Hansen
reached the open doorway, she hesitated and actually stopped,
saying, “No, I’m . . . no.” After she said that, the two officers made
several statements to Hansen that clearly communicated to her
that she didn’t have a choice. In fact, Officer 2 said this to her
directly and in exactly those terms, telling Hansen, “You don’t have
a choice right now. You need to go outside and talk to them. And I
have to be with her.” (Emphasis added.) A few moments later,
Officer 2 used yet more command-form language, telling Hansen,
“I’m gonna stay right here and you’re gonna go talk to them. Okay?
That’s how it has to be.” (Emphases added.) For his part, Officer 1
told Hansen, “You gotta come outside and talk to this man right
here,” and, “[Y]ou have to come outside and talk to this man right
here, please.”

¶36 It’s difficult to imagine language from police officers that
could more clearly communicate to a suspect that the suspect has
no choice but to talk than language such as “you don’t have a
choice right now,” “you’re gonna go talk to them,” and “you have
to come outside and talk to this man.” Yet despite these

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commands, the district court drew a distinction, suggesting that
these statements were only about how or where the interview
would take place, not about whether it would take place. But in our
view, this distinction is at odds with what the officers said and
with the practical realities of the situation. The officers didn’t
qualify their commands, saying anything along the lines of, “As
long as you’re still willing to talk to us, we need that conversation
to be outside the presence of your daughter.” Rather, without any
such qualification, the officers told Hansen that she had to go
outside and talk to Caseworker. In terms of the practical realities,
we don’t believe that a reasonable person who was given a direct
command from a uniformed police officer would feel free to parse
that command out, reinterpret its semantics, and choose to
disregard it, nor do we believe that law enforcement officers
would typically look favorably upon such an attempt by a person
who had received such a command.

¶37 Along these same lines, we note that in many Miranda
cases, it mattered a lot if officers affirmatively told a suspect that
the suspect was free to leave. In Howes, for example, officers
interviewed a suspect who was already incarcerated on an
unconnected offense. 565 U.S. at 502. On appeal, the Supreme
Court concluded that the suspect was not in custody for Miranda
purposes during this interview. In doing so, the Court stressed
that one of the “[m]ost important” factors was that the suspect
“was told at the outset of the interrogation, and was reminded
again thereafter, that he could leave and go back to his cell
whenever he wanted.” Id. at 515. For similar reasons, many Utah
decisions have held that a suspect was not in custody, in part,
because officers told the suspect that he or she was free to leave.
See, e.g., Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶¶ 30, 32 (concluding that the
defendant was not in custody where he “was assured at least three
times that he was not under arrest and was free to leave—and
each time he acknowledged the assurance and indicated
understanding”); State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 48, 332 P.3d 937
(concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he “was

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State v. Hansen

specifically told that he was free to leave at any time”); State v.
Tingey, 2016 UT App 37, ¶¶ 5, 16, 368 P.3d 467 (concluding that
the defendant was not in custody where he “confirmed that the
officers told him he could leave,” and where an officer told him
that “It’s not like [he was] under arrest or anything” and that he
could “do and say what [he] want[ed]”). Here, if officers had
meant to tell Hansen that they were only directing her where the
conversation would occur (as opposed to whether it would
occur), they could have said so, but they didn’t. And beyond that,
the officers never told Hansen that she did not have to speak with
them or Caseworker and that she was free to terminate the
encounter whenever she wanted.

¶38 Finally, we note that there were other circumstances in
those initial moments that were indicative of this not being a
voluntary encounter. Hansen knew that she was suspected of
wrongdoing relating to her child, and she told the officers and
Caseworker that she was “really nervous” as soon as they entered
her apartment. In addition, Hansen was outnumbered three to
one, with two of the people who entered her apartment being
armed police officers. These circumstances would have
contributed in some measure to a reasonable person’s perception
that this encounter was not voluntary.

¶39 In the context of this case, however, we ultimately believe
that the direct and command-form language used by the officers
was the most important factor, because that language would have
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free
to leave and terminate this encounter. As a result, we conclude
that Hansen’s freedom of movement had been curtailed before
she began speaking with Caseworker on the walkway.

¶40 We accordingly turn to the second step of the analysis,
under which we consider whether the interview with Caseworker
on the walkway presented “the same inherently coercive
pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in

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State v. Hansen

Miranda.” Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶ 21 (quotation simplified). Here,
we agree with the district court and the State that the
circumstances surrounding this interview did not present such
pressures.

¶41 As discussed above, one of the key components of this part
of the analysis is whether the suspect was isolated or rendered
incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. Hansen was
not. This interview took place in the middle of the day on an open-
air, public walkway. Hansen stood next to a banister for some of
it, there was a parking lot on the other side of the banister, there
were stairs at the end of the walkway, and there was a busy road
a short distance away with cars driving by throughout the
discussion. Members of the public walked up and down those
stairs a few times during the interview. About ten minutes into
the interview, Grandmother arrived on the scene, approached the
group, interrupted the interview, and asked Hansen if she was
okay. This is a far cry from what would be expected in an ordinary
station house interrogation, where members of the public are not
walking or driving by and where a family member would
certainly not be allowed to simply walk onto the scene and
observe the events, much less interrupt the interview.

¶42 Beyond this, other circumstances also support the
conclusion that Hansen was not subjected to the kinds of coercive
pressures involved in a station house interrogation. There was
only one officer present during this portion of the interview, and
he remained behind Hansen during her conversation with
Caseworker. This officer never made any physical contact with
Hansen, never attempted to restrain her in any way, never drew
his weapon, and never made any show of force. Indeed, after
Hansen came out to the walkway, the officer was largely silent.

¶43 The questioning on the walkway instead came from
Caseworker. But Caseworker was not a police officer, much less a
uniformed officer, and he was clad in jeans and a polo shirt.

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State v. Hansen

Caseworker was soft-spoken throughout the interview and never
raised his voice. Caseworker made no threats to Hansen—indeed,
he assured her at the beginning of their conversation that it was
“not [his] goal” to take Iris away from her.

¶44 In addition, while we don’t believe that Hansen could
reasonably leave, we note that she was able to exercise at least
some control over her surroundings. Hansen opened the front
door further at one point, ostensibly to keep Iris within view, and
she did this on her own without interference. This, too, is unlike
the kind of thing that would typically occur in a station house
interrogation. Finally, we note that while custodial interrogations
in other Miranda cases have often been lengthy, this one lasted
around thirteen minutes.

¶45 Viewing all these circumstances together, we conclude that
while Hansen’s movement was curtailed, she was not subjected
to the kinds of pressures ordinarily associated with an arrest or a
station house interrogation. For these reasons, we conclude that
the officers were not required to give Hansen the Miranda
warnings before she spoke with Caseworker, and there was
accordingly no basis to suppress the statements she made at the
apartment. Because Hansen’s arguments relating to the interview
with Detective hinge on her assertion that a violation occurred at
the apartment, we likewise see no basis for concluding that those
statements should have been suppressed either.

CONCLUSION

¶46 We conclude that Hansen was not in custody for Miranda
purposes during her interview at the apartment. As a result, we
affirm the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress, and we
likewise affirm her conviction.

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