Orem City v. Jakeman

2025 UT App 107

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OREM CITY,
Appellee,
v.
DAVID AMMON JAKEMAN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20231059-CA
Filed July 10, 2025

Fourth District Court, Spanish Fork Department
The Honorable Jared Eldridge
No. 221300408

David Ammon Jakeman, Appellant Pro Se
D. Jacob Summers, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN M. HARRIS
concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 David Ammon Jakeman was convicted of child abuse and
violation of a protective order related to an incident in which he
kneed his daughter in the thigh. He had threatened to hit her
because she had hurt his feelings by telling him he was being
manipulative, and then he made good on his threat. He complains
that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for
child abuse, that the trial was plagued by structural error because
his transport to the courthouse from the jail was delayed, and that
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
communicate with him and by failing to adequately question
witnesses. None of these claims of error have merit, and we
therefore affirm Jakeman’s convictions.
Orem City v. Jakeman

BACKGROUND 1

¶2 Prior to the incident in question, Jakeman had been
meeting with multiple therapists on a weekly basis and attending
anger management classes. He also had been taking medication
to address a psychological condition. When he did not take his
medication, he would become “snappy,” “impulsive,” and
“frustrated” with his family. Jakeman’s family had a “plan of
safety” for when he was “not calm.” This involved having a code
word that his wife (Wife) and children would use to communicate
to Jakeman that they felt unsafe around him. That plan entailed
that Jakeman, upon hearing the word, “would get up and walk
out” of the vicinity. However, Wife revealed that “whenever it
was actually crisis time,” Jakeman would refuse to leave when
asked to do so: “It always had to be on his terms and when he
wanted to go.” Indeed, a protective order was imposed on
Jakeman in September 2020, preventing him from committing,
trying to commit, or threatening “to commit any form of
violence,” including “threatening, physically hurting, or causing
any other form of abuse,” against Wife or any of their seven
children.

¶3 On a May morning in 2022, Jakeman, who had been
sleeping in his car in the driveway of the family home, was
awakened by a phone call from Wife. She asked him to come
inside and take care of the children because she wanted to get
some rest. When Wife noticed that he was being “snappy” with
their son, JJ (age ten), she asked Jakeman if he had taken his
medication. When he said he hadn’t, she asked him to do so
because she was concerned about the way he was acting with JJ.

1. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view and recite the evidence
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings; we present
additional evidence only as necessary to understand the issues on
appeal.” State v. Jack, 2018 UT App 18, n.2, 414 P.3d 1063.

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¶4 While Wife was sleeping, one daughter, HJ (age twelve),
told her older sister, AJ (age seventeen), that Jakeman was “being
really . . . mean and scary” and was not listening to her when she
told him that she was not feeling “very safe.” After listening to
Jakeman “being really aggressive,” AJ intervened. Standing at the
top of some stairs in the house, AJ began arguing with Jakeman,
telling him that he was being manipulative. Jakeman responded
by telling AJ, “[I]f you don’t leave I’m going to come up and hit
you.” Jakeman then went up the stairs and “cornered” AJ against
a wall. AJ testified that Jakeman had “at least one hand on” her,
while she tried to “create distance” by putting her hand on his
chest and telling him that he needed to back away and leave.
When AJ again told Jakeman that he was being manipulative, “he
just kind of blew up.” Jakeman then “forcibly” moved AJ down
the hallway. Jakeman ended the confrontation when he “hit” AJ’s
leg with his leg. AJ said the blow “hurt really badly” and resulted
in debilitating pain: “I know I was on the ground at one point, and
I got up, and I was crying.” Jakeman left the house, while Wife
attempted to comfort AJ. AJ recalled that she didn’t want to be
touched because she was in “so much pain.” Wife called the
police.

¶5 Police then contacted Jakeman, who had taken JJ to a
nearby pond to fish. The encounter was recorded on a body
camera, and the recording was admitted at trial. Police asked
Jakeman what had happened, and Jakeman explained that he and
AJ had been involved in an argument about whether he was being
manipulative. Unprompted, JJ then interjected, “And you hit her”
and “shoved her into the wall.” Jakeman initially denied hitting,
kicking, or pushing AJ, but he later admitted to police that he and
AJ were touching and that there may have been some “[p]ushing
back and forth.” Jakeman was arrested and charged with child
abuse and violation of the existing protective order, and the case
proceeded to trial.

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¶6 On the day of his bench trial, Jakeman was apparently late
in being transported to the courthouse from the jail. The trial was
scheduled to begin at 1:00 p.m., but the trial did not actually begin
until 2:15 p.m. Still, Jakeman met with his attorney (Counsel)
outside the courtroom before trial. During their meeting, Counsel
“seemed really upbeat and confident” and informed Jakeman that
she had recently found helpful caselaw. Given her confidence,
Jakeman felt comfortable proceeding with the trial. 2

¶7 At the bench trial, AJ testified consistently with the facts
recited above. AJ clarified in her testimony that she initially
thought that Jakeman had “kicked” her, but, upon further
consideration, she realized that he had “kneed [her] in [her] right
thigh.” She also testified that the contact to her thigh was “super
painful when it happened” and that, in the days following the
incident, a bruise developed at the place of impact. She took
photos of the bruise, which were admitted into evidence. AJ
further testified that she initially thought Jakeman had shoved her
head, but she was “a little foggy” about that aspect: “So my head
was never hit against the wall, and I didn’t claim that it was. . . . I
was trying to say [that] he’d shoved my head and moved me
along the wall when I made that report. Then I remember
afterwards being like well, my head doesn’t hurt, so is that really
what happened?” AJ also conceded that some of what she was
testifying to at trial was based on what Jakeman had posted online
or what others had told her: “Everything is something that
someone else told me and I’ve specifically clarified. So I remember
being moved. I remember him hitting me in the leg. I remember
being on the other side of the hallway, and I remember . . . him
[cornering] me and all the events before that.”

2. We will recount other facts relevant to Counsel’s pre-trial
consultation and contact with Jakeman in the Analysis section
below.

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¶8 Jakeman testified in his own defense at trial. He stated that
on the morning of the incident, he and HJ “were being rude to
each other.” And he “realized” that he “felt emotionally unsafe”
because of the way HJ, who was only twelve years old, was
talking to him. When he attempted to talk to HJ about how her
behavior made him “feel unsafe,” Jakeman said that AJ came
“charging . . . in a totally aggressive manner and in an aggressive
tone,” saying, “No, you’re just being manipulative. You need to
leave.” Feeling “totally hurt,” Jakeman retorted, “No. If
anybody’s going to leave . . . , it’s going to be you.” Jakeman said
he then went up the stairs to where AJ was standing. He testified
that they “stood there in a standoff,” while he was thinking, “I’m
doing a stupid, dumb thing and I’m trying to win because I’m all
hurt and now I’m going to be prideful about it or whatever.” He
said that he then “started to raise [his arms] first,” prompting AJ
to raise “hers automatically, like subconsciously.” Again,
Jakeman stated, “I had just had my feelings hurt, and so I’m going
to win this little standoff . . . .” Jakeman testified that he
remembered coming to the following realization while his arms
were locked with AJ’s:

I notice holy cow, this girl is so thin. I don’t know
why, but I noticed that. I’m like she is super thin,
and she starts . . . shaking from side to side in a
drastic manner . . . and . . . I’m like oh, crap. Like I
think this girl’s afraid, . . . and her eyes are closed,
so I don’t know if this is intentional or unintentional,
but in my mind I’m not even mad anymore. I feel
bad because she is . . . totally afraid of me, okay? I
don’t want her to be afraid of me, right? . . . [B]ut I’m
still going to win this stupid standoff.

Jakeman continued testifying, “At this point I just want to be
done. I feel terrible about the whole thing. My daughter’s afraid
of me, and I want to be done.” In an effort to “safely disengage,”
Jakeman decided to “put [his] knee on her left thigh” and “apply

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pressure.” This move caused AJ to “drop[] to the ground.”
Jakeman said the move worked, but not how he wanted it to. He
said AJ “dropped to the floor” and “let out a scream.”

¶9 On cross-examination, Jakeman admitted he was “mad at
AJ for saying that [he was] being manipulative.” And he was
asked about a statement he had emailed to friends, family,
neighbors, and church members detailing his “side of the story.” 3
He was asked if he wrote the following in that email:

1. “I told AJ that if she kept on as she was doing I would hit
her.”
2. “I knew saying this could get me in trouble.”
3. “I placed my right knee on her exposed thigh and slowly
applied pressure to her left thigh with my right knee.”
4. “She dropped to the floor like a ton of bricks.”
5. “She emitted the most blood curdling scream.”
6. “Her claim that I slammed her head into the wall is
reasonable.”
7. “Her claim that I kicked her leg was also reasonable.”

Jakeman admitted that he wrote each of these statements.

¶10 And when asked if “it was obvious to [him] that [AJ] was
feeling pain from what [he was] doing,” Jakeman testified, “It was
obvious once I engage[d] her pressure point that she felt pain,
because . . . she did drop to the floor and she did emit [a] terrible
scream, and that’s why I was like great, I’m just going to leave,

3. This email statement does not appear in the trial record, but it
does appear in the presentencing report. However, the City
explicitly referenced and extensively quoted from the email
during Jakeman’s cross-examination. All the portions quoted here
are taken from the trial transcript.

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because anybody who heard that isn’t going to believe anything I
say.” Jakeman further admitted in his testimony to (1) telling
police officers that he and AJ may have been “pushing back and
forth” during the incident and (2) saying, in a subsequent phone
call to Wife, that he and AJ “were pushing each other.”

¶11 At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Jakeman
guilty on both charges. First, the court stated that it was
“persuaded by the testimony . . . that AJ’s version of events [was]
the more accurate version,” especially since it was “corroborated
by multiple other witnesses,” including Jakeman himself. Indeed,
the court stated that Jakeman’s testimony acknowledged “he
intentionally put his knee on a pressure point on [AJ’s] thigh . . .
in such a way that it [left] bruising.” Concerning the protective
order, the court found that “by his own testimony,” Jakeman
“threatened to hit AJ,” with the evidence showing that he “did
much more” when “he actually did assault his daughter and
cause injury to her.”

¶12 After his conviction, Jakeman filed a pro se motion for a
new trial. The motion itself, which consisted of an unfocused
series of assertions about errors allegedly committed by Counsel,
spans seventy-five pages. It included a lengthy declaration from
Jakeman, many pages of Jakeman’s journal entries, and letters
from two individuals addressing the delayed transport and
Jakeman’s character. In that motion, he asserted, as relevant here,
the following:

1. “The aggregate communication between [Jakeman] and
[Counsel], consisting of some letters, two phone calls, and
a single hour-long meeting” resulted in a “lack of
communication and lack of preparation time” so as to
“materially alter the potential outcome of the trial.”
Moreover, Counsel did not “rehearse” with him the
questions she planned to ask on direct examination.

20231059-CA 7 2025 UT App 107
Orem City v. Jakeman

2. Counsel “failed to cross examine [AJ] about the bruise.” A
proper cross-examination would have “clearly
demonstrated that the cause of the bruise [was] unknown
and could not have been the incident in question.”
3. The delayed transport to the courthouse “was a sneaky,
unfair, and unethical method of hamstringing his right to
a fair trial by making it impossible for him and his attorney
to prepare for trial.” He “was afforded only one in-person
meeting with” Counsel, which did not provide “enough
time to properly or adequately prepare for trial.” The
delayed transport resulted in Jakeman having only “about
10 seconds” with Counsel before “being ushered into the
courtroom,” which wasn’t “enough to cure the gigantic
deficit in prior communication and preparation.” Being
transported late “completely and utterly eviscerated
[Jakeman’s] ability to convey critical information that he
had due to his personal involvement in the incident” and
that “[Counsel] lacked.” This information was “vital to
[Counsel] being able to adequately represent him during
the trial.”

¶13 The court considered Jakeman’s motion for a new trial on
the child abuse charge at a hearing in March 2024. At the outset of
the hearing, the City asked for clarification of the basis of the
motion. It noted that Jakeman never used the phrase “ineffective
assistance of counsel” in his filings but that ineffective assistance
seemed to be the basis of the motion for a new trial. Jakeman,
through new counsel, responded, somewhat puzzlingly,
“[R]egardless of what it’s called, that’s largely what we’ll be
focusing on today.” Based on the ineffective assistance claim,
Jakeman agreed that he was waiving attorney-client privileges as
it related to Counsel.

¶14 Along with Jakeman, Counsel, her co-counsel (Second
Chair), and an attorney with Counsel’s law firm who had worked
on Jakeman’s case in the early stages testified at the hearing.

20231059-CA 8 2025 UT App 107
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¶15 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled on
Jakeman’s request for a new trial. As to the delayed transport
preventing him from engaging in last-minute trial preparation,
the court did not detect “an error or impropriety that had a
substantially adverse effect” on Jakeman’s rights. The court noted
that if Jakeman wanted to fire Counsel and represent himself, he
“clearly understood how to do that.” The court stated,

I don’t know why he didn’t speak up. He obviously
could have, and he’s had no problem in the past
speaking up and letting the Court know his
thoughts and desires on certain points.

If there’s an error there, it’s [Jakeman’s] error for not
asserting himself and not letting anybody know that
that’s what he wanted to do. And I don’t see that
that’s some kind of error that would rise to a level
that would demand a new trial.

Based on this analysis, the court concluded that “whether or not
[Counsel] met with [Jakeman] just prior to trial didn’t really affect
her trial preparation.”

¶16 As to other deficiencies in representation (e.g., lack of
communication and trial strategy), the court noted that the
testimony showed there had been “extensive communications”
between Jakeman, Counsel, and the other attorneys in her office.
In fact, the firm’s case management system documented 131
contacts (namely, phone calls, emails, and letters) with Jakeman.
Through those communications, Counsel testified that she
became informed about Jakeman’s version of the events. The
court found Counsel’s recitation of her trial preparation credible,
especially since it was corroborated through evidence from the
case management system and the testimony of Second Chair.
Given this extensive contact, the court found that Counsel was
“very . . . familiar with certain defenses that [Jakeman] wanted to
raise” and that “they discussed things like strategy,” especially

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about the advisability of Jakeman testifying. Because they “talked
about all of those things,” the court concluded that there were
“plenty of pretrial communications that took place.”

¶17 Concerning alleged deficiencies in preparing Jakeman for
examination at trial, the court found that Counsel “did try to
prepare [Jakeman] for his testimony,” noting, “Whether or not
[Jakeman] was going to heed that advice or not was completely
up to him, but she did make reasonable efforts to prepare him for
his testimony.” Concerning the cross-examination of AJ, the court
found that Counsel and Jakeman had agreed to a strategy of
undermining AJ’s “testimony and her credibility by
demonstrating that she didn’t have a clear memory of the events.”
Given this strategic aim, the court concluded that it didn’t “see
anything about [Counsel’s] cross-examination of [AJ] that fell
below the standard of care that a reasonable defense attorney
would apply in performing cross-examination.”

¶18 The court concluded, “So after having considered all of the
areas that [Jakeman] raised . . . , I don’t believe that he has met his
burden to demonstrate that there are errors or improprieties that
are so substantially adverse that it affected his rights and requires
a new trial.” With that, the court denied his motion for a new trial.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶19 Jakeman appeals, raising the following issues. He first
asserts that the conviction for child abuse was against the clear
weight of the evidence. “We review a claim of insufficient
evidence at a bench trial for clear error, meaning we must sustain
the district court’s judgment unless it is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v. Sparling, 2024
UT App 59, ¶ 13, 549 P.3d 86 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 554 P.3d
1096 (Utah 2024). And we “accord deference to the district court’s
ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor,”

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Orem City v. Jakeman

deferring “to its findings unless the record demonstrates clear
error.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶20 Jakeman next contends that the court committed
“structural error by conducting [the] trial” after the delayed
transport to the courthouse, thus “denying him the opportunity
to meet in person and conference with his attorney.”
“Constitutional issues are questions of law that we review for
correctness.” State v. Curry, 2006 UT App 390, ¶ 5, 147 P.3d 483
(cleaned up).

¶21 Jakeman’s final claim is that Counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in two ways: (1) by failing to communicate adequately
with him and (2) by “directly examining Jakeman and cross-
examining” AJ about the bruise “in a way that failed to explore
key elements of the crime.” “[W]hen a district court rules on a
criminal defendant’s claim that he was deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel due to ineffective assistance, the
district court’s determination of whether the defendant received
constitutionally ineffective assistance is reviewed for
correctness.” State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, ¶ 6, 562 P.3d 706.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶22 Jakeman first asserts that the conviction for child abuse
was against the clear weight of the evidence, arguing that the
“evidence before the trial court was insufficient to rise to the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard to find Jakeman guilty of
intentionally and knowingly inflicting upon [AJ] a physical
injury.” More specifically, Jakeman contends that he “took the
stand . . . to provide direct evidence” of his mental state by
showing that “he lacked intent to harm [AJ] in that moment” and
was instead “only [seeking] to disengage.” Given that Jakeman
testified that he applied pressure to AJ’s thigh only “in order to

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safely disengage without intent to injure in what had risen to a
physical encounter,” he insists that the “evidence did not support
intentional or knowing infliction of a physical injury.”

¶23 Jakeman also claims—although his briefing is more than a
little convoluted on this point—that his “use of pressure points”
did not, in fact, cause AJ “physical harm.” To this point, he
maintains that “the evidence was insufficient to form a nexus
between the bruise that appeared four . . . days later and the
alleged incident.” To support this argument, Jakeman points out
that he testified he applied pressure to AJ’s left leg, while AJ
testified the bruising appeared on her right leg. “Given the
disparity in their testimonies,” Jakeman insists that “it was
necessary for the City to draw a nexus rather than just hope for an
inference to connect the bruise with this alleged incident.”

¶24 Under Utah law, an “actor commits child abuse if the actor
. . . inflicts upon a child physical injury.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
109(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023). “Physical injury” is defined as
including “a bruise or other contusion of the skin” and “any other
condition which imperils the child’s health or welfare and that is
not a serious physical injury.” Id. § 76-5-109(1)(a)(ii). Where, as
here, a defendant is charged with a class A misdemeanor, the
infliction of physical injury must be “done intentionally or
knowingly.” Id. § 76-5-109(3)(a). Intentionally applying one’s knee
to a child’s thigh with such force that it leaves a bruise obviously
meets the elements of child abuse by inflicting physical injury as
defined in the statute.

¶25 Jakeman’s conviction was supported by ample evidence of
both (1) his intent and (2) the actual physical injury he caused
when he assaulted AJ.

¶26 Jakeman asserts that he could not have intentionally and
knowingly inflicted physical injury on AJ because his purpose for
applying his knee to AJ’s leg “was to avoid injury and safely
disengage from the confrontation.” While Jakeman encourages us

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to credit his testimony on this point, other evidence indicates that
Jakeman acted with the requisite intent.

¶27 “Proof of a defendant’s intent is rarely susceptible of direct
proof. Accordingly, circumstantial evidence has long been used to
prove specific intent.” State v. Heath, 2019 UT App 186, ¶ 54, 453
P.3d 955 (cleaned up); see also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah
1991) (“It is well established that intent can be proven by
circumstantial evidence.”). “Direct evidence is not required.
Sustainable verdicts are entered every day on the sole basis of
circumstantial evidence. And where the [factfinder] returns a
verdict that is reasonably sustained by circumstantial evidence
and the inferences drawn from it, we must uphold [that] verdict.”
State v. Kitzmiller, 2021 UT App 87, ¶ 38, 493 P.3d 1159 (cleaned
up). When proving intent by circumstantial evidence, we employ
a two-step process. First, we determine “whether the
[prosecution] presented any evidence that [the defendant]
possessed the requisite intent.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 21,
10 P.3d 346 (cleaned up). Second, we consider “whether the
inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove that
[the defendant] possessed the requisite intent.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶28 The strongest evidence the City presented that Jakeman
possessed the requisite intent came from Jakeman’s own mouth.
He admitted that he told AJ that “if she kept on as she was doing
[he] would hit her.” And Jakeman also testified that his feelings
had been so “totally hurt” that he went up the stairs to engage in
a “standoff” that he was determined to “win.” Even after Jakeman
and AJ had locked arms and he realized how frail and terrified
she looked, Jakeman said that he thought to himself, “[B]ut I’m
still going to win this stupid standoff.”

¶29 And he made sure that he won by striking AJ in the leg in
an area that he repeatedly described as a “pressure point.” The
obvious inference is that he knew enough about human anatomy

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to know that striking a “pressure point” would cause a person
disabling pain. “A person engages in conduct . . . with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of
his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage
in the conduct or cause the result.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)
(LexisNexis 2017). And a “person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.”
Id. § 76-2-103(2). Thus, because Jakeman knew that striking (or
applying significant pressure to) AJ’s leg would cause her pain,
his conduct was both intentional and knowing.

¶30 There is simply no doubt that Jakeman intentionally and
knowingly meant to apply his knee to a part of her body—“a
pressure point”—in such a way to cause AJ severe pain. The
inference, based “in logic and reasonable human experience,”
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 21 (cleaned up), is obvious: Jakeman, a
grown man, had his feelings hurt by the words of a child and got
so mad that he decided he was going to overpower her and hurt
her. After the two locked arms, Jakeman decided he wanted “to
be done with” the standoff, and he effected that desire by
intentionally applying pressure to AJ’s thigh with his knee. He
knew this spot on her thigh was a “pressure point” and he knew
that forcing his knee into that spot would cause AJ enough pain
to make her let go—that was, after all, the reason he bore his
weight down at a vulnerable spot on AJ’s thigh. And so Jakeman
accomplished his goal: AJ let go, dropped to the ground, and
screamed in pain. Thus, Jakeman’s claim that the City provided
insufficient evidence to show he intentionally and knowingly
caused physical harm to AJ fails.

¶31 There was also sufficient evidence that Jakeman’s act of
striking or applying significant pressure to AJ’s leg caused her
physical injury. After all, there was a photograph admitted into
evidence of the bruise AJ claimed to have received after Jakeman’s
contact with her. The factfinder was well-equipped to come to this

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conclusion based on the photographic evidence alone. “Whether
the mark constituted a bruise and what caused it did not involve
obscure medical factors but were within the common experience
of laypersons.” State v. Whitchurch, 2024 UT App 108, ¶ 54, 554
P.3d 1166 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 564 P.3d 960 (Utah 2025). And
simply because Jakeman insists that he applied force to AJ’s left
leg while she said the bruise appeared on her right leg does not
mean the evidence was insufficient. Contradictory evidence does
not insufficiency make. “When reviewing a trial wherein
conflicting, competent evidence was presented, we simply
assume that the [factfinder] believed the evidence supporting the
verdict. Accordingly, the existence of contradictory evidence or of
conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing the . . . verdict.”
State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶ 14, 25 P.3d 985 (cleaned up). And here,
the trial court determined that AJ was the more credible witness
to the events. Indeed, the court explicitly stated that it was
“persuaded by the testimony . . . that AJ’s version of events [was]
the more accurate version,” especially since it was “corroborated
by multiple other witnesses.” 4

¶32 Given that Jakeman admitted to applying pressure to AJ’s
leg, that AJ said the blow happened to her right leg, and that AJ
had a bruise to show for Jakeman’s conduct, it certainly was not
against the clear weight of the evidence that Jakeman’s conduct
caused physical injury to AJ. Accordingly, this claim of error also
fails.

II. Structural Error

¶33 Jakeman next contends that the court committed
“structural error by conducting [the] trial” after the delayed
transport to the courthouse, thus “denying him the opportunity

4. The evidence included the police body camera video in which
JJ explicitly stated that Jakeman had “hit” AJ. See supra ¶ 5.
Jakeman made no objection to the body camera video at trial.

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to meet in person and conference with his attorney.” Jakeman
develops this issue as a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, arguing that “[n]o attorney could provide assistance
given the circumstances of the late transport.”

¶34 “[S]ome constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error . . . .”
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). These are known as
“structural errors.” Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 294
(2017). “The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure
insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should
define the framework of any criminal trial. Thus, the defining
feature of a structural error is that it affects the framework within
which the trial proceeds, rather than being simply an error in the
trial process itself.” Id. at 294–95 (cleaned up).

¶35 Jakeman has pointed us to no case that supports a delayed
arrival infringing on a defendant’s additional consultation time
with counsel as constituting structural error. Rather, he argues in
more general terms, asserting that a structural error occurred in
his case because “the breakdown in communication” between
him and Counsel was “severe enough to prevent preparation or
adequate representation.” See United States v. Soto Hernandez, 849
F.2d 1325, 1328 (10th Cir. 1988) (“A complete breakdown in
communication between an attorney and client may give rise to [a
presumption of ineffectiveness]. . . . [A] breakdown in
communication between an attorney and his or her client can be
severe enough to prevent even the most able counsel from
providing effective assistance.”). Jakeman argues that he had
“planned to meet with [Counsel] an hour or more before trial so
that he could determine whether they were on the same page
regarding his defense and possibly represent himself at trial if
necessary,” but “when he arrived almost an hour late, [Counsel]
was waiting for him outside the courtroom and told him she had
found a favorable case that required the [City] prove intent to
cause injury for him to be found guilty.” He contends that

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“[b]ased upon the lack of time, the rushed state of the
proceedings, . . . the favorable case she had found, and her
positive outlook, he did not attempt to proceed with the pre-trial
meeting they had previously agreed to, fire her, nor discuss the
matter in-depth with her.” From this, he concludes that the “trial
court knew or should have known this late transport caused
structural error that weighed against [him].” Jakeman points us to
no authority establishing that this circumstance, even if true,
would constitute structural error.

¶36 Moreover, Jakeman is mistaken in his reading of the facts
of this case. To be clear, there was no error here, structural or
otherwise, to serve as a basis for the relief Jakeman seeks. Simply
put, the delayed transport did not infringe upon any of Jakeman’s
constitutional rights. Counsel testified that there “was no new
information coming” to her from Jakeman on the day of trial.
Counsel said that instead of discussing trial strategy, she and
Jakeman spent about fifteen minutes “going over his rights.” She
further stated that she had “enough time to ask him multiple
times” if he was comfortable with “going forward,” adding that
there were “no stressors or undue pressure with the time.”
Moreover, no court personnel (e.g., bailiffs or clerks) came into the
holding area during their pretrial conversation telling them they
had to wrap up. Instead, Counsel said that no sort of restrictive
timeframe was communicated to her for the pre-trial consultation,
nor was there “any sort of impetus for [her] to rush [her]
conversation” with Jakeman.

¶37 Second Chair testified that Jakeman’s late arrival, while
unanticipated, did not “throw a wrench into things,” noting that
he was “not aware of any preparation that needed to be done” on
the day of the trial: “I don’t recall any tension, in my mind, that
we weren’t prepared, we needed things to be addressed prior to
the trial, things like that.” Indeed, Second Chair explicitly stated
that “there wasn’t any issue in [his] mind whether [Counsel] was
prepared” on the day of trial. Additionally, Second Chair testified

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Orem City v. Jakeman

that Counsel was not rushed during her pre-trial conversation
with Jakeman, that they were not interrupted by court personnel
during that conversation, and that there was no indication from
the court that it was anxious to get started. He did say that during
the pre-trial conversation, Jakeman expressed that “his method of
cross-examination would’ve been the best because he was there,”
but Jakeman had the opportunity to ask Counsel questions.
Second Chair further testified that Jakeman did not express
concerns about “being able to present the trial because of the
lateness of his transportation.” Instead, Jakeman “wanted to
rehash all the things that [they] had [previously] discussed in the
jail and about examining the trial ethics.”

¶38 In short, there simply was no error here. The evidence
indicates that Jakeman had all the time he needed before trial to
discuss his case with Counsel. Jakeman was provided with legal
representation, and Counsel was prepared for trial. Jakeman had
the opportunity to meet with Counsel and express any lingering
concerns or reservations he might have had. Accordingly,
Jakeman’s assertion of structural error fails both legally and
factually.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶39 Jakeman’s final claim of error is that he received
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel on two fronts.
First, he asserts that Counsel failed to adequately communicate
with him before trial. Second, he maintains that Counsel failed to
adequately examine Jakeman and AJ about the bruise.

¶40 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): “First, the defendant must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient. . . . Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.” Id. at 687. The deficient performance prong requires
a defendant to “show that counsel’s representation fell below an

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Orem City v. Jakeman

objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. “A court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” meaning
that a defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel’s
action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689
(cleaned up). Thus, if it “appears counsel’s actions could have
been intended to further a reasonable strategy, a defendant has
necessarily failed to show unreasonable performance.” State v.
Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34, 469 P.3d 871. “To establish prejudice, the
defendant must present sufficient evidence to support a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” State v. Torres-Orellana, 2021 UT App
74, ¶ 29, 493 P.3d 711 (cleaned up), aff’d, 2024 UT 46, 562 P.3d 706.
Finally, “a defendant’s inability to establish either element defeats
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. ¶ 27 (cleaned up).

A. Lack of Communication

¶41 Jakeman asserts that he met with Counsel for only one
hour face-to-face before the day of the trial and very briefly right
before trial. And even though there were many remote
communications between him and Counsel, he complains that
how those communications related to trial preparation was not
explored and remained unknown.

¶42 “Under Strickland, we must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct did fall within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” State v. Draper, 2024 UT App 152, ¶ 99,
560 P.3d 122 (cleaned up). Jakeman fails to meet the burden of
overcoming this presumption. Instead, his claim that Counsel
didn’t adequately communicate with him is almost entirely
conclusory; in other words, he asserts that Counsel’s
communication was deficient, but he doesn’t attempt to explain
how it was deficient. It appears that he believes that Counsel’s

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Orem City v. Jakeman

communication efforts were deficient because he was convicted,
but that is not the standard for deficiency. Instead, he needs to
show that Counsel’s communication “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He has not
done so, and the record indicates that the communication between
Counsel and Jakeman was robust.

¶43 While Jakeman met with Counsel in-person only twice,
Jakeman does not address all the other preparation Counsel
undertook in reading, analyzing, and developing a strategy from
the material he submitted to her in his many communications. Cf.
Draper, 2024 UT App 152, ¶ 99 (declining to find deficient
performance in a case where a defendant “met with [c]ounsel only
twice” but said “nothing about how long those meetings were”).
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned against
retrospective micromanagement of attorney practice in assessing
deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“The
availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would
encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. . . .
Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for
acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the
independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of
assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and
client.”). And we have declined “to determine what amount of
time counsel must spend with a defendant to ensure that the
representation does not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ¶ 57, 275 P.3d
1050 (cleaned up); see also Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, ¶ 38, 203
P.3d 976 (“We have refused to hold that counsel is ineffective
based on the amount of time counsel spent working on the case
or consulting with a client.”); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 526
(Utah 1994) (stating that “the time period” required to ensure
adequate representation “will vary with every case”). Instead, our
caselaw has considered whether an attorney “spent sufficient
time” working on a case, Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ¶ 38, so as to ensure

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that there was no “overlooked information critical to the defense,”
Parsons, 871 P.2d at 526.

¶44 Here, Jakeman has failed to demonstrate that Counsel
spent too little time meeting with him and developing a strategy
for the case. In fact, the record points in the other direction,
demonstrating that Counsel was well-prepared for the case.
Counsel’s law firm documented 131 communications with
Jakeman, including phone calls, texts, emails, letters, and
meetings. These communications concerned how Jakeman
“would like to proceed with his” case. In preparation for her
meeting with Jakeman at the jail, Counsel had gone through the
“numerous documents” Jakeman had sent her, noting his
“questions and concerns.” She determined it was “more
appropriate for [her] to go through them [on her own] time, write
down [her] response, and visit him at the jail.” Counsel
subsequently went “through the letters in detail” during her
meeting with Jakeman at the jail. In addition to answering
Jakeman’s questions during the jail meeting, Counsel discussed
trial strategy, who would be called as witnesses, and Jakeman’s
desire to testify. Counsel noted, “[Jakeman] decided he would like
to testify at trial, and we went over what he would testify to, what
should be said, and what manner he should answer questions on
the stand.” Additionally, Counsel had conversations with
Jakeman “[m]ultiple times” during which he “relayed . . . his
version of events.” Counsel was also familiar with Jakeman’s
account of the incident based on letters he had sent. She indicated
that Jakeman had sent “at least five packets, each containing
anywhere between 20 and 60 pages” to her law firm. She
subsequently reviewed those packets and used the information
she gleaned from them to review in person with Jakeman trial
strategy, admissibility of evidence, and any other questions
Jakeman had. Counsel testified that Jakeman never objected to her
proposed strategy during these discussions.

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Orem City v. Jakeman

¶45 Counsel also noted that Jakeman “wanted his side of the
story to be heard” and “did not care what the outcome was.”
During their discussions, Counsel advised Jakeman that it would
be harmful to his case to state that he said he was going to hit AJ
and that he shouldn’t “testify to that unless asked directly.” In
addition, Counsel advised Jakeman “to be honest, . . .
straightforward, controlled, and direct in his answers and not to
get off-topic.” Counsel testified that her coaching of Jakeman was
part of a strategic decision “[t]o keep it clear, to keep it concise,
and to ensure the points that [they] wanted to get across came
across in the correct way.” In short, there is every indication that
Counsel undertook extensive preparation for trial and developed
a trial strategy in accord with Jakeman’s objectives. There is
simply no foundation in the record that Counsel’s communication
efforts fell short of the standard expected of reasonable counsel in
any way.

¶46 Accordingly, the trial court’s findings about the extent of
communication between Jakeman and Counsel were not clearly
in error. And these communications represent the efforts
objectively reasonable counsel would take to ensure adequate
representation. Thus, this claim of ineffective assistance fails
because Jakeman has not shown deficient performance.

B. Testimony About the Bruise

¶47 Jakeman also asserts that Counsel was ineffective for
failing to directly examine him and cross-examine AJ with regard
to the bruising on her leg. Jakeman claims that this shortcoming
resulted in a failure “to subject the City’s case to proper
adversarial testing” because it prevented the presentation of
“proper and necessary evidence.”

¶48 “In evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney’s actions,
courts will often look to whether the actions the attorney took
were motivated by trial strategy.” State v. King, 2024 UT App 151,
¶ 24, 559 P.3d 96. Here, we have no trouble articulating a

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reasonable trial strategy for how Counsel handled the bruise
testimony.

¶49 Counsel was pursuing a strategic purpose in limiting her
cross-examination of AJ. She testified that she deliberately kept
cross-examination “brief” because she wanted “to elicit a certain
response,” “get what [she needed] from the case,” and not “leave
room for someone on cross-examination to add details that could
potentially help the prosecutor.” Instead of delving into the
bruise, Counsel explained that her strategy in cross-examining AJ
was to go after her credibility. Specifically, Counsel focused on
AJ’s initial report that Jakeman had slammed her head into the
wall. By getting AJ to admit that Jakeman never slammed her
head against the wall, Counsel aimed to “undercut her
testimony.” Moreover, Counsel elicited testimony from AJ that
her memory of the events was “foggy” and “brought back to her
via other people’s recollections.” Based on these responses,
Counsel felt she had established that AJ was “an uncredible
witness.” Counsel explained, “Her testimony was based on what
others had told her, and she had changed her story between the
written statement she provided to officers, what she told the
officers that day, and what she had stated on the stand.”

¶50 And having introduced evidence indicating that AJ was an
unreliable witness, Counsel made the strategic decision to stop
her cross-examination of AJ, a decision that was also informed by
AJ’s age. Counsel explicitly stated that she wanted to avoid asking
questions of AJ that would come off as “badgering,” explaining,

I do take the time to think out the questions asked,
especially when it’s a child, and try and phrase it in
a non-threatening-type way. It is intimidating for a
child to testify, so I asked her everything I wanted
to that day. I just made sure I worded it in a way
that she would feel more comfortable.

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Orem City v. Jakeman

¶51 Moreover, additional questioning of AJ about the bruise
could have resulted in more vivid testimony about how painful
the blow to her leg had been and how that pain was confirmed by
the development of a bruise in the days following the incident;
such testimony would certainly not have benefited Jakeman in
any way. Thus, given that Counsel articulated a reasonable
strategic purpose in limiting her questioning of AJ to issues of
credibility, the trial court did not err in rejecting Jakeman’s
ineffective assistance claim.

¶52 As to the direct examination of Jakeman about the bruise,
Jakeman does little to develop this point in his briefing other than
asserting that he should have been directly examined “on this
point to effectively establish the discrepancy.” But Counsel had
good reason not to question Jakeman about the bruise. First,
Jakeman testified that he applied pressure to AJ’s left thigh, while
AJ said the bruise was on her right thigh. We fail to see the value
of asking Jakeman specifically about the bruise when his other
testimony established that, in his account of the event, he could
not have caused it since he asserted that he applied pressure to
the thigh without the bruise. More importantly, direct
examination of Jakeman about the bruise may have led to
damaging testimony—such as Jakeman saying that AJ was being
deceptive or had fabricated the injury. Counsel—perhaps aware
that Jakeman did not present a terribly sympathetic defendant—
could reasonably have wanted to keep him from doing damage
by straying off track in his testimony. Thus, questioning him
about the bruise would have been, at best, pointless and, more
likely, counterproductive.

¶53 Thus, since Counsel had a reasonable strategic purpose to
limit testimony about the bruise, we conclude that this claim of
ineffective assistance fails for lack of deficient performance.

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Orem City v. Jakeman

CONCLUSION

¶54 Jakeman’s convictions were supported by sufficient
evidence, both as to his intent and the fact that he caused physical
injury to AJ. His delayed transport to the courthouse did not
result in error, structural or otherwise. And Counsel did not
perform deficiently in either respect identified by Jakeman.

¶55 Affirmed.

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