State v. Abonza

2025 UT App 101

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
HECTOR ABONZA,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20241002-CA
Filed July 3, 2025

Seventh District Court, Price Department
The Honorable Don M. Torgerson
No. 241700067

Tristan L. Thomas and Christian B. Bryner,
Attorneys for Appellant
Wendy M. Brown, Debra M. Nelson, and
Benjamin Miller, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DAVID N. MORTENSEN
concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Hector Abonza filed a motion to suppress evidence of an
interaction with police that led to his arrest for, among other
things, public intoxication. Concluding that the police did not
have probable cause to arrest him, the district court granted the
motion to suppress and dismissed the charges against Abonza.
The State appeals, arguing that because Abonza’s intoxication
would have become apparent soon after the arrest anyway, the
evidence should have been admitted under the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. We disagree and
affirm.
State v. Abonza

BACKGROUND

¶2 Observing a car that failed to properly signal, police
initiated a traffic stop. An officer (Officer) who approached the car
could smell “the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming
from the vehicle.” The driver was promptly arrested for DUI. The
passenger, Hector Abonza, remained in the car and spoke with
Officer. Officer later averred that Abonza had “watery glassy eyes
and his speech was extremely slurred.” Officer’s body camera
footage shows Abonza tell Officer he would “walk down the
street,” but he did not provide the address of his destination. He
also refused to give Officer his ID.

¶3 Over the course of about two minutes, Officer attempted to
coax Abonza out of the car, but Abonza remained in the passenger
seat and asked Officer through the slightly open car window,
“Am I detained?” When Officer said, “Yes,” Abonza asked, “For
what?” Officer answered, “Public intoxication.” Officer told
Abonza, “I feel you pose a danger to yourself at this point.”
During this exchange, Abonza called someone on his cell phone,
telling them, “They’re trying to arrest me.” After another officer
unlocked the driver side door of the car, Abonza eventually
opened the passenger door. As he stepped out of the car, he
stumbled, and Officer immediately turned him around and
placed him in handcuffs. Abonza yelled at police as they led him
away, asking why he was being arrested, and he initially resisted
attempts to put him in a police car.

¶4 Abonza was charged with public intoxication, failure to
disclose his identity, and interference with an arresting officer. 1
Abonza moved to suppress evidence of his intoxication, arguing
that Officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain him or

1. Abonza was also charged with possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person based on knives discovered in the
car, but he was not bound over on this charge.

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State v. Abonza

probable cause to arrest him. At the preliminary hearing, Abonza
was bound over on these charges. The district court also
addressed the pending suppression motion, scheduled another
hearing, and allowed the parties to further brief the issue.

¶5 Abonza submitted a memorandum in support of his
motion to suppress, arguing there was not a reasonable likelihood
of his harming himself or others—an element of public
intoxication, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701(1) (LexisNexis Supp.
2024) 2—and, thus, there was no probable cause to arrest him. The
State responded, arguing there was probable cause at the time of
Abonza’s arrest and, regardless, probable cause would have
arisen as soon as Abonza exited the car. The State thus argued that
evidence of Abonza’s intoxication was admissible under the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.3

¶6 At the hearing on the suppression motion, the State argued
much the same thing, pointing to Abonza’s insistence on walking
away from the scene “combined with obvious signs of
intoxication, the smell from the car,” and “the slurring of the

2. We cite the current version of the statute, as it does not differ
from the version in effect at the time of Abonza’s arrest.

3. As we explain more fully in our analysis, the “inevitable
discovery doctrine admits unlawfully obtained evidence if the
police would have, in spite of the illegality, discovered the
evidence by some other legal means.” State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9,
¶ 56, 227 P.3d 1251. The prototypical example is when contraband
is seized illegally under circumstances when it would have later
been discovered anyway. See, e.g., In re M.V., 1999 UT App 104,
¶ 13, 977 P.2d 494 (concluding that a knife found on a teenager
during an illegal pat-down search would have inevitably been
discovered when the teenager was transported to a juvenile
detention center pursuant to an already existing court pick-up
order).

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State v. Abonza

speech” as providing probable cause to arrest him. The State also
argued that the inevitable discovery doctrine should apply to this
evidence “because it was clear that nothing good was going to
come out of Mr. Abonza leaving the vehicle.”

¶7 The court expressed concern about “the timing of it all”
and stated that Abonza was arrested before he did “anything that
really shows that he’s [a] danger to himself.” And the court stated
that it was “not sure how” the inevitable discovery exception
would apply in this case. Ultimately, emphasizing that this was
“a super close call,” the court stated, “Letting someone go from
the scene might be a liability issue, but it doesn’t necessarily
translate that that is a basis to determine that they’re in violation
of the public intoxication statute.” The court noted that it was
“slightly uncomfortable” granting the suppression motion
because Abonza’s intoxication would have been apparent “as
soon as he got out of the car, if he’d have wandered off.” But
because police “hadn’t yet been able to form probable cause for
the arrest when they arrested” Abonza, the court granted the
motion and dismissed the charges. 4

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 On appeal, the State argues the district court should have
denied Abonza’s suppression motion. In particular, the State
argues the court should have concluded that evidence of
Abonza’s intoxication would have been inevitably discovered.
“We review a trial court’s factual findings underlying a decision
to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence for clear error.
However, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law based on
such facts under a correctness standard, according no deference

4. The court dismissed the charges on its own initiative,
perceiving that the State would be unable to proceed with its case
without this pivotal evidence.

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State v. Abonza

to the trial court’s legal conclusions.” State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT
App 289, ¶ 19, 318 P.3d 238 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” “Courts have breathed life into the Fourth
Amendment’s protections by developing the exclusionary rule,
which generally requires suppression of evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional protections.” Brierly v. Layton City, 2016
UT 46, ¶ 20, 390 P.3d 269. In other words, “the exclusionary rule
prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative
(the ‘fruit of unlawful police conduct’), obtained in violation of an
individual’s constitutional and statutory rights.” State v.
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶ 13, 76 P.3d 1159 (quotation simplified).
But “the harsh consequences of this rule—excluding relevant
evidence of illegal activity at trial—are tempered somewhat by
the exceptions to the exclusionary rule.” Id.

¶10 One such exception is the inevitable discovery exception
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984). There, a defendant agreed to lead police to the
body of his child victim after an officer asked him to do so to
facilitate “a Christian burial” for the child. Id. at 435. At the same
time, a search party was scouring a swathe of farmland to find the
body. Id. The search was called off once it became clear that the
defendant was cooperating with police, but the body was
“essentially within the area to be searched.” Id. at 436. The
Supreme Court held that any constitutional violation by the
officers in making emotional appeals to the defendant was
excused by the fact that “the search parties were approaching the
actual location of the body” and “the body inevitably would have
been found” had the defendant “not earlier led the police to” it.
Id. at 449–50.

20241002-CA 5 2025 UT App 101
State v. Abonza

¶11 In discussing its application of the inevitable discovery
exception, the Supreme Court recognized that its own rationale
“for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of
unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and
socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of
constitutional and statutory protections.” Id. at 442–43. But, the
Court stated, “If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means . . . then the
deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be
received” and “[a]nything less would reject logic, experience, and
common sense.” Id. at 444.

¶12 Here, the State concedes that at the time of Abonza’s arrest,
there may not have been probable cause to arrest him for public
intoxication. But the State argues that probable cause would have
materialized as soon as Abonza stepped out of the car and walked
away from the scene, as he told Officer he intended to do. Thus,
the State argues the inevitable discovery rule should apply,
excusing the illegality of the arrest and shielding the evidence of
Abonza’s interaction with police from suppression. This
argument confuses inevitable discovery with potential discovery. It
also confuses evidence of a crime having been committed with a
crime likely to be committed in the future.

¶13 Since Nix, Utah courts have had many occasions to apply
the inevitable-discovery exception. These cases illustrate that the
exception “permits the admission of evidence that would have
inevitably been lawfully discovered notwithstanding its actual
discovery as the result of an unconstitutional search or seizure.”
Brierly, 2016 UT 46, ¶ 20 (emphasis added). See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 19–40;
State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ¶¶ 56–59, 227 P.3d 1251; State v. Worwood,
2007 UT 47, ¶¶ 43, 49, 164 P.3d 397; Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,
¶¶ 13-21; State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, ¶¶ 20–24, 318 P.3d
238; State v. Amirkhizi, 2004 UT App 324, ¶¶ 21–22, 100 P.3d 225;
In re M.V., 1999 UT App 104, ¶¶ 12–13, 977 P.2d 494.

20241002-CA 6 2025 UT App 101
State v. Abonza

¶14 The State does not challenge on appeal the district court’s
determination that there was no probable cause to arrest Abonza
because there was no evidence at the time of arrest that, although
intoxicated, he posed a danger to himself or others. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-701(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2024) (“A person is guilty of
intoxication if the person is under the influence of alcohol, a
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of
releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger the
person or another, in a public place[.]”) (emphasis added). See also
Due South, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 2008 UT
71, ¶ 31, 197 P.3d 82 (“In order to satisfy the may endanger
element of the public intoxication statute, an officer must be able
to articulate objective facts indicating a reasonable likelihood of
endangerment based on the particular circumstances.”). Thus, at
the time of Abonza’s arrest, just before he exited the car, there was
no evidence of a key element of the public intoxication offense—
only the potential that the element might soon spring into
existence. And the State did not prove by a preponderance that
evidence that did not exist at the time of his arrest would
inevitably have been discovered. 5 Accordingly, the district court

5. As explored at some length during oral argument, a number of
scenarios could have unfolded once Abonza exited the car. He
might have walked off safely on the shoulder, parallel to and
away from the roadway. Or he might have decided instead to sit
down on the side of the road to sober up or to call someone to pick
him up. Indeed, he had already made one call while talking to
Officer. Of course, other scenarios were well within the realm of
possibility, including that he might set off down the road,
stumbling and falling, and perhaps doing so in a lane of traffic.
The problem is that jumping the gun and arresting Abonza before
any of these scenarios unfolded was a matter of speculation—
rather than of inevitability—about whether Abonza, even though
intoxicated, would present a danger to himself or others upon
exiting the car.

20241002-CA 7 2025 UT App 101
State v. Abonza

correctly concluded that the inevitable discovery exception was
inapplicable. 6

CONCLUSION

¶15 The inevitable discovery exception does not apply where
the discovery is merely possible. We thus affirm the district
court’s grant of Abonza’s motion to suppress and its dismissal of
the charges against him.

6. Abonza faults the State for not specifically addressing prejudice
in its briefing. See State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶ 52, 387 P.3d
618 (“The appellant must demonstrate prejudice or harm to
prevail.”) (quotation simplified). But—as the State noted during
oral argument—the prejudicial ramifications of suppressing the
evidence and dismissing its case are obvious. In any event, based
on our resolution of this appeal, we need not reach the prejudice
issue.

20241002-CA 8 2025 UT App 101