State v. Fretwell

2025 UT App 96

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
CHARLES W. FRETWELL,
Appellant.

Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20250497-CA
Filed June 26, 2025

Sixth District Court, Richfield Department
The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
No. 121600174

Dylan T. Carlson and Debra M. Nelson,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Marian Decker,
Attorneys for Appellee

Before JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER,
DAVID N. MORTENSEN, and AMY J. OLIVER.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Charles W. Fretwell appeals the district court’s
memorandum decision denying his post-judgment motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. This appeal is before the court on its
own motion for summary disposition based on the lack of a
substantial issue for review warranting further proceedings in
this court. We affirm.

¶2 Fretwell pleaded guilty and was sentenced in 2013. In
March 2025, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, along
with several other motions, in his criminal case. He asserted that
the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Rippey, 2024 UT 45,
permitted the filing of a post-judgment motion to withdraw a
State v. Fretwell

guilty plea. The district court determined that it no longer had
jurisdiction in the criminal case and denied Fretwell’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and his other motions.

¶3 In Rippey, the supreme court held that specific provisions
of the Plea Withdrawal Statute, see Utah Code § 77-13-6, were
unconstitutionally enacted. See 2024 UT 45, ¶ 47. In particular, the
court struck the provision that required a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea to be made before the sentence was announced. Id. In
conjunction with another provision of the Plea Withdrawal
Statute, the requirement to file the motion prior to sentencing had
the effect of barring the consideration of the validity of a guilty
plea on direct appeal. See id. ¶ 37 (noting that the provisions
“together create[d] a rule of preservation and waiver”). After
striking those provisions, the court held that the “normal rules of
preservation and waiver apply.” Id. ¶ 48. “In practice, this means
that whether a defendant may challenge a guilty plea on direct
appeal will depend on whether he attempted to withdraw that
plea in the district court. . . .” Id. ¶ 49. If a timely motion was made,
“then the issue of the plea’s validity is preserved and may be
argued on direct appeal.” Id. Otherwise, “to challenge that plea on
direct appeal the defendant will need to show that an exception
to preservation applies.” Id.

¶4 Although Rippey struck a statutory requirement to file a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing to preserve a
challenge to the plea on direct appeal, it did not more broadly
affect the time to move to withdraw a guilty plea. “Once a court
imposes a valid sentence and final judgment is entered, the court
ordinarily loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” State v.
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ¶ 13, 218 P.3d 610. Although district courts
may have jurisdiction to consider certain post-judgment motions
as permitted by rule, see State v. Boyden, 2019 UT 11, ¶ 39, 441 P.3d
737, there is no rule that allows a district court to consider a post-
judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea. On the contrary, rule
11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a motion to

20250497-CA 2 2025 UT App 96
State v. Fretwell

withdraw a guilty plea to be filed before a sentence is imposed.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f)(2) (“A defendant must make a motion
to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest, or guilty with a mental
condition at the time of the offense before the sentence is
announced.”).

¶5 Accordingly, the order denying Fretwell’s motion to
withdraw his plea is affirmed. 1

1. Fretwell asserts that there are substantial issues for review
because this court could consider the implicit denial of an earlier
motion to reinstate the time for direct appeal. However, there is
no order regarding that motion, and “the mere entry of a final
judgment inconsistent with but silent regarding a [separate]
motion does not dispose of the motion by necessary implication
unless the surrounding circumstances indicate that the [district]
court considered and rejected the motion.” Rosas v. Eyre, 2003 UT
App 414, ¶ 17, 82 P.3d 185 (cleaned up). The motion to reinstate
the time to appeal was filed in 2020, and there is no indication that
it was considered and rejected in the district court’s order.

20250497-CA 3 2025 UT App 96