In re I.C.

2025 UT App 37

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF I.C.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

A.C.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision
No. 20240667-CA
Filed March 13, 2025

Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Aaron Flater
No. 1229910

Sara Pfrommer and Emily Adams,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and John M. Peterson,
Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME,
MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, and AMY J. OLIVER.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 A.C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order
adjudicating I.C. (Child) as abused and neglected and its order
denying Mother’s motion for a new trial. We affirm.
In re I.C.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In September 2023, Child disclosed allegations that she had
been sexually abused by her older brother (Brother). In the course
of forensic interviews following the disclosure, Child also
revealed that she had attempted or considered suicide and that
she had otherwise harmed herself. She also revealed conduct by
Mother over the years that may be abuse. At the time, Child lived
with Mother and Brother. After the allegations, however, Child’s
father (Father) placed Child in an in-patient therapeutic setting.
After her release, she went to live with Father.

¶3 When Mother was notified of Child’s disclosures by the
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) and law
enforcement, Mother stated that Child was making things up as
retaliation against Brother for getting Child into trouble. She was
not cooperative with DCFS regarding making a safety plan for
Child and did not mind that Child would not return home.
However, she was unsatisfied with Child going to live with Father
and would rather have Child go to juvenile detention instead.
Overall, Mother expressed little concern for Child or her welfare.

¶4 DCFS filed a petition seeking protective services for Child.
The allegations in the petition were primarily regarding Mother’s
conduct and Child’s disclosures of sexual abuse by Brother. Trial
on the petition was set for Mother in late January 2024. About one
week before the trial date, Mother’s counsel filed a list of
witnesses and exhibits expected to be presented at trial. Shortly
before trial, Mother’s initial counsel withdrew, and the trial was
postponed.

¶5 New counsel appeared, and Mother’s trial began in March
2024, but no new witness or exhibit list was filed. After day one of
trial, another continuance was granted. Three additional days of
trial were held in April 2024. On day three, Mother proffered
testimony of three undisclosed witnesses she wanted to present

20240667-CA 2 2025 UT App 37
In re I.C.

on day four of trial. Before day four, the State moved to exclude
the witnesses as untimely disclosed.

¶6 On day four, Mother’s counsel explained further the
anticipated scope of testimony from the three witnesses. After
discussion in court, two witnesses were permitted to testify
regarding a conversation that may have impeached earlier
testimony, and the third witness was excluded. The court noted
that much of the proposed testimony was not proper
impeachment and was not probative.

¶7 After trial, the juvenile court determined that the
allegations in the petition were proven and that Mother had
abused and neglected Child. Mother obtained new counsel and
filed a motion for new trial. In the motion, she asserted that trial
counsel had provided ineffective assistance, at least in part by
failing to timely disclose a variety of exhibits in an extensive list.
The juvenile court denied the motion. The court noted that the list
of exhibits lacked sufficient information and that Mother had
failed to demonstrate prejudice. Mother appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶8 Mother raises several issues in her petition, challenging
both the denial of her motion for new trial and the underlying
adjudication order. Regarding the adjudication order, Mother
asserts that the juvenile court erred in excluding certain witness
testimony discussed on day four of the trial. She also contends
that the determination that she neglected Child was in error.

¶9 In the context of an adjudication trial, “we apply differing
standards of review to findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
determinations of mixed questions of law and fact.” In re K.J., 2024
UT App 47, ¶ 31, 548 P.3d 886 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 554 P.3d
924 (Utah 2024). “The factual findings underlying an abuse or

20240667-CA 3 2025 UT App 37
In re I.C.

neglect adjudication are reviewed deferentially and are reversed
only if clearly erroneous.” Id. The court’s “ultimate determination
regarding abuse or neglect is reviewed for correctness, because
making that determination, which involves applying a given set
of facts to statutory criteria, is primarily a law-like endeavor.” Id.
(cleaned up). A juvenile court’s ruling on the admission of
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See In re G.C., 2008
UT App 270, ¶ 9, 191 P.3d 55.

¶10 Mother contends that the juvenile court inappropriately
excluded witness testimony that she asserts would have affected
the credibility of other witnesses, particularly Child’s testimony
of specific instances of conduct by Mother. Mother’s witnesses
would have testified that they did not see the identified conduct;
more broadly, they would have testified that they did not see
similar types of conduct, nor did they see Mother mistreat Child
in general. The juvenile court determined that the proffered
testimony was not probative and was not proper impeachment
evidence. Mother cannot show that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in excluding the testimony.

¶11 As an initial matter, Mother’s petition does not reflect the
posture or full ruling of the juvenile court in excluding the
testimony. The witnesses were not timely identified and were
therefore limited to impeachment. Under rule 20A of the Utah
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, disclosure of information necessary
to support claims or defenses must be timely made “unless solely
for impeachment.” Utah R. Juv. P. 20A(b). Impeachment evidence
is “evidence used to undermine a witness’s credibility.” Glacier
Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., 2006 UT App 516, ¶ 29, 154
P.3d 852 (cleaned up). Accordingly, the proffered witness
testimony was appropriately excluded unless it was targeted
solely to another witness’s credibility. Additionally, a juvenile
court has broad discretion to determine the relevance and
probative value of evidence. See id. ¶ 24.

20240667-CA 4 2025 UT App 37
In re I.C.

¶12 The juvenile court determined that most of the proffered
testimony was not proper impeachment evidence. 1 The proffered
testimony was that those witnesses did not observe the types of
conduct testified to by Child. The court determined that such
testimony was not probative and did not impeach Child’s
testimony because it would not conflict with the testimony. Given
that Child’s testimony of specific conduct and the proffered
testimony that the witnesses did not see that conduct could both
be true, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
testimony.

¶13 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that
she neglected Child. We need not decide this challenge on its
merits because Mother has not challenged the court’s separate
and independent determination that she abused Child. See In re
G.B., 2022 UT App 98, ¶ 29, 516 P.3d 781. “Juvenile court
jurisdiction over a child can be based on, among other things,
either abuse or neglect.” In re K.J., 2024 UT App 47, ¶ 42. Because
Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s abuse
determination, the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over
Child regardless of the neglect determination.2

¶14 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s denial of her
motion for new trial. Appellate courts “review a [juvenile] court’s
ruling on a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion

1. The juvenile court allowed two witnesses to testify narrowly
regarding conversations that could have impeached earlier
witness testimony.

2. Moreover, to the extent that the issue is a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge, we determine after a review of the record that
the evidence was sufficient to support the neglect adjudication.
Mother’s callous response to Child’s suicide attempt
demonstrated a failure to protect as found by the juvenile court,
given the “potentially fatal consequences” of the response.

20240667-CA 5 2025 UT App 37
In re I.C.

standard.” State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, ¶ 42, 562 P.3d 706
(cleaned up). However, “when the basis of a new trial order is
ineffective assistance, the standard of review for ineffective
assistance claims applies.” Id. “An ineffective assistance of
counsel claim presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. ¶ 46
(cleaned up). A determination of ineffective assistance of counsel
by a lower court is “a law-like mixed question, and therefore we
review it for correctness.” Id. ¶ 47. However, “where a district
court makes factual findings that are relevant to an ineffective
assistance claim arising in a new trial motion, appellate courts will
defer to those factual findings and overturn them only if they are
clearly erroneous.” Id. ¶ 52 (cleaned up). Additionally, juvenile
“courts are in the best position to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses,” and thus, “appellate courts defer to juvenile courts on
matters of credibility.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 52, 201 P.3d 985.

¶15 “To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
Mother must show that (1) ‘counsel’s performance was deficient’
and (2) this ‘deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’” In re
C.M.R., 2020 UT App 114, ¶ 19, 473 P.3d 184 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish prejudice,
Mother “must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
outcome of her case would have been different absent counsel’s
error. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶ 21
(cleaned up). In evaluating the likelihood of a different result, we
“consider the totality of the evidence before the judge,” bearing in
mind that “[s]ome errors will have had a pervasive effect on the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire
evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial
effect.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695–96.

¶16 Mother moved for a new trial, asserting that trial counsel
was ineffective because he failed to timely disclose a variety of

20240667-CA 6 2025 UT App 37
In re I.C.

“unused evidence” set forth in a twenty-three-page chart. 3 The
juvenile court denied the motion. Although the court found that
trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to
timely disclose the identified evidence, the court found that
Mother did not show prejudice. The court’s order stated that the
“summary charts do not contain the sufficient legal analysis upon
which the court can rely in making its decision.” Additionally, the
court noted that Mother had failed to carry her burden of
persuasion in showing prejudice because “Mother’s briefs contain
conclusory and summary statements alleging she was prejudiced
by the actions of her attorney.”

¶17 Mother asserts that she met her burden for a motion for
new trial because she identified the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, identified the missing evidence, and
identified why it was important. However, identifying the
evidence and why it was important does not demonstrate
prejudice. Mother’s argument regarding prejudice consisted
basically of a single paragraph listing some of the missing
evidence and stating that “none of this was used by [trial counsel]
and the result was total prejudice to [Mother] at trial as a result.”
This conclusory statement is insufficient to show prejudice. It
does not address the evidentiary picture at all, and it certainly
does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a different
outcome given the totality of the evidence before the juvenile
court. In sum, the juvenile court did not err in finding that Mother

3. Mother also asserted that trial counsel was ineffective due to a
medical condition that allegedly affected his performance. The
juvenile court rejected that claim, and Mother does not pursue
that ruling on appeal.

20240667-CA 7 2025 UT App 37
In re I.C.

had not demonstrated prejudice. Therefore, the court properly
denied Mother’s motion for new trial. 4

¶18 Finally, Mother contends that her post-trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by not attaching the actual
proposed evidence to the motion for new trial and “by not
sufficiently arguing how the missing evidence harmed Mother.”
“An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time
on appeal presents a question of law.” In re A.H., 2021 UT App 57,
¶ 28, 493 P.3d 81 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 496 P.3d 715 (Utah
2021). Because the failure to establish either prong of an
ineffective assistance claim defeats the claim, “we are free to
address [Mother’s] claims under either prong.” Id. ¶ 35 (cleaned
up). We determine that Mother cannot show prejudice because
the “missing evidence” is largely irrelevant, of little probative
value, and of questionable admissibility. The list of more than 150
items includes many that appear to lack foundation or time
frames, and many items regard issues that were explicitly ruled
on in some form by the juvenile court. 5 However, we address the
specific evidence listed in Mother’s petition.

4. Mother also asserts that the juvenile court was wrong in finding
that “many of the court’s findings and conclusions relied heavily
on Mother’s own admissions during her testimony.” Mother
contends that she denied the many allegations that were the basis
for the court’s finding of abuse. She is correct in that respect.
However, her testimony supported many of the findings
regarding neglect. Her petition asserts that her admissions did not
“fully support” the court’s findings, but the court did not rely on
Mother’s admissions for all of its findings.

5. For example, many of the items purport to show Father’s abuse
of Child, but the juvenile court excluded evidence of Father’s
alleged abuse as irrelevant to the allegations against Mother.

20240667-CA 8 2025 UT App 37
In re I.C.

¶19 Mother first asserts that post-trial counsel should have
attached bank statements that would have shown that Mother
used DoorDash. She contends that this evidence refutes Child’s
testimony that, over the course of time, there was a pattern of
servitude, including cooking and shopping. Child also testified
that sometimes DoorDash was used. Because Child
acknowledged that DoorDash was used, further evidence of its
use would not affect the validity of her testimony.

¶20 Mother next asserts that Ring camera evidence should have
been presented to refute Child’s off-hand comment that Mother
almost ran over someone when backing out of the driveway. The
juvenile court addressed the matter of the Ring video on day four
of trial when an effort to admit it was made. After discussion
regarding what the video would show, the juvenile court
accepted as a factual proffer that Mother did not almost run
anyone over on the day that Child and others came to retrieve
additional belongings. As a result, the video was not admitted.
Mother does not challenge the court’s exclusion of the video.

¶21 Mother also asserts that evidence supporting that Father
abused Child should have been submitted with the new trial
motion. However, the juvenile court made multiple rulings over
the course of the trial, none of which are challenged on appeal,
that evidence regarding any abuse by Father was not relevant to
adjudicating the allegations against Mother. See supra note 5.

¶22 Mother further contends that evidence of Child’s improper
online behavior should have been attached to the new trial motion
and argued as the reason that Mother took away Child’s
electronics. But in the new trial motion, it was asserted that
Child’s electronics were removed due to the online behavior.
Similarly, in Mother’s petition she asserts that she took the
electronics away after discovering the online behavior and that
Child responded by making allegations that would remove her
from Mother’s household. However, the assertions made in the

20240667-CA 9 2025 UT App 37
In re I.C.

motion for new trial and in the petition are contrary to Mother’s
own testimony.

¶23 Mother testified that after she learned of Child’s
allegations, she “went home and . . . did not discuss it with [Child]
at all.” Rather, she talked with Brother about the allegations. After
that conversation, she stated that she went to Child and asked for
Child’s phone and any other electronic devices and took them to
her (Mother’s) room. Mother also stated that she took the devices
to look at them for inappropriate online behavior and that the
removal was not a suspension. Given Mother’s testimony, the
post-trial assertion that she took Child’s electronics away as
discipline for Child’s online behavior is not supported, and the
specific evidence of Child’s online behavior is not relevant.

¶24 Finally, Mother argues that she provided evidence that
would call into question a detail of the alleged sexual assaults. She
argues that a discrepancy regarding the age of a sleeping bag in
which Child alleged one of the assaults occurred disproves the
assault. However, not only is the age of a sleeping bag as reported
by a child of minimal import, it does not affect the total
evidentiary picture regarding Mother’s conduct.

¶25 Overall, Mother cannot show prejudice resulting from
post-trial counsel’s failure to attach these specific items to the
motion for new trial or failing to argue specific prejudice. None of
the items identified had sufficient evidentiary value such that a
reasonable likelihood of a different outcome could be shown.
Accordingly, her claim for ineffective assistance of post-trial
counsel fails.

¶26 In sum, for the reasons stated above, we affirm both the
juvenile court’s adjudication order and the denial of Mother’s
motion for new trial.

20240667-CA 10 2025 UT App 37