State v. Coleman

2025 UT App 33

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
COREY COLEMAN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230707-CA
Filed March 6, 2025

Eighth District Court, Vernal Department
The Honorable Clark A. McClellan
No. 191800295

David M. Corbett, Attorney for Appellant
W. Anthony Wilcox, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Corey Coleman was a building official for Vernal City
(City). In 2017, Coleman resigned from his position. Two years
later, during litigation regarding an employment discrimination
claim he brought against the City, Coleman turned over
photographs he had taken of City records during his
employment. When the State learned that Coleman had kept
photographs of City records, it charged him with violating a Utah
criminal statute captioned, “Stealing, destroying or mutilating
public records by one not a custodian,” a class A misdemeanor. A
jury convicted Coleman, and he now appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to arrest judgment, arguing that the statute
only criminalizes actions with respect to original City records and
does not criminalize merely keeping photographs of City records.
We reverse the district court’s denial of Coleman’s motion to
State v. Coleman

arrest judgment without deciding whether the statute
criminalizes keeping photographs of City records because
Coleman presented a plausible basis for reversal and the State
failed to respond to his arguments on appeal.

BACKGROUND 1

Resignation from the City

¶2 Coleman was a building official who worked for the
City from 2011 to 2017. After giving notice that he was
resigning, his last two weeks with the City were from May 1 to 12,
2017. Prior to his resignation, Coleman filed complaints with
various state and federal agencies concerning his employment
with the City. As part of the subsequent litigation stemming from
one of the complaints, Coleman was required to provide
discovery to the City. The documents Coleman turned over to the
City included photographs he had taken of City records while still
an employee.

¶3 Upon learning that Coleman had photographs of these
documents in his possession, the State charged Coleman with
“Stealing, destroying or mutilating public records by one not a
custodian,” which is “a class A misdemeanor.” See Utah Code
§ 76-8-413 (2023). 2 The case proceeded to a jury trial.

1. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly.” State v.
Smith, 2024 UT App 82, n.1, 550 P.3d 1030 (cleaned up).

2. The legislature amended the statute in 2024, adding
explanatory language and subsections. See Utah Code § 76-8-413.
Because Coleman was convicted under the prior version of the
statute, and because neither party asks us to apply the amended
version, we consider the prior version in this appeal.

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State v. Coleman

The Trial

¶4 At trial, the State argued that Coleman violated the statute
by making photographs and photocopies of City records and
keeping them after his employment ended. It presented testimony
from three witnesses who were employed by the City: a recorder
(Recorder), an assistant manager (Manager), and an
administrative secretary (Secretary). Recorder testified that in the
last two weeks of Coleman’s employment, Coleman was making
copies of records on the copy machine just outside Recorder’s
department. Coleman typically used the copy machine around
once a week, but Recorder testified that during Coleman’s last two
weeks, she saw him at the machine or heard the machine
operating two to three times a day.

¶5 Manager testified that he shared an adjoining office wall
with Coleman and recalled Coleman being in the office the first
five days of May. He testified that he did not give Coleman
permission to take photographs of any City records.

¶6 Secretary testified that she also noticed Coleman
“constantly” making copies during his last week and that he did
not do any building inspections or approve building applications
during that time. According to Secretary, this was out of character
for Coleman. Secretary further testified that one day when
walking back from lunch, she saw Coleman’s car parked by the
office building and his trunk was open. In the trunk, she noticed
a box full of green hanging file folders. These green folders were
filled with manila folders that were themselves filled with
documents, but Secretary testified that she did not actually see
any of the documents in the box. Later, Coleman’s wife returned
the box with the green folders, which Secretary assumed was the
same one she saw in Coleman’s car. Secretary counted the green
file folders and found there were 101 of them, but none of the
manila folders or documents that were previously inside were
there.

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State v. Coleman

¶7 Taking the stand in his defense, Coleman admitted to
making and keeping photographs of City records, but he
maintained that none of the photographs he had were original
documents and the photographs were taken “well before” his last
two weeks on the job. He also testified that the documents he took
home in the box in the trunk of his car were his personal copies of
various manuals and technical specifications. He also testified
that he could not have been seen or heard making copies at the
office because he was away for most of his last two weeks due to
travel both in- and out-of-state for prior work-related
commitments.

¶8 In closing, the State argued, “what we’re really looking at
is removing or secreting [documents under the statute].” The
State pointed to witness testimony that Coleman “was at the copy
machine a whole bunch more than normal” and Coleman’s
testimony where he admitted he “took those photos” and kept
them when he left his employment.

¶9 Coleman’s counsel argued in closing that having
photographs of the records was not the same as removing or
secreting the records themselves. He specifically argued that the
words in the statute do not say “that reproduction is prohibited
or photographs are prohibited. It says stealing documents is
prohibited.” He further argued that Coleman made the
photographs to document what he believed was fraud and that
Coleman was not in the office every day during his last two weeks
of employment when witnesses testified they saw him at the copy
machine.

¶10 The jury convicted Coleman as charged. The district court
sentenced him to a suspended jail sentence of one year, ordered
him to pay a fine of $1,960, and placed him on probation for
eighteen months.

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State v. Coleman

The Motion to Arrest Judgment

¶11 After his conviction, Coleman filed a motion to arrest
judgment. He argued that Utah Code section 76-8-413 did not
prohibit making or keeping photographs or copies of public
records and, instead, only applied to originals. According to
Coleman, he did not commit the crime he was convicted of
because he did not engage in conduct prohibited by the statute.
The court denied the motion and emphasized “it was reasonable
for the jury to conclude that taking and retaining a photograph of
public documents” and keeping it after employment with the City
ended “could constitute ‘stealing, removing or secreting’” under
the statute. The court did “not believe that it should attempt to
substitute its judgment for that of the jury.”

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 Coleman asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motion to arrest judgment. This is a legal determination we
review for correctness. State v. Camara, 2023 UT App 106, ¶ 12, 537
P.3d 1017, cert. denied, 547 P.3d 827 (Utah 2024). 3

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Arrest Judgment

¶13 Coleman argues that the district court should have granted
his motion to arrest judgment because the plain language of Utah
Code section 76-8-413 (2023) only regulates conduct with respect

3. Coleman raised two additional issues on appeal: a challenge to
the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial and claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we reverse on the
issue of the motion to arrest judgment, we need not address these
additional issues.

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State v. Coleman

to actual records and does not criminalize making or retaining
copies of records. 4 “A district court may arrest a jury verdict when
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is
so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of
the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to that element.” State v. Camara, 2023 UT
App 106, ¶ 12, 537 P.3d 1017 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 547 P.3d
827 (Utah 2024). Because the State presented no evidence at trial
that Coleman took original documents, and instead only
presented evidence that Coleman copied records and retained
those copies, Coleman maintains that the district court erred in
denying his motion to arrest judgment.

¶14 In response to Coleman’s argument on appeal, the State
argues that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
convict Coleman. It also acknowledges that Coleman only
removed or secreted copies of records, not the original records
themselves. Despite this acknowledgment, the State makes no
effort to engage with Coleman’s argument that the statute does
not criminalize taking copies of records. When appellees fail to
brief an argument raised by an appellant on appeal, “they do so
at their own peril” because when “the appellant’s arguments
stand unrebutted . . . we then review them with a lower standard
than the typical burden of persuasion on appeal.” Musselman v.
Keele, 2024 UT App 143, ¶ 19, 559 P.3d 64 (cleaned up); see also
Mitchell v. Arco Indus. Sales, 2023 UT App 70, ¶ 22, 533 P.3d 394,
cert. denied, 537 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2023); cf. State v. Amboh, 2023 UT
App 150, ¶ 16, 541 P.3d 299 (applying this rule in the criminal law
context). Therefore, we will address Coleman’s claim “through
the lens of this lower standard of review.” Amboh, 2023 UT App
150, ¶ 20. Under this lower standard of review, “it is appropriate
to rule in favor of an appellant if the appellant establishes a prima
facie showing of a plausible basis for reversal.” Mitchell, 2023 UT

4. For ease of reference, we include both photographs and
photocopies in the term “copies” in our analysis.

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State v. Coleman

App 70, ¶ 22 (cleaned up); see also Zions Bancorporation, NA v.
Schwab, 2023 UT App 105, ¶ 16, 537 P.3d 273 (reversing the district
court’s decision where the appellant presented “an interpretation
of the [statute] that is at least plausible”).

A. The Plain Meaning of Utah Code Section 76-8-413 (2023)

¶15 When an appellate court is “faced with a question of
statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to evince the true
intent and purpose of the legislature. The best evidence of the
legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute itself.”
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d
863 (cleaned up).

¶16 Coleman first argues that the plain language of the statute
only regulates actual records, not copies. Under the statute, a
person who is not a custodian commits a class A misdemeanor for
“stealing, destroying or mutilating public records” when they
have “custody of any record, map, or book, or of any paper or
proceedings of any court, filed or deposited in any public office,
or placed in his hands for any purpose” and are “guilty of
stealing, willfully destroying, mutilating, defacing, altering,
falsifying, removing, or secreting the whole or any part thereof.”
Utah Code §§ 76-8-412 to -413 (2023). According to Coleman,
because there is no mention of copies in the text, the statute
applies only to original documents and not to copies of such
documents.

¶17 Coleman next argues that the plain language of the statute
“does not prohibit copying or retaining copies.” He asserts that
variations of the words copying or retaining are nowhere in the
statute and neither are any synonyms. Instead, the statute
criminalizes only “stealing, willfully destroying, mutilating,
defacing, altering, falsifying, removing, or secreting the whole or
any part thereof.” Id. § 76-8-412. He argues that under the noscitur
a sociis canon, a rule of statutory interpretation, “a word is known
by the company it keeps” and that when read in harmony and in

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State v. Coleman

light of this doctrine, the words show intent to criminalize
conduct that goes further than merely copying or retaining those
copies. See State v. Camara, 2023 UT App 106, ¶ 25, 537 P.3d 1017
(“[W]e utilize [the noscitur a sociis canon] to give words grouped
in a list related meanings.”), cert. denied, 547 P.3d 827 (Utah 2024).
Coleman asserts that when “[r]ead together, the terms all describe
conduct that modifies, conceals, destroys or removes records so
that they cannot be found or read in their original state.” He thus
concludes that because copying and retaining those copies does
“not affect the integrity of originals,” those actions fall “outside
the scope” of the statute. Coleman has therefore presented a
plausible argument that the plain meaning of Utah Code section
76-8-413 does not criminalize copying or retaining copies of City
records.

¶18 Coleman notes that the “legislature has demonstrated its
ability to differentiate between crimes involving original
government records and copies of those records,” pointing to
the Government Records Access and Management Act
(GRAMA). See generally Utah Code §§ 63G-2-101 to -901. GRAMA
establishes criminal penalties for any person “who intentionally
discloses, provides a copy of, or improperly uses a private,
controlled, or protected record” to which they had lawful
access. Utah Code § 63G-2-801(1)(a), (2)(a) (emphasis added).
Coleman also points out that under GRAMA, possession alone is
not criminalized, but rather the statute penalizes the act of
disclosure.

¶19 In response, the State “fails to meaningfully address
[Coleman’s] claim” that the statute does not criminalize copying
documents “or provide us with legal analysis addressing the
points” Coleman raises. Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants,
LLC, 2012 UT 17, ¶ 18, 279 P.3d 391. In his reply brief, Coleman
notes that the State “does not squarely address [his] arguments.”
See id. In its brief, the State argued that “the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to prove” Coleman violated the statute. The

20230707-CA 8 2025 UT App 33
State v. Coleman

State pointed to Coleman’s admission that he kept photographs
of City records and Secretary’s testimony that Coleman had a box
of folders and documents in his trunk, but the folders were empty
when he returned them to the City. Thus, the State presented its
responsive argument in terms of the strength of the evidence
presented at trial. But Coleman does not challenge the strength of
the evidence presented at trial. Rather, he challenges whether the
conduct proved at trial fits within the conduct criminalized by the
text of the statute. The State did not respond to Coleman’s
statutory interpretation argument. “We will not bear the burden
of argument and research on behalf of [the State]. Nor will we
create arguments on behalf of [the State] in an attempt to respond
to [Coleman].” Id. ¶ 19.

¶20 Because the State failed to respond to Coleman’s statutory
interpretation argument, Coleman need only meet the lowered
appellate burden of making “a prima facie showing of a plausible
basis for reversal.” AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp., 2021
UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76 (cleaned up). He did so here, and we
therefore reverse the denial of the motion to arrest judgment. But
“without adequate briefing from [the State] in response to
[Coleman’s] arguments, we are not comfortable addressing the
merits” of Coleman’s statutory interpretation arguments. 5
Broderick, 2012 UT 17, ¶ 19. Therefore, this decision is “a non-
merits decision that is not intended to have any precedential
value.” Musselman v. Keele, 2024 UT App 143, ¶ 20 n.4, 559 P.3d 64
(cleaned up).

5. We see potential merit in Coleman’s interpretation of the
statute. But because we lack briefing from the State, we do not
resolve the question of whether Utah Code section 76-8-413
applies to copies of records. To the extent that the legislature
wishes to provide clarification, we invite it to do so.

20230707-CA 9 2025 UT App 33
State v. Coleman

CONCLUSION

¶21 The State did not respond to Coleman’s argument that
Utah Code section 76-8-413 does not criminalize the copying of a
City record. Because Coleman met his lowered burden of
establishing a plausible basis for reversal of the district court’s
denial of his motion to arrest judgment, we reverse the district
court’s denial and remand the matter for entry of a judgment of
acquittal of the offense charged.

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