Wal-Mart v. Tax Commission

2025 UT App 28

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WALMART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST, WALMART STORES INC.,
AND SAM’S REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST,
Appellants,
v.
TAX COMMISSION, SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION,
AND SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20220655-CA
Filed March 6, 2025

Second District Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable David M. Connors
No. 200700770

David J. Crapo and John T. Deeds,
Attorneys for Appellants
Derek E. Brown, Erin T. Middleton, Steve Geary,
Laron J. Lind, and Joshua R. Nelson, Attorneys for
Appellee Tax Commission
Simarjit S. Gill, Timothy A. Bodily, and Perrin E.
Love, Attorneys for Appellees Salt Lake County
Board of Equalization and Salt Lake County

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 At issue in this case is the 2016 fair market value, for
property tax purposes, of three large retail properties owned by
Walmart Real Estate Business Trust, Walmart Stores Inc., and
Sam’s Real Estate Business Trust (collectively, Walmart). In a
nutshell, Walmart believes that its properties are worth a lot less
Walmart v Tax Commission

than does the relevant assessing entity, Salt Lake County (the
County). Walmart challenged the County’s assessed value in an
administrative proceeding before the Utah State Tax Commission
(the Tax Commission). Neither side was happy with the decision
the Tax Commission rendered in that proceeding, and both sides
elected to challenge it in a trial de novo in district court. After an
eight-day bench trial, the district court concluded that neither side
had carried its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that its proposed value was “more accurate than any
other value.” See T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011
UT 28, ¶ 17, 254 P.3d 752. And after considering the entire record
presented, including the Tax Commission’s decision, the district
court found that the fair market value of Walmart’s properties
was—more or less, with minor adjustments—the value that had
been assigned to those properties by the Tax Commission.

¶2 Walmart now appeals from the district court’s decision,
and it raises both procedural and substantive arguments. On the
procedural side, it asserts (among other things) that, by
considering and largely agreeing with the Tax Commission’s
valuations, the court failed to conduct the sort of “de novo”
review contemplated by the governing statute. And on the
substantive side, it asserts that the court applied an incorrect
definition of “fair market value.” For the reasons discussed, we
reject Walmart’s arguments and affirm the court’s valuation.

BACKGROUND

¶3 The three properties at issue in the case are all located in
Salt Lake County: (1) the Walmart Supercenter in West Valley
City, (2) the Walmart Supercenter in South Jordan, and (3) the
Sam’s Club in South Jordan. For the 2016 tax year, the County
assessed these properties as follows: $18,183,100 for the West
Valley Supercenter; $20,296,400 for the South Jordan Supercenter;
and $13,873,200 for the Sam’s Club. Walmart disagreed with these
assessments, and it appealed them to the Salt Lake County Board

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of Equalization (the Board), which primarily affirmed the
assessments, although it did make a small downward adjustment
to the value of the Sam’s Club.

¶4 Walmart then appealed the Board’s decision to the Tax
Commission, which held a formal two-day evidentiary hearing.
At that hearing, the Tax Commission heard testimony from expert
real estate appraisers retained by both sides, who had reached
starkly different conclusions about the value of the properties.
J. Philip Cook testified for Walmart, and he offered his opinion
that the three properties were worth $12,100,000, $15,300,000, and
$11,400,000, respectively. Kerry M. Jorgensen testified for the
County, and he offered his view that the three properties were
worth $23,260,000, $26,000,000, and $15,000,000, respectively. The
major point of dispute between the appraisers—and therefore
between the parties—concerned whether and to what extent the
properties’ current use by Walmart should be factored into the
valuation equation, or whether the properties should be valued
solely as if they were being sold to a “second-generation user” for
some use (e.g., big box retail) other than as a supercenter or a
warehouse club.

¶5 After the hearing, the Tax Commission took the matter
under advisement, and a few months later it issued a lengthy
written decision. The Tax Commission found portions of each
appraiser’s approach compelling, but also found other portions
unpersuasive, and it ultimately settled on valuations for the
properties that were in between the two experts’ valuations: it
found that the three properties were worth $18,555,000,
$19,545,000, and $13,373,000, respectively.

¶6 Walmart was dissatisfied with the Tax Commission’s
decision, and it opted to challenge that decision by filing a petition
for judicial review in the district court and asking that the case be

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assigned to a tax judge. 1 The County responded by filing a cross-
petition for judicial review and by also asking that the case be
assigned to a tax judge. The matter eventually proceeded to a
bench trial, which took place over the course of eight days: seven
days (five full days and two half days) for presentation of
evidence and another half-day for closing arguments.

¶7 As the initial appellant, Walmart presented its case-in-chief
first, and it called the same appraisal expert (Cook) as it had in
front of the Tax Commission. In his trial testimony—which lasted
a day and a half—Cook discussed his valuation methods,
including his understanding of the concept of “fair market value.”
Cook explained that he had used both the income and sales
comparison approaches in determining the value of Walmart’s
properties, just as he had before the Tax Commission. Cook

1. As discussed more fully below, see infra Part I.B, Utah litigants
dissatisfied with a decision rendered by the Tax Commission have
two options: they can file a “petition for judicial review” in either
the district court or in the appellate courts. See Utah Code § 59-1-
602(1). Here, Walmart filed its challenge in district court, and it
correctly did so in Salt Lake County’s Third District Court. See id.
§ 59-1-602(1)(b) (stating that petitions for district court review are
to be filed “in the district court located in the county of residence
or principal place of business of the affected taxpayer”). However,
in its petition Walmart requested that the case be assigned to a
“tax judge,” one of several specially designated and trained
district judges from across the state who have “volunteer[ed] as
tax judges.” See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 6-103(1), (2). The case was
then randomly assigned to Judge David M. Connors, one of the
specially designated tax judges. The fact that Judge Connors was
a judge in the Second District Court (rather than the Third District
Court) did not draw any objections from the parties at the district
court level, and no party raises any venue objection here on
appeal. We therefore consider any potential objections regarding
venue to have been waived by the parties.

20220655-CA 4 2025 UT App 28
Walmart v Tax Commission

concluded that the Walmart properties’ “highest and best use” “is
for big box retail.” After summarizing his approach, Cook
concluded that the properties in question should be valued at
$12,400,000, $15,100,000, and $11,300,000, respectively—values
that were similar to, but slightly different from, the values he had
advanced during the Tax Commission proceeding.

¶8 On the morning of the third day of the trial, after Walmart
had completed its case-in-chief but before the County began its
presentation, the court mentioned that its file “seem[ed] to be
missing any copy of the Tax Commission’s underlying rulings.”
Walmart responded by asserting that, in the de novo proceeding,
the Tax Commission’s ruling was not “controlling or relevant,”
but it also acknowledged that the court had “request[ed] a copy”
of that ruling at a previous pretrial conference and that Walmart
(in response to the court’s request) had “submitted a copy” of the
ruling to the court’s clerk via email. The court stated that it had
requested a copy because the governing statute required the Tax
Commission to “certify a record of its proceedings to the district
court,” a requirement the court interpreted as mandating that the
Tax Commission’s ruling be placed in the court’s file for
consideration during the “trial de novo.”

¶9 Following this discussion, the County began its
presentation, and it also called the same appraisal expert
(Jorgensen) as it had in front of the Tax Commission. In his trial
testimony—which lasted nearly two full days—Jorgensen
discussed the methodology he used to value the three properties
at issue. He explained that, when valuing a property, he
considered its “highest and best use,” and he stated that for some
properties, including Walmart’s properties, the properties’
current use can be considered their highest and best use. And he
testified that, in valuing the Walmart properties, he used the
income, sales comparison, and cost approaches. Jorgensen was
asked to explain whether, and how, his valuations at the time of
the trial de novo were different from the valuations he had offered

20220655-CA 5 2025 UT App 28
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to the Tax Commission. In the end, he testified that the properties
should be valued at $22,200,000, $24,600,000, and $16,000,000,
respectively—figures that were similar to, but somewhat different
from, those he had offered before the Tax Commission.

¶10 On cross-examination, Walmart questioned Jorgensen at
some length about the criticisms that the Tax Commission, in its
written ruling, had leveled against his conclusions. For example,
Walmart’s counsel asked Jorgensen directly whether the Tax
Commission had “disagreed with [his] premise of value,” and at
one point Walmart’s counsel asked Jorgensen to read aloud
certain portions of the Tax Commission’s ruling.

¶11 Both Walmart and the County were allowed to make
rebuttal presentations; Walmart called two additional
appraisers—neither of whom appear to have testified before the
Tax Commission 2—who offered critiques of Jorgensen’s
testimony. In addition, both Walmart and the County re-called
their respective main experts to the stand. During Jorgensen’s
rebuttal testimony, he was asked numerous questions about the
differences between his appraisal and Cook’s, and specifically
about ways that Jorgensen thought Cook had changed his
appraisal based on “issue[s] that came up at” the Tax
Commission. Jorgensen also again discussed how his testimony
at trial “differed from the appraisals that he presented to” the Tax
Commission. During cross-examination, Walmart’s counsel
asked Jorgensen a number of questions about his testimony before
the Tax Commission. Indeed, on at least two occasions, Walmart’s
counsel played for Jorgensen excerpts from the audio recording

2. The record submitted to us does not include the full record of
the Tax Commission proceedings. As best we can tell, while one
of the additional appraisers helped Cook prepare the appraisal
report Walmart submitted to the Tax Commission, neither of
them actually testified during the Tax Commission proceedings.

20220655-CA 6 2025 UT App 28
Walmart v Tax Commission

of his testimony before the Tax Commission and asked Jorgensen
specific questions about those portions of his testimony.

¶12 At one point during the trial, after apparently having
finally reviewed the Tax Commission’s ruling, the court informed
the parties that it had questions about how the Tax Commission
had computed the “square footage number” for one of the
properties. The next day, the attorneys and the court engaged in
a discussion regarding the square footage issue, including a
partial stipulation, and Walmart’s counsel expressed its view that
the discussion “should answer all of [the court’s] questions . . .
regarding the Tax Commission decision.”

¶13 After completion of Walmart’s and the County’s
evidentiary presentations, the court asked the attorney
representing the Tax Commission—nominally a party to the
proceeding and which was represented by counsel during the
entire trial—whether the Tax Commission would be presenting
any witnesses, and the attorney answered in the negative.

¶14 Shortly thereafter, the court again inquired about whether
a record of the Tax Commission proceeding would be transmitted
to the district court. A few minutes later, a discussion ensued
about the procedural posture of the case, and the court stated its
understanding of its task: to “consider the competing appraisals”
submitted by Walmart and the County and “to review and
consider and weigh those appraisals against other valuations that
have been made in the case, including the Tax Commission’s
valuation and the . . . property assessor’s valuations, and
ultimately to do an independent analysis” of the value of
Walmart’s properties and issue a decision, “which could include
. . . affirming, modifying, [or] remanding” the Tax Commission’s
“conclusions.” The County agreed with the court’s assessment of
its procedural task. But Walmart took “a little bit of [an] exception
to” that assessment, offering its view that the court was to conduct
a “de novo review” of the matter. The court responded by stating

20220655-CA 7 2025 UT App 28
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that it “absolutely agree[d] with that observation” and that it
would conduct a “de novo review and an independent analysis.”

¶15 A few weeks after the evidentiary presentations were
completed, and after allowing the Tax Commission to submit a
post-trial brief, the court held a hearing for the purpose of
allowing the parties to present closing arguments. At the
beginning of that hearing, the court asked the parties if they
“ha[d] an objection” to the court supplementing the “exhibits . . .
by adding th[e] documents from the Tax Commission record.”
Walmart responded that it “would probably object to [the Tax
Commission documents] being added as exhibits” but that it had
“no problem with it being the certified record from the Tax
Commission before the Court.” When asked about whether there
was truly a meaningful difference between admitting the Tax
Commission record as exhibits versus transmitting it to the court
as part of the certified record, Walmart responded that “an exhibit
is something where” there was “a witness before the Court” and
that witness “was subject to cross-examination.” The court then
asked whether Walmart was suggesting that the court “does not
have the ability to look at those documents and consider them.”
Walmart then reiterated that it discerned “a difference between
the certified record and an exhibit,” but that, regardless, “the
Court is at liberty to look at those documents and do with them as
it pleases.” (Emphasis added.) After further discussion, the court
decided that it was “going to take judicial notice that [the Tax
Commission documents] were part of the record before the Tax
Commission, and make them part of this record, and only for
those limited purposes that this court may review them in the
context of making its final decision in this matter.” In doing so,
however, the court noted that it was “not intending to give
anything in that record any greater weight than anything else.”

¶16 Following this discussion, the attorneys presented their
closing arguments. At one point, the court asked Walmart’s
counsel what he believed Walmart needed to prove, and

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Walmart v Tax Commission

Walmart’s counsel stated that Walmart had to show “that the
value that [it] put forth is better than the value that is put forth by
anybody else.” At the conclusion of the arguments, the court took
the matter under advisement.

¶17 Several weeks later, the court issued a written ruling,
setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the
outset of its decision, in a section entitled “Standard of Review,”
the court set forth its understanding of the applicable procedure.
It observed that it was conducting a “trial de novo” in which it
“must make a new and independent assessment of property value
without relying on or deferring to previous [Tax] Commission
assessments.” The court noted, however, that it was statutorily
permitted to “affirm, reverse, modify or remand” the Tax
Commission’s order and that it therefore needed to at least
“consider” that order as part of its obligation to “consider[] the
evidence as a whole.” And the court observed that it was possible
to “be convinced that the [Tax Commission] has determined the
most accurate valuation” of the properties, so long as the court
“arrives at that conclusion by considering the evidence as a
whole” and not by “giving deference to” the Tax Commission’s
decision. Finally, the court observed that both Walmart and the
County—as cross-challengers to the Tax Commission’s decision—
each bore a burden to “show by a preponderance of the evidence
that its proposed valuation is more accurate than any other
value,” and it offered its view that the Tax Commission’s
valuation was “another value that the [c]ourt must consider when
determining whether either party has met its burden.”

¶18 On the merits of the valuation question, the court
evaluated the evidence presented by both sides, including the
experts’ extensive testimony. However, the court stated that it
was “not convinced that either party’s valuation [was]
particularly persuasive.” It found that Walmart’s experts
“significantly undervalue[d] the properties” because they relied
too heavily “on sales of vacant properties to second-generation

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Walmart v Tax Commission

users” and because they were too unwilling “to consider that the
highest and best use of these properties might actually be as
supercenters . . . and a warehouse club,” the very uses to which
the properties were then being put. But it also found that
Jorgensen had “significantly overvalue[d]” the properties due to
“a stubborn insistence on understating the
depreciation/obsolescence factor,” thus “lend[ing] credence to the
criticism that he appear[ed] to be valuing the properties in
connection with their value to Walmart alone.”

¶19 The court made specific findings that “the highest and best
use of the properties” is their current use as supercenters and a
warehouse club, and that the properties were “much closer to [the
special-purpose property] end of the spectrum” than to the
“single-family houses” end of the spectrum. In making this
finding, the court noted that “there is not the slightest indication
of any intent by [Walmart] to discontinue using the properties for
those purposes, and both sides agree that the properties have
significant remaining useful life.” The court stated that “to value
the properties as if their only possible use is to be converted to
‘big box retail’ by second-generation users would result in a
significant undervaluing of the properties.”

¶20 Due to the infirmities it found in both sides’ appraisals, the
court turned to the Tax Commission’s decision, and it concluded
that “the valuations set forth [there] do not suffer from the same
deficiencies and biases displayed by the competing extreme
valuations presented” by the parties. The court offered its view
that each side had “done a good job of demonstrating the
deficiencies in the opposing party’s analysis,” but determined
that “neither [side] ha[d] successfully demonstrated that its
valuation [was] more correct than the valuation set forth in the
[Tax] Commission decision.” The court thus determined that,
based on the preponderance of the evidence presented, including
the Tax Commission’s decision, the methodologies used by the
Tax Commission led to the most accurate valuation of the

20220655-CA 10 2025 UT App 28
Walmart v Tax Commission

properties. However, the court made a square footage adjustment
regarding the South Jordan supercenter, finding that it was larger
than the Tax Commission had found. Using the adjusted square
footage numbers and the Tax Commission’s methodology, the
court found that the fair market value of the three properties was
$18,555,000, $19,932,000, and $13,373,000, respectively.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶21 Walmart now appeals, and it raises two categories of
challenges. First, it raises procedural objections, asserting (among
other things) that the district court, by considering and ultimately
largely agreeing with the Tax Commission’s valuations, failed to
conduct the sort of “de novo” review contemplated by the
governing statute. Walmart’s procedural objections raise
questions of statutory interpretation, and on such issues we afford
no deference to district court decisions. See T-Mobile USA, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 28, ¶ 9, 254 P.3d 752 (“The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review
for correctness.”); see also Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings,
LLC, 2010 UT 40, ¶ 10, 238 P.3d 1035 (“The interpretation of a rule
of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness.”
(cleaned up)).

¶22 Second, Walmart raises substantive objections to the
district court’s ultimate finding regarding the “fair market value”
of the properties. Walmart attempts to cast these arguments as
legal objections, asserting that the court applied the wrong legal
definition of “fair market value.” To the extent that Walmart
raises questions about the court’s interpretation of the statutory
definition, we will review for correctness. See T-Mobile USA, 2011
UT 28, ¶ 9. But to the extent that Walmart’s objections implicate
the propriety of the court’s factual findings, we will review
deferentially, and we will disturb those findings only if Walmart
can demonstrate clear error. See id. (“We review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error.” (cleaned up)).

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Walmart v Tax Commission

ANALYSIS

I. Procedural Issues

¶23 We begin by addressing Walmart’s procedural objections,
which—as we understand them—fall into two categories. First,
Walmart raises what amounts to an evidentiary objection: it
asserts that the district court should not have admitted the Tax
Commission’s decision into its file at all. Second, it raises a wider-
ranging procedural objection: it asserts that by considering the
Tax Commission’s decision in connection with its valuation
determination, the court failed to conduct the sort of “trial de
novo” contemplated by the relevant statute. We discuss each
objection, in turn, and find neither one persuasive.

A

¶24 Walmart’s first procedural objection is that the district
court should not have “supplemented the record to include the
Commission’s decision after the close of evidence.” This objection
is not well taken, for two reasons.

¶25 As an initial matter, Walmart failed to preserve any
objection to the court’s admission of the Tax Commission record.
At the outset of the closing argument hearing, the court engaged
in a discussion with the parties about the Tax Commission record
and, after some back-and-forth, Walmart’s counsel acknowledged
that the court was “at liberty to look at [the Tax Commission]
documents and do with them as it please[d].” By making this
admission, Walmart failed to preserve any objection to the court’s
decision to admit the Tax Commission record into the court’s file.

¶26 But even if we assume, for purposes of the discussion, that
Walmart had somehow preserved an evidentiary objection for our
review, that objection would have no legal basis. Utah law
specifies that, “[i]n any appeal to the district court” in this context,

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Walmart v Tax Commission

the Tax Commission “shall certify a record of its proceedings to
the district court.” Utah Code § 59-1-601(3)(a).

¶27 When presented with an issue of statutory interpretation,
“our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature.” Muddy Boys, Inc. v. Department of Com., 2019 UT App
33, ¶ 12, 440 P.3d 741 (cleaned up). “The best evidence of the
legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute itself.”
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d
863 (cleaned up). Indeed, when the “meaning of a statute can be
discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are
needed.” Id. ¶ 15 (cleaned up).

¶28 Here, the plain language of the statute is quite clear. Not
only is the district court authorized to view “a record of [the Tax
Commission’s] proceedings,” the Tax Commission is required to
certify a copy of that record to the district court whenever a trial
de novo is requested. See Utah Code § 59-1-601(3)(a).

¶29 Thus, in any trial de novo that is requested under the
relevant statute, a copy of the Tax Commission’s proceedings—
including its ultimate decision—must be certified to the district
court and made part of its record. In this case, then, the court did
not err by supplementing the record—even after the close of
evidence—and allowing the Tax Commission documents to be
made a part of that record.

B

¶30 Walmart’s wider-ranging objection goes to the use to which
the district court is allowed to put the Tax Commission’s decision
that is statutorily mandated to be placed in its file. As Walmart
sees it, the Tax Commission’s decision is a “nullity” and—
although part of the court’s file—is not to be considered by the
court during the substantive part of its valuation analysis.
Walmart asserts that it chose, and was entitled to, a “trial de novo”
in the district court, and it claims that the district court in this

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case—by considering and ultimately agreeing with the Tax
Commission’s valuation methodology—failed to afford Walmart
the type of “trial de novo” that it believes the statutory scheme
envisions. We find Walmart’s arguments unpersuasive, and we
conclude that the court committed no error in its handling and
consideration of the Tax Commission decision.

¶31 We begin our analysis by describing the appeal-like
options available to any litigant who is dissatisfied with a decision
rendered by the Tax Commission. Prior to 1993, a litigant in that
situation had only one option: seek judicial review of that agency
action directly in a Utah appellate court, where the court would
utilize “a substantial evidence standard of review”—which was
part of “the standard of review applied in traditional
administrative review cases”—and would “grant the [Tax]
Commission deference concerning its written findings of fact.” See
T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 28, ¶ 14, 254
P.3d 752 (cleaned up); accord Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm’n, 953 P.2d 435, 437–38 (Utah 1997). The
“substantial evidence” standard of review “is a deferential one:
. . . we do not reweigh the evidence and independently choose
which inferences we find to be the most reasonable.” C.R. England
Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2024 UT App 170, ¶ 26, 561 P.3d 213 (cleaned
up), cert. denied, Feb. 7, 2025 (No. 20241332). “Instead, we defer to
an administrative agency’s findings because when reasonably
conflicting views arise, it is the agency’s province to draw
inferences and resolve these conflicts.” Id. (cleaned up). And
“substantial evidence need not necessarily constitute a
preponderance of the evidence—our supreme court has made
clear that substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence though something less than the weight of the evidence.”
Id. (cleaned up). Because appellate courts are generally not in the
business of taking new evidence, judicial review proceedings filed
directly with an appellate court are conducted using the factual
record developed before the Tax Commission, and without the
opportunity for litigants to present or introduce new evidence

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that had not already been presented to the Tax Commission. This
option—direct review in the appellate courts—remains available
to litigants today: the governing statute allows litigants the
“option” of filing a “petition for judicial review . . . in the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals,” see Utah Code § 59-1-602(1)(a),
and if that option is selected, the reviewing court “shall . . . grant
the [Tax Commission] deference concerning its written findings
of fact,” id. § 59-1-610(1)(a).

¶32 More recently, however, our legislature has amended the
relevant statute to provide a second option to litigants dissatisfied
with a Tax Commission decision: a “trial de novo” in the district
court. 3 See id. §§ 59-1-601, -602(1)(a) (stating that litigants have the
“option” to file a “petition for judicial review in the district
court”); see also T-Mobile USA, 2011 UT 28, ¶ 15 (“[T]he Utah Code

3. The legislature first enacted the statute affording litigants the
“trial de novo” option in 1993. See Evans & Sutherland Computer
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 953 P.2d 435, 437–38 (Utah 1997).
But in 1997, our supreme court declared that enactment to be in
violation of a then-existing state constitutional provision that
granted to the Tax Commission—and not to the district courts—
the power to “administer and supervise the tax laws of the State”
and to “equalize the assessment and valuation of property within
the counties.” See id. at 441–43 (quoting Utah Const. art. XIII, § 11
(1997)). In 1998, however, “the Utah Constitution was amended to
provide the Legislature with authority to grant [district] courts
jurisdiction to ‘adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any
matter decided by” the Tax Commission “relating to revenue and
taxation.” See T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011
UT 28, ¶ 12, 254 P.3d 752 (quoting Utah Const. art. XIII, § 6, cl. 4
(1998)). Acting on this authority, our legislature “reinstated”—
effective January 1, 1999—the statutory provision that had
previously been declared unconstitutional. Id.; see also Utah Code
Ann. § 59-1-601 compiler’s notes (LexisNexis 2021). Thus, since at
least 1999, both statutory options have been available to litigants.

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now creates two potential avenues of review for a petitioner.”). In
this context, the term “trial de novo” is defined as “an original,
independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on
the record.” Utah Code § 59-1-601(2). As already noted, upon the
filing of any such petition for review in the district court, the Tax
Commission is required to “certify a record of its proceedings to
the district court.” Id. § 59-1-601(3)(a). After holding the “trial de
novo,” the district court is required to “render its decision in
writing,” and it “may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any
order of” the Tax Commission. Id. § 59-1-604.

¶33 In this case, Walmart (and, eventually, the County as well)
selected this second option: it filed a petition for judicial review in
the district court and requested a trial de novo. The district court
afforded the parties a trial that spanned eight days, including five
full days and two half days of evidentiary presentation. The
proceeding was not limited to evidence presented to the Tax
Commission; indeed, both Walmart and the County were allowed
to call live witnesses, including new ones who hadn’t testified
before the Tax Commission. And even the witnesses who had
testified before the Tax Commission were not limited to simply
presenting the same evidence and testimony they had presented
to the Tax Commission; to the contrary, both Cook and Jorgensen
offered testimony that differed in some respects from the
conclusions they had provided to the Tax Commission. Simply
put, the trial that the district court afforded these parties was not
at all limited to the administrative record; each party was afforded
every opportunity to present an entirely new case, supported by
new evidence and testimony.

¶34 Nevertheless, Walmart takes issue with one procedural
aspect of the trial—the district court’s consideration of the Tax
Commission’s ruling—and asserts that the court failed to provide
Walmart with the “trial de novo” to which it was statutorily
entitled. In essence, Walmart asserts that a “trial de novo,” as that
term is used in the relevant statute, means a trial in which the Tax

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Walmart v Tax Commission

Commission’s ruling—although part of the district court’s file—
is “completely disregarded” and not given any substantive
consideration. Our interpretation of the relevant statute is
different from Walmart’s.

¶35 That statute states that the “trial de novo” must be “an
original, independent proceeding” that is different from an appeal
limited to the administrative record. See id. § 59-1-601(2). As
noted, the district court did not limit itself to the evidence
submitted to the Tax Commission; instead, the court correctly
conducted “an original, independent proceeding” in which it
allowed the parties ample opportunity to present whatever
admissible evidence they wished to present, including new
evidence not presented to the Tax Commission.

¶36 The statute also contains two items of instruction regarding
the treatment that is to be afforded to the Tax Commission’s
ruling. First, as already discussed, that ruling (along with the rest
of the Tax Commission’s record) is required to be certified to the
district court. Id. § 59-1-601(3)(a). Thus, the Tax Commission’s
decision must become part of the record during the trial de novo
proceedings. Second, the court at the conclusion of the trial is
authorized to “affirm, reverse, modify, or remand” the Tax
Commission’s underlying order. Id. § 59-1-604. As we interpret
this language, it mandates at least some consideration of the Tax
Commission’s order; after all, one cannot “affirm” or “modify” an
order without first reviewing the order in question.

¶37 Interpreting this “plain statutory language,” our supreme
court stated that “the legislative intent” behind creation of the
“trial de novo” option “was for the [district] court to make a new
and independent assessment of property value without relying on
or deferring to previous [Tax] Commission assessments” and
“without restriction to the record before” the Tax Commission. See
T-Mobile USA, 2011 UT 28, ¶ 13; see also Evans & Sutherland, 953
P.2d at 441 (Utah 1997) (stating that the statute “directs the district

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court to decide the matter afresh”). In this trial, “no presumption
of correctness attaches to the [Tax] Commission’s assessment.” T-
Mobile USA, 2011 UT 28, ¶ 17. Instead, a litigant’s “only burden is
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that its proposed
valuation is more accurate than any other value.” Id.; see also Utah
Code § 59-1-604 (noting that the burden of proof, preponderance
of the evidence, falls on “the parties seeking affirmative relief”). 4

¶38 Here, the district court correctly understood and applied
the statutory standard. The court repeatedly emphasized, in both
comments from the bench during trial and in its written ruling,
that it was conducting a new and independent proceeding and
that it was not affording any deference to the Tax Commission’s
decision. It also emphasized that it was required to consider “the
evidence as a whole,” including new evidence presented during
the trial. And the court correctly stated that each party’s burden
of proof was simply “to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that its proposed valuation is more accurate than any other
value.” (Quoting T-Mobile USA, 2011 UT 28, ¶ 17.)

¶39 The district court also gave careful consideration to how it
could and should treat the Tax Commission’s ruling, which (as
already noted) was part of the record and something that Walmart
agreed the court could “look at” and “do with . . . as it please[d].”
In its written ruling, the court noted its statutory authority to
“affirm, reverse, modify, or remand” the Tax Commission order,
and it concluded that it could not simply “ignore the [Tax]
Commission decision” but, instead, had to “consider” that
decision in some form. And because that decision was part of the
record, the court concluded that it constituted “another value that

4. In this situation, because the Tax Commission was not “seeking
affirmative relief,” see Utah Code § 59-1-604, it bore no burden of
proof and was under no obligation to present evidence to the
district court. The parties who bore the burden, in this case, were
Walmart and the County.

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Walmart v Tax Commission

the court must consider when determining whether either party
has met its burden of showing that its proposed valuation is more
accurate than any other value.” Although the court was fully
aware that it could not afford any deference to the Tax
Commission’s ruling, it ultimately concluded that, after “taking
an independent view of the evidence before it,” including the Tax
Commission valuation, it could—if the evidence warranted it—
conclude “that the valuation determined by the [Tax]
Commission is more accurate than a valuation proposed by
another specific party.”

¶40 In our view, the district court got the procedural aspects of
this case exactly right. It afforded the parties an “original,
independent proceeding” in which they were not limited to
discussion of the evidence presented to the Tax Commission but,
instead, were afforded the opportunity to present new evidence.
See Utah Code § 59-1-601(2). The court correctly determined that
the Tax Commission’s ruling was part of its record, and it
correctly determined that it needed to take notice of, and consider,
that ruling so that it could determine whether to “affirm, reverse,
modify, or remand” that ruling. See id. §§ 59-1-601(3)(a), -604. But
the court was also aware that, in considering that ruling, it was
forbidden from affording it any deference, and that it needed to
make an independent valuation determination after considering
the entire record and all of the evidence presented. We discern no
error in the court’s procedural approach.

¶41 Walmart resists this conclusion by directing our attention
to language our supreme court used in the Evans & Sutherland
case, where the court stated that, once a litigant selects a trial de
novo in district court, “the [Tax] Commission’s prior decision
becomes a nullity.” 953 P.2d at 443. As Walmart sees it, the court’s
use of the word “nullity”—which word Walmart repeats some
thirty times in its briefing—means that the district court must
“completely disregard[]” the Tax Commission’s ruling. But we
don’t read Evans & Sutherland the same way Walmart does. In our

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Walmart v Tax Commission

view, our supreme court’s use of the word “nullity,” in context,
simply does not (and cannot) connote that the Tax Commission’s
ruling is to be completely disregarded in a trial de novo.

¶42 As an initial matter, the context in which our supreme
court used the word “nullity” was different from the context
presented here. In Evans & Sutherland, the court was considering
whether the statute allowing district courts to conduct judicial
review via trial de novo of Tax Commission decisions was
constitutional, given the Utah Constitution’s then-extant
provision granting to the Tax Commission—and not to the district
courts—the power to “administer and supervise the tax laws of
the State” and to “equalize the assessment and valuation of
property within the counties.” See id. at 441–43 (quoting Utah
Const. art. XIII, § 11 (1997)); see also supra note 3. In that context,
the court’s statement that the trial de novo process renders the Tax
Commission’s decision a “nullity” is best understood as simply
an indication that the challenged statute had improperly
transferred ultimate decision-making responsibility from the Tax
Commission to the district court. Indeed, in that same sentence
the court stated that the trial de novo process was constitutionally
problematic because “it effectively eliminates the [Tax]
Commission’s role” as the ultimate decision-maker in property
valuation disputes. Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 443. It is one
thing to say that the trial de novo process renders the Tax
Commission no longer the ultimate decision-maker (as the Utah
Constitution then required); it is another thing entirely to say that
the trial de novo process requires a district court to completely
disregard the Tax Commission’s decision and pretend that it
doesn’t exist. In context, we read Evans & Sutherland as
communicating the former concept, and not the latter.

¶43 Moreover, the statutory provisions identified by the
district court simply do not allow the district court to completely
disregard the Tax Commission decision. As noted, that decision—
along with the entire administrative record—is required to be

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Walmart v Tax Commission

certified and transmitted to the district court. See Utah Code § 59-
1-601(3)(a). And the district court must decide, at the conclusion
of the trial de novo, whether to “affirm, reverse, modify, or
remand” the Tax Commission’s decision, a choice that is
impossible to make without knowing the contents of the ruling.
See id. § 59-1-604. In a nod to these realities, Walmart even
conceded, on the morning of closing arguments, that the district
court was authorized to “look at” the Tax Commission’s decision
and “do with [that decision] as it please[d].”

¶44 Finally, the manner in which this particular trial unfolded
makes evident that—as a practical matter and almost by
definition—the Tax Commission’s decision is anything but a
nullity in district court trials de novo. Both parties’ main experts—
Cook and Jorgensen—offered testimony that was, at least in part,
responsive to the criticisms leveled against them in the Tax
Commission’s decision. And in examining Cook and Jorgensen,
both parties’ attorneys used the Tax Commission decision as a
basis for many of their questions, and the experts testified at some
length about how their current conclusions differed from the
conclusions they had offered at the Tax Commission. To be sure,
the Tax Commission itself—although present, through counsel,
during the entire trial—chose not to present any evidence, and no
expert witness offered an opinion that the Tax Commission’s
valuation figures were the best values for Walmart’s properties.
But given the way the trial unfolded, the Tax Commission’s ruling
was very much a part of the parties’ evidentiary presentations,
and the parties thus had ample opportunity to explore with the
experts the basis and reasons for the Tax Commission’s valuations
as well as the Tax Commission’s criticism of Cook’s and
Jorgensen’s conclusions.

¶45 In this situation, the district court did not err by
considering the Tax Commission’s valuation figures as part of the
matters presented and discussed in the case, and it did not err by
treating those valuation figures as another value to be considered

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Walmart v Tax Commission

when determining whether either party had met its burden of
showing that “its proposed valuation is more accurate than any
other value.” See T-Mobile USA, 2011 UT 28, ¶ 17. The situation
would, of course, be different if the district court had afforded
deference to those figures and had determined to affirm them
unless one party or the other could show that they had not been
supported by substantial evidence at the Tax Commission
hearing. But that is not what the court did here. The court engaged
in no appellate-style examination of the evidence presented at the
Tax Commission hearing, and it did not even purport to assess
whether the Tax Commission’s valuation figures had been
supported by evidence at the Tax Commission hearing. Instead,
the court correctly trained its evaluation on the evidence that had
been presented to it during the eight-day trial, and it pointedly
refused to afford any deference to the Tax Commission’s figures.
And based on its examination of all the evidence presented during
the trial, it made an independent determination, applying a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that the Tax
Commission’s figures best represented the fair market value of
the three properties. All of this was entirely proper.

¶46 Thus, the district court committed no procedural error in
the manner in which it conducted the trial and the manner in
which it considered the Tax Commission’s decision to be part of
the record. We therefore reject Walmart’s procedural arguments.

II. Fair Market Value

¶47 Next, we turn to Walmart’s substantive objection to the
district court’s valuation decision: it disagrees with the court’s
determination of the fair market value of its properties. Yet
Walmart readily acknowledges that it “has not challenged any of
the [district court’s] factual findings” regarding fair market value,
and it does not claim that any of those findings lack support in the

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Walmart v Tax Commission

evidentiary record. 5 Instead, it attempts to style its challenge as a
legal one rather than as a factual one, asserting that the district
court did not “apply the objective fair market value standard
required by Utah law.” We disagree with Walmart’s
characterization of its challenge, and we conclude that the district
court applied the proper legal standard in making its
unchallenged factual findings.

¶48 The Utah Constitution directs that “all tangible property in
the State . . . shall be (a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in
proportion to its fair market value, to be ascertained as provided
by law; and (b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate.” Utah Const.
art. XIII, § 2, cl. 1. And our legislature has defined “fair market
value,” in this context, as “the amount at which property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.” Utah Code § 59-2-
102(13)(a).

¶49 Walmart correctly points out that the “statutory definition
of ‘fair market value’ establishes an objective test,” which requires
the assessing entity to “estimate the fair market value of [the
relevant] property in the abstract, not the value of the property
from [the taxpayer’s] unique business perspective.” See Action TV
v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 1999 UT App

5. Indeed, the valuations at which the district court arrived were
well within the ranges discussed by the parties’ competing
experts and were therefore supported by the evidence. See Schmidt
v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 1999 UT 48, ¶ 9, 980 P.2d 690 (stating
that a reviewing tribunal “has the discretion to adopt a figure that
falls somewhere between polarized estimates” (cleaned up)); Olé
Mexican Foods Inc. v. J & W Distrib. LLC, 2024 UT App 67, ¶ 46, 549
P.3d 663 (“A factfinder generally has discretion to select any
figure within the range of numbers supported by the evidence.”),
cert. denied, 558 P.3d 88 (Utah 2024).

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Walmart v Tax Commission

231, ¶ 31, 986 P.2d 108. Building on the words “objective test,”
Walmart asserts that Utah’s statutory definition of “fair market
value” requires assessors (and district courts, on review) to focus
solely on a property’s “value in exchange,” and that it forbids
assessors from considering a property’s “value in use.” Indeed,
Walmart goes so far as to suggest that “the value-in-exchange
approach is the only approach that is consistent with Utah law.”
And Walmart asserts that the district court violated this principle
here by taking into account, as part of its “fair market value”
analysis, the use to which Walmart is currently putting the
properties and by ultimately concluding that the properties’
“highest and best use” was their current use.

¶50 But Walmart’s categorical approach misses the mark.
Assessment of fair market value is an inherently property-specific
exercise; indeed, our supreme court has stated that “[t]he proper
application of appraisal techniques depends upon varying factual
circumstances that defy generalization.” Beaver County v. Utah
State Tax Comm’n, 916 P.2d 344, 355 (Utah 1996); see also id.
(“Valuation is an art, not a science. It is a function of judgment,
not of natural law.” (cleaned up)); Board of Equalization of Salt Lake
County v. Utah State Tax Comm’n ex rel. Benchmark, Inc., 864 P.2d
882, 885 (Utah 1993) (“Despite these judicial and statutory
definitions, ‘market value’ remains a fluid standard.”). For this
reason, assessments of fair market value are deemed to involve
factual questions upon which assessors are afforded deference.
See T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2011 UT 28, ¶ 49 (“The choice of a valuation
methodology and the resulting fair market value are questions of
fact . . . .”); accord Schmidt v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 1999 UT 48,
¶ 6, 980 P.2d 690.

¶51 Indeed, Walmart acknowledges that Utah’s statutory
definition of “fair market value” sometimes allows assessors to
consider a property’s current use. For instance, when the property
at issue “is of a class not commonly bought and sold,” then “the
usual test” involving a hypothetical willing buyer and willing

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Walmart v Tax Commission

seller “breaks down,” and assessors may—in appropriate cases—
factor into their valuation analysis the property’s current use. See
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 250 P.2d 938, 940 (Utah
1952); see also Schmidt, 1999 UT 48, ¶¶ 5, 11–12 (affirming a
valuation assessment in which, due to the uniqueness of the
property, the assessor took into account the property’s “value-in-
use”). In such cases, taking a property’s current use into account
is not at odds with the traditional “fair market value” test; to the
contrary, it is part of what allows unique properties to be fairly
valued. See Kennecott Copper Corp., 250 P.2d at 940. Our supreme
court explained it this way:

While market value is always the ultimate test, it
occasionally happens that the property taken is of a
class not commonly bought and sold, [such] as a
church or a college or a cemetery or the fee of a
public street, or some other piece of property which
may have an actual value to the owner, but which
under ordinary conditions he would be unable to
sell for an amount even approximating its real
value. As market value presupposes a willing
buyer, the usual test breaks down in such a case, and
hence it is sometimes said that such property has no
market value. In one sense this is true; but it is
certain that for that reason it cannot be taken for
nothing. From the necessity of the case the value
must be arrived at from the opinions of well-
informed persons, based upon the purposes for
which the property is suitable. This is not taking the
“value in use” to the owner as contradistinguished from
the market value. What is done is merely to take into
consideration the purposes for which the property
is suitable as a means of ascertaining what
reasonable purchasers would in all probability be
willing to give for it, which in a general sense may
be said to be the market value.

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Walmart v Tax Commission

Id. (emphasis added) (cleaned up). The extent to which a property
falls into this category is a property-specific determination that is
ultimately a factual question, not a legal question. See Schmidt,
1999 UT 48, ¶¶ 5, 11.

¶52 In this case, the district court explained that properties fall
on something of a spectrum between—on the one hand—single-
family homes of a type that are commonly bought and sold and
for which the “housing market is relatively active and information
about sales of comparable houses is easy to gather,” and—on the
other hand—properties that “are so highly specialized and so
uniquely customized to a single purpose that it would be almost
impossible to find any buyer that would ever be ‘willing’ to
acquire the property for anything other than perhaps the value of
the underlying land.” The court stopped short of making a
specific finding that Walmart’s properties “are true special
purpose properties,” but it did find that Walmart’s properties are
“much closer to that end of the spectrum of real property
categories than to the other end of the spectrum that is best
exemplified by single family houses.” 6

¶53 All of this is an inherently factual exercise. And none of it
bespeaks a failure on the part of the district court to apply the

6. In its briefing, Walmart declares that the district court “found
that the Walmart properties are not special purpose properties.”
This is a mischaracterization of the record. While the court
stopped short of finding that the Walmart properties “are true
special purpose properties,” it certainly didn’t make the opposite
finding (that they are not special purpose properties). Stopping
short of making a positive finding is not necessarily the same
thing as making a negative finding. And as explained in the text,
the court carefully explained that—on the spectrum between
“true special purpose properties” and “single family houses”—
the Walmart properties were “much closer” to special purpose
properties.

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Walmart v Tax Commission

correct legal definition of “fair market value.” To the contrary, the
court specifically emphasized that it was applying the correct
statutory definition of “fair market value.” On this record, neither
the court’s consideration of the uniqueness of the Walmart
properties nor its finding that those properties’ highest and best
use was their current use was an indication that the court was
straying from the correct legal standard. In fact, the court’s
analysis involved a thorough effort to examine these unique
properties on their own terms and to arrive at a fair valuation of
parcels that are—as the length and volume of this litigation
attests—relatively difficult to value.

¶54 Accordingly, we reject Walmart’s substantive challenges to
the district court’s valuation analysis. The court applied the
correct legal standard, and its factual findings were supported by
the evidentiary record and do not contain clear error.

CONCLUSION

¶55 In conducting the eight-day trial, the district court did not
commit procedural error. It correctly admitted the Tax
Commission documents (including the Tax Commission’s ruling)
into the court record, and it did not err in the manner in which it
considered and took into account the valuation figures from the
Tax Commission’s ruling. Nor did the district court commit a
substantive error. It applied the correct definition of “fair market
value,” and it reached factual findings regarding valuation that
were supported by the evidentiary record.

¶56 Affirmed.

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